How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

Economic policy uncertainty and stock price crash risk

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on firm-specific crash risk. Based on a large sample of Chinese listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2017, we provide empirical evidence that firms are more likely to experience stock price crashes when EPU increases. Cross-sectionally analysis further reveals that the impact of EPU on stock price crash risk is stronger for firms whose returns are more sensitive to EPU. More specifically, young stocks, small stocks, high volatility stocks, and growth stocks, which have higher valuation uncertainty per se, are more sensitive to EPU and are more affected by EPU in terms of crash risk. We further show that EPU is significantly and positively associated with aggregated stock price crash risk at the market level.     

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value: (1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies; (2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and (3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises (SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.     

Industry Signals Relayed by Corporate Earnings Restatements

This study finds that downward earnings restatements are associated with negative industry valuation effects. These effects are more pronounced when the valuation effects and the change in earnings of the firm restating its earnings are worse, when the restatement is initiated for reasons other than fraud, when the bubble was bursting, and when the restatement is subsequent to the publicity regarding Enron's fraud. The negative industry effects are more pronounced in industries that have a higher level of accruals and intangible assets, weaker sales growth, and a higher degree of stock volatility.     

State ownership and abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms: Evidence from China

We examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ abnormal accruals during a period of high valuation. We find the magnitude of abnormal accruals first increases for up to three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. We also find that managers turn to using abnormal real transactions after four consecutive years of high valuation. Next, we examine whether the degree of abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms differs between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-NSOEs. Supporting the view that SOE managers have less incentive to sustain high stock prices, we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower levels of abnormal accruals than highly-valued NSOEs during the period of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices and their accounting choices in firms with different ownership structures.     

国有公司的信贷优惠:信贷干预还是隐性担保?——基于信用贷款的实证检验

本文主要从信用贷款视角研究我国国有公司是否以及缘何具有信贷优惠。以2003-2005年我国A股上市公司为检验样本进行研究,发现:(1)国有公司的信用贷款比例显著高于民营公司,二者的差异平均大约为9%;(2)当公司高管具有政府部门任职经历时,二者的差异更小;(3)当公司的显性担保价值增大时,二者的差异并未减小。总的来说,本文结果支持我国国有公司的信贷优惠主要源于政府对银行信贷决策的干预,而与隐性担保假说不一致。     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

Chairman’s government background,excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.     

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.     

Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China

This paper investigates the institutional origins of ownership discrimination in bank lending through a staggered quasi-natural experiment: China's Split-share Structure Reform. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have an advantage over non-SOEs in securing external financing to protect investment opportunities from cash flow fluctuations. This financing privilege declined significantly after the reform, which mandatorily converted SOEs' non-tradable state-owned shares into tradable shares, sharply increasing the likelihood of further privatization. Consistent evidence also exists in terms of bank lending behaviors. Further, we show both direct and indirect evidence that the effects were more pronounced among SOEs under higher threats of privatization (e.g., firms with larger increases in tradable shares, smaller workforce, and in industries peripheral to national strategy). The evidence suggests that banks proactively prefer SOEs for the perceived safety of loans under implicit government guarantee; when this privilege disappeared after the reform, banks reacted by allocating credits more fairly. This paper provides new evidence on the bright side of share structure reforms in mitigating credit misallocation and enlightens policy makers to practical resolutions to the financing inefficiency in emerging capital markets.     

Overseas listing as a policy tool: Evidence from China’s H-shares

We investigate why the Chinese government chooses to perform share issue privatization (SIP) of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Hong Kong, despite the benefit of facilitating the domestic stock market development if performing SIP in China (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) and the higher cost to list in Hong Kong. We address this issue by arguing that the positive effect of SIPs on the development of the domestic market may have limitations, especially when the domestic market is not well developed and cannot absorb rapid and large-scale SIP activities. To maintain domestic market order, it may be optimal to carry out SIP in overseas markets. Furthermore, by listing shares in developed overseas markets, SOEs from the less developed countries could leverage on the overseas markets’ better accounting, governance, and legal standards. By examining a sample of 92 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and the relevant control samples of purely domestically listed Chinese firms during the period of 1993–2006, we find supporting evidence for both arguments.     

Does Internal Corporate Governance Complement or Substitute for External Auditing? Evidence from China's Anti‐corruption Campaign

Two competing hypotheses have been developed for the relationship between internal corporate governance and external auditing. One proposes a complementary relationship, while the other suggests it is substitutable. This study takes advantage of China's recent anti‐corruption campaign as a quasi‐natural experiment to explore this relationship. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that, after the campaign, internal corporate governance improved more in SOEs (state‐owned enterprises) than in non‐SOEs. SOEs were less likely to choose Big 10 auditors after the campaign, while audit firms assigned less experienced auditors to their SOE client firms and charged lower audit fees. These effects were more pronounced in SOEs that exhibited greater improvement in corporate governance. Overall, we find the anti‐corruption campaign improved corporate governance in SOEs but, at the same time, reduced external audit quality, which supports the substitution view. We argue that this result might be driven by the fact that SOEs have limited demand for high‐quality accounting information because the Chinese government maintains strong control over the capital markets.     

