Less timely earnings announcements and voluntary disclosure

The release of earnings information has become less timely in recent years partly because firms increasingly disclose earnings concurrently with their periodic reports (e.g., 10-Ks, 10-Qs). We examine whether firms use voluntary disclosure to mitigate the negative economic consequences of less timely earnings announcements (EAs). We find that firms with less timely EAs are more likely to provide voluntary 8-K filings over the period leading to the EA. We also find that investors’ demand for timely information, the nature of earnings news and litigation risk affect the extent to which firms provide voluntary disclosure to compensate for less timely EAs. The negative effect of less timely EAs on information asymmetry is attenuated when firms provide voluntary 8-K filings prior to EAs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms voluntarily communicate with investors using voluntary disclosure when their EAs are less timely.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report

This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value‐relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.     

Environmental performance and analyst information processing costs

This study tests whether the information processing costs of analysts vary positively with the environmental performance information available on the firms they follow. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that these costs increase when analysts process a wider array of environmental performance ratings. Specifically we find that as the number of environmental performance ratings increases, analysts cover fewer firms in their portfolio, provide fewer earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast revisions, and make less timely forecast revisions. Two additional tests confirm that our results relate to environmental performance information and not to confounding factors. First, the “shock” of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 implemented for California firms in 2012 increases analyst information processing costs incremental to the main effect of environmental performance ratings. Second, analyst information processing costs increase further in the year a firm covered by an analyst provides a CSR report for the first time. Our results have implications for firm managers considering voluntary environmental disclosure and investors deciding on what stocks to include in their socially responsible portfolios because when processing costs are high, analysts will provide less information or less timely information, resulting in more gradual price discovery in capital markets.     

The impact of disclosure reform on the NZX's financial information environment

This study investigates the impact of changes to the New Zealand Exchange's listing rules and legislative amendments to the Securities Markets Act 1988 enacted in December 2002. The reforms provided statutory backing for a more stringent disclosure regime. We find evidence that non-dual listed firms, not subject to any prior enhanced disclosure regime, released more earnings-related information to the market in the post-reform period and announced their half-year and fiscal year-end results in a more timely manner. Our results also show that analysts' earnings forecast errors did not decline but analysts' forecasts showed less dispersion in the post-reform period. In respect of informational efficiency, we find evidence of a smaller abnormal return around the half-year and fiscal year earnings announcement date in the post-reform period. Our results suggest that the reforms improved the flow of information to investors, consistent with their intent.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Does alternative data reduce stock price crash risk? Evidence from third-party online sales disclosure in China

This study empirically investigates the effect of releasing alternative data on firm-specific price crash risk. Using the public launch of a firm's third-party online sales data in a well-known Chinese financial database as an exogenous shock, we find that stock price crash risk significantly decreases with the disclosure of third-party online sales data. The results are robust to a series of endogeneity corrections and robustness checks. We also find that the reduction of stock price crash risk is due to the decrease in managers' bad news withholdings and the increase in the accuracy of market expectations. In addition, the negative association between third-party online sales disclosure and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with weaker external governance, higher earnings volatility, greater likelihood of sales manipulation, and lower book-to-market ratio. Our findings yield important implications for a comprehensive understanding of the information disclosure effect of online sales data in the capital market and the mechanisms to reduce stock price crash risk.     

Do product market threats affect analyst forecast precision?

We examine how product market threats influence the precision of analyst forecasts. Greater competitive threats may make forecasting more difficult by increasing the uncertainty regarding future cash flows and by influencing the quality of financial disclosure. Using a firm-specific measure of product market threats (i.e., fluidity), we find that analysts are more likely to be less precise forecasting earnings for highly fluid firms and that the lack of precision is not fully explained by performance volatility. Our findings further suggest that firms with fluid products have lower accruals quality and that they are more likely to withheld information regarding contract terms and sales from major customers. Cross-sectional analysis further suggests that the effect of fluidity on analyst forecasts is more pronounced when firms have flexibility in disclosure choices. Using significant changes in tariff rates as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that analyst forecast precision is significantly lower following tariff reductions.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

Do conference calls facilitate market price discovery? Evidence from Taiwan

This study examines whether conference calls accelerate the speed at which the market and analysts understand the implications of the accrual components of current earnings on future earnings. We analyze Taiwan’s listed firms from 2001 through 2014 and find that (1) delayed market reactions to earnings news during the following 12?months occur less often for firms than for host conference calls, and (2) conference calls are associated with a significant improvement in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. One possible explanation for our results is that conference calls improve the efficacy of investors’ and analysts’ reactions to earnings announcements by conveying information regarding the accrual components of reported earnings. Our results have implications for other Asian economies that have relatively opaque information environments and weak shareholder protections.     

