Housing and the mortgage securities markets: Review,outlook, and policy recommendations

During the 1980s, strong demographic demand for housing created a bulging need for mortgage credit. The mortgage market has creatively accommodated this need through extensive securitization of residential mortgages. This process greatly facilitated the financing of housing demand. During this decade, however, the scheme of funding long-term mortgages with short-term deposits bankrupted savings institutions. A gigantic federal bailout for thrifts was finally required. In the 1990s, the weakening demographics and the resulting reduction in the demand for mortgage credit afford the federal government opportunities to reformulate its housing policies in terms of limiting federal insurance on consumer deposits, phasing out income tax deductibility of mortgage interest, and ensuring capital adequacy at federally sponsored credit agencies.     

Infrequent Housing Adjustment,Limited Participation,and Monetary Policy

This paper asks why monetary contractions have strong effects on the housing market. The paper presents a model with staggered housing adjustment in which monetary policy has real effects in the absence of any rigidity in producer pricing or wages. Limited participation in financial markets leads to a rise in the real mortgage rate following an increase in the nominal short rate. Since households must take on a mortgage to consume housing, the rise in the real interest rate reduces the share of residential investment in output.     

Effects of Bankruptcy Exemptions and Foreclosure Laws on Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Rates

This study analyzes the effects of state bankruptcy asset exemptions and foreclosure laws on mortgage default and foreclosure rates across different segments of the mortgage market. We found that the effects of these legal provisions are larger for subprime than for prime mortgages and larger for adjustable rate mortgages than for fixed rate mortgages. These results demonstrate that the effect of variation in bankruptcy exemptions and foreclosure laws is most pronounced in the most risky segments of the mortgage market, which are those that have been most affected by the continuing housing slump in the United States.     

Joint Dynamics of House Prices and Foreclosures

This paper studies the joint transitional dynamics of the foreclosures and house prices in a standard life‐cycle incomplete markets model with housing and a realistic long‐term mortgage structure. We calibrate our model to match several long‐term features of the U.S. housing market, and analyze the effects of several unexpected and permanent shocks on the house price and the foreclosure rate both across the steady states and along the transition between the steady states. We examine permanent, unexpected shocks to the risk‐free interest rate, the minimum down‐payment ratio, and unemployment. During the transition, these shocks create large movements in house prices. More importantly, the foreclosure dynamics are quite significant along the transition compared to the steady‐state changes, and there are strong feedbacks between foreclosures and house prices. We assess the effects of a temporary reduction in the risk‐free interest rate, which has moderate effects on house prices but little effect on foreclosure dynamics. We also study the effects of an ex ante macroprudential policy, which establishes a minimum down‐payment requirement at a higher threshold. Such a macroprudential policy helps substantially stabilize both house prices and foreclosures.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance

The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in number of foreclosures. The average length of time from onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded dramatically. Although most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled them to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Thus, foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default—suggesting that improvement in credit card performance during the post-crisis period would likely be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures reach completion.     

Subprime Loan Default Resolutions: Do They Vary Across Mortgage Products and Borrower Demographic Groups?

This paper examines default outcomes for subprime first lien loans during the recent subprime mortgage boom. It conducts this investigation in two phases. The paper first examines factors associated with pre-foreclosure outcomes for subprime mortgages in default. It then examines factors associated with different outcomes for loans that enter foreclosure. These factors include less understood elements such as mortgage product features and borrower demographics. The analysis is based on detailed loan-level data and employs multinomial logit models in a hazard framework. Results show that default resolutions vary with product features and borrower demographics. Adjustable rate and interest-only mortgages, and loans with low- or no-documentation are more likely to enter foreclosure proceedings, and, once in foreclosure, are more likely to become REO. The existence of junior liens increases the probability of the loan remaining in default. Owner-occupancy is associated with lower likelihood of foreclosure initiation and REO, and greater likelihood of curing default. Additionally, default outcomes are impacted by local legal, economic and housing market conditions, and the equity in the home.     

