公司特征对公司现金持有量的影响研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文采用描述性统计、单因素方差分析和OLS等方法实证检验公司特征如何影响公司现金持有量。研究结果显示：（1）中国上市公司的现金持有量比英美国家高;（2）不同行业之间的公司现金持有量存在系统性差异,行业类别是影响公司现金持有量的一个重要因素;（3）公司规模、公司成长机会与公司现金持有量显著正相关;（4）杠杆、非现金流动资产与公司现金持有量显著负相关;（5）支付现金股利的公司具有相对高的现金持有量。作者没有发现银行债务显著影响公司现金持有量的经验证据。     

股利政策、股权制衡与公司成长性

本文以我国2005年-2007年中小板市场上市公司为样本（面板数据），从公司成长性的角度考察了股权结构对现金股利政策的实证影响。具体检查了现金股利和第一大股东、股权制衡以及公司成长性之间的计量关系，经验结果表明：中小板公司的第一大股东具有强烈的发放现金股利的激励，公司成长性不能弱化第一大股东对现金股利的偏好，其他大股东不能够对第一大股东的行为进行监督和牵制，甚至存在附和第一大股东的倾向。     

家族企业现金持有量影响因素分析

本文分析了我国家族上市公司现金持有量的影响因素。与已有的研究结论不同,本文实证回归结果表明,家族上市公司资产负债率、董事长和总经理两职合一、现金替代物、债务融资成本与现金持有量显著负相关,公司投资机会、第一大股东持股比例、股利支付率与现金持有量显著正相关,企业规模、银行借款比重、控制权与现金流权分离度和股权制衡比例和现金持有量没有显著相关性。融资约束是影响家族企业现金持有量决策的重要因素,而且家族控股股东对上市公司主要体现为支持动机,而不是一般认为的掏空动机。     

家族企业现金持有量影响因素分析

本文分析了我国家族上市公司现金持有量的影响因素。与已有的研究结论不同,本文实证回归结果表明,家族上市公司资产负债率、董事长和总经理两职合一、现金替代物、债务融资成本与现金持有量显著负相关,公司投资机会、第一大股东持股比例、股利支付率与现金持有量显著正相关,企业规模、银行借款比重、控制权与现金流权分离度和股权制衡比例和现金持有量没有显著相关性。融资约束是影响家族企业现金持有量决策的重要因素,而且家族控股股东对上市公司主要体现为支持动机,而不是一般认为的掏空动机。     

现金持有量:增加还是损害公司业绩?

通过放松现金持有量与公司业绩之间是线性关系的假设,从线性(平均效应)和非线性(现金持有量不同水平下的区间效应)两方面探讨现金持有量对公司业绩的影响。结果发现,虽然平均而言,现金持有量有利于提升公司业绩,但是随着现金持有量的提升,公司业绩却呈现逐渐下降的趋势。进一步地结合投资支出来分析不同现金水平下公司业绩呈下降趋势的主要原因,结果发现现金水平的提升易引发企业的过度投资行为,并最终导致公司业绩的下降。同时,还发现融资约束和成长性也会影响现金持有量与公司业绩之间的关系。     

公司治理环境、控制权和现金流权分离与现金持有量价值——基于我国上市公司的实证分析

公司治理环境、控制权和现金流权分离度共同影响着企业的现金持有量,实证研究发现:我国公司治理环境与现金持有量之间为正相关关系;控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离度与现金持有量之间为负相关关系,但是公司治理环境的改善对这种关系有抑制作用;与国有企业相比,治理环境和上市公司现金持有量之间的正相关关系在私营企业中表现得更为明显。     

融资约束、投资效率与融资渠道选择

研究融资约束影响企业的现金持有量、盈利能力、融资渠道与其投资效率,发现融资约束主要通过银行信贷途径影响企业投资效率,对股权融资途径影响较小。充分现金持有、盈利能力强能缓解企业的融资约束。在融资约束条件下,国有企业通过债务融资可以提高投资效率,非国有企业投资效率下降。在非融资约束条件下,非国有企业债务融资的投资效率提高。     

上市公司现金持有量与盈利能力的实证研究——基于A股市场房地产行业的经验数据

目前,学术界对于最佳现金持有量的研究,主要集中于最佳现金持有量的影响因素研究,对于企业现金持有量和盈利能力持有量之间的相关关系鲜有涉及,企业持有现金的动机主要是为了满足企业的交易性需要、预防性需要、以及投机性需要,现金的特点主要表现在：①流动性强,②收益性较低,本文基于现金持有量理论中现金的流动性强和盈利性弱的逻辑关系对上A股房地产行业的上市公司的现金持有量和盈利能力进行实证研究。     

