Financial Intermediary Versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution Systems and Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies

An examination of the efficiency of the marketing distribution channel and organizational structure for insurance companies is presented from a framework that views the insurer as a financial intermediary rather than as a “production entity” which produces “value added” through loss payments. Within this financial intermediary approach, solvency can be a primary concern for regulators of insurance companies, claims‐paying ability can be a primary concern for policyholders, and return on investment can be a primary concern for investors. These three variables (solvency, financial return, and claims‐paying ability) are considered as outputs of the insurance firm. The financial intermediary approach acknowledges that interests potentially conflict, and the strategic decision makers for the firm must balance one concern versus another when managing the insurance company. Accordingly, we investigate the efficiency of insurance companies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) having as insurer output an appropriately selected (for the firm under investigation) combination of solvency, claims‐paying ability, and return on investment as outputs. These efficiency evaluations are further examined to study stock versus mutual form of organizational structure and agency versus direct marketing arrangements, which are examined separately and in combination. Comparisons with the “value‐added” or “production” approach to insurer efficiency are presented. A new DEA approach and interpretation is also presented.     

Organizational Structure and Performance: Evidence From the Nonlife Insurance Industry in Japan

This study examines the impact of organizational structure on firm performance, incentive problems, and financial decisions in the Japanese nonlife (property‐casualty) insurance industry. Stock companies that belong to one of six horizontal keiretsu groups have lower expenses and lower levels of free cash flow than independent stock and mutual insurance companies. Keiretsu insurers also have higher profitability and higher loss ratios than independent insurers. With a limited sample size, there is some evidence that mutual insurers have higher levels of free cash flows, higher investment incomes, and lower financial leverage than their stock counterparts. Overall, empirical evidence suggests that each structure has its own comparative advantage.     

On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies

Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most stock companies don't offer participating contracts. This study explains why. We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stockholders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the fair‐return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legislation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn't because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

THE REINSURANCE DECISION IN LIFE INSURANCE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RISK-BEARING HYPOTHESIS

Several explanations have been advanced in the financial economics literature to explain the reinsurance decision in insurance firms. Prominent amongst these is the risk-bearing hypothesis which holds that reinsurance is motivated by the ability of residual claimants to effectively hedge against operational risk. Since the efficiency of risk-bearing is influenced by organisational factors, such as ownership structure and firm size, the amount of reinsurance should also vary according to the characteristics of insurance firms. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that reinsurance is related to firm-specific factors. Using 1988–1993 data gathered from New Zealand's life insurance industry, a fixed-effects covariance regression model is estimated. Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that reinsurance is associated with smaller and more highly leveraged life insurance entities, and companies with greater underwriting risk. However, contrary to predictions, it also appears that it is stocks and companies with diversified production that tend to reinsure. The risk-bearing hypothesis thus receives only partial support.     

股票价格对投资的影响：资产负债表效应分析

资产负债表效应是股票价格影响投资的重要渠道。股票价格的波动除了会通过影响托宾Q值而影响上市企业的融资成本,进而影响上市企业的投资外,还会通过影响企业的净值进而影响企业从银行获得贷款的能力而影响企业的投资。而投资是总需求的重要组成部分,也是股票价格影响物价水平的重要方面,因此,研究股票价格对投资的影响,即对资产负债表效应的研究,对于研究股票价格对物价稳定的影响具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。     

Ownership Structure and Control: Property-Casualty Insurer Conversion to Stock Charter

We examine 98 property-casualty insurance companies that convert to stock charter from a mutual or reciprocal form of organization. Our evidence shows converting firms have low surplus, significant growth in premium income, and draw down on their non-financial assets in years prior to conversion. Following conversion there is significant growth in assets and the number of States licensed. We also show by examining evidence on the riskiness of firms' operations that converting companies began operating like stock companies prior to conversion. Thus, our evidence suggests there can be important costs associated with the operation of a mutual or reciprocal insurance company. These costs can include the opportunity costs associated with foregone investments arising because of higher incremental capital costs inherent in the mutual or reciprocal forms of ownership. There also is a cost disadvantage if a mutual or reciprocal is operating in activities more appropriate for the stock ownership form. These costs can in particular circumstances offset the advantage mutual ownership affords in controlling incentives to transfer wealth from policyholders to equityholders.     

