企业会计内部控制的探讨

企业内部会计控制可以提高财务管理的水平,保证企业资产的安全性和完整性,降低经营风险以及拓展企业经营范围,以此来保证企业战略目标的实现。另外,企业内部会计控制必须依据国家相关的法律和法规,建立符合企业内部控制需要的会计控制制度,实现对会计行为的规范,会计数据的纠正,经营风险的控制,避免财务数据错误和业务流程舞弊现象的发生,本文就企业内部会计控制问题作出探讨。     

企业会计内部控制的探讨

企业内部会计控制可以提高财务管理的水平,保证企业资产的安全性和完整性,降低经营风险以及拓展企业经营范围,以此来保证企业战略目标的实现。另外,企业内部会计控制必须依据国家相关的法律和法规,建立符合企业内部控制需要的会计控制制度,实现对会计行为的规范,会计数据的纠正,经营风险的控制,避免财务数据错误和业务流程舞弊现象的发生,本文就企业内部会计控制问题作出探讨。     

基于收入舞弊的手法与审计策略分析

收入是一个信息使用者最关心的会计项目,投资者按总收入及其构成分析业务趋势的变化,并制定出相关决策;它也是企业管理层关注的重要指标。统计数据显示,很多会计欺诈与收入有关。在审计工作中,收入舞弊审计是整个审计过程的重点,注册会计师要知道企业常用的收入欺诈方法,并采取措施应对它。因而探讨收入舞弊的手法与审计策略具有重要意义。     

浅谈内部控制制度建设

企业要实现利益最大化,就必须防范和规避经营风险,防止欺诈和舞弊,而最好的方法就是建立一套完整的内部控制制度。完善的内部控制制度既能防范风险,又能保证会计信息质量,对于完善公司治理结构和信息披露制度,保护投资者合法权益,都能起到很好的作用。     

基于ERP条件的企业内部控制探讨

在企业的经营活动过程中始终贯穿着内部控制,这是企业为实现自己的经营战略目标,在经济活动中建立起来的相互制约的职责分工制度和业务组织形式。每个企业有效地内部控制制度不仅能合理对企业的资源进行配置、提高企业的管理效率,更能及时发现并防范企业内部和外部舞弊和经济欺诈行为的发生。EPR系统的运行对企业内部的有效控制产生了深远的影响。     

商业银行内部欺诈与风险导向审计——兼述银行业内部经济案件的综合防范与治理

金融内部欺诈舞弊及所演绎的经济案件是困扰当前国内银行业可持续发展的重要桎梏。内审部门推出的风险导向审计与银行业实施全面风险管理存在契合点，以风险导向审计应对内部欺诈舞弊、加强银行业案防案控相对于传统审计模式具有一定的比较优势。本文在着重分析风险导向审计博弈银行业内部欺诈舞弊能动性的基础上，提出了以风险导向审计整治内部欺诈舞弊的路径依赖与选择。     

我国上市公司利润操纵问题及风险防范

一、我国上市公司利润操纵手法剖析利润操纵是财务舞弊现象中的一种,它是指管理当局利用信息的不对称,采取欺诈手段不合法地调整企业的     

企业财务舞弊及其防范措施

财务舞弊,是指主观恶意,客观违背会计法律、法规、制度及会计准则等,通过财务欺诈等手段,给舞弊人带来经济利益,而侵害他人利益的故意行为。它不但损害企业经营原则,而且破坏市场经济规则,甚至会影响宏观经济的正常发展。     

浅谈内部审计在防范会计舞弊中的作用

正一、会计舞弊的定义及影响伴随经济全球化程度的日益加深,新兴市场的不断涌现,资本市场中金融产品的推陈出新,企业面临着激烈的竞争和无限的机遇。这两种因素亦共同作用,把企业推向高风险经营环境的风口浪尖。在金融学的定义中"风险"有着双重含义,即代表着潜在损失也表明获利的可能性。但无论哪种定义,企业的经营风险都是诱发会计舞弊的重要因素。     

从经营风险与财务报表认定的关系看经营风险分析的审计意义

经营风险与财务报表重大错报风险之间存在高度的相关性。多数经营风险最终都会产生财务后果,经营风险正是沿着企业风险管理路径形成财务报表重大错报风险。产生财务报表重大错报的原因包括管理层舞弊和会计人员的错误。本文主要讨论了因管理层舞弊而导致财务报表重大错报风险的形成机制。经营风险形成重大错报风险的路径与机制为注册会计师评估财务报表重大错报风险提供了一个全新的视角。注册会计师需要采用一种自上而下的方法,以便注册会计师了解被审单位如何在其所处的经济网络中创造价值,识别和评估对被审计单位经营活动产生影响威胁的因素(经营风险),以便对财务报表重大错报风险进行评估。     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

The Effects of Fraud Risk and Management Representation on Auditors' Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis generation is considered to be critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of diagnostic processes in auditing. Using a between-subjects experimental design, this work examines the impact of fraud risk and the availability of a non-misstatement management explanation on auditors' hypothesis generation performance. The context is when managers undertake analytical procedures at the planning stage of the audit. The results indicate that auditors are sensitive to increased fraud risk by generating more fraud hypotheses, while the number of misstatement hypotheses generated is not affected by fraud risk. The availability of a non-misstatement management explanation was found not to interfere with auditors' hypothesis generation performance, but facilitated the generation of proportionately more misstatement and fraud hypotheses from the same transaction cycle as that indicated by the management explanation. Together, these findings provide some insights on the sensitivity of auditors' hypothesis generation to fraud risk and whether this sensitivity could be undermined by the availability of management representations.     

