Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise?

This article analyses visions of the future articulated by proponents of ‘biotechnology for the poor’, those who claim that an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Specifically, we analyse how such ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents represent a future with or without transgenic crops. Such representations include visions of a beckoning (promising) future, where much is to be gained from an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture, and an onrushing (threatening) future, where much will be lost if the technology is not embraced. The article shows that claims about a beckoning or onrushing future by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents are based upon unexamined or problematic assumptions about the poor and poverty. As such, poverty becomes merely a moral backdrop against which visions of a future are articulated. Furthermore, ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not engage in dialogue with alternative voices in articulating their perspectives on the future, losing a key opportunity to democratize debate about this crucial issue. We conclude by considering the policy consequences (in regulatory and institutional terms) of ‘biotechnology for the poor’ depictions of the future, particularly for the global South where such consequences will be felt.     

Futures sustainability

This article presents a strategic framework to guide public policy with respect to very long-term futures. The framework is based upon three fundamental principles. Threats to meeting the principles are assessed. Integrated planning responses to overcoming the threats are proposed. Significant changes in economic, political and social theory and organization required to support the strategic responses are discussed. It is argued that human civilization would need to pass through the mythic ‘singularity’ on the path to futures sustainability.     

The vision phenomenon: Towards a theoretical underpinning of visions of the future and the process of envisioning

Visions of the future and the method of envisioning are common approaches for making claims about and for the future. On the one hand, we can have our own vision, and we also expect certain people (mostly leaders) to have vision. On the other hand, most futures practitioners confirm that a (shared) vision is needed for successful action, and the active development of vision is therefore to be encouraged. However, theory development has been limited and many authors do not go beyond the confirmation that it is important to have or develop (a) vision, mostly in relation to a specific desire for action. Vision appears to be much more a phenomenon (in its original sense as ‘appearance’) than a theory. Hence, what we should expect from a vision theory is a deeper understanding of what vision is, what the added value of the process of visioning could be, and how we have to appreciate and assess (explicit) vision statements. In this contribution, we propose a basic theoretical framework in order to move towards the underpinning of ‘visionary’ approaches.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

The future of bioregional planning in the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere region

This paper assesses the current status and future prospects for bioregional planning in the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere (SAMAB) region in the United States. The SAMAB region is one of the most biodiverse temperate regions in the world. The region's environment is threatened by development, air and water pollution, and invasive species. Numerous institutions in the region have some responsibility for protecting the region's environment, including the National Park Service, the US Forest Service, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, several states, hundreds of municipalities, and numerous active non-profit organizations. Twenty-seven people associated with bioregional planning were interviewed to gauge their opinions on the state of bioregional planning in the SAMAB region. Overall, the respondents do not believe that the totality of all those efforts comprises bioregional planning because the efforts are limited in scale and scope and somewhat uncoordinated. With respect to the future of the region, the respondents found it difficult to imagine the state of the region 50 and especially 200 years into the future. Additionally, almost all of their definitions of bioregional planning included a spatial dimension but none included a time dimension. Thus, one of our conclusions is that the future of bioregional planning in the region will be hampered by difficulties people responsible for environmental protection have in dealing with ‘the future’. Much effort needs to be expended to inculcate people in the region with the desire to anticipate problems long before they occur. Reactive responses, which characterize the majority of current efforts, are likely to be ‘too little, too late’.     

Do managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts?: Evidence from Australia

This paper examines whether managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous Australian studies on benchmark-beating have focused on loss avoidance and small earnings increases as benchmarks [Coulton, J., Taylor, S., & Taylor, S. (2005). Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management? Accounting and Finance, 45, 553-576; Holland, D., & Ramsay, A. (2003). Do Australian companies manage earnings to meet simple earnings benchmarks? Accounting and Finance, 43, 41-62]. This paper extends this earlier research on benchmark-beating in Australia by incorporating analyst forecast as an important benchmark. Using three different models of unexpected accruals as proxies for earnings management, this study did not find any significant difference between the mean and median unexpected accruals of the “‘just meet or beat” group as against the “just miss” group. Furthermore, for a long period of time (1997-2002), the proportion of Australian firms ‘just meeting or beating’ analyst forecasts benchmark increased, although such increase was not statistically significant.     

