Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?

Participants in defined contribution (DC) retirement plans rarely adjust their portfolio allocations, suggesting that their investment choices and consequent money flows are sticky and not discerning. However, participants’ inertia could be offset by DC plan sponsors, who adjust the plan's investment options. We examine these countervailing influences on flows into U.S. mutual funds. We find that flows into funds from DC assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity than non‐DC flows, primarily due to adjustments to the investment options by the plan sponsors. Thus, DC retirement money is less sticky and more discerning than non‐DC money.     

Management of Portfolio Depletion Risk through Optimal Life Cycle Asset Allocation

Members of defined contribution (DC) pension plans must take on additional responsibilities for their investments, compared to participants in defined benefit (DB) pension plans. The transition from DB to DC plans means that more employees are faced with these responsibilities. We explore the extent to which DC plan members can follow financial strategies that have a high chance of resulting in a retirement scenario that is fairly close to that provided by DB plans. Retirees in DC plans typically must fund spending from accumulated savings. This leads to the risk of depleting these savings, that is, portfolio depletion risk. We analyze the management of this risk through life cycle optimal dynamic asset allocation, including the accumulation and decumulation phases. We pose the asset allocation strategy as an optimal stochastic control problem. Several objective functions are tested and compared. We focus on the risk of portfolio depletion at the terminal date, using such measures as conditional value at risk (CVAR) and probability of ruin. A secondary consideration is the median terminal portfolio value. The control problem is solved using a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman formulation, based on a parametric model of the financial market. Monte Carlo simulations that use the optimal controls are presented to evaluate the performance metrics. These simulations are based on both the parametric model and bootstrap resampling of 91 years of historical data. The resampling tests suggest that target-based approaches that seek to establish a safety margin of wealth at the end of the decumulation period appear to be superior to strategies that directly attempt to minimize risk measures such as the probability of portfolio depletion or CVAR. The target-based approaches result in a reasonably close approximation to the retirement spending available in a DB plan. There is a small risk of depleting the retiree’s funds, but there is also a good chance of accumulating a buffer that can be used to manage unplanned longevity risk or left as a bequest.     

Myopic loss aversion,reference point,and money illusion

We use the portfolio selection model presented in He and Zhou [Manage. Sci., 2011, 57, 315–331] and the NYSE equity and US treasury bond returns for the period 1926–1990 to revisit Benartzi and Thaler’s myopic loss aversion theory. Through an extensive empirical study, we find that in addition to the agent’s loss aversion and evaluation period, his reference point also has a significant effect on optimal asset allocation. We demonstrate that the agent’s optimal allocation to equities is consistent with market observation when he has reasonable values of degree of loss aversion, evaluation period and reference point. We also find that the optimal allocation to equities is sensitive to these parameters. We then examine the implications of money illusion for asset allocation. Finally, we extend the model to a dynamic setting.     

Stock‐bond return co‐movement and accounting information

I examine how an important attribute of financial reporting quality, i.e., accounting conservatism, affects the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to changes in the value of equity (i.e., the hedge ratio). The correlation between stock and bond returns (co‐movement) is a fundamental input for asset allocation decisions as it determines the diversification benefits of bonds relative to equities within an investment portfolio. According to structural models of credit risk, co‐movement should be generally positive, but lower when the risk of wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders is severe. I find that firms that report conservative earnings and use covenants in their bond contracts exhibit on average stronger co‐movement. This result is consistent with conservatism providing bondholders with a credible and contractible signal that improves monitoring, thus preventing wealth transfers.     

Jump robust two time scale covariance estimation and realized volatility budgets

We estimate the daily integrated variance and covariance of stock returns using high-frequency data in the presence of jumps, market microstructure noise and non-synchronous trading. For this we propose jump robust two time scale (co)variance estimators and verify their reduced bias and mean square error in simulation studies. We use these estimators to construct the ex-post portfolio realized volatility (RV) budget, determining each portfolio component’s contribution to the RV of the portfolio return. These RV budgets provide insight into the risk concentration of a portfolio. Furthermore, the RV budgets can be directly used in a portfolio strategy, called the equal-risk-contribution allocation strategy. This yields both a higher average return and lower standard deviation out-of-sample than the equal-weight portfolio for the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the period October 2007–May 2009.     

Privatisation and worker buy‐outs

With a few honourable exceptions, worker co‐operatives in this country do not have a large following or a particularly impressive track record. The first public sector enterprise to sell out to its workers ‐ the former National Freight Company, now the National Freight Consortium ‐gave a much‐needed fillip to the whole concept; so did the 1983 Finance Act. And if the Government's privatisation plans don't come unstuck, the opportunities for other worker buy‐outs are immense.     

