2006年国际油价走向何处

2005年,国际市场原油价格持续上涨并不断创出新高。随着全球石油进口国经济增长速度的放慢,原油供给增加,2006年全球原油市场将较2005年宽松。如果不出现重大意外事件,2006 年油价在经过1-2个季度的高位震荡之后．将逐渐回落至合理的价格水平,预期全年油价水平在50美元／桶上下。     

油价波动对中国经济的影响及对策研究

各国间最重要的战略物资之一就是石油,而我国的能源安全以及经济建设都会受到油价波动的影响,当今能源领域面临的一个重要课题就是如何防范、化解油价波动带来的风险,如何满足现阶段国民经济的发展需要,如何以稳定、合理的价格来获得持续地安全、有效的石油供给。首先,本文从市场供求的角度出发,以供给和需求因素来探讨影响油价波动的幅度大小;其次,详细分析了油价波动对中国的国际收支、通货膨胀率的影响;最后从能源安全领域上,提出我国防范、化解油价波动风险的对策和战略。该建议对成品油与原油市场改革和定价机制具有一定的指导意义和重要的参考价值。     

我国推出原油期货的必要性和可行性研究

随着经济的高速发展,我国石油消费以惊人的速度在逐年增长,但是由于我国自身石油供给的缺乏,造成石油对外依存度已经达到56.5%,成为仅次于美国的世界第二大石油进口国和消费国。同时,由于石油具有独特的政治、经济金融属性,因此在国际上多种因素的共同作用下,国际油价常常频繁地剧烈波动。为了规避国际油价剧烈波动给我国石油进口和国内经济、消费者带来的不利影响,因此,积极参与到国际期货市场中、推出我国原油期货品种已成为迫在眉睫的重要任务。鉴于此,本文主要从必要性和可行性两个大的方面,对我国推出原油期货的问题进行分析。     

浅议我国石油价格的现状及相应对策

<正>随着中国经济的发展,人们的生活水平越来越高,对汽车的需求也越来越大;近年来,汽车行业越来越火热,与之对应的石油产业也发展的如火如荼。油价成为制约汽车行业发展的一个重要因素,也成为影响人们出行方式的一个决定因素。前些年,世界石油价格在波动中有所下降,但中国油价却居高不下。近几年我国政府对油价进行了多次宏观调控,但是油价的总趋势仍然在上升。油价的变动与需求供给曲线有着密切的关系,与垄断行业也密不可分。通过     

国际石油价格波动的非经济因素分析

自2001年“9.11”事件至2002年初,国际原油价格持续在每桶20美元的低迷状态后,伴随着亚洲金融危机的结束和全球经济的快速增长开始稳步上升。反复波动、剧烈上涨的国际油价对石油需求日益增加的中国造成了不可避免的冲击。鉴于此,本文从研究国际石油波动原因着手,深入分析国际油价波动的非经济因素,进而结合油价波动给中国能源安全所带来的诸多影响进行探讨。并系统地提出了中国应对石油价格波动具体措施与对策,以提高中国经济对国际油价冲击的抵御能力与适应能力。     

海外速递

八国财长会议商讨能源安全问题2006年2月11日,八国集团(简称G8,目前成员包括美国、日本、德国、英国、法国、意大利、加拿大和俄罗斯)财长在莫斯科会晤后发表声明认为,能源价格波动威胁全球经济增长,但2006年全球经济增长势头将会不错。这次G8财长会议主要讨论了高企的油价和能源安全问题,同时还在以下领域达成一致:呼吁全球为遭受禽流感袭击的发展中国家提供援助;敦促世界贸易组织谈判各方在开放全球贸易方面采取更多行动;加强打击为恐怖主义活动提供资金的金融网络。G8成员国多为石油进口大国,此次G8财长会议对原油和天然气价格暴涨以及…     

国际油价上涨的原因、影响和对策

2011年初以来,国际原油价格开始加速上涨,显露出重回本世纪以来上升趋势线的迹象。近期油价上涨既与全球经济加快复苏、石油供给相对短缺有关,也与超宽松货币环境下国际金融资本借中东地区政局动荡和气候变化大肆炒作有关。近期内原油供给不足不会影响全球经济复苏的步伐,但如果高油价持续时间较长,则将威胁全球经济的增长前景。对此,包括中国在内的新兴市场国家必须采取措施,认真应对。     

油价走势与国际能源格局调整

前几年支撑国际油价高位波动的主要因素如今全面逆转,石油定价权之争使世界石油供应量易涨难跌,由此判断,国际油价有较大机会步入低价时代。受此影响,国际能源行业格局将出现调整,并带来新的融资需求,"石油人民币"可能崛起,经济通胀压力将会有所舒缓。国际油价有较大机会步入低价时代     

外刊文摘

明年全球石油需求将锐减周二发表的两份权威报告表示,明年全球石油需求将锐减;在可预见的将来,大宗商品价格不会重返今年夏季触及的高位。两份报告均预测,全球将经历一次漫长而痛苦的衰退。美国政府周二说,由于世界经济放缓至接     

在经济复苏中发展——全球石油市场回顾及展望

伴随着世界经济的微弱复苏,在经历了2009年的供需降低后,2010年世界石油供需全面回升,尽管石油需求回升幅度低于供给回升幅度,石油库存仍维持高位,但美国的宽松货币政策一度导致美元指数走低,国际油价震荡上行,创下了年内新高。世界炼油能力年内波动较大,10月炼油能力降至年内最低点,但随后有所恢     

What is going on in the oil market?

