Strategic pricing by Big 4 audit firms in private client segments

We examine how Big 4 auditors compete for new private clients. We find evidence suggesting that Big 4 auditors offer fee discounts to attract non‐Big 4 private clients to experience attributes of their brand name audit services. We also find that to attract clients from competing Big 4 suppliers, Big 4 auditors target fee discounts at clients in industries where they are the market leader. Our results further indicate that the Big 4 industry leaders target fee discounts to fast‐growing clients and are able to charge these clients significant price fee increases in the second mandate period (after 3 years).     

Do supply shocks in the audit partner labor market affect auditor choice? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We examine whether supply shocks in the audit partner labor market induce clients to switch audit partners. We argue that audit partners in their early careers (i.e., junior partners) charge low audit fees to attract clients, which induces client firms to switch from senior partners to junior partners when there are more junior partners available. Utilizing the Big4 localization policy, we find that Big4 clients are more likely to replace senior auditors with junior auditors to cut costs after the policy. Furthermore, the results are mainly driven by clients who are charged high fees. Our empirical evidence enriches the understanding of auditor choice determinants and informs the ongoing debates surrounding new regulations for Big4 firms in China.     

Further evidence on mandatory partner rotation and audit pricing: a supply‐side perspective

This study examines effects of mandatory partner rotation (MPR) on audit fees of Australian‐listed companies. Using a fee changes approach, evidence of fee increases in year of the MPR driven by smaller offices of non‐Big 4 auditors is found, consistent with supply‐side resource constraint arguments. Broadly consistent findings are observed using a fee levels approach. Appointment of inexperienced partners to MPR engagements has no discernible effect on fees. Additional analysis of audit reporting lag indicates fee increases reflect additional audit effort as opposed to a pricing strategy. Overall, the evidence supports recent moves by policy‐makers to soften MPR requirements.     

Auditor quality,audit fees,organizational structure,and risk taking in the US life insurance industry

Using a system of simultaneous equations, this study examines the relation among external audit monitoring, in the US life insurance industry. We find insurers with higher leverage risk and surplus risk are more likely to use Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher fees. In return, insurers hiring Big‐4 auditors and paying higher audit fees have lower leverage risk and surplus risk. Second, the results suggest that mutual life insurers have a higher leverage risk and surplus risk than stock life insurers. This evidence is in contrast to that for property–liability insurance companies. Third, we find insurers are less likely to hire Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher audit fees after implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Finally, life insurers with Big‐4 auditors or paying higher audit fees are more likely to take lower risks after the implementation of SOX.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

Are non‐audit services associated with firm value? Evidence from financial information system‐related services

The purchase of non‐audit services from incumbent auditors has generated considerable attention. Surprisingly, limited empirical evidence exists on the association of non‐audit services with firm value. Focusing on services related to financial information system (FIS), we find that the market value of equity is greater for firms that purchase FIS‐related services from their incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not. The levels of FIS fees are also positively related to firm value after controlling for total other fees, or total other non‐audit fees. Hence, despite the negative perception associated with non‐audit services, investors regard FIS‐related services as value‐adding activities.     

On the persistence and dynamics of Big 4 real audit fees: Evidence from the UK

Despite the huge audit pricing literature, there is a dearth of evidence on the temporal dynamics of audit fee adjustments and the persistence of audit fees. Based on a sample of 76,867 panel observations for a sample of UK companies audited by the Big 4 over the period 1998 to 2012, we employ consistent lagged dependent variable panel estimators to provide new evidence on the persistence and dynamics of real Big 4 audit fees. Contrary to extant research, which assumes that audit fees adjust immediately in a single period, our empirical results indicate that Big 4 real audit fees are persistent, being partly dependent on their previous realisations. We conclude that static audit fee models omit a potentially important temporal dimension of audit pricing behaviour and that further research is warranted into dynamic audit fee models across other jurisdictions.     

Has SOX Enhanced Non–Big 4 Auditors' Ability to Deal with Client Pressure?

We investigate whether non–Big 4 auditors have enhanced their ability to resist client pressure over accrual reporting following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Regressing abnormal accruals on proxies for economic bonding, we find that changes in the association, defined as (Post–Pre), are significantly negative, implying an improvement in auditor independence after SOX. Among non–Big 4 auditors, only Tier 3 auditors compromised reporting objectivity before SOX, but neither Tier 2 nor Tier 3 auditors yielded to client pressure after SOX. Evidence that these two groups of non–Big 4 auditors differ in the way they cope with client pressure in a loose regulatory regime highlights the importance of assessing the efficacy of SOX separately for subsets of auditors and contributes to an understanding of the underresearched, but inherently important, segment of the audit market served by non–Big 4 auditors. Further analysis indicates that the low pre‐SOX audit quality observed in the full sample is driven by non–PCAOB registrants.     