The apparatus of fraud risk

‘Fraud risk’ is ontologically different from fraud. Fraud itself is a disruptive event; fraud risk can and must be governed. This essay draws on Foucault’s concept of an apparatus (dispositif) to explain the emergence of this difference. The analysis begins with a concrete case and explicates the history of fraud risk which flows through a specific organizational setting. First, it is claimed that fraud risk must be understood in relation to the broader historicity of risk in which risk expands its reach as an organizing practice category. Second, it is argued that the diverse elements of the fraud risk apparatus – words, laws, best practice guides, risk maps, websites, compliance officers, text books, regulatory judgments and many more – have a trajectory of formation. This trajectory begins with auditing and expands into risk management, regulation and security more generally. Fraud risk management emerges as a highly articulated, transnational web of ideas and procedures which frame the future within present organizational actions, and which intensify the responsibility of senior managers. Overall, the paper challenges the common sense idea that the present shape of fraud risk management is a functional necessity demanded by fraud events. The purpose is to display the historically contingent regime of truth for speaking about fraud, risk and responsibility in organizations. The paper suggests that this ‘regime of truth’ consists in a form of managerial and regulatory knowledge with a ‘grammar’ governing rules for talking about and acting on risky subjects and organizations. The rise of ‘fraud risk’ management and its prominent position within the field of corporate governance in the 21st century is emblematic of an ongoing neoliberal project of individualization and responsibilization.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

Do site visits mitigate corporate fraudulence? Evidence from China

Corporate site visits emerge as an increasingly important means of information acquisition process for analysts and institutional investors. In this study, we test whether and how site visits mitigate corporate fraud risk using a unique dataset of site visits to Chinese listed firms. We find that corporate site visits can substantially reduce the incidence of corporate fraud, which is robust to adding a series of control variables, alternative model specifications and alternative measures of corporate fraud, as well as accounting for endogeneity issue and controlling for firm and time fixed effects. This negative effect is more pronounced for firms with poorer information environment and for firms with weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, we examine the mechanisms underlying the negative association between site visits and corporate fraud. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by providing complementary evidence that site visits are important venues for analysts and institutional investors to collect firm-specific information and monitor the management of firms in China. Our findings also provide significant practical and policy implications for investors and regulators who seek to promote corporate information disclosure and mitigate the risk of corporate fraud.     

The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud

This paper provides new evidence on the characteristics of firms that commit financial statement fraud. We examine how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial statement fraud and in doing so develop three new fraud predictors. Using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 non-fraud firms, we find that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years and that earnings management in prior years is associated with a higher likelihood that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts or that inflate revenue are committing fraud. We further find that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms are even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. This paper contributes to the fraud detection literature and the earnings management literature, and can help practitioners and regulators develop better fraud detection models.     

Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.     

Understanding the potential impact of information technology on the susceptibility of organizations to fraudulent employee behavior

Although the infusion of progressively advanced information technology (IT) into business organizations can improve the capturing, processing, and reporting of critical decision-making information across the enterprise, such technology can also create an environment that is more vulnerable to fraud. In this article, we develop a framework based on the theory of planned behavior [Org. Behav. Human Decis. Process. 50 (2)(1991) 179] that addresses the potential impact of IT on the susceptibility of an organization to employee fraud. We believe that this framework can serve as a useful tool for management, internal auditors, and external auditors when assessing fraud risk.     

Determinants of banks’ risk exposure to new account fraud – Evidence from Germany

This paper studies empirically the determinants of new account fraud risk within two dimensions: the probability of fraud, and the expected and unexpected (monetary) loss-per-account due to fraud. By fraud risk, we mean the risk that a bank fails to enforce a debt because the identity of the person incurring the debt cannot be ascertained. Using a unique and rich data set of account applicants, provided by a German Internet-only bank, we find that fraud risk is highly sensitive to demographic and socio-economic variables like nationality, gender, marital status, age, occupation, and urbanisation. For example, foreigners are 22.25 times more likely to commit account fraud than Germans, and men are 2.5 times more risky than women.     

The effects of tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments

Prior research suggests that internal auditors’ judgements are subject to management influence resulting in compromised risk assessments. This study investigates the effects of the tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments. Results of an experiment involving 64 internal auditors indicate that when the tone at the top is poor, rather than favouring management, internal auditors report a higher risk of intentional misstatements and that coordination with external auditors can further reduce expectations of the incidence of intentional misstatements.