Housing and the Tax System: How Large Are the Distortions in the Euro Area?*

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of the preferential treatment of owner‐occupied housing in the euro area. We find that tax benefits to homeowners reduce the user cost of housing capital by almost 40 per cent compared with the efficient level under neutral taxation. On average, the tax subsidy translates into an excess consumption of housing services equivalent to 7.8 per cent of the value of owner‐occupied housing, or about 30 per cent of financial asset holdings in household portfolios. The bulk of the subsidy stems from undertaxation of the return to home equity, while the average contribution of the tax rebate for mortgage interest payments is driven down by relatively low loan‐to‐value ratios in the data. However, at the margin, the tax‐induced incentive to use mortgage debt to finance the purchase of the main residence is sizeable.     

Foreclosure Contagion and the Neighborhood Spillover Effects of Mortgage Defaults

In this paper, I identify shocks to interest rates resulting from two administrative details in adjustable‐rate mortgage contract terms: the choice of financial index and the choice of lookback period. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in interest rate at the time of adjustable‐rate mortgage (ARM) reset results in a 2.5 percentage increase in the probability of foreclosure in the following year, and that each foreclosure filing leads to an additional 0.3 to 0.6 completed foreclosures within a 0.10‐mile radius. In explaining this result, I emphasize price effects, bank‐supply responses, and borrower responses arising from peer effects.     

Current Wealth,Housing Purchase,and Private Housing Loan Demand in Japan

Japanese households accumulate wealth for down payments at a high rate. Therefore, current wealth plays an important role in home acquisition as well as public loans whose direct mortgage lending is a strong support for home purchasers. We estimate the wealth effect on private mortgage debt as well as housing consumption by applying a model where mortgage-debt demand is derived from house-purchase decisions and is determined jointly with housing consumption. We use a simultaneous equation Tobit estimation method. Wealth effects on private mortgage debt, likelihood of borrowing, and housing consumption are not elastic. On the other hand, a change in housing consumption affects the likelihood of borrowing elastically much more than the private mortgage amount of borrowers. Housing and private mortgage markets fluctuate very closely with the number of participants in the mortgage market. Therefore, the number of housing starts is linked strongly to the private mortgage market.     

The effect of mortgage form on borrower interest rate risk: A portfolio theory approach

The problems faced by U.S. regulatory authorities in controlling residential housing cycles have resulted in a continuing search for methods of reducing the volatility of housing construction. One of the most widely discussed methods of decreasing volatility in mortgage credit is the variable rate mortgage (VRM) whose interest rate is linked to some interest rate index. In this paper we employ a portfolio theory approach to examine the relative riskiness of the VRM and fixed rate mortgage (FRM) for borrower and lender. As expected, we find that relative riskiness depends on the composition of the borrower/lender portfolio of assets and liabilities.     

Banks’ lending behavior and monetary policy: evidence from Sweden

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the aggregate data about bank loans which may hide significant information about the monetary transmission mechanism. This study, by disaggregating bank loans data and using the relevant interest rates in Sweden, investigates the behaviour of banks after a monetary policy tightening. By using an unrestricted VAR model and impulse response analysis, our results show that a shock on the policy rate affects the main components of the banks’ loan portfolios differently. Initially, banks do not reduce lending to firms and households and they present a sluggish reaction concerning the relevant interest rates. On the contrary, they reduce lending to mortgage credit institutions significantly since real estate lending can be considered as a risky long-term investment. Moreover mortgage credit institutions reduce lending for housing purposes to non-bank public. This reduction is mainly driven by flexible rate loans and loans secured on tenant owned apartments. Consequently, theses actions have a significant effect on real economic activity, by amplifying the initial shock from the tightening monetary policy. The latter result provides evidence of the bank lending channel in Sweden working via mortgage lending and could be very important for policy makers.     

Mortgage Choice in the Euro Area: Macroeconomic Determinants and the Effect of Monetary Policy on Debt Burdens

This paper provides novel evidence on the role of the macroeconomic environment for households’ choice between fixed‐interest‐rate and adjustable‐interest‐rate mortgages (ARMs) in the euro area. We find that relatively more ARMs are taken out when economic growth is strong, the interest rate spread is high, or unemployment shows low volatility. A simulation exercise shows that a reduction in mortgage rates as witnessed during the monetary easing in the course of the global financial crisis produces a substantial decline in debt burdens among mortgage‐holding households, especially in countries where households have higher debt burdens and a larger share of ARMs.     

