公司债务期限结构问题研究综述

本文对国内外公司债务期限结构间题的理论和经验研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，包括两方面内容：一是公司债务期限结构与公司价值之间的关系，二是公司债务期限结构的影响因素。本文评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司债务期限结构问题研究提供了依据和方向。     

The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.     

Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

This study documents that managerial stock ownership plays an important role in determining corporate debt maturity. Controlling for previously identified determinants of debt maturity and modeling leverage and debt maturity as jointly endogenous, we document a significant and robust inverse relation between managerial stock ownership and corporate debt maturity. We also show that managerial stock ownership influences the relation between credit quality and debt maturity and between growth opportunities and debt maturity.     

The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues

We document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7,369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993. Our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum, while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum. This pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short-term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation, but are screened out of the long-term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution.     

债务期限结构和区域因素——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文采用参数和非参数检验方法经验检查中国上市公司注册地所在区域因素与公司债务期限结构之间关系。研究发现：（1）不同区域之间的债务期限结构存在系统性差异：（2）区域因素能解释公司债务期限结构3％左右的变异；（3）中部地区的债务期限显著高于东部、西部地区的债务期限；（4）市场化程度高、经济发达的地区具有相对低的债务期限。     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions

By examining how executive compensation structure determines corporate acquisition decisions, we document a strong positive relation between acquiring managers' equity-based compensation (EBC) and stock price performance around and following acquisition announcements. This relation is highly robust when we control for acquisition mode (mergers), means of payment, managerial ownership, and previous option grants. Compared to low EBC managers, high EBC managers pay lower acquisition premiums, acquire targets with higher growth opportunities, and make acquisitions engendering larger increases in firm risk. EBC significantly explains postacquisition stock price performance even after controlling for acquisition mode, means of payment, and "glamour" versus "value" acquirers.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Firm Investment

This study shows that the maturity structure of a firm's debt has a significant impact on its investment decisions. We show, after controlling for the effect of the overall level of leverage, that a higher percentage of long-term debt in total debt significantly reduces investment for firms with high growth opportunities. In contrast, the correlation between debt maturity and investment is not significant for firms with low growth opportunities. The results are strong at the firm level and at the business segment level. These results hold even after controlling for the endogeneity problem inherent in the relationship between total leverage, the maturity composition of leverage, and investment.     

Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we suggest the trade-off model to explain the choice of debt maturity. This model is based on balancing between risk and reward of using shorter-term loans. Shorter-term loans have cost advantage over, but incur higher refinancing and interest rate risk than longer-term loans. Using the Compustat data, we show that the principal components of financial attributes are financial flexibility and financial strength. Therefore, only firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength can use proportionately more short-term loans. We also document that financially strong firms take advantage of lower interest rates of short-term debt. They use proportionately more short-term loans when the term premium is high. The results of our study also provide evidence supporting the agency cost hypothesis, which is strongly supported by current literature.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬实证研究

本文以中国深、沪两市在2004年上市公司样本作为公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬研究对象,从公司绩效、股权结构的安排以及董事会治理三个方面,通过构建最小二乘模型进行多元线性回归,来研究公司内部治理机制对公司管理层报酬的影响。研究结果表明:公司绩效、国有股比例、董事会规模、两职兼任均对管理者报酬产生显著的影响。     

投资者情绪、经理激励契约与企业投资

本文基于中国上市公司经理激励契约安排的制度背景,把经理激励契约纳入投资者非理性分析框架,就投资者情绪与经理激励契约如何相互作用影响企业投资进行了理论分析,并进行了实证检验。结果发现,高管持股会诱发高管利用投机的股市进行过度投资,而与股价弱相关的货币薪酬没有这种作用,而且经理薪酬的这种作用因企业实际控制人性质不同而有所差异。本研究表明高管持股在企业投资决策中具有负面的公司治理效应。     

债务期限结构理论综述

企业的债务期限结构与企业价值是密切相关的。为此 ,一些经济学家对企业的债务期限结构进行了研究。本文在阅读这些文献的基础上 ,将债务期限结构理论划分为基于契约成本的理论、基于信息不对称的理论、基于税收的理论和基于期限匹配的理论四种 ,并分别对它们进行了概述     

A Gap‐Filling Theory of Corporate Debt Maturity Choice

We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short‐term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long‐term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher and (2) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory sheds new light on market timing phenomena in corporate finance more generally.     

