德累斯顿银行：全方位演绎“客户至上”

“一站式客户经理负责制”下,每个客户都只配备一个客户经理全权负责业务。客户经理不仅要做好客户的拓展、管理与维护,而且要为客户提供包括战略规划、市场研判、投资专家、理财顾问、业务操作等一系列的综合金融服务。     

直投保荐模式是否加剧了利益冲突?

证券公司直接投资业务从试点以来一直争议不断,市场广泛担心该业务中的直投保荐模式可能加剧承销商与一级市场投资者之间的利益冲突。为揭开事实真相,本文对A股市场数据进行了实证检验,发现直投保荐模式并未显著加剧利益冲突,有力地澄清了市场各方对直投保荐模式的质疑。此研究不仅表明我国监管层的监管和证券公司内部防火墙制度有效规制了直投保荐模式中的利益冲突,也为监管部门发展证券公司直接投资业务提供了新的决策参考。     

对公理财：机构金融业务新蓝海

一、我国商业银行理财业务发展现状 理财业务又称财富管理业务,广义来说,商业银行的理财业务包括理财顾问服务与理财产品业务。目前,在发达国家,以理财顾问服务为主的商业银行理财服务发展较为成熟,已经成为其利润的重要来源,商业银行可以利用掌握的客户信息与金融产品,深入分析客户财务状况,     

个人理财向专家模式转变

国际化资产管理是当今理财业务发展的趋势，它是一项商业银行借助自身的专业优势，为客户理财的行为。从外延上来定义，资产管理业务包括传统意义上的个人理财业务、高端客户财富管理业务、企业客户资产管理、企业客户负债管理业务，还包括现金管理计划、风险规避方案等投资顾问咨询服务。而高技术含量的国际化资产管理未来会成为银行开发理财市场的重点。     

中资银行发展理财业务应重视的三大关键性问题

本文所指的银行理财业务,是指商业银行为个人客户提供的财务分析、投资顾问等专业化服务,以及商业银行以特定目标客户或客户群为对象,推介销售投资产品、理财计划,并代理客户进行投资操作或资产管理的业务活动,不包括对企业的理财。近年来,中资银行在应对我国入世带来的挑战中,     

互联网金融时代证券投资顾问业务的困境与突破

越来越激烈的佣金价格战使券商的经纪业务陷入困境,单一通道收入模式受到前所未有的严峻挑战。投资顾问业务能增加客户忠诚度、信任度,提高客户签约率和收入贡献率,从而改善盈利模式,培养券商的经营特色和核心竞争力。但展业环境恶化、人才建设滞后以及收费模式等因素制约了投资顾问业务的发展。互联网金融时代投资顾问业务的突破口在互联网,"互联网+"既大幅降低投资顾问业务成本,还能充分发挥专业,提升服务和效率。券商投资顾问业务可借鉴其他金融机构互联网展业的经验和做法,借助综合金融服务互联网平台或第三方知名互联网平台,线上线下相结合进行分层差别营销,并通过长效培训机制提升投资顾问的专业能力和职业素养。     

农业银行财务顾问业务介绍（三）

中国农业银行财务顾问业务产品是农业银行“金光道”品牌系列产品之一，是专为公司、机构类客户提供专业化顾问服务的产品总和，按业务对象不同可分为企业财务顾问和政府财务顾问。首批推出的财务顾问业务产品具体包括信息顾问类产品、管理顾问类产品、投、     

商业银行基金投顾业务的实践探讨

财富管理业务作为商业银行的重要业务板块,直接服务着千家万户,其中的基金投资理财业务尤其活跃,各家银行近年来均保持了较快的增速。无论是普通的个人零食金融,还是服务于高净值客户的财富管理,均面临如何推动基金理财业务转型,为客户提供投资顾问的问题。2019年10月证监会推出的公募基金投资顾问业务试点为此提供了良好的契机,商业银行应以基金投顾业务为落脚点,扎实推进更广泛的投资顾问业务的发展。     