Corporate Innovation and Disclosure Strategy

This study investigates the impact of firm innovation on MD&A disclosure. Firms need to reduce information asymmetry to assist investors on the one hand and to prevent rivals from benefitting from disclosures on the other. Innovative firms can use an optimistic tone to convey good news but increase content similarity to reduce proprietary costs. Management chooses a certain content similarity and tone strategy for an innovation and as the number of innovations increases, the ratio of similar innovation disclosure and positive tone increases in the overall MD&A, resulting in greater content similarity and more news conveyed with a positive tone. We find that the firm's level of innovation is positively related to content similarity and tone optimism. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced when product market competition is stronger and when regional intellectual property rights protection is weaker. Our further analyses on market responses provide evidence suggesting that management's disclosure strategy functions as intended.     

The Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure and Insider Stock Transactions

We examine stock price reaction to voluntary disclosure of innovation strategy by high‐tech firms and its relation with insider stock transactions before the disclosure. We find that, despite the qualitative and subjective nature of strategy‐related disclosure, there is positive stock price reaction to the disclosure. The evidence suggests that investors view the disclosure as credible good news. We also find that the disclosure is associated with more positive stock price reaction when it is preceded by insider purchase transactions. This evidence is consistent with insider purchase enhancing the credibility of the disclosure. The credibility‐enhancing effect is found to be stronger for firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry (younger firms, firms with lower analyst following, loss firms, and firms with higher research and development (R&D) intensity). Our evidence also indicates that predisclosure insider purchase is associated with greater future abnormal returns, suggesting that managers are privy to good news shortly before the disclosure.     

The effect of option transaction costs on informed trading in the options market around earnings announcements

We investigate the effect of option market transaction costs (a form of market imperfection) on the ability of option implied volatility-based measures to predict future stock returns and volatility around quarterly earnings announcements. We find that the predictability is significantly stronger for firms with lower option relative bid-ask spreads. The effect is more pronounced around positive rather than negative earnings news. We find no significant effect of option transaction costs around randomly chosen dates when there is no clustering of major information events. Trading strategies based on option market predictors and transaction costs earn monthly abnormal returns of 1.39% to 1.91%.     

Beyond Financial Reporting An Integrated Approach to Disclosure

A company's market value is a key determinant of its future success, affecting its ability to raise capital, recruit and retain key employees, and make strategic acquisitions. Confident, well‐informed investors are necessary for achieving and maintaining accurate valuation of a company's stock. But standard disclosure practice has left many companies releasing a great deal of data while conveying only limited understanding to outsiders. This article presents the outline of an integrated approach to corporate disclosure in which each of the three major elements–required financial reports, supplemental disclosure, and interactions with investors and intermediaries–are consistent and mutually reinforcing. Such an approach begins with required reports that refiect as closely as possible the economic reality of a company's business. But if GAAP income statements and balance sheets are often useful for communicating current and past performance, they are not designed to convey management's strategic vision and the company's prospects for creating value. To achieve and maintain accurate valuation, management must supplement mandated financial reporting with voluntary communication that highlights value drivers and helps investors understand both the company's strategic goals and management's progress in meeting those goals. Finally, management must interact with investors and capital market intermediaries in ways that provide them with a clear and compelling picture of the company's prospects, which should help both analysts and institutional investors become more effective monitors of the firm's performance. Through consistent communication that goes well beyond the sell side's focus on quarterly earnings per share, management will discover that it has the power to set the agenda for how the company's performance is evaluated by the market. In the process, companies are also likely to find that their investors (and analysts) are more patient than they thought, while their operating managers feel less pressure to take shortsighted steps to boost EPS. Both of these expected benefits of an integrated disclosure policy should end up increasing a company's value.     

Does Regulation FD work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public disclosure

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls—that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting “fair game” property of the market.     

Do disclosures of selective access improve market information acquisition fairness? Evidence from company visits in China

Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.     

Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether more frequent disclosure by firms is associated with lower levels of information asymmetry among investors. Using a panel of 386 firms in the US retail sector, I find that the practice of regularly providing monthly revenue disclosures is not associated with reduced information asymmetry. In contrast, I find that more detailed (greater quantity) disclosure is associated with reduced information asymmetry. I provide preliminary evidence that the distinction between disclosure frequency and disclosure quantity is due to more frequent disclosure providing an incentive for increased private information acquisition by sophisticated investors. The results indicate that the relation between disclosure and information asymmetry is multi-dimensional and varies depending on the disclosure attribute being studied.     

Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts

This paper examines whether analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts. Using a sample of 32 countries, we find an economically and statistically significant local analyst advantage even after controlling for firm and analyst characteristics. The local advantage is high in countries where earnings are smoothed more, less information is disclosed by firms, and firm idiosyncratic information explains a smaller fraction of stock returns. It is negatively related to whether a firm has foreign assets and to market participation by foreign investors and by institutions, and positively related to holdings by insiders. The extent to which U.S. investors underweight a country's stocks is positively related to that country's local analyst advantage.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.