Earnings‐based Delisting Regulations and Government Subsidies

This paper examines who receives government subsidies when a firm faces delisting risk and how subsidies affect such a firm's performance in China. It focuses on the accounting‐based delisting rule issued in 1998 that relies heavily on the profitability of firms. Using the probit model, this study finds that subsidies are less likely to be granted to a firm that has a higher risk of being delisted than a healthy firm, but are more likely to be granted to such a firm if it is state‐owned. It is also found that having a political connection increases a firm's chance of receiving subsidies, but such an effect disappears when a firm faces a delisting risk. In assessing the impact of a subsidy on firm performance, this study shows that a subsidy increases a firm's valuation and profitability for firms at delisting risk.     

State ownership and the structuring of lease arrangements

The existing literature provides extensive evidence that firms intentionally structured lease arrangements to achieve off-balance-sheet accounting treatment prior to ASU 842 (FASB, 2016) and IFRS 16 (IASB, 2016). However, this study finds the opposite for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs): compared to non-SOEs, SOEs in China have a higher tendency to use finance leases rather than operating leases. This result remains significant after we control for the possibility that Chinese capital providers are discriminatively extending credit to SOEs in the form of finance leases. We explain SOEs' preference for finance leases by their executives' empire building incentives. Such incentives are created by the executives' hunger for compensation, promotion and subsidies, which are determined by the government. Consistently, we find that SOEs' engagement in finance leases increases with their incentives to expand the firms' size. And indeed, SOE executives obtain more compensation and subsidies by growing their firms with finance leases. Finally, we find that SOEs with higher borrowing costs structure more finance lease arrangements. Such structuring further increases SOEs' financial leverage and, to some extent, decreases their corporate value. Taken together, these results suggest that the benefit of the ASU 842 (or IFRS 16), which aims to bring leased assets onto the balance sheet, may be impaired in situations where executives have strong incentives to build empires.     

Financial Crisis,Politically Connected CEOs,and the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from Korea

This study examines under specific situations the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from two points of view—business performance and public performance. We find that SOEs with a politically connected CEO perform well even during a financial crisis as the SOEs are able to obtain more favorable treatment. However, the results imply that politically connected CEOs perform poorly when government subsidies are excluded as they may lack the skills for successful management. The results also confirm that SOEs encourage more corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities during a financial crisis in an effort to gain legitimacy by demonstrating that they are committed to social responsibility. However, politically connected CEOs have a negative effect on CSR performance during a financial crisis.     

Monetary policy,government control and capital investment: Evidence from China

This study examines how the relationships between local governments and local enterprises moderate the effect of targeted monetary policies through different action-propagating mechanisms. First, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on enterprise investment in areas with different institutional environments. Second, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with different property rights structures. Third, we examine how political connections can influence the action-propagating mechanism of monetary policies. We conclude that in China monetary policies have different effects on SOEs and on private enterprises with or without political connections. Specifically, local government interventions can significantly weaken and distort the effects of monetary policies, such that the intended reduction in investment is noticeably alleviated for SOEs and private enterprises with close links to local governments.     

Non-state shareholders entering of state-owned enterprises and equity mispricing: Evidence from China

Equity mispricing is a common occurrence in emerging capital markets. Based on a sample of 10,864 firm-year observations of state-owned listed companies (SOEs) in China, we investigate how the non-state shareholders entering in SOEs (NSSESOEs) affects equity mispricing. The results show that the NSSESOEs significantly reduces the equity mispricing. Our results are not altered by a battery of robustness checks, such as the difference-in-differences approach, propensity score matching, Heckman two stage and instrumental variable regressions. Further analysis shows that the mitigating role of the NSSESOEs is especially prominent for SOEs faced with more agency conflicts or more serious government intervention; these firms have a higher proportion of retail investors, more positive media coverage, and constrained short selling. In addition, we found that equity mispricing in the current period reduces future stock returns in terms of market value, while the NSSESOEs mitigate such adverse effects. These findings not only reveal that encouraging non-state shareholders to enter SOEs can mitigate the mispricing, but also provide meaningful implications for the current mixed ownership reform in China and other countries in which have implemented or are going to implement the mixed ownership reform.     

Hedging and competition

We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital (due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework. We show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. In addition, hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed. Further, with hedging, the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative, and is more negative, the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor.     

Government ownership and exposure to political uncertainty: Evidence from China

The government of China started its anti-corruption campaign in December 2012. Since then, more than 600 government officials have been investigated. We regard the investigations involving senior officials as signals of increased political uncertainty. Focusing on these events, we study how firms’ exposure to political uncertainty varies with government ownership. It is found that the stock performance of private firms is worse on the event days than in normal times, whereas state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer less from the events. Moreover, the event-day effects are not quickly reversed in the post-event periods. Among SOEs, the negative impact of the events also decreases with government ownership. The evidence indicates that government ownership mitigates firms’ exposure to political uncertainty.     

Operating and stock market performance of state-owned enterprise privatizations: The Spanish experience

We investigate the operating and stock market performance of Spanish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized through public share issue offerings (SIPs) from 1990 to 2001, when the last SIP was conducted. We compare the performance of SOEs and privately-owned firms. We find significant operating improvements in Spanish SOEs after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. Spanish governments tried to minimize the foregone proceeds when selling SOE shares and underpriced them lower than private firms. We relate these results with the pressure of the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, as well as lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Finally, we do not find long-term abnormal stock market performance after SIPs.