Social predictions, institutional design and prestige loops: Richard Henshel’s contribution to futures studies

The article is both a contribution to the intellectual history of the field and a reminder that future studies have always been concerned not only with the epistemics and the cognitive procedures regarding the future but also with the impact of ideas on the very unfolding of the future. Cases when social predictions, by the mere fact of being made public, change the situations they have predicted, are an important challenge for social theory and institutional design. Richard Henshel dedicated an important part of his work to their study. The paper starts by mapping the conceptual contours of the problem. Then it outlines the ways in which various authors have dealt with its challenge, thereby putting the distinctiveness of Henshel’s unique contribution in a clearer perspective. The paper continues by presenting Henshel’s main arguments as they were developed around the key concept of ‘prestige loop’ as well as some of the implications of the fact that social predictions and ‘prestige loops’ not only challenge the way we understand the relationship between social theory and its practical applications, but also the ways we understand the very nature of applied social science and its relationship with futures studies.     

The dystopia of technoscience: An ecofeminist critique of postmodern reason

This essay addresses postmodern feminist statements on ‘women’ and ‘nature’, as expressed in the influential work of US theorist Donna Haraway and some of her European followers like Braidotti, Bryld and Lykke. It makes a critical reading of epistemological postures adopted by these postmoderns, revealing a number of internal incoherencies. And it finds their substantive analyses as unhelpful to radical political action in the here and now, as it is to utopian prefiguration of a just and sustainable future. The author argues from the perspective of an ‘embodied materialist ecofeminism’ and makes two claims. First, the postmodern preoccupation with methodologies of discourse analysis becomes counterproductive by deflecting attention from activism. Secondly, Haraway's quasi-celebration of capitalist patriarchal technoscience with it iconic cyborg, presents a dystopia that confuses the political focus of feminists, just as an aggressive neoliberal form of globalisation colonises and consumes the support systems of all life on earth.     

Exploring client scenarios associated with scenario planning

All scenario planning projects have a ‘client’ and one of the most challenging tasks facing a scenario planner is the client's role or position in the way projects are conceptualized, delivered and received. The scenario planner has to establish and manage a ‘successful client relationship’—but what actually constitutes that for a scenario planning project?The client acts as the conduit between the scenario planner and the organization for which the scenario planning project is being undertaken.The ‘client as conduit’ implies several challenges for the scenario planner including:

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The client's awareness and understanding of scenario planning as a method for their organization to learn from the future [1].

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The client's level of commitment to learning from the future.

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The size and context of the scenario planning project.

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The position of the client within a network of people and/or resources required to run a scenario planning project.

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The client's involvement or position within the scenario building team created in the project.

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The benefits and risks accruing to the client through the execution of the scenario planning project.

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The client organization's capacity to act strategically; its power to perform.

This paper will explore, through storytelling, different pictures of client relationships associated with scenario planning. The stories are developed from a deep and extensive well of scenario practitioner and consulting experience over the last 15 years to explore and discuss these client issues, and how clients for scenario planning projects have evolved, and how they may enhance or restrict scenario planning projects in the future.     

Futurists and their schools: A response to Ziauddin Sardar's ‘the namesake’

A ‘futurist’ is the generic term for someone seriously engaged in the consideration of future conditions. ‘Futures research’ has a systems science orientation with a planning horizon in excess of 10 years. ‘Futures studies’ has a social science connotation and ‘foresight’ is the most popular term within the management science and corporate sectors. Five schools of futures researchers are defined: 1. Environmental and geosciences. 2. Infrastructure systems and engineering technology. 3. Social, political and economic science. 4. Human life, mind and information science. 5. Business and management science. The academic route to a futures qualification is outlined with a list of futures orientated organisations. The inclusion of urbanisation in the next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment, would involve replacing the notion of economic equilibrium by the concept of far-from-equilibrium stability. Finally futures research is described as an evolutionary science, which will possibly become integrated within complexity science by 2050.     

Systems approaches to economic development for indigenous people: a case study of the Noongar Aboriginals of Australia

This paper illustrates a case study in the application of systems approaches to securing economic development for a specific group of indigenous people in Australia. The case study combines Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) with Effects-Based Operations (EBO) planning to realise more purposeful actions and endeavours in pursuit of economic development. The approach is a hybrid of Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), Rhyne’s FAR and an advancement of the EBO process emerging from within national security domains. The paper focuses primarily on the use of FAR as a means of understanding an economic development problem space within a present and future orientation, with minor reference to EBO planning as a method of bringing about purposeful change within a combined solution and design space. The paper seeks to demonstrate the utility of ‘soft’ approaches, such as FAR, in the exploration of economic undevelopment and how more purposeful corrective actions can result if they are harnessed to a deepened understanding of the problem space.     

