Risk and capital transfer in insurance groups

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of capital and risk transfer instruments (CRTIs) on a financial group's risk situation. In this respect, we extend previous literature by accounting for the conglomerate discount on firm value, which is a reduction in shareholder value due to diversification within the group. In general, CRTIs between parent and subsidiaries have a substantial effect on the diversification of risks, economic capital requirements, and default risk, which we study in detail for different types of CRTIs, including intra-group retrocession and guarantees. One main finding is that diversification effects within the group are much lower when taking into account conglomerate discount effects. We believe this aspect to be an important issue in the ongoing discussion on group solvency regulation and enterprise risk management.     

Shareholder wealth effects of interstate banking: The case of Delaware's Financial Center Development Act

The Financial Center Development Act (FCDA) of Delaware was signed into law in March 1981, to permit out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to establish special purpose banking subsidiaries within the state of Delaware. The FCDA can be viewed as part of the growing national trend toward interstate banking. If interstate banking is to succeed, the benefits from BHCs establishing interstate subsidiaries must be consistent with the welfare of the BHCs shareholders. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact on shareholder wealth of the decision by BHCs to establish subsidiaries within the state of Delaware. Using event study methodology, the results from this study show that the decision to establish a special purpose banking subsidiary within the state of Delaware under the FCDA is consistent with the maximization of shareholder wealth.Funding for this research was made available by the University of Delaware General Research Fund. The authors thank Paul Horvitz, Kevin Scanlon, Ron Watson, and David Walker for helpful comments.     

Debt Financing and Earnings Management: An Internal Capital Market Perspective

This paper investigates the role internal capital markets play in mitigating earnings management of group firms. We predict that the funding advantages of internal capital markets from business affiliates obscure solvency problems resulting from higher leverage for individual firms within a group, which in turn mitigates their incentives for earnings management. Using Taiwanese firms as a sample, we provide evidence that is consistent with such a prediction. In particular, we show that higher group profitability reduces its member firms’ sensitivity of earnings management to debt levels. Among business groups, earnings management in pyramidal groups is less sensitive to debt levels. We also find that the debt‐abnormal accrual curve becomes smoother as group profitability increases when considering the non‐monotonic relationship between firm leverage and earnings management.     

Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.     

Foreign bank subsidiaries' default risk during the global crisis: What factors help insulate affiliates from their parents?

This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries in developing countries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of determining the size and sign of this correlation and, more importantly, understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. We find evidence of a significant and robust positive correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have a higher share of retail deposit funding and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country bank regulations are also associated with the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries’ default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of subsidiaries and their parents is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements, and tougher restrictions on bank activities.     

Agency and Internal Capital Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Banking Organizations

Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than nonpublicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence of interests between the chief executive officer and the shareholders is an important source of the internal capital misallocation. I also demonstrate that BHCs incorporating a tiered organizational structure are less efficient than nontiered BHCs, but only within a sample of BHCs that are publicly traded. These findings imply that a greater degree of rent‐seeking activity by division managers contributes to internal capital market inefficiency only if the top manager is an agent. This is consistent with theoretical models that explain internal capital misallocations through the multiple layers of agency within an organization.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

The Role of Internal Capital Markets in Financial Intermediaries: Evidence From Insurer Groups

We exploit the transparency of internal capital markets (ICMs) within insurance groups to investigate the activity and efficiency of ICMs within insurance groups. Specifically, we compare the relationship between internal capital transfers and investment to that between capital from other sources and investment. The ability to track the actual ICM transactions allows for more direct analysis of ICM activity than most previous studies. Consistent with theory, we find evidence that ICMs play a significant role in the investment behavior of affiliated insurers. We then use these detailed data to execute a more direct test of ICM efficiency than currently exists in the literature. Consistent with ICM efficiency, results suggest that capital is allocated to subsidiaries with the best expected performance.     

Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

Withdrawal from Foreign Lending in the Financial Crisis by Parent Banks and Their Branches and Subsidiaries: Supply Versus Demand Effects

This study investigates the different channels through which internationally active banks can provide loans abroad. Using data on German banks from 2002 to 2010, we contrast determinants for cross-border lending by the parent bank with lending by affiliates located abroad. We show that lending by parent banks is based almost entirely on supply-side determinants, in particular on bank-specific factors. The more the loans are intermediated by banks’ affiliates located abroad, the more relevant become foreign countries’ demand and risk characteristics. This applies in particular when banks operate via locally focused affiliates - rather than regionally active hub affiliates - as well as when the affiliates have the status of branches as opposed to legally independent subsidiaries. In general, banks with a greater risk aversion withdraw more from foreign lending during the financial crisis, especially following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, at a Tier I capital ratio of around 11 %, a further increase in the ratio did not affect lending anymore.     

