Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? The Case of the United Kingdom

A large number of studies have shown that many companies have made large acquisitions that their own shareholders probably would not have approved if given the opportunity to do so. In this article, which summarizes the findings of their study published recently in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors present evidence that suggests the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a corporate governance mechanism designed to prevent such value‐reducing acquisitions from taking place. The authors' study focused on acquisitions in the U.K. where proposed transactions that exceed a series of 25% relative size (target's as a percentage of the acquirer's) thresholds are defined as “Class 1” transactions and require shareholder approval. The authors found strikingly positive stock market reactions to the announcements of such Class 1 acquisitions—as compared to zero if not negative average announcement returns for Class 2 transactions that were not subject to a shareholder vote. And when the authors extended their analysis to U.S. M&A markets, they found that the larger (again, in relative size) U.S. deals—large enough that they would have required a shareholder vote in the U.K.—provided returns to their shareholders that were negative, and thus significantly lower than those of their U.K counterparts. In terms of the economic significance of their findings, the authors found that Class 1 transactions were associated with aggregate gains to acquirer shareholders of $13.6 billion. By contrast, U.S. transactions of similar size, which again were not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $210 billion for acquirer shareholders; and Class 2 U.K. transactions, also not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $3 billion. In a further series of tests designed to shed light on how mandatory shareholder voting generates such substantial value improvements for acquirer shareholders, the authors also found evidence suggesting that when faced with the requirement of a shareholder vote, CEOs and boards are more likely to resist the temptation to overpay to close a deal. And the fact that the shareholders of the Class 1 acquirers did not end up blocking a single transaction that was submitted to a vote suggests that this mechanism works without the need for shareholders to actually vote down a deal. In other words, mandatory shareholder voting on acquisitions is a powerful deterrent to “bad deals” because, first of all, the vote is triggered automatically by the relative size tests and, second, CEOs and boards, with the help of their bankers, have a pretty good idea well in advance of the vote whether their shareholders are going to vote “no”—and such a vote would be viewed by top management as a major rejection, a strong vote of no confidence.     

Comply or Explain: Investor Protection Through the Italian Corporate Governance Code

Nearly 86% of listed Italian companies now claim to be in formal compliance with the provisions of the Italian Corporate Governance Code, which, like many codes in EU countries, give companies the option to either comply or explain their decision not to do so. But in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the effectiveness of such self‐regulatory corporate governance codes has been subjected to increasing skepticism. In particular, critics wonder whether such governance codes actually encourage the adoption of best practices and promote better governance. This article presents a governance indicator (CoRe) devised by the authors that attempts to assess the actual, or effective, levels of compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance Code in terms of listed companies' procedures for dealing with related party transactions (RPTs). The authors report that the companies' level of effective compliance with regard to RPTs is considerably lower than their publicly reported levels of formal compliance. The authors also report that higher levels of effective compliance tend to be found in companies where (1) minority shareholders have appointed one or more directors; (2) independent directors serve on important committees; and (3) there are significant holdings by institutional investors—particularly foreign investors—who participate in general shareholder meetings.     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

The Relationship between Shareholder Return and CEO Pay over a CEO's Full Period of Service

The author reports the findings of his examination of the relationship between CEO pay and performance, as measured by shareholder returns, using measures of compensation and returns that span a CEO's full period of service. Unlike studies that look at annual measures of CEO pay and stock returns—which are distorted by the widespread use of options and the arbitrary effects of when CEOs choose to exercise their options—the author finds a statistically significant connection between total compensation and shareholder return measured over full periods of service for 521 S&P 500 CEOs. Indeed, after one adjusts for differences in the length of a CEO's service, shareholder return is arguably the most important determinant of variation in the amount paid CEOs over their complete tenures. Besides answering the legion of critics of CEO pay, the author's analysis refutes the claim that bull markets are the main force driving executive pay by demonstrating that the increases in career pay attributable to increases in shareholder returns are almost exactly offset by reductions in pay when the Value‐Weighted (S&P 500) Index increases by the same amount. In other words, CEOs’ cumulative career pay is effectively driven by the extent to which their stock returns outperform the broad market. The analysis also casts doubt on the popular claim that the link between CEO pay and corporate size provides incentives to undertake even value‐reducing acquisitions to boost size. As the author's analysis shows, the estimated losses in career CEO pay associated with even small declines in shareholder returns are likely to be offset by the pay increases attributable to size.     