The Market for External Audit Services in the Public Sector: An Empirical Analysis of NHS Trusts

This study investigates the market for audit services in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The market has a number of interesting features, including the presence of the Audit Commission as a regulator, appointer and provider of audit services. Following a theoretical overview of audit pricing in the NHS, evidence is provided on the behaviour of private sector auditors in an environment where audit risk characteristics differ from the private sector. The research also investigates, for the first time in the public sector, the relationship between audit fees and non–audit (consultancy) fees. Comparisons are also drawn between audit fees in the public and private sectors in an analysis of audit fees by industry. Despite some key similarities, the study shows that a number of differences exist between private and public sector audit fee models. In particular, we find no evidence of Big 6 (or mid–tier) auditor premiums, but we do find a significant negative relationship between audit and consultancy fees providing support for the 'knowledge spill–over' hypothesis. In addition, the fees charged to trusts appear significantly lower than their private sector counterparts, despite trust auditors having additional duties to perform. Possible explanations for this finding are offered in the paper.     

Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence from China's binary market

Big 5 auditors enjoy a worldwide audit fee premium that is believed to be attributable primarily to their reputation for providing high-quality services to clients. This study finds that the fee premium is also attributable to a lack of competition in the market. Taking advantage of the binary structure of the audit market in China, we compare the pricing practices of the Big 5 in the competitive statutory market and the less competitive supplementary market. Although the Big 5 have a reputation for high-quality audits in both markets, the degree of competition in the two markets is very different. Using audit fee data from the period 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 earn a significant fee premium in the less competitive supplementary market, but not in the competitive statutory market. Although our results do not completely rule out reputation as an explanation, they are consistent with the notion that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is more likely to be attributable to their dominant market position than to their reputation in the emerging Chinese markets, in which the usual audit-quality benefits for investors and managers are either absent or minimal.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

The value of Big 4 audits in Australia

Research suggests that equity markets value Big N audits over non‐Big N audits. Explanations include the information quality hypothesis, whereby Big N auditors increase information quality, and the insurance hypothesis, whereby investors value the deeper pockets of Big N auditors. Using client firms’ex ante cost of capital as the dependent variable, we investigate whether capital market participants differentially value Big 4 versus non‐Big 4 audits in Australia and whether the value of Big 4 audits in Australia changed as a result of the audit failures of 2001–2002. We find that Big 4 audits reduce the ex ante cost of equity capital until 2001, but not after 2001. We cannot dismiss the insurance hypothesis for the persistence of the loss beyond 2003 because of the establishment of liability caps, but the demise of the Big 4 audit value for 2001–2003 is consistent with the information quality hypothesis and does not support the insurance hypothesis.     

The pricing of initial audit engagements by big 4 and leading mid-tier auditors

The recent investigation of the UK audit market by the Competition Commission testifies to perennial regulatory concerns regarding increasing supplier concentration, big 4 dominance of large company audits and the capacity of mid-tier auditors to compete. Against this backdrop, this paper presents new evidence on whether there is competitive pricing for initial audit engagements by big 4 auditors relative to their next four largest mid-tier (mid 4) counterparts for the UK quoted and private corporate sectors. Based on data from FAME for 2007 and 2010, the evidence indicates that larger quoted companies switching between the big 4 benefit from substantial discounts, with smaller discounts attracted by clients switching to the mid 4. Coupled with evidence that fees for both audit and non-audit services recover in subsequent periods, and consistent with the theoretical framework, the paper concludes that big 4 discounting is a competitive outcome aimed at securing future economic rents. New evidence demonstrates that smaller clients switching to big 4 or mid 4 auditors do not benefit from low-balling.     

Is the audit services market competitive following Arthur Andersen's collapse?

This study investigates whether audit markets remain competitive in the wake of Arthur Andersen's demise and merger with Ernst & Young to create the Big Four. We conduct the study estimating audit fee models using Australian audit market data from both 2000 and 2003 to determine whether there is any evidence of cartel pricing either before, or subsequent to, the merger. In both years, we find evidence of a Big N price premium when estimating an audit fee model across all clients, and when we estimate the model separately across large and small client market segments. This evidence is consistent with product differentiation by Big N auditors and competitive markets.     

Economic consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs

This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write‐offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write‐off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write‐offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write‐off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs. I also provide evidence that write‐off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst‐forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.     

What is the impact of corruption on audit fees?

This study examines the impact of country-level corruption on audit fees. Using a sample of 102,934 companies from 48 countries over the period 1998–2014, the authors find that audit fees are positively associated with higher levels of corruption. They also discovered that corruption adds a significant margin to the premium paid to Big 4 (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG) auditors. The study opens up a new line of research and adds significantly to the academic literature on the Big 4 audit premium.

IMPACT

The study has several important implications for academics and policy-makers. These include discussion of the factors driving corruption and the role of auditing. Knowledge of the factors driving corruption should guide policy-makers to adoption of polices that could reduce corruption. The finding that audit fees are positively associated with corruption, as well as with audit quality, points to the potential for auditing as a tool for corruption control beyond its traditional role as an assurance service.     

我国审计定价影响因素的实证研究

审计定价与注册会计师的独立性和审计质量息息相关.通过运用2006年沪、深两市上市公司的实证数据对我国审计定价影响因素进行实证研究,结果表明:非审计费用未影响审计定价,董事会规模、董事会勤勉与独立性、事务所品牌、企业规模和子公司数目等直接影响审计定价.