现金管理政策案例分析

企业现金管理的核心内容是现金持有量的决策问题,影响着企业的相关财务决策。本文旨在研究企业内部结构对现金持有量的影响,并依据实证结论提出现金管理的各种模式,保证企业高效、高质地开展经营活动,同时尽可能保持最低的现金持有量。     

股权分置、公司治理与股利分配决策：现金股利还是股票股利？

以2004~2007中国上市公司为样本,应用LOGISTIC回归对-股权分置改革前后我国上市公司股利分配决策进行理论与实证分析。结果表明,股权分置改革后,我国上市公司发放股票股利呈现增多的趋势,第一大股东、第二大股东持股比例越高,以及董事会人数越多,公司越倾向于现金股利分配,但机构投资者持股比例越高,越倾向于发放股票股利。同时,企业成长性强的公司倾向于发放股票股利,而现金流量好的公司往往不发放股票股利,企业规模与股票分配决策无关。     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

Organization capital and corporate cash holdings

This paper investigates the relationship between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. We develop two competing hypotheses in relating organization capital with cash holding. Our analysis reveals that organization capital is related to high levels of cash holdings. Moreover, we find that the effect of organization capital on corporate cash holdings is stronger for firms experiencing high levels of financing constraint and cash flow risk. Our results remain robust to alternative measures of organization capital and corporate cash holdings, and are not driven by omitted variable bias or endogeneity issues. We also find that the positive relation between organization capital and cash holdings is not confounded by sample period or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the precautionary motive for corporate cash holding.     

Banking deregulation,consolidation, and corporate cash holdings: U.S. evidence

This paper tests the effects of banking deregulation on the cash policies of nonbanking firms in the United States. We document a significant and negative relation between intrastate banking deregulation and corporate cash holdings. We show that the negative relation is driven by financially constrained firms, especially by constrained firms with low hedging needs. Further, we construct indexes measuring the intensity of bank consolidation in local markets. We find that the intensity of in-market bank mergers is negatively related to corporate cash holdings. However, in-market bank mergers in highly concentrated markets tend to be positively related to corporate cash holdings.     

The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.     

Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences

The considerable growth in corporate cash holdings around the world has prompted scholarly interest. Consequently, there is now a large academic literature examining cash holdings and their impact on corporate outcomes and firm values. This article reviews and synthesizes the literature to offer insight into two primary motives to hold cash: precautionary and agency. We first present a stylized model that explores the trade-off in holding cash between these two motives and then examine empirical studies to determine how existing theories are supported by evidence using data from a variety of countries. In addition, we examine the effectiveness of a variety of corporate governance devices in curtailing cash holdings and also the extent to which these devices offer investors' confidence that cash will not be wasted. Finally, we discuss methodological and measurement issues associated with empirical cash holdings studies.     

Cash and Corporate Control

The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.     

Grabbing hand or financial constraint mitigation effect? A reexamination of the relationship between institutional development and cash holdings

This study reexamines the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Our findings confirm that institutional development has a negative effect on corporate cash holdings, which may be partially explained by the financial constraint mitigation effect of institutional development. Our empirical evidence also shows that the corruption index, used as a proxy for the grabbing hand effect, does not mediate the negative effect of institutional development on corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, the impact of institutional development on corporate cash holdings is not significant for large firms and state-owned enterprises. These results are robust to different measures of cash holdings.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

Corporate cash holdings,foreign direct investment,and corporate governance

The determinants of corporate cash holdings in the context of corporate governance theories have recently been analyzed in the literature. In the present study, the behavior of corporate managers in countries with poor shareholder rights protection is more in conformity with the agency problem theory than other corporate governance theories. Also, smaller firms tend to hold larger cash balances relative to their total assets than their larger counterparts. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in today's highly integrated capital markets act as substitutes for corporate cash holdings. When firms in G-7 countries are separated from the ones in other countries, FDI inflows demonstrate different effects on international corporate cash holdings: They are substitutes for cash holdings in the former group of countries but become complements for cash holdings by firms in the latter one.     

Oil price uncertainty and corporate cash holdings: Global evidence

This study investigates the effects of oil price uncertainty on corporate cash holdings using large international publicly listed firms from 89 countries for the period 1990–2017. Building on the precautionary motive of cash and the trade-off theory, we argue that the oil price uncertainty has a significant impact on corporate cash holdings and this impact is nonlinear. First, we find that oil price volatility is positively associated with corporate cash holdings. However, we then find evidence that shows that the association between oil volatility and cash holdings exhibits a U-shape. Finally, we present evidence that the positive relationship between oil price uncertainty and corporate cash holdings is more pronounced in firms operating in oil-exporting countries and in oil-exposed industries. Overall, our findings support our predictions and are robust to multiple robustness tests.