Earnings quality at initial public offerings

We show that, contrary to popular belief, initial public offering (IPO) firms report more conservatively. We attribute this to the higher quality reporting demanded of public firms by financial statement users and consequentially higher monitoring by auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny [Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 83–128]. We also question the evidence of Teoh et al. [1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974] supporting the alternative hypothesis that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to influence IPO pricing. We conjecture that upward-biased estimates of “discretionary” accruals occur in a broad genre of studies on earnings management around similar large transactions and events.     

Does earnings management lead to favorable IPO price formation or further underpricing? Evidence from Japan

This study addresses an important but unanswered question regarding the relationship between earnings management and underpricing. Earnings management has long been one of the central issues in initial public offerings (IPOs), however little evidence exists on whether earnings management leads to favorable price formation or further underpricing. Using several proxies for earnings management, this study finds evidence that firms with aggressive earnings management during the pre-IPO period tend to be more underpriced than firms without it, in contrast to the dominant hypothesis that IPO firms can sell their stocks at inflated prices by manipulating earnings upwardly. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric information theory of underpricing and suggests that aggressive earnings management increases valuation uncertainty of IPO firms and leads to steeper price discounts.     

盈余管理问题初探

近年来,会计信息的质量问题普遍堪忧.盈余管理问题是影响会计信息质量的一大因素.对盈余管理的研究要正确划分盈余管理与财务欺诈的界限.另外,要认清盈余管理可能造成的后果.本文的研究重点在于盈余管理的资本市场动因以及影响,并提出正确判断企业是否存在盈余管理应解决的标准问题.     

Earnings management at rights issues thresholds—Evidence from China

Burgstahler and Dichev (BD) (Burgstahler, David, Ilia, Dichev, 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23(1), 99–126.) and Degorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (DPZ) (Degeorge, Franscois, Patel, Jayendu, Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72(1), 1–33.) examine earnings management among American firms by looking at actual distributions around critical thresholds. Chinese firms must meet minimal ROE requirements if they are to have rights issues. Using a distribution approach, we examine whether Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regulatory requirements. Our empirical findings indicate that Chinese firms indeed heavily engaged in earnings management to meet the rights issue thresholds during the period 1994–2002. In addition, we show that these firms changed their behavior in response to changes in regulatory requirements. Furthermore, we analyse the pervasiveness of this practice and the means used in earnings management at the relevant ROE thresholds. Our findings have direct policy implications for the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).     

The association between management earnings forecasts, earnings management, and stock market valuation: Evidence from French IPOs

This study investigates managers' motivations to engage in earnings management through purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) in France. Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses are expected to differ from nonforecasters in the level of earnings management during the year following the public offering. Within the context of contracting theory, four research questions are addressed. First, are IPO firms issuing forecasts more inclined to manage earnings 1 year after an IPO compared to nonforecasting firms? Second, is a forecasting firm's level of earnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast deviation? Third, is earnings management by IPO forecasting firms affected by contractual and governance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through earnings management following IPO earnings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market participants value earnings components (i.e., nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals)? Our findings document that in the year following an IPO, the magnitude of earnings management is much higher for forecasters than for nonforecasters. Results also show that a firm's accrual behavior is affected by earnings-forecast deviation, but the relationship is moderated by contractual and governance constraints. Finally, it would appear that French investors do not adequately readjust the relationship between reported earnings and a firm's market value for the year in which earnings are subject to manipulations.     

Earnings management to exceed thresholds: Evidence from Singapore and Thailand

Earnings play a vital role in portraying a company's economic health. Hence, executives have incentives to manage earnings. Motivated by Degeorge et al. [Degeorge, F., Patel, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72, 1–33] and Burgstahler and Dichev [Burgstahler, D., Dichev, I., 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 99–126], this study applies the behavioral framework developed by Degeorge et al. [Degeorge, F., Patel, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72, 1–33] to investigate earnings management to exceed thresholds in Singapore and Thailand. The empirical evidence reveals that earnings management exists in Singapore and Thailand to avoid reporting losses and negative earnings growth. This earnings management practice, however, varies between financial and non-financial firms, between Singaporean and Thai firms, and between before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Moreover, corporate governance structure is found to impact the extent of earnings management to exceed thresholds in Singapore.     

Do auditing standards improve the accounting disclosure and information environment of public companies? Evidence from the emerging markets in China

In this paper, we investigate the impact of the implementation of a set of new auditing standards in 1996 on the information environment in the emerging markets in China. Because the implementation of such standards can increase the quality and/or quantity of accounting disclosures, it can be conceptualized as an improvement in the information environment of public companies. We investigate the improvement in accounting disclosure and information environment from both the market perspective and the accounting perspective. First, consistent with the information economics literature (e.g., [Holthausen, R., & Verrecchia, R., (1990). The effect of informedness and consensus on price and volume behavior. The Accounting Review, 65, 191–208]), we find that companies experience a significant increase in trading volume and price volatility subsequent to the implementation of the standards. Second, consistent with the literature on earnings management (e.g., [Chen, C. W. K., & Yuan, H. Q., (2004). Earnings management and capital resource allocation: evidence from China's accounting-based regulation of right issue. The Accounting Review, 79, 645–665, Jian, M., & Wong, T. J., (2004). Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups. Working Paper, Nanyang Technological University and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]), we find a decrease in earnings management and, hence, an increase in quality of earnings. Finally, we find a decrease in the synchronicity of stock prices and, hence, an increase in the quality of firm-specific information available to investors, which is consistent with the literature on price synchronicity (e.g., [Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W., (2000). The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 215–260]). Our results have significant implications for standard setters, regulators, researchers, managers, and investors in general and those in the emerging markets in particular.     

Earnings attributes and investor-protection: International evidence

This study explores the effects of investor-protection on reported earnings quality assessed on the basis of four accounting-based earnings attributes (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness). We test the hypothesis that favorable values of each earnings attribute (considered individually) occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide relatively strong investor-protection. The results based on K-means cluster analysis of institutional characteristics are mixed. Earnings smoothness is less prevalent in strong investor-protection countries, as hypothesized. However both accruals quality and earnings predictability are better in countries whose institutional characteristics are relatively weak. No association is found between investor-protection and earnings persistence, except that countries with low ownership concentration appear to have high earnings persistence. The results based on regression analysis are consistent with those based on the cluster analysis. These results imply that conclusions about the impact of institutional characteristics on earnings quality depend on how earnings quality is measured.     

公司治理结构与盈余管理模式的互动分析

公司治理结构影响会计信息质量,会计信息质量的高低对公司治理结构的完善起到关键作用.盈余管理通过会计政策的选择与公司治理结构产生关系,公司治理结构对盈余管理模式具有重要影响,这种影响体现在内部治理和外部治理两个方面.同时,不同的盈余管理模式对公司治理结构的完善起着不同的作用.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.