债务期限结构、公司价值和债权人保护

以上市公司为研究样本,考察债务期限结构对公司价值的影响力,分析债务期限结构的管理激励差异,经验结果显示,短期财务杠杆具有更强的管理激励,能够更有效地迫使管理者改善经营效率和提升公司价值。结论表明,我国的制度环境能够为短期债权人提供更有效的保护机制,债务的流动性是影响资本结构激励功能的关键因素。     

我国上市公司的债务期限结构——基于权衡思想的实证研究

本文认为债务期限结构的确定是企业对短期债务的优势和其缺陷进行权衡的结果,为此提出了债务期限结构的权衡思想。同时,为了考察我国上市公司债务期限结构选择的影响因素,本文利用这一思想对其进行了详细的实证研究。研究结果表明,权衡思想能够较好地解释我国上市公司债务期限结构的选择行为,同时也表明,尽管我国上市公司的短期债务普遍偏高,但这种选择却是其理性思索的结果。     

公司并购、盈余管理与高管薪酬变动

基于前人关于上市公司盈余管理影响因素的研究,本文分析了主并方公司并购收益与并购完成后公司盈余管理之间的关系,以及两者对高管货币性薪酬变动的相互作用机制。本文以2007至2012年我国沪深两市发生重大并购的A股上市公司为研究对象,结果发现:在并购完成后,并购收益与公司盈余管理存在负相关关系,即并购收益越低,公司在并购完成后第一、二年进行正向盈余管理的程度越高;盈余管理与并购收益对高管薪酬的变动存在着相互替代的关系,即并购收益越低,盈余管理对促进高管薪酬增长的影响越大。本文的研究丰富了盈余管理和公司并购的理论内涵,并为监管部门以及投资者的决策提供了重要的经验证据。     

制度环境对债务期限结构的影响研究

本文将制度环境与产权性质纳入到对公司债务期限结构研究的统一分析框架,深入研究了我国各地区制度环境的差异对债务期限结构的影响以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间存在的差异。研究发现:市场化程度高的地区具有相对短的债务期限结构;而政府干预能够帮助公司获取较长期限的贷款,政府干预程度与公司债务期限结构显著正相关;在金融发展水平较高的地区,银行更倾向于发放较多的短期贷款来约束上市公司;法律环境的改善会降低公司债务期限结构;与非国有控制公司相比,制度环境的改善对国有控制公司债务期限结构的负向影响相对更大。     

金融结构对企业债务融资的影响研究

企业债务融资一直是财务学界研究的重点，对它的认识也逐渐从企业层面扩展到了宏观环境层面。但目前的研究仅仅局限干整个的经济发展，并没有深入讨论具体是哪个方面对债务融资有较大的影响。金融业是企业资金来源的提供方，因而它的发展和结构直接关系到企业的债务融资。为了深入研究，本文把金融结构分成了两个层级。研究结果表明，债务比率和债务期限结构都受到了两个层级的影响，但金融中介发展和股票市场份额的影响要远大于金融中介内部结构的影响。     

终极控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构

从终极产权的视角,以我国沪、深两市公司为研究对象,考察了终极股东控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构的关系。发现:终极股东现金流权水平越高,其掠夺外部投资者的成本也就越高,债务融资的代理成本降低,银行等金融机构愿意为公司提供更多较长期限的债务资金,终极控制股东现金流权对公司债务期限结构具有显著正向影响。而终极股东控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,其越有可能掠夺外部投资者,增大了公司与债权人的代理冲突,导致较高的债务融资代理成本,银行等金融机构倾向于为其提供更多的短期资金来约束终极控制股东。