IPO发行抑价现象研究

IPO（首次公开发行）定价中的新股抑价现象是IPO发行定价中的异常现象的一种表现,一般指新股在发行市场的发行价格远远低于新股在流通市场的价格,具体表现是新股上市首日交易价大幅度上扬,超出流通价格15到30倍以上,上市首日即可获得丰厚的回报。IPO抑价在任何国家都普遍存在,但在我国抑价现象表现的更加明显。本文主要分析了IPO抑价产生的原因,以及IPO抑价产生的弊端,并查阅相关资料,得出了一些控制IPO抑价的政策建议。     

中国A股市场IPO抑价研究

IPO抑价问题一直是困扰金融学界的一个难题,且在全球新股发行市场普遍存在.本文对有关股票市场IPO抑价进行了简单叙述,介绍了西方国家对IPO抑价的理论解释,分析了我国IPO抑价的影响因素并得出结论,最后提出了一些抑制抑价的措施.     

股改后我国IPO抑价的原因浅析

本文在对IPO抑价理论分析的基础上,探寻股改后造成我国A股市场新股IPO抑价的原因,结果表明我国IPO发行抑价主要与我国新股发行机制不完善、资本市场不够成熟有关。要降低新股的IPO抑价水平,需要提高新股发行的信息披露程度、增加新股发行的定价效率、规范和培育一批高质量的承销商。     

IPO定价与抑价发行治理

创业板开闸以来出现高市盈率、高发行价、高超募和高抑价率并存现象，对新股发行制度改革尤其是IPO定价效率提出了新的要求。本文通过IPO定价与股票估值之间固有区别的比较，提出了一个更为实用的估价函数，根据平价发行条件得出一个以发行前每股净值、发行比例、EPS和EPS增长率为因子的平价定价模型。必然抑价点的存在，证明特殊市场条件下以行政指导定价和市场自由化定价对抑价发行治理完全无效。进而指出治理IPO抑价是一个需要恰当制度安排、通过市场机制作用对投资情绪进行纠正、引导和培育的长期过程，并给出IPO定价市场化和合理化的几点建议。     

IPO抑价现象研究文献综述

IPO抑价是指企业首次公开发行的股票上市后,其首日交易价格远高于发行定价的现象.这种现象使得企业在进行首次公开发行时能够获得较高的短期无风险的超额收益率.目前,世界上很多国家都存在IPO抑价的现象,只是程度有所不同.从上世纪60年代,国内外学者就开始对IPO相关的理论进行了深入的研究,其中对于IPO的高抑价现象即新股热销现象和长期弱势现象等方面的研究尤为深入.本文将对IPO抑价形成原因的理论研究文献进行阐述,试图归类说明造成IPO抑价现象的理论解释.     

中国IPO抑价现象研究

各国股票市场都存在一定程度的IPO抑价现象,而新股发行市场化之前我国IPO抑价现象尤其严重,新股发行询价制度推行以来有所缓解。本文选取06年至11年的新股发行数据对IPO抑价现象的原因进行探究,发现市场因素、中签率、发行价格、发行市盈率、首日换手率对IPO抑价现象有较强的解释力。     

中国IPO抑价现象研究

各国股票市场都存在一定程度的IPO抑价现象,而新股发行市场化之前我国IPO抑价现象尤其严重,新股发行询价制度推行以来有所缓解。本文选取06年至11年的新股发行数据对IPO抑价现象的原因进行探究,发现市场因素、中签率、发行价格、发行市盈率、首日换手率对IPO抑价现象有较强的解释力。     

全流通下我国IPO抑价的实证分析

股权分置现象是长期困扰我国股市发展的顽疾之一,我国IPO市场实现全流通以来,我国IPO市场的定价效率如何值得关注.本文选取全流通后的沪深IPO为样本,运用比较分析方法和相关分析、OLS回归、Logistic回归、逐步回归等计量方法实证研究全流通下我国IPO抑价的成因,结果发现:第一,我国的股权分置改革引发的"全流通"并不能有效降低我国高的新股发行抑价程度;第二,在股权分置改革前后,西方理论对我国股票市场IPO发行抑价解释均不强,"赢着诅咒"假说和承销商声誉理论在我国股票市场也不适用.     