Conclusion In this article, we propose a consistent view on the recent oil-price history based on fundamental data and economic theory. We sum up: After the turn of the century three major stylized shocks have hit market. First, the demand curve has shifted fight outwards, mainly driven, as extensively reported in the media, by sustained growth in China and other Asian Countries. Second, supply disruptions in countries with low extraction costs (Iraq and Venezuela) have shifted the supply curve to the left. Third, we show that speculators adjust their inventories in order to take advantage of predictable price fluctuations and play themselves a major role in the price formation. Optimal storage theory implies that aggregate inventories are negatively related to the oil price and positively to the volatility of supply and demand shocks. We provide evidence that the political events in the last years have increased volatility and induced the inventory curve to shift right outwards. We analyze in a graphical framework the interaction of all these shocks and conclude that speculators have caused the oil price to overshoot in the short run its long-run fundamental value. However, this is not at all attributable to market failure or the harmfulness of speculators. In fact, the opposite is true. Speculators have in general a dampening effect on the oil price. The record oil price in the very recent history is partly a consequence of speculators maintaining or building-up inventories to cope with the supply and demand shocks to come. Hence, high prices represent a short-term toll for future price stability. It follows from our analysis that the oil price is expected to fall towards its long-term mean, provided that no further shocks hit the economy and, critically, the oil supply. As we saw, this prediction is consistent with the observed prices in the futures markets. Also in terms of future price volatility, the outlook is rather upbeat. The increased inventory levels held by speculators will cushion the spot market against fluctuations in natural supply and demand and limit the degree to which the currently high underlying volatility will translate into higher price volatility. We would like to thank Manuel Ammann, Bernd Brommundt, Stephan Kessler, Ralf Seiz, Michael Verhofen, Hemrich von Wyss, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments We are particularly indebted to Sergej Peisotchenko at United Energy System (UES) of Russia and Jan Gjerde at Shell for clearing us up on technical aspects of oil production     

石油，走上前台

当供需矛盾和投机等多种因素将石油价格不断推向高位时,一系列原本还能被掩盖的矛盾正慢慢浮出水面,如何解决高油价下的诸多经济、政治矛盾成为当前新的热点问题。     

The non-linear response of US state-level tradable and non-tradable inflation to oil shocks: The role of oil-dependence

This paper investigates the effects of oil supply, oil-specific consumption demand, oil inventory demand shocks, and global economic activity shocks on state-level tradable and non-tradable inflation in the US. We use oil shock data following the work of Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) and estimate both linear and non-linear impulse responses using a lag-augmented local projections model in a panel context. Our results from a linear model show that both supply and demand-side oil shocks have a statistically significant impact on both types of inflation. While supply, global economic activity, and demand shocks have a greater impact on tradable inflation, non-tradable inflation responds more strongly to inventory shocks. Further, the non-linear model results provide evidence of heterogeneity in the magnitude and persistence of impact between high- and low-oil dependence regimes. Non-tradable inflation is more sensitive to nearly all components of oil price shocks in the high-oil dependence regime.     

Two scenarios for Europe: “Europe confronted with high energy prices” or “Europe after oil peaking”

A significant change in trends regarding energy prices (in particular oil) has taken place in 2003 at the beginning of the Iraq War. It has revealed a very strong tension between oil prices on the one hand and the relationship between global oil supply and demand on the other. The strong growth rates of emerging economies up to 2008 have generated a very sharp increase in oil prices. The temporary economic recession of 2008-2009 has resulted in turn into a significant decrease of oil prices, down to a level which remained, however, twice as high as that of early 2003. With the economy recovering from the recession, it is highly probable that energy prices will continue to increase and that Europe will be confronted with high energy prices in the coming decades. Against this general background, two scenarios have been elaborated which differ mainly by the time of occurrence of oil peaking.¹ The differences between the scenario hypotheses are therefore differences of context in relation to exogenous factors. Policies are also considered in the scenarios, but they are not at the forefront and their impact is considered as limited in relation to that of exogenous factors.The first scenario “Europe in a context of high energy price” assumes that the process of oil peaking will not take place before 2030, but that oil price increase will nevertheless be sustained and substantial until then. Numerous adjustments will have to be made in the economy and their territorial impacts will be significant (less polycentricity, more compact cities, decline of the importance of road and air transport). The second scenario “Europe after oil production peaking” assumes that oil production will peak around the mid-2010s (followed by gas production peaking around 2025), despite significant investments to increase production. In a context of steadily growing oil and gas demand, Europe will be confronted with serious economic difficulties. The territorial impacts will be different from those suggested by the first scenario, with stronger pressure put on rural areas and a loss of attractiveness of large cities related to increasing unemployment and social tensions. In both scenarios, the countries of central and eastern Europe will be more severely hit by the new energy context.The scenarios were elaborated in 2005 and slightly reviewed in 2009 in order to take account of the impacts of the economic recession in Europe and of the growing concerns about climate change.     