Blockholders Are More Common in the United States Than You Might Think*

Finance scholars have long characterized the large publicly traded U.S. company as having a fragmented ownership structure with a diffuse shareholder base—significantly more diffuse than comparable companies in most other countries. But the findings of the author's recent study, which incluudes large amounts of “hand-collected data” on the share ownership of U.S. companies, are strikingly at odds with this characterization. As reporteed in the study, 96% of a sample of 375 randomly chosen, publicly traded U.S. corporations—including companies like American Express and McDonald's—had at least one shareholder who owned at least 5% of the firm's common stock. In fact, such blockholders as a group owned almost 40% of the typical U.S. company. There was, to be sure, an inverse relation between ownership concentration and firm size, but ownership was unexpectedly concentrated even among the largest companies, with 89% of the S&P 500 companies in the sample having at least one 5% blockholder. What's more, the ownership concentration of U.S. public companies turned out to be remarkably similar to the average ownership concentration of large samples of listed companies from 22 European and East Asian countries. More specifically, the ownership structure of U.S. companies—after controlling for differences in company size—appears to all in the middle of the distribution of those countries, whether one looks at the proportion of companies with block-holders or the blockholders' average percentage holdings.     

The UK's Exit Charge from the EU: Insights from Modes of Accounting

Whatever the final charge on the UK for leaving the EU, the money itself is relatively marginal to the former's public finances. However, this charge is politically sensitive and financially aggravating during one of the longest periods of fiscal austerity in the UK's history. The ways in which leaving is conceptualized have implications for any continuing financial obligations that must be managed within the context of fiscal austerity and political uncertainty. Yet, leaving the EU is a unique transaction: it is not analogous, for example, to a divorce settlement, the leaving of a club, the termination of a commercial contract, the leaving of a treaty-based international organization, or secession from a state. Analyzing the formulation of the charge in terms of the four modes of government accounting—financial reporting, statistical accounting, budgeting, and fiscal sustainability projections—enhances its fiscal transparency. It evidences not only the weakness and inconsistency of the UK's negotiating position but also the dominance in EU thinking of the short-term budgetary calculations of the 2014–20 Multiannual Financial Framework over its long-term sustainability without a large net contributor. The final amount paid by the UK will depend on the resolution of competing perspectives as well as on liabilities and contingent liabilities associated with the increasingly complex EU financial architecture.     

Loyalty‐Shares: Rewarding Long‐term Investors

In the face of growing concern about investors' excessive focus on quarterly earnings, recent research has found new evidence of the benefits of a committed long‐term shareholder base, whether in terms of higher profitability, R&D investment, greater integration of ESG factors, or a reduced cost of capital. In light of this evidence, this article takes up the challenge of proposing a market solution to this problem. Although much has already been done in the financial industry to lengthen the outlook of executives by imposing longer vesting periods for stock options, a significant fraction of institutional shareholders continues to have a short‐term orientation. The authors propose that companies try to attract a more long‐term‐oriented shareholder base by modifying the form of the common share contract to include a special reward for buy‐and‐hold investors. The type of contract proposed—called a “loyalty share”—is a call‐warrant attached to each share that is exercisable at a specified time‐horizon—say, three years—and exercise price, but is nontransferable and hence has value only if the share is held for the entire length of the specified “loyalty period.” Such a reward is expected to encourage a longer‐term valuation outlook, since those shareholders seeking the loyalty reward are likely to be those who are most confident about the company's ability to increase its value through the expiration of the loyalty period.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

Towards an Objective European Rule on Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies

Following up on Insol Europe's Note ‘Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU level’ (2010), this article provides a proposition for a European rule on transaction avoidance in insolvencies. The question explored here is whether, and to what extent, it is possible and desirable to identify rules on transaction avoidance solely on the basis of objective criteria. Based on a comparison of English, German and Dutch law a largely objective rule is formulated for three basic categories of detrimental legal acts. The first category concerns legal acts compromising the integrity of the estate of the debtor. The second category is formed by preferences. The third category consists of shareholder loans and shareholder guarantees. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Arrow's Theorem of the Deductible with Heterogeneous Beliefs

In Arrow's classical problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, it is well-known that the optimal insurance indemnification for an insurance buyer—or decision maker (DM)—is a deductible contract when the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer and when the DM is a risk-averse EU maximizer. In Arrow's framework, however, both parties share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realizations of the underlying insurable loss. This article reexamines Arrow's problem in a setting where the DM and the insurer have different subjective beliefs. Under a requirement of compatibility between the insurer's and the DM's subjective beliefs, we show the existence and monotonicity of optimal indemnity schedules for the DM. The belief compatibility condition is shown to be a weakening of the assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio. In the latter case, we show that the optimal indemnity schedule is a variable deductible schedule, with a state-contingent deductible that depends on the state of the world only through the likelihood ratio. Arrow's classical result is then obtained as a special case.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

论股东资格确认的法律规则

在审判实务中,如因股东出资义务、股东相关权利的行使、股权的转让和股东会相关决议等问题发生争议时,认定民事主体的股东资格是裁判者首要考虑的问题.股东资格的判决认定,对某一民事主体是否能成为股东,行使股东权利和履行股东义务都具有确定性的指引作用.从股东资格确认的法理依据、股东证明文件的效力规则和证据认定方面,提炼出股东资格的认定标准.以期该股东资格确认的标准对我国公司法律体系的完善能有所裨益,同时也希望在实务界能形成统一的审判标准,影响司法实践.     

WHEN SHAREHOLDERS CHOOSE NOT TO MAXIMIZE VALUE: THE UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND'S 1994 PROXY FIGHT

This paper examines the fight over a share reunification plan that pitted Swiss financier Martin Ebner against Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), once the largest Swiss bank and a global leader in asset management. In the U.S. corporate governance debate, large shareholders are often held up as a possible solution to corporate governance problems. But this examination of the UBS proxy fight shows why some large shareholders can themselves be a source of governance problems. The share reunification plan was designed to combine the firm's two classes of stock: registered (voting) shares and bearer (non-voting) shares. As its motive for the plan, the UBS board cited a desire both to increase liquidity and to prevent a control change. The majority of the holders of the company's registered stock—many of whom had other financial ties to the bank—ended up voting for a proposal that caused them to lose 11% of the value of their shares during the three trading days following its announcement, and eventually almost twice as much. Moreover, even the holders of the bearer stock hurt themselves by approving the reunification plan. Although the plan clearly transferred value from the registered to the bearer shares, the redistribution benefits from the plan for the bearer shareholders were not sufficient to offset their losses from the reduced probability of a control change. Although it did not succeed in accomplishing its immediate goal, the UBS proxy fight is today recognized as a watershed event in Swiss corporate governance. Until recently, Switzerland's economy has been dominated by cartels, with closely overlapping boards of directors. Hostile takeovers were essentially unheard of, and criticism of management by shareholders was highly unusual. Ebner's activities have had the effect of stimulating public debate about shareholders' rights and shareholder activism. In so doing, they have made it more acceptable for shareholders to criticize management and established shareholder value as a “politically correct” goal for Swiss corporations.     

