首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 125 毫秒
1.
This article examines why CEOs are rewarded for luck, namely for observable shocks beyond their control. I propose a simple hidden action model where the agent has implicit incentives to avoid bankruptcy. After signing the contract, but before acting, the agent observes a signal on future luck. Implicit incentives are weaker after good news, and call for higher pay‐for‐performance sensitivity in good times. As a result, managerial pay is tied to luck. The model is also consistent with recent evidence of asymmetric pay for luck, that is, a larger exposure of managerial pay to good luck than to bad.  相似文献   

2.
Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principal’s ability to delegate depends on the agent’s luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option‐to‐buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay‐for‐performance arrangement.  相似文献   

3.
CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验   总被引:74,自引:0,他引:74  
本文利用逐步回归和路径分析方法 ,检验了我国上市公司CEO薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。结果发现 :(1)决定CEO薪酬增长的因素主要是营业利润率变动 ,决定CEO薪酬下降的因素则主要是总资产净利率变动 ,这表明在我国上市公司的CEO薪酬层面已体现了一定的激励制约机制 ;(2 )增加CEO薪酬对提高企业的规模和股东财富均有一定的促进作用 ,但降低CEO薪酬却不仅不能提高企业规模和股东财富 ,反而会对其产生一定的负面影响 ,这不仅说明CEO薪酬也具有“工资刚性”特征 ,而且说明我国上市公司的CEO薪酬也仅有单方面的激励效果 ,而没有预期的制约效果 ;(3)无论是增加或降低CEO薪酬 ,CEO均不存在盈余管理或利润操纵的机会主义行为 ,这表明CEO进行盈余管理或利润操纵的动机不应该是为了增加其公开性薪酬 ,而应该是居于除公开性薪酬以外的其他目的。  相似文献   

4.
How do dividend taxes affect stock volatility? If a risk-averse executive faces price risk through his incentive contract, changes in stock volatility due to dividend taxes may increase agency costs and therefore decrease overall welfare. In this paper, I use a decrease in dividend taxes as a natural experiment to identify their effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Stock volatility decreased after the tax cut for firms at which executives have larger sensitivity to stock price in their incentive compensation package relative to firms at which executives have a smaller sensitivity. Therefore, with risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders, dividend taxes may exacerbate agency costs. The increase in agency costs will decrease shareholder welfare, which can be partially offset by the use of options in the employment contract.  相似文献   

5.
江轩宇  朱琳  伊志宏  于上尧 《金融研究》2019,469(7):135-154
本文结合我国工薪所得税税负较重及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景,探讨工薪所得税筹划是否以及如何对企业创新产生影响。研究发现:(1)工薪所得税筹划程度与企业创新显著正相关;(2)员工应税压力越大,二者正相关关系越显著,且2011年个人所得税税制改革会抑制二者之间的正向关系,表明纳税筹划主要通过降低工薪税负的不利影响,强化薪酬的激励效应,进而促进企业创新;(3)当公司为国有企业或公司处在税收征管强度较大的地区时,二者的正向关系更强;(4)当企业人均薪酬波动较大时,二者的正向关系削弱;(5)当创新员工更有可能是避税行为的受益者时,二者的正相关关系更强。本研究对于降低工薪阶层税负,以及如何提高企业创新意愿,实现创新驱动发展战略,具有重要的理论和现实意义。  相似文献   

6.
Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.  相似文献   

7.
Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.  相似文献   

8.
Using data from three production units of a large manufacturing plant that employs production teams in its assembly operations, this paper examines how changes made to an existing team-based incentive plan affects labor productivity, product quality, and worker absenteeism. The firm switched from a piece-rates contract and an attendance bonus and instituted a two tier incentive plan comprising two different but complementary performance-based bonus schemes: one tier based on individual team performance and the other tier on plant-wide performance. The incentives were introduced concurrently with management control initiatives intended to facilitate cooperation and monitoring among the teams. I find significant productivity gains and improvements in quality and absenteeism associated with the new incentive plan. These findings underscore two important points that have not been emphasized in existing empirical studies of incentive pay: incentive contracts for teams generate superior performance using combination of incentives, and the need to introduce organizational changes to facilitate cooperation and peer monitoring in tandem with incentive pay to capture greater incentive effects in team production.  相似文献   

9.
Information asymmetry increases the risks undertaken by venture capitalists. The present study departs from the tendency in earlier analyses to attribute the problem of information asymmetry to the entrepreneur only. In view of the obvious social benefits that the development of the venture capital industry brings, the government should take upon itself to consider tax incentives and changes to regulatory policies in order to attract venture capital investments. Three scenarios are portrayed here to examine the issue of asymmetric information in the venture capital market: (1) when both the venture capitalist's and entrepreneur's efforts are observable and the government incentive policy is available; (2) when the entrepreneur's effort is unobservable but the venture capitalist's is observable and government tax incentive is available; and (3) when the entrepreneur's effort is observable but the venture capitalist's effort is unobservable, and regulatory monitoring and government tax incentives are uncertain. This investigation reveals that the tax incentive policy and regulatory measures put in place by the government can significantly and positively affect the outcome of the entrepreneurial project by reducing information asymmetry.  相似文献   

10.
I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on “input” measures related to the agent's actions and an “output” measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input‐based pay minimizes income risk, only output‐based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both kinds of performance measures. The results help to explain some empirical puzzles and lead to several new predictions.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号