产权结构与商业银行贷款中的风险行为

产权结构是集中反映当前中国银行业公司治理特征的重要变量.基于我国14家代表性商业银行1994～2004年的面板数据,本文实证检验了产权结构差异对银行贷款中风险行为的影响.分析结果表明:在放贷过程中,非国有银行比国有银行更加谨慎,上市银行比非上市股份制银行更为谨慎.此外,国民经济的持续增长显著增加了商业银行贷款中的风险行为.银行贷款风险对存贷利差的变化并不敏感,对此尚未完成的利率市场化进程可作为部分解释.     

商业银行谨慎经营行为及其对绩效的影响研究

本文首先利用投资效用函数从理论上分析商业银行谨慎经营对绩效的影响,然后进行了实证研究.理论模型表明,银行效率与风险资产比例存在一种倒U型关系;在考虑存款人效用或者加强临管后,银行会加大资本的投入比例、减少风险资产的投资比例,更为谨慎地经营.实证分析表明,我国商业银行经营日趋不谨慎,经营绩效有所下降;股份制银行比国有银行更加谨慎,绩效好于国有银行;从"在控制风险的前提下获取最大收益"的角度看,谨慎经营能提升银行绩效,实证结果与理论预测相吻合.调整传统业务结构,适当降低高资本消耗的贷款业务,优化资产组合配置,建立以风险调整的资本收益率(RAROc)为核心的绩效考核体系,是提高我国商业银行绩效的根本途径.     

市场竞争、资本约束与银行风险承担行为调整

本文通过运用我国14家商业银行1996～2009年的数据,研究了市场竞争下资本约束与银行风险承担行为之间的关系。结果表明:首先,资本与风险行为之间存在弱负相关关系,且这两者之间的相互影响程度不对称。其次,产权属性和产权结构对银行风险行为无显著影响,其要害在于:股份制银行风险承担行为的"工农中建化"现象。再者,市场竞争对银行风险行为具有显著的正面影响,且它对银行风险承担行为的影响系数大于资本约束。也即,伴随着国有银行制度改革的推进,多元化产权竞争格局逐渐形成,一方面银行业市场化竞争日趋激烈,另一方面银行资产负债表中国家声誉的不可退出性,使得中国银行业在完全隐性存款保险制度的默许下,内生出风险承担偏向。     

我国银行业改革的侧重点选择和具体实施步骤

中国银行业需要通过进一步的改革解决目前存在的问题，但改革侧重点应放在银行产权方面还是银行业的市场方面则值得认真加以研究。本文通过从银行业效率的提高、不良资产问题的解决、银行业制度变迁的绩效等三个方面的分析，提出了在现阶段产权改革应优先于市场改革的结论。作者还具体设计了国有银行产权改革的三个步骤：第一步，通过结构重组，分立出公司制的优质子银行；第二步，对银行进行股份化改造，引入有实力的民营经济主体和境外战略投资者，构造多元化的产权结构，改善国有银行治理结构；第三步，推动商业银行上市，对商业银行实行民营化，最终实现国有股的退出。     

产权结构、市场结构与银行效率

在近几年关于如何提高我国银行效率的讨论热潮中，影响银行效率的主要因素被归结为两个：国有银行的产权结构、银行业的垄断性市场结构。以此为基础，在中国银行业改革这一问题上理论界也提出了不同的主张：有的主张应以国有银行的产权结构改革为突破口，有的则认为应从优化银行业的市场结构、提高商业银行的竞争性入手。本文的作者认为，产权结构对银行效率的影响作用与市场竞争程度有关；而在公司治理制度不完善的环境下，市场竞争也可以起到约束和激励管理层的作用。因此，中国银行业的改革应该是市场结构改革和产权结构改革并举。     

论商业银行结构及其竞争力

我国商业银行发展呈现出多元化态势，在国有银行、股份制商业银行、民营银行及外资银行等商业银行之间的激烈竞争中，各商业银行的竞争力取决于其资源禀赋、经营者的能力及努力水平，而经营者的能力与努力水平又依赖于其产权结构和治理结构。     

我国商业银行贷款行业结构分析——基于国有银行与股份制银行的比较

正近年来,我国实体经济不振,不良率升高。商业银行资金投放面临行业和客户选择困难。本文从国有银行和股份制银行比较的角度,对商业银行的贷款行业投向进行分析。国有银行与股份制银行贷款行业分布情况整体情况从整体上看,国有银行贷款总额为37.66万亿元,