Testing for Fraud in the Residential Mortgage Market: How Much Did Early-Payment-Defaults Overpay for Housing?

Current explanations for the high rate of default and foreclosure in the U.S. emphasize house price fluctuations and lax lending criteria. Another explanation for default and foreclosure, which has generally been neglected in the academic literature but not by the FBI, is fraud. One impediment to identifying and measuring fraud is the lack of statistical tests capable of detecting it. This paper proposes a simple method to detect transactions where fraud may have occurred. The models proposed here are important for at least three reasons. First they can document the role of fraud in the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Second, they can serve as part of a forensic effort designed to detect and deter mortgage fraud. Third, they demonstrate that mortgage fraud distorts house price indexes because it artificially elevates house prices during the period of fraud followed by a subsequent collapse due to the foreclosure sales. Accordingly, fraud can give the false impression that foreclosure lowers area house prices when it actually artificially inflates them. This suggests an alternative interpretation for the recent empirical literature on externalities from foreclosure.     

Loss given default of high loan-to-value residential mortgages

This paper studies loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high loan-to-value residential mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that loss given default can largely be explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, and the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. We find that the current loan-to-value ratio is the single most important determinant. More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions. These findings have important policy implications for several key issues in Basel II implementation.     

A Model of Mortgage Default

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero‐profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan‐to‐value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable‐rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.     

The Economics of Housing Savings Plans

Housing Savings Plans (HSP) are contractual savings products in which a household is granted a mortgage at preferential terms (or option for such) in exchange for accumulating savings in the plan and in the institution offering it. As such, they represent a bundle of savings and borrowing financial services. While such plans are common in some countries, the reasons for their use have not been fully explored. In some cases, HSPs are used because financial markets and institutions have not reached sufficient levels of development to attract savings or raise capital for housing finance, and in other cases, tax and subsidy incentives may be at play. Here, we ask under which circumstances households and financial institutions will voluntarily contract to participate in HSPs even in advanced capital markets and in the absence of tax/subsidy incentives. We argue that the HSPs may be chosen by households because of their hedging qualities. We model HSPs and show how changes in variables affect the willingness of households to join the HSP and the characteristics of any HSP chosen.     

Housing and Tax Policy

This paper investigates the effects of housing‐related tax policy measures on macroeconomic aggregates using a dynamic general‐equilibrium model featuring borrowing and lending across heterogeneous households, financial frictions in the form of collateral constraints tied to house prices, and a rental housing market alongside owner‐occupied housing. We analyze the effects of various tax policies and find that they all lead to significant output losses, with large long‐run tax multipliers of around 2. Among them, reducing the mortgage interest deduction is the most effective in raising tax revenue per unit of output lost, whereas reducing the depreciation allowance for rental income is the least effective.     

Household Finance

The study of household finance is challenging because household behavior is difficult to measure, and households face constraints not captured by textbook models. Evidence on participation, diversification, and mortgage refinancing suggests that many households invest effectively, but a minority make significant mistakes. This minority appears to be poorer and less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. There is some evidence that households understand their own limitations and avoid financial strategies for which they feel unqualified. Some financial products involve a cross‐subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and this can inhibit welfare‐improving financial innovation.     

Determinants of the incidence of U.S. Mortgage Loan Modifications

This paper combines data on the performance of mortgage loans with detailed borrower, neighborhood, and property characteristics to examine the factors that determine the outcomes of seriously delinquent loans. We employ multinomial logit models in a hazard framework to explain how loan, borrower, property, servicer and neighborhood characteristics affect which of the following four outcomes results from a seriously delinquent loan: (1) the borrower cures the delinquency; (2) the borrower and lender agree to modify the loan; (3) the borrower suffers a liquidation (short sale, deed in lieu, foreclosure auction sale or REO); or (4) the loan remains delinquent. In particular, we focus on mortgage modification. We find that the outcomes of delinquent loans are significantly related to: current LTV, FICO scores, especially risky loan characteristics, the servicer of the loan, neighborhood housing price appreciation, and whether the borrower received foreclosure counseling.