中国创业板IPO定价效率的实证研究

我国创业板历经了近十年的筹备之后终于得以正式开盘,创业板IPO抑价问题尤为突出.本文首次实现了用一级市场的发行价格与二级市场的交易价格共同表示出IPO抑价.研究表明,中国创业板IPO定价效率相对较低;创业板成立之初,IPO抑价程度更加明显.     

A股IPO高抑价的成因及改革建议

新股IPO抑价问题普遍存在于各国市场,而A股市场上IPO抑价率历史上远高于其他国家,本文通过对中国新股发行定价机制的回顾解释历史上IPO高抑价的成因,其分别来自于一级市场和二级市场的定价偏差.并且在分析A股IPO抑价独特性的前提下,提出了针对中国现实情况的政策改革建议,以使我国证券市场在未来能够健康发展.     

Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns

The Chinese stock market with its unique institutions is rather different from western stock markets. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a supply-demand analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China's primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1377 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1992 and 2004. We find that Chinese IPO underpricing is principally caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the control of IPO share supplies. Besides the regulatory underpricing, this paper also documents some specific investment risks of IPOs in China's stock market.     

Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets

Market returns before the offer price is set affect the amountand variability of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing.Thus an important question is "What IPO procedure is best adaptedfor controlling underpricing in "hot" versus "cold" market conditions?"The French stock market offers a unique arena for empiricalresearch on this topic, since three substantially differentissuing mechanisms (auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price)are used there. Using 1992–1998 data, we find that theauction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lowervariance of underpricing. We show that the auction procedure'sability to incorporate more information from recent market conditionsinto the IPO price is an important reason.     

Chinese IPO activity,pricing, and market cycles

We examine the activity, pricing, and market cycles of 1,380 Chinese A share IPOs over the period 1991–2005 and find initial underpricing of 238%. The government restrictions on IPO offer price and quota allocation cause pricing structural breaks and attribute more than half of initial underpricing. A multifactor model that includes firm’s characteristics, excess demand for IPO shares, and the government restrictions explains cross-sectional initial returns, after controlling for industrial differences and stock market conditions. In addition, monthly IPO volume and average initial return are highly correlated. A VAR model indicates that initial return leads IPO volume by 6 months.     

What comprises IPO initial returns: Evidence from the Chinese market

We studied the IPO price and long-term performance in China after the adoption of the book-building pricing mechanism. Using comparable firm value, we separated the IPO initial returns into pre-market deliberate underpricing and aftermarket overpricing. This separation enables us to clearly test different theories regarding high IPO initial returns. We find little evidence supporting the classic information theory on IPO underpricing but strong evidence supporting the behavioral arguments regarding IPO overpricing. Even though the results are specific to the Chinese market, we find some general results on what composes and drives IPO initial returns that have been lacking in the IPO literature.     

Accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing: China evidence

This study examines how accounting conservatism impacts underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese stock market. In addition, we investigate how information asymmetry affects the association of accounting conservatism with IPO underpricing. Based on regression analysis of 674 A-shares companies that went public through IPOs at both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China during 2001–2009, we find that (1) accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing; and (2) the relationship between accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing is more pronounced when information asymmetry is high. The findings should shed a light on what drives IPO underpricing and how it could be affected by accounting conservatism in an emerging economy.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。     

Are share price levels informative? Evidence from the ownership, pricing, turnover and performance of IPO firms

We ask whether a firm's choice of IPO price is informative in the sense that it relates systematically to the firm's other choices and characteristics. We find that both institutional ownership and underwriter reputation increases monotonically with the chosen IPO price level. We also find that the relationship between IPO price and underpricing is U-shaped. In contrast, post-IPO turnover displays an inverted U-shaped relation to IPO price. Moreover, firms choosing a higher (lower) stock price level experience lower (higher) mortality rates. Our results are robust to controls for market liquidity and firm size, and for partial adjustment of IPO prices based on pre-market information.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information Production

This paper presents an information-theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High-value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low-value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high-value firms.