Multinational capital structure and financial flexibility

We address multinational capital structure decisions when firms have varying degrees of financial flexibility for shifting income and/or tax shields between subsidiaries. We find: (1) firms can use leverage to dramatically reduce negative valuation effects from operating in a high-tax country; (2) financial flexibility is a key determinant of optimal capital structure, acting as both a substitute and a complement for leverage; (3) multinational firms derive a synergistic effect from financial flexibility, which can enhance their value beyond that for a single-country firm from a low-tax jurisdiction; and (4) optimal capital structure typically differs substantially across subsidiaries, with each having positions in multiple currencies.     

Financial Dampening

We propose a novel mechanism, “financial dampening,” whereby loan retrenchment by banks attenuates the effectiveness of monetary policy. The theory unifies an endogenous supply of illiquid local loans and risk sharing among subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs). We derive an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that separates supply-driven loan retrenchment from local loan demand by exploiting linkages through BHC internal capital markets across spatially separate BHC member banks. We estimate that retrenching banks increase loan supply substantially less in response to exogenous monetary policy rate reductions. This relative decline has persistent effects on local employment and thus provides a rationale for slow recoveries from financial distress.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.     

Multinational banking and the international transmission of financial shocks: Evidence from foreign bank subsidiaries

Using bank-level data on 368 foreign subsidiaries of 68 multinational banks in 47 emerging economies during 1994–2008, we present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign subsidiaries. We find that internal capital markets transmit favorable and adverse shocks by affecting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal funds for lending. We also find that the transmission of financial shocks varies across types of shocks; is strongest among subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by Asia and Latin America; is global rather than regional; and becomes more conspicuous in recent years. We also explore various conditions under which the international transmission of financial shocks via internal capital markets in multinational banking is stronger, including the subsidiaries’ reliance on funds from their parent bank, the subsidiaries’ entry mode, and the capital account openness and banking market structure in host countries.     

Determinants of the capital adequacy ratio of foreign banks’ subsidiaries: The role of interbank market and regulation

This paper examines the factors influencing the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of foreign banks. We test whether the CAR of subsidiaries and branches in developed and developing countries depends on the same factors. We use data from 310 subsidiaries and 265 branches to test the impact of the parent banks’ fundamentals on subsidiaries’ and branches’ capital ratios. We also study how the economic condition and regulatory environment in a bank's home country determine foreign banks’ CAR. Our results provide strong evidence that the CAR of subsidiaries and branches operating in developing and developed countries do not depend on the same set of explanatory factors. We also find that the regulatory framework of a parent bank's home country affects the capitalization of its foreign subsidiaries in the host countries. Finally, we show that specific variables of the parent bank have a stronger effect for foreign banks highly related to the interbank market.     

The Capital Structure of Large Firms and the Use of Dutch Financing Entities

Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set up lowly‐taxed affiliates for internal debt‐shifting purposes. In addition, they may channel interest payments through Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs) to avoid withholding taxes, a widely‐used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure of large EU‐based multinationals, this paper provides evidence that the use of Dutch‐issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch on‐lending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Thus, the paper provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU countries such as the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, allow large firms to avoid those taxes.     

Equity Carve-Outs and Managerial Discretion

This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve-outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve-outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve-outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve-outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.     

On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

Much of the literature on capital structure excludes Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) due mainly to the unique regulatory environment of these firms. As such, the issue of how REITs choose among different financing options when they raise external capital is largely unexplored. In this paper, we explore two issues on the capital structure of REITs: is there a relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratios, and, is the relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratio temporary or persistent. Our results suggest that REITs with historically high market-to-book ratio tend to have persistently high leverage ratio. In essence, REITs with high growth opportunity and high market valuation raise funds through debt issues. This finding, which is robust to various specifications and econometric tests, is contrary to the financing decisions of non-regulated firms. We attribute it to the special regulatory environment of REITs where, despite no apparent benefits to debt financing, management issues debt. Comments from Robert Edelstein and others at the Maastricht–Cambridge 2005 Symposium, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are our own.