华尔街投行创新产品的适当性监管

2012年2月,国际证监会组织发布了《提供复杂金融产品的适当性要求》报告,对健全中介机构向客户提供复杂金融产品的投资者适当性制度提出了建议。投资者适当性制度要求中介机构履行公平交易职责、诚实信用职责、专业服务职责和管理利益冲突的职责。中介机构应当充分了解客户的投资知识、投资经验、投资目标、财务状况、风险容忍度等信息,充分了解所推荐或销售的金融产品或服务,从而使所推荐或销售的金融产品或服务适合客户。     

我国商业银行个人理财业务的风险管理

一、商业银行个人理财业务的风险表现商业银行个人理财业务是商业银行将客户关系管理、资金管理和投资组合管理等融合在一起,向客户提供的综合化、个性化服务的一类金融产品。早在上个世纪90年代末期,我国商业银行开始尝试向客户提供专业化投资顾问和个人外汇理财服务。近年来,     

ADVERSE CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND INVESTMENT BANKER REPUTATION: TARGET FIRM TENDER OFFER FEES

I measure the potential economic importance of fee-contract incentives and investment banker reputation as factors that can mitigate conflicts of interest between investment bankers and their target firm clients in tender offers. I find that the fee contracts used between target firms and their investment bankers contain incentives that can create substantial conflicts of interest. Simulated losses from these adverse incentives can be large—up to 16.7 percent of target firm value. I also find, however, that when investment banker reputation capital is included in the simulation, losses are substantially reduced.     

Is universal banking justified? Evidence from bank underwriting of corporate bonds in Japan

We examine the extent to which universal banking in Japan creates conflicts of interest. We find that as banks enter the securities business, they discount the price of the corporate bonds they underwrite significantly in an effort to attract investors, thereby generating conflicts of interest that are harmful to issuers. Further, we find that close prior lending relationships between banks and their client issuers is the driving force behind such conflicts and that competition from investment houses limits but does not eliminate these conflicts. Our results contrast sharply with the evidence for the US, which largely shows a certification role for banks.     

Accurate forecasts attract clients; Biased forecasts keep them happy

We examine whether business relationships between mutual funds and sell-side analysts influence earnings forecasts using Chinese data from 2007 to 2019. Consistent with prior studies, our results support the commission pressure hypothesis. Analysts' forecasts are overly optimistic for the holdings of existing fund clients. Significantly, we propose the potential client hypothesis and show that analysts' forecasts are more accurate for the holdings of funds that are not clients than for holdings of clients or for stocks not held by any fund. Our results suggest that commission pressure from existing fund clients increases analysts' optimistic bias, while potential clients pressure inhibits analysts' optimistic bias to some extent. Finally, our evidence supports the conflicts of interest hypothesis. Commission pressure is reduced as economic uncertainty grows.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors

Political pressures can bias public pension funds (PPFs) toward activist shareholders. The pension business ties mutual fund families (MFFs) have with portfolio firms can bias them toward firm management. We examine how these contrasting conflicts of interest affect institutional investors' proxy voting behavior and show PPFs (MFFs) are considerably more supportive of activist shareholders (firm management) in voting, even if doing so may harm investment value. The biases are more pronounced when incentive conflicts are stronger. PPFs support shareholder (management) proposals more (less) when Democrats gain more power in the fund's home state. Conflicted PPFs are particularly active in supporting value reducing shareholder proposals.     