Internal promotion competitions in firms

Using a sample of skilled workers from a cross section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the United States, I present evidence suggesting that promotions are determined by relative worker performance. I then estimate a structural model of promotion tournaments (treating as endogenous promotions, worker performance, and the wage spread from promotion) that simultaneously accounts for worker and firm behavior and how the interaction of these behaviors gives rise to promotions. The results are consistent with the predictions of tournament theory that employers set wage spreads to induce optimal performance levels, and that workers are motivated by larger spreads.     

基于股票期权的核心知识员工多重激励组合模型

核心知识型员工与一般知识员工相比,其鲜明的个性和工作特征决定了他们的需求为混合交替式需求模式.通过引入股票期权变量构建核心知识员工的多重激励组合模型,旨在将给予核心知识员工的货币性薪酬和股票期权联系起来,以探讨基于股票期权的多重激励组合所诱发的公司委托人与核心知识员工的行为选择特征.     

Valuation, optimal asset allocation and retirement incentives of pension plans

We provide a framework in which we link the valuation and assetallocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetimemarginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pensionplan formula. In turn, we examine the retirement policies thatare implied by the primitives of the model and the value ofpension obligations. Our model provides an explicit valuationformula for a stylized defined benefits plan. The optimal assetallocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio independentof the pension liabilities. We show that the worker with retirewhen the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reachesa critical value which depends on the parameters of the pensionplan and the discount rate. Using numerical techniques we analyzethe feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuationof plans and on the asset allocation decisions.     

Corporate Governance and Labor Relations*

This article begins with the premise that since the corporation involves a symbiotic relationship between labor and capital, a single‐minded focus on shareholder value is likely to be shortsighted, and some degree of employee influence on corporate governance has the potential to increase an organization's efficiency and value. But the set of findings and implications that emerge from the author's analysis is a complicated one. On the one hand, “moderate” levels of employee ownership (for example, the 6% ownership of the average American ESOP) are associated with increases in corporate productivity and values as well as worker morale and productivity. On the other hand, majority employee ownership and corporate ownership and governance systems like “co‐determination” that give labor a major say on governance issues often lead to worker‐management alliances that end up hurting the firm's investors—and, in the longer run, the workers themselves— by reducing competitiveness. The author ends with a call for a balanced governance system that, while aiming to maximize the total value of the enterprise, seeks to encourage the participation and emotional allegiance of workers—and indeed all important corporate stakeholders.     

周炜 做VC需慢工出细活儿

对于KPCB的合伙人周炜来说,选择做VC的生活,注定不轻松。不过,虽然过程经常与风险与困难相伴,但收获同样颇多。     

Endogenous Life‐Cycle Housing Investment and Portfolio Allocation

This paper develops a life‐cycle portfolio allocation model to address the effects of housing investment on the portfolio allocation of households. The model employs a comprehensive housing investment structure, Epstein–Zin recursive preferences, and a stock market entry cost. Furthermore, rather than resorting to calibration we estimate the value of the relative risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The model shows that housing investment has a strong crowding out effect on investment in risky assets throughout the life‐cycle. We further find that the effect of the presence of housing investment on households portfolio allocation is larger than the effect of having EZ recursive preferences.     

Idiosyncratic Volatility Covariance and Expected Stock Returns

Given that the idiosyncratic volatility (IDVOL) of individual stocks co‐varies, we develop a model to determine how aggregate idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) may affect the volatility of a portfolio with a finite number of stocks. In portfolio and cross‐sectional tests, we find that stocks whose returns are more correlated with AIV innovations have lower returns than those that are less correlated with AIV innovations. These results are robust to controlling for the stock's own IDVOL and market volatility. We conclude that risk‐averse investors pay a premium for stocks that pay well when AIV is high, consistent with our model.     

On the Asset Allocation of a Default Pension Fund

We characterize the optimal default fund in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. Using detailed data on individuals' holdings inside and outside the pension system, we find substantial heterogeneity within and between passive and active investors in terms of labor income, financial wealth, and stock market participation. We build a life‐cycle consumption‐savings model, with a DC pension account and an opt‐out/default choice, that produces realistic investor heterogeneity. Relative to a common age‐based allocation, implementing the optimal default asset allocation implies a welfare gain of 1.5% during retirement. Much of the gain is attainable with a simple rule of thumb.     