Session I: Corporate Purpose and Governance

In this first of five sessions of a recent Columbia Law School symposium devoted to discussion of his new book, Prosperity—and The Purpose of the Corporation, Oxford University's Colin Mayer begins by calling for a “radical reinterpretation” of the corporate mission. For all but the last 50 or so of its 2,000‐year history, the corporation has combined commercial activities with a public purpose. But since Milton Friedman's famous pronouncement in 1970 that the social goal of the corporation is to maximize its own profits, the gap between the social and private interests served by corporations appears to have grown ever wider, helping fuel the global outbreaks of populist protest and indictments of capitalism that fill today's media. In Mayer's reinterpretation, the boards of all companies will produce and publish statements of corporate purpose that envision some greater social good than maximizing shareholder value. To that end, he urges companies to make continuous investments of their financial capital and other resources in developing other forms of corporate capital—human, social, and natural—and to account for such investments in the same way they now account for their investments in physical capital. Although the author appears to prefer that such changes be mandatory, enacted through new legislation and enforced by regulators and the courts, his main efforts are directed at persuading the largest institutional owners of corporations—many of whom are already favorably predisposed to ESG—to support these corporate initiatives. Marty Lipton, after expressing enthusiasm about Mayer's proposals, suggests that mandating such changes is likely neither feasible nor desirable, but that attempts—like his own New Paradigm—to gain the acceptance and support of large shareholders is the most promising strategy. Ron Gilson, on the other hand, after voicing Lipton's skepticism about the enforceability of such statements of purpose, issues a number of warnings. One is about the political risks associated with ever more concentrated ownership of public companies in a world where populist distrust of all concentrations of wealth and power is clearly on the rise. But most troubling for the company themselves is the confusion such proposals could create for corporate boards whose responsibility is to limit two temptations facing corporate managements: short‐termism, or underinvestment in the corporate future to boost near‐term earnings (and presumably stock prices); and what Gilson calls hyperopia, or overinvestment designed to preserve growth (and management's jobs) at all costs.     

Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence From Backdating

Regulators and governance scholars often regard the high rates of reelection among those nominated for boards of directors (and the small percentage of nominated directors who lose elections) as persuasive evidence of limited shareholder power. To correct this perceived imbalance against shareholders, some corporate governance advocates have undertaken a number of efforts to reform the director election system, most recently by proposing “proxy access” regulation to facilitate contested board elections. The authors take a close look at the board turnover within companies implicated in stock‐option backdating to assess the effectiveness of board elections. What they find is that, despite high reelection rates among nominated directors, board turnover is in fact substantial—but it takes place almost entirely before the board elections. Because of the apparently high costs associated with losing such an election, board nominees generally are not renominated for election (or reelection) unless success is quite likely. And whereas independent directors generally leave boards by not being renominated, management directors generally resign. For this reason, reelection rates tell us very little about the effectiveness of shareholder voting. But what the authors' findings do show is that directors involved in stock‐option backdating experience reductions in both the number and prestige of their future directorships. Thus, the authors' findings suggest that the board of director election process functions more effectively than shareholder advocates typically claim, that criticism of the responsiveness of the board‐election process to shareholder interests is overstated, and that reform efforts are therefore likely to be misplaced.     

Risk Management,Corporate Governance,and the Search for Long-Term Investors

This discussion explores a number of ways that more effective risk management, corporate governance, and communication with investors can help companies increase their effciency and long-run value. According to one of the panelists, recent surveys of corporate directors suggest that companies should devote more time and attention to three issues—strategy, risk management, and succession planning—and that strategy and risk are the “flipsides of the same coin.” As the panelist argues, “You can't talk about strategy without talking about what risks you're going to take—and what risks you decide to take has to depend on the core competencies that drive the corporate strategy.” In addition to making risk management a critical part of corporate strategy, another notable recommendation is to communicate a company's strategy and business plan as clearly as possible to investors, with the aim of attracting more sophisticated, long-term shareholders. Contrary to popular belief, such a group may well include some hedge funds and other activist shareholders. According to a newly released report on shareholder activism (produced and cited by another panelist), corporate boards should work harder to identify and engage the “largest 10 shareholders in the organization,” with the ultimate goal of cultivating a shareholder base that buys into the company's strategy.     

Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

This paper examines the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms. First, we discuss what is known about the setting of CEO compensation and then we go on to examine factors that may help explain variations in the use of performance related pay. In China, listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder and we argue that the distinct types of controlling shareholder have different impacts on the use of incentive pay. We find that firms that have a State agency as the major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO's pay to increases in stockholders' wealth or increases in profitability. However the pay–performance sensitivities for CEOs are low and this raises questions about the effectiveness of firms' incentive systems.