Two Modes of Investment Banking: Technocrats,Relationship Managers,and Conflict

Efficient capital allocation in a market economy depends on the exchange of reliable information between providers of capital and companies that seek to put capital to work. One challenge, however, is that information exchange is at most only partly subject to verification and contractual arrangements. Take the case of securities issuance, including IPOs; whereas issuers of the new securities have incentives to overstate their prospects to attract higher bids, prospective investors have incentives to understate their interest. In principle, the counterparties could enter into an agreement that would prevent or discourage misrepresentations by both sides, but failure to perform would be very costly, if not impossible, for a court to verify. Investment banks have traditionally addressed this problem by creating extralegal markets for information whose functioning depends on the reputations of the banks for upholding the interests of both their corporate clients and the providers of capital. But committing to strike the right balance among all of the parties’ interests means that relational investment bankers inevitably face conflicts of interest. The authors of this article argue that such bankers exist to absorb and to manage conflicts of interest in financial markets—and that they do so by exercising judgment in ways that support their reputation for fair dealing. Modern full‐service investment banks, when addressing such conflicts, combine, or braid, such relational functions with technocratic banking activities involving the use of technical skills with advanced information technology. In so doing, however, technocratic bankers substitute formal contracts for the informal judgment exercised by relational bankers; and as a result, they are less dependent on their banks’ reputations for fair dealing. Moreover, technocratic bankers often have powerful incentives to pursue a personal reputation by executing complex transactions that demonstrate their skill, even at the expense of their clients and the bank's reputation for fair dealing. Well‐governed braided banks can benefit from complementarities between relational and technocratic skills. Nevertheless, full‐service banks continue to struggle with governance problems. The authors discuss several market responses to these struggles, such as the growing use of boutique banks offering “unconflicted” sell‐side advice in mergers and acquisitions and securities offerings. But the authors view such responses as at most a first step toward achieving a new understanding of the extent of the challenge facing today's investment banks in carrying out their economic function of bringing together and balancing the interests of companies and their investors.     

证券分析师利益冲突影响投资者利益吗——一个经验研究评述(1995—2007)

近年来,公众对证券分析师利益冲突的广泛关注促使政府及相关部门采取了组织隔离与业务分立等一系列监管措施以保护投资者利益。然而,近期的实证研究却对证券分析师利益冲突损害投资者利益这一监管前提提出了质疑。本文在对1995—2007年间相关文献进行综述的基础上,分析了实证结果与监管当局观点之间存在差异的原因,并据此提出了若干利益冲突监管政策调整思路,以期为我国证券市场监管效率的提高提供启示和借鉴。     

Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations

Abstract:  This paper tests whether sell-side analysts are prone to behavioural errors when making stock recommendations as well as the impact of investment banking relationships on their judgments. In particular, we analyse their report narratives for evidence of cognitive bias. We find first that new buy recommendations on average have no investment value whereas new sell recommendations do, and take time to be assimilated by the market. We also show that new buy recommendations are distinguished from new sells both by the level of analyst optimism and representativeness bias as well as with increased conflicts of interest. Successful new buy recommendations are characterised by lower prior returns, value stock status, smaller firms and weaker investment banking relationships. On the other hand, successful new sells do not differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in terms of these measures. As such, we provide evidence that analysts are prone both to behavioural bias as well as potential conflicts of interest in their new buy stock recommendation decisions. We also show that these two explanations of analyst behaviour are to a great extent independent of each other. Consequently, the recent attempts by regulators to address potential conflicts of interest in analyst behaviour may have only limited impact.     

Analyst Behavior and Underwriter Choice

We examine the role that analysts play in a firm's choice of underwriter using a sample of major U.S. investment banks. In order to best capture the competitive environment, which is critical to the potential role that analysts play, we limit our sample of firms to 161 real estate investment trusts (REITs) issuing debt or equity between 1996 and 2004. Using the estimation technique of Ljungqvist et al. (Journal of Finance 61:301?C340 2006), which accounts for the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the coverage self-selection decision, we find that target prices that are optimistic relative to competitors' target prices, significantly increase an underwriter's probability of attracting underwriting business. This result holds for both equity and debt issues with fees greater than one million dollars. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that increased regulatory scrutiny of conflicts of interest between analysts and investment banks has decreased the impact of analyst behavior on underwriter choice.     

Responsiveness of Auditors to the Audit Risk Standards: Unique Evidence from Big 4 Audit Firms

We examine the effect of changes in audit risk standards on the conduct of financial statement audits in a European setting. We investigate this by analysing the audit hours and audit fees for clients of Big 4 audit firms in Finland in 1996 and 2010. Our results show that audit firms became more sensitive to clients’ business risk due to the introduction of the new audit risk standards, with more audit hours allocated to owner-managed companies in 2010 than in 1996, and fewer audit hours allocated to low-risk clients in 2010 than in 1996. Also, the labour mix in the audit team changed for owner-managed companies, with a greater work load carried by junior auditors in 2010 than in 1996. Regarding the price of audit, we find an increase in audit fees for clients with high business risk, while audit fees remained at roughly the same level for low-risk clients. These findings should be of interest to the auditing profession and those involved in the development of auditing regulations.