The Impact of DC Pension Systems on Population Dynamics

Abstract

This study investigates the risk inherent in defined contribution (DC) pension plans on an individual and aggregate basis, based on U.S. data. Our aim is to gain insight into the consequences of a DC pension scheme becoming the predominant pillar of retirement income for an entire society. Using the stochastic simulated output of a DC flexible age-of-retirement model, we first determine the optimal investment strategies. We then examine the demographic retirement dynamics of an entire population of DC pension plan participants.

We observe that even for the most risk-averse plan members there is a high level of uncertainty in an individual’s age at retirement. At the aggregate population level, we find that this uncertainty does not get dampened to any great extent by a diversification effect. Instead, the central role played by the market in determining retirement dates results in significant variation in the dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to workers) over time. In addition, an attempt to ameliorate the outcome by introducing additional realistic features in the DC population modeling did little to dampen this volatility, which suggests that countries dominated by DC schemes of this type may, over time, be exposed to significant risk in the size of its labor force.     

The 4% strategy revisited: a pre-commitment mean-variance optimal approach to wealth management

In contrast to single-period mean-variance (MV) portfolio allocation, multi-period MV optimal portfolio allocation can be modified slightly to be effectively a down-side risk measure. With this in mind, we consider multi-period MV optimal portfolio allocation in the presence of periodic withdrawals. The investment portfolio can be allocated between a risk-free investment and a risky asset, the price of which is assumed to follow a jump diffusion process. We consider two wealth management applications: optimal de-accumulation rates for a defined contribution pension plan and sustainable withdrawal rates for an endowment. Several numerical illustrations are provided, with some interesting implications. In the pension de-accumulation context, Bengen (1994)’s [J. Financial Planning, 1994, 7, 171–180], historical analysis indicated that a retiree could safely withdraw 4% of her initial retirement savings annually (in real terms), provided that her portfolio maintained an even balance between diversified equities and U.S. Treasury bonds. Our analysis does support 4% as a sustainable withdrawal rate in the pension de-accumulation context (and a somewhat lower rate for an endowment), but only if the investor follows an MV optimal portfolio allocation, not a fixed proportion strategy. Compared with a constant proportion strategy, the MV optimal policy achieves the same expected wealth at the end of the investment horizon, while significantly reducing the standard deviation of wealth and the probability of shortfall. We also explore the effects of suppressing jumps so as to have a pure diffusion process, but assuming a correspondingly larger volatility for the latter process. Surprisingly, it turns out that the MV optimal strategy is more effective when there are large downward jumps compared to having a high volatility diffusion process. Finally, tests based on historical data demonstrate that the MV optimal policy is quite robust to uncertainty about parameter estimates.     

Transfer of information by an informed trader

This paper analyzes the effect of the transfer of information by an informed strategic trader (owner) to another strategic player (buyer). It shows that while the owner will never fully divulge his information, he may transfer a noisy signal of his information to the buyer. With such a transfer, the owner loses some of his informational superiority and yet increases his trading profit. I also show that if the transfer can be made to more than one buyer, then, the owner’s profit is increasing in the number of other buyers to whom the transfer is made.     

Portfolio implications of systemic crises

Systemic crises can have grave consequences for investors in international equity markets, because they cause the risk-return trade-off to deteriorate severely for a longer period. We propose a novel approach to include the possibility of systemic crises in asset allocation decisions. By combining regime switching models with Merton [Merton, R.C., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The continuous time case. Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 247–257]-style portfolio construction, our approach captures persistence of crises much better than existing models. Our analysis shows that incorporating systemic crises greatly affects asset allocation decisions, while the costs of ignoring them is substantial. For an expected utility maximizing US investor, who can invest globally these costs range from 1.13% per year of his initial wealth when he has no prior information on the likelihood of a crisis, to over 3% per month if a crisis occurs with almost certainty. If a crisis is taken into account, the investor allocates less to risky assets, and particularly less to the crisis prone emerging markets.     

Venture capitalists and portfolio companies’ real activities manipulation

I study the relation between venture capitalists’ (VCs) presence and real activities manipulation (RM). I find that compared to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. This is consistent with the argument that VCs do not inflate earnings when they exit the IPO firm but instead exercise a monitoring role to reduce the RM by other insiders. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies’ RM decreases dramatically. This suggests that the impact of VCs on portfolio companies is mainly through direct monitoring rather than through the establishment of a governance structure. A partitioned sample analysis indicates that VCs lapse their control and do not restrain RM during the Internet Bubble. VCs also tighten their control and reduce significantly RM in technology companies where managers engage in more aggressive RM, but they have no influence on RM in non-tech companies. Furthermore, using alternative VCs’ reputation proxies, I find that portfolio companies’ RM is negatively associated with VCs’ reputation.