Problematizing international business futures through a ‘critical scenario method’

This paper proposes the need for change in how managers in international business (IB) determine organisational objectives and what criteria they use in addressing complex problems. We propose a move from a largely firm-centric focus; on profit maximization and shareholder value; to a broader societal and environmental view. We see the educational context as the locus for initiating such a shift. However, we see obstacles within the canon of mainstream IB textbooks, with their focus on exposition of normative models of managerial action, illustrated by case studies of successful multinational enterprises (MNEs). Whilst we acknowledge their incorporation of critical issues, we view the lack of substantive critical reflection on the wider implications of IB activity as underpinned by an implicit assumption of the ‘good’ of IB. We posit that the normative structure of mainstream texts militates against students understanding the full range of possible futures for IB practice, and against developing the capability to cope with situations of uncertainty and ambiguity. Seeking to promote a critical pedagogy that accommodates consideration of both mainstream approaches and critical responses to these, we propose one approach to teaching and learning about IB futures that is based upon development of what we term ‘critical scenario method’. This offers a basis for active investigation of complex problems in the ‘real’ world from a range of perspectives, beyond that of profit maximization. We provide a worked, case example of our new method and demonstrate how it will enhance perceptions/understandings of involved and affected actors’ interests and their likely (re)actions as a particular scenario unfolds. The theoretical grounding for this approach is based upon contemporary social science interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis, or ‘practical wisdom’.     

What future for Middle Eastern studies?

Middle Eastern Studies (MES) has increasingly come under attack in recent years. The critics have included the more politically oriented (as with Martin Kramer who reproached Middle Eastern scholars for failing to serve US interests) as well as generalists in various social science disciplines (who have criticised MES for having produced ‘theory-free’ work thereby failing to serve the cause of building cumulative social scientific knowledge). Middle Eastern scholars have responded to such criticism by seeking to point to various contributions MES has made over the years. These debates between Middle Eastern scholars and their critics have revealed three alternative future courses for MES: (1) going back to its roots in ‘Oriental Studies’ (as called for by Martin Kramer in Ivory Towers on Sand); (2) establishing itself firmly in the discipline-oriented social sciences (as called for by the avatars of methodology in the Social Sciences); (3) building upon the pioneering works of those Middle Eastern scholars who have sought to theorise from Middle Eastern experiences thereby contributing both to MES and the disciplines. Pointing to how the sides to these debates differ radically in terms of their understanding of ‘theory’, the article will suggest that the future of MES would be shaped depending upon which understanding of ‘theory’ comes to prevail.     

How futuring bush mechanics seek to transform the world

In today's complex and turbulent world it is vital to have futurists who can collaborate on collective projects, focus on action codified in exemplar projects and validate actions towards a better world. Unfortunately, current ‘education’ systems focus almost exclusively on the individual learner and have separated the learner from the praxis of the lived life. Furthermore, classrooms separate the learner from design, production and integration of learning into community life. The author argues that overcoming this separation of thinking and doing is one of the key challenges for modernity in future, in particular.This paper argues that a way in which we may be able to meet this challenge is known by the term ‘bush mechanics’ in Australia—innovative individuals who look forward wisely and solve collective problems today through applying their ingenuity with what is available, thus integrating thinking, doing and being in what in ancient times was called poiesis and in Medieval times ‘artificing’ and today can be seen in action learning and the bush mechanic. The four principles, as well as examples, of the bush mechanic approach are discussed including their exemplar projects. Finally, the importance of the bush mechanic approach to ‘futuring’ and creating living breathing examples today of a future our children can live with is emphasised and collaboration sought.     

Can internally generated futures accelerate organizational learning?

After many years of scenario planning, this paper takes a moment to reflect on its use within, and value to, organizations. The author states that ultimately the benefit of scenario planning must result from ‘changed and more skilful action by the organization within its business environment.’ Navigating through the business environment is discussed as taking on two forms, that of strategising and learning where the former is dominated by ‘knowing by gaining control’ and the latter by ‘knowing by participation’ and reflection. Taking this logic a step further, van der Heijden sees the purpose of scenario planning as being categorisable along two dimensions content/process and thinking/action producing a matrix of four categories of purpose. Although he sees these four reasons for using scenario planning as harbouring different degrees of difficulty and likelihood of success, he advocates above all that organizations think carefully about which category is appropriate for them and ensure that the process of scenario planning is designed to support this goal.     