The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the Returns in China’s Stock Market

The main goal of this paper is to study the relationship between oil price shocks and mainland China’s stock market. From empirical study, we have found that the impact of oil price shocks on stock prices in China has been mixed. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that higher oil prices may cause lower stock prices, positive shocks to oil-market-specific demand resulted in both higher real oil prices and higher stock prices, which helps explain the boom of the Chinese stock market as oil prices were increasing in 2007. However, global oil demand and supply shocks had no significant effects.     

中国原油价格的外生性检验

本文基于条件ECM模型,对中国原油价格与原油供给和需求以及影响供给和需求的国内生产总值和原油已探明储量的内生性或外生性进行检验。结果表明,原油价格具有弱外生性、强外生性的特点,已经成为中国经济体系的外生变量;中国原油价格脱离国内供求关系,没有完全反映中国自身原油资源稀缺程度。中国势必要推进原油定价机制的转型,为夺取定价权提供基础。     

Asymmetric impacts of disaggregated oil price shocks on uncertainties and investor sentiment

This paper aims to examine short- and long-run asymmetries in the impacts of disaggregated oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty, stock market uncertainty, treasury rates, and investor (bullish and bearish) sentiment in the US. To this end, we use a nonlinear auto-regressive distributed lag cointegration approach, which allows us to capture both positive and negative disaggregated oil shocks. We find that oil demand shocks are the main drivers of both measures of uncertainty, while oil supply shocks affect treasury rates. However, both oil demand shocks and oil supply shocks affect investor sentiment, with certain differences in the effects of positive and negative shocks. The overall effects of both oil demand and supply shocks—whether positive or negative—are stronger in the long-run than in the short-run. Additionally, we apply rolling causality and reveal evidence of a rather homogenous causal flow from disaggregated oil shocks to the variables studied, particularly around global stress periods. Our findings have implications for asset pricing and portfolio risk management and suggest policy formulations that differentiate between disaggregated positive and negative oil price shocks.

     

The historic oil price fluctuation during the Covid-19 pandemic: What are the causes?

On 20 April 2020, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price dropped to negative levels for the first time in history. This study examines the factors underlying the historic oil price fluctuation during the Covid-19 pandemic. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach incorporating a structural break is applied to the daily series from 17 January to 14 September 2020 to analyze long-run relationships and short-run dynamics. The results reveal that increases in Covid-19 pandemic cases, US economic policy uncertainty, and expected stock market volatility contributed to the fall in the WTI crude oil price, whereas the fall in the global stock markets appears to significantly reduce the fall. Furthermore, the Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war and speculation on oil futures are shown to play a critical part in the collapse of the oil markets. The findings are consistent with our expectations. Although it is reasonable to assume that the solution to this oil crisis is a pick-up in global oil demand, which will occur only when the novel coronavirus is defeated, this study proposes policy recommendations to cope with the current oil price crash.     

Demand effects and speculation in oil markets: Theory and evidence

We present evidence showing the existence of stable cointegrating vectors connecting four important variables in the U.S. and global oil markets: oil production, stocks of crude oil, the real price of oil, and broad measures of income. Our data are monthly, and go back to the 1930s, split into sub-samples which correspond to periods before and after the 1973 crisis. We further show that the cointegrating vectors found in the data accord well with an extended commodity storage model which allows for demand growth dynamics and for supply regimes. Specifically, inventories and price move in opposite directions when supply is flexible, but the relationship reverses so that they comove when supply is inflexible.     

How do oil supply and demand shocks affect Asian stock markets?

This paper examines how oil market shocks affect Asian stock prices using the structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach. Global oil supply and demand shocks are disentangled using sign restrictions and elasticity bounds. Oil price increases are bad news only if the source is from oil-market-specific demand shifts. Northeast Asian stock markets are more resilient as investors’ expectation of continued economic growth outweighs the adverse effect of higher oil prices. Increased global economic activity also stimulates stock prices. Global oil shocks are more important in explaining variability in Asian stock returns compared with the United States, suggesting different dynamics in Asia.