股权结构对财险公司风险承担行为影响的实证研究

本文从理论层面上剖析了公司股权结构对风险承担的影响及具体作用机理,然后基于2002~2018年我国77家财险公司的非平衡面板数据构建联立方程模型,利用三阶段最小二乘法(3SLS)进行参数估计。研究发现,股权结构对我国财险公司的风险承担行为存在显著影响。具体而言,股权集中度对承保风险存在显著正向影响,表现出"侵占效应";股权制衡度对承保风险存在显著负向影响,对投资风险存在显著正向影响;外资参股对承保风险和投资风险分别存在显著正向和负向影响,外资股东的进入有利于降低财产保险公司的投资风险,但在一定程度上会提高其承保风险。基于此,本文提出强化股权的穿透式监管、推进形成"相对集中、多股制衡"的股权结构以及适当引入外资丰富财险公司股权结构等建议。     

对国有投资控股或参股公司进行审计的研究

随着现代企业制度的发展,各类企业为增强企业实力,引入了国有、民营、私人及国外战略投资,组建上市或非上市股份制控股或参股公司,产权结构日趋多元化。合资公司或多或少存在着控制乏力、管理薄弱的问题,如何实施对这类公司的监管,特别是从内部审计的角度如何介入,以维护投资方的利益,实现投资目的,是一个亟待解决的课题。本文拟对合资公司实施内部审计的必要性,内部审计的内容以及应注意的问题和对策,进行初步的探讨。     

Effizienz und Eigentümerstruktur: Eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Lebensversicherungsmarktes

We provide new insights into the effect of ownership on efficiency by analyzing the German life insurance market over the period 2002–2005. Previous research on alternative organizational forms in the life insurance industry has focused on stock and mutual ownership only. Due to the uniqueness of the German insurance market, where privately-owned companies face competition by public insurers, we add to the recent literature the well known debate on public versus private ownership, by investigating stock, mutual and public ownership forms. Using traditional DEA, we calculate technical efficiency and cost efficiency scores to test the efficient structure hypothesis as well as the expense preference hypothesis. Our results give strong support to the latter, while we find no evidence that public ownership is an efficient corporate structure for life insurers. The group of stock firms dominates both, mutual and public insurers, although differences between stock and mutual companies are smaller than differences between stock and public firms. Analyzing within-group results, our findings suggest that high efficiency scores can be associated with certain firm characteristics which are publicly available: high returns on assets, low cancellation rates and low costs.     

Optimal constrained investment in the Cramer-Lundberg model

We consider an insurance company whose surplus is represented by the classical Cramer-Lundberg process. The company can invest its surplus in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset, governed by the Black-Scholes equation. There is a constraint that the insurance company can only invest in the risky asset at a limited leveraging level; more precisely, when purchasing, the ratio of the investment amount in the risky asset to the surplus level is no more than a; and when short-selling, the proportion of the proceeds from the short-selling to the surplus level is no more than b. The objective is to find an optimal investment policy that minimizes the probability of ruin. The minimal ruin probability as a function of the initial surplus is characterized by a classical solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We study the optimal control policy and its properties. The interrelation between the parameters of the model plays a crucial role in the qualitative behavior of the optimal policy. For example, for some ratios between a and b, quite unusual and at first ostensibly counterintuitive policies may appear, like short-selling a stock with a higher rate of return to earn lower interest, or borrowing at a higher rate to invest in a stock with lower rate of return. This is in sharp contrast with the unrestricted case, first studied in Hipp and Plum, or with the case of no short-selling and no borrowing studied in Azcue and Muler.     

MORGAN STANLEY ROUNDTABLE ON Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of distinguished finance academics and practitioners discuss a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerges is that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial flexibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value both by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate free cash flow problem. In such cases, both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks signal management's commitment to its shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce low‐return growth that comes at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve more flexibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial flexibility: too little can mean lost investment opportunities, but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

保险公司资产组合与最优投资比例研究

保险公司收益主要来源于承保利润和投资收益,其中承保利润受政策变动、市场条件等外部环境的影响较大,而投资收益则更多地取决于保险公司的投资能力,因此保险公司如何构建资产组合、如何确定最优投资比例就是获取投资收益最大化的重要因素。本文通过理论推导得出了保险公司的资产组合模型并运用非线性规划求解出最优投资比例,进而根据保险公司的投资数据进行了实证研究,为我国保险公司的资产组合及最优投资比例提供了一个可借鉴的思路。     

Funding conditions and insurance stock returns: Do insurance stocks really benefit from rising interest rate regimes?

We examine funding conditions and U.S. insurance company stock returns. Although constrained funding conditions, signaled by restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, correspond with increases in the future payouts of fixed‐income securities held by insurance firms and potentially provide value through the liability side of insurer balance sheets, they also decrease the values of securities currently held in insurer portfolios. Prior research finds that restrictive policy has a negative effect on equity returns in general. Our results suggest the negative impacts of constrained funding environments outweigh the potential positives, as insurance company stock returns are significantly lower during periods of constrained funding. This effect varies within a given funding state and also across insurer type. The effect is strongest during the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment and for life and health insurers—insurer types with longer portfolio durations. For property and liability (P&L) insurers, lower stock return performance only exists in the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment. In the subsequent months, P&L insurers actually have higher stock returns during constrained periods, consistent with their typically shorter duration asset portfolios, which are more quickly rolled over into new higher‐yielding securities.     

Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mutual firms on competition in the insurance market. We distinguish two actors in this market: mutual firms, which belong to their pooled members, and traditional companies, which belong to their shareholders. Our approach differs from the literature by one crucial assumption: the expected utility of the consumers depends on the size of their insurance firm, which generates network externalities in this market. Thus, the choice of a contract results in a trade-off between the premium level and the probability of that premium being ex-post adjusted. The optimal contract offered by a mutual firm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or positive), while the contracts a company offers imply a fixed premium that is possibly negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period. In an oligopoly game, we show that three types of configurations are possible at equilibrium: either one mutual firm or insurance company is active, or a mixed structure emerges in which two or more companies share the market with or without a mutual firm.     

On the application of finance theory to the insurance firm

The primary argument set forth in this article is that the theory of finance can and should be rigorously applied to the study of the insurance firm. In order to illustrate this point, we turn our attention to the insurance solvency literature, where the implications of default risk for insurance company decision-making and regulatory policy are widely discussed but not nearly as widely understood. Rather than treat the probability of ruin as an exogenous constraint that is arbitrarily imposed by regulators, the approach taken here is to endogenize the probability of ruin with respect to a complex contracting process undertaken by a variety of self-interested claim holders. This treatment enables us to evaluate regulatory constraints such as minimum capital requirements within a rigorous theoretical framework. Our analysis suggests that even in an unregulated market, insurers would voluntarily limit their premium-capital ratios in an effort to economize on contracting costs. Furthermore, mutual insurers are likely,ceteris paribus, to employ less leverage than insurers organized as stock corporations.     

Financing risk transfer under governance problems: Mutual versus stock insurers

Mutual insurance companies and stock insurance companies are different forms of organized risk sharing: policyholders and owners are two distinct groups in a stock insurer, while they are one and the same in a mutual. This distinction is relevant to raising capital and selling policies in the presence of frictional cost of capital. Free-rider and commitment problems in a stock insurer limit shareholders’ compensation for the frictional cost and therefore the level of capital that can be raised. By tying sales of policies to the provision of capital, the mutual form can overcome these problems at the cost of less diversified owners.     

消费者投诉冲击与保险公司业绩北大核心

保险消费者权益保护是保险监管的目标之一,也是保险市场健康发展与成熟的标志。本文以中国保险监管部门开通首个保险消费者投诉热线作为外生政策变量,利用2009-2018年中国163家保险公司数据设计准自然实验,研究了保险消费者投诉热线的外部监督职能及其对保险公司业绩的影响。研究结果表明:保险消费者投诉热线的开通显著降低了消费者权益保护水平更差的保险公司业绩;佣金激励水平越高,保险消费者投诉冲击对消费权益保护水平更差的保险公司业绩的负向影响越显著;区分人身保险公司与财产保险公司后发现,保险消费者投诉冲击对消费者权益保护水平更差的财产保险公司业绩的负向影响更显著。本文研究成果丰富了消费者权益与保险公司治理理论,对保险消费者权益保护实践和保险市场高质量发展具有启示意义。     

An Empirical Study of Insurance Performance Measure

This author applies Insurance Performance Measure (IPM) to a set of Indian insurance companies over the period 2005–2016. This is the first article published that applies the IPM model on real industry data and studies its implications. The IPM was introduced in a Winter 2002 JACF article by Joseph Calandro, Jr., then at General Star management, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway and by Scott Lane, then an accounting professor at the University of New Haven. Those authors explained why financial reporting for insurance companies was so challenging and presented the IPM metric as a better way to assess industry and company performance. Evaluating P&C companies is difficult because the unique format of insurance company financials does not lend itself to traditional financial accounting analysis and because the industry's preeminent performance measure, the Underwriting Ratio, captures underwriting and claims activity but says nothing about investment and risk distribution (reinsurance). By contrast, the IPM represents the interrelation of underwriting, investment and reinsurance along with a hurdle rate and is quite consistent with Warren Buffett's expressed desire for a balanced overview of industry performance. IPM uses financial data without modification thereby simplifying and fastening computation. Operationally, it could help in negotiations for reinsurance renewals and identify “Maximum Profitable capacity”—the threshold limit for overall profitability.     

HOW TO FIX ACCOUNTING—MEASURE AND REPORT ECONOMIC PROFIT

Bending accounting rules has become so ingrained in our corporate culture that even ethical business leaders succumb to the temptation to “manage” their earnings in order to meet analysts' demands for smoothly rising results. The author of this article argues that such behavior reflects not a general decline in ethical standards so much as executives' growing sense that accounting itself has become “unhinged from value.” For example, clearly valuable expenditures on R&D, customer acquisition, and employee training are generally expensed immediately against earnings. And reported corporate income is often further reduced by provisions for losses that most companies never expect to incur, by “book” taxes they never expect to pay, and by depreciation charges on assets that are actually increasing in value. At the same time, the opportunity costs associated with employee stock options and the corporate use of equity capital are not reflected in the accountant's measure of profit. To improve the quality of corporate governance and revitalize the public's faith in reported earnings, the author proposes a complete overhaul of GAAP accounting to measure and report economic profit, or EVA. Stated in brief, the author's concept of economic profit begins with an older, but now seldom used, definition of accounting income known as “residual income,” and then proposes a series of additional adjustments to GAAP accounting that are designed to produce a reliable measure of a company's annual, sustainable cash‐generating capacity. Besides expensing the cost of equity capital as well as stock options, the author recommends bringing off‐balance‐sheet items such as pension assets and liabilities back onto the balance sheet, eliminating reserve accounting, capitalizing R&D and other expenditures on intangible assets, and recording economic rather than accounting depreciation. Such changes, by replacing the accountants' current flawed definition of earnings with a comprehensive new statement of value added, could restore investor confidence in financial statements. Even more important, managers would be less likely to pursue their now common practice of boosting earnings by making value‐reducing operating and investment decisions and more likely to use financial reporting not to mislead the market but as an opportunity to communicate relevant, forward‐looking information.