Cities of the imagination: Science fiction, urban space, and community engagement in urban planning

Stories, dreams, histories and myths, Michel de Certeau argues, connect people to particular places and makes place concrete and inhabitable. These narratives generate an imaginary, poetic geography that haunts the abstract city of street maps and development plans, and makes it socially meaningful. This paper is concerned with one particular kind of story-telling - science fiction - and its relationship with the city, urban planning, and questions of community engagement. The paper argues that the ‘cities of the imagination’ generated by science fiction and other forms of narrative provide a powerful means of understanding, communicating and enriching the connections to place in urban communities. Moreover, science fiction is often characterised by its ability to explore the future of cities. This gives the genre a fascinating and potentially useful resonance with urban planning as a discourse and set of practices; and, in particular, strategies for engaging communities in the design process and, thus, designing for future social sustainability. These ideas will be tested through a reading of near-future urban spatiality in the cyberpunk stories of William Gibson. The theorisation of the relationship between urban space and narrative in the work of de Certeau and other theorists will be used to help frame this discussion.     

Participation in environmental spatial planning: Structuring-scenario to manage knowledge in action

Participatory planning experiences highlight the crucial role of cognitions produced, shared and used throughout participatory processes. The construction of spatial plans is more and more intended as a socio/political activity producing highly cognitive visions able to guide collective action and make a common good of it.In accordance with the view that a relevant portion of such knowledge is revealed only through action, the paper proposes the idea of structuring-scenarios as open entities able to structure action and, consequently, to bridge participatory knowledge to the impetuous practice of action.The paper first presents and discusses the role of structuring-scenarios in the work carried out while developing an environmental plan for the delta area of the Po River in Italy. Then it reflects on the main features of content and structure of such scenarios. Finally, the paper analyses the ‘structuring properties’ of these scenarios and their role in structuring action.     

‘Exploratory landscape scenarios’ in the formulation of ‘landscape quality objectives’

The European Landscape Convention (ELC) calls for the definition of ‘landscape quality objectives’ (LQO) as “the formulation by the competent public authorities of the aspirations of the public with regard to the landscape features of their surroundings”. However, it is not yet defined how the integration of the visions of the public should be carried out. Notably in regions with poor participatory culture and in rural landscapes abandoned by people and consequently by their activities, dealing with the future does not seem a straightforward task. In these marginal rural landscapes the role of agriculture is being altered under the influence of the new rationale of the Common Agriculture Policy, so it may have to assume different functions in the future. Thus, this paper aims at showing how the development of ‘exploratory landscape scenarios’ can be a useful tool, firstly to find plausible landscape futures, and secondly to trigger discussions with the public regarding their aspirations for their landscape. The development procedure for ‘exploratory landscape scenarios’ builds on the ‘intuitive logics’ approach that focuses on the production of a variety of scenarios as starting point for discussion about the future rather than on finding an optimal one, which can limit the options unnecessarily from the beginning. The methodological approach is illustrated at a local scale by using the case study of Mértola in southeast Portugal. The results of the scenario exercise point out the adequateness of the methodology in the development of futures that are perceived as plausible by local stakeholders and, thereby, able to bring out their desires and threats towards the future of their landscape.     

Municipal visions: Reflexive futures between paradigm and practice

How does the reflexive knowledge we develop about institutions and environments influence the expectations we might have about the future? The paper addresses this question in the context of Foresight in local governance. It describes a project aiming at creating visions for a Norwegian municipality by inviting schoolchildren to contribute with their ideas of the future. The focus is on how the interactions between project owners and participants produced certain forms of resistance and led to visions best described as idealistic conformism. Introducing the idea of ‘reflexive futures’, I suggest that that a broader understanding of reflexivity as containing both enabling and constraining features can help to unlock certain paradoxes of current Foresight and provide a renewed inquiry into the practise of visioning for strategy and long-term planning.     

Cognitive representations of the future: Survey results

This paper reports the results of a web-based survey concerning how people think about the future. Five hundred and seventy-two people from 24 countries completed the survey. The results indicate that when the respondents hear the word ‘future’, they think about a point in time 15 years into the future, on average, with a median response of 10 years. Respondents think less about the future than the present. On the other hand, they tend to worry more about the future than the present. Respondents’ ability to imagine the future goes ‘dark’ around 15-20 years into the future. Most of the respondents are optimistic about the near term, but become more pessimistic about the longer term. Respondents believe that humankind is not acting very responsibly with respect to a whole host of environmental and social issues but is acting responsibly with respect to technology. Almost half of the respondents would not wish to have been born in the future. Most of the other respondents would have preferred to have been born 50-500 years into the future. Approximately 45% of the sample believes that humankind will become extinct. The data suggest that Christians are more optimistic and less worried about the future and do not believe that we will become extinct. Males worry less but also think more about the future. There is a strong correlation between thinking about the future, clearly imagining the future, and being optimistic about the future. It is concluded that individuals have diverse and rich conceptions about the future but that they think less about the future than futurists might hope. Individuals’ considerations of the future are highly influenced by their identities and worldviews. Future research should focus on better unraveling these relationships and on understanding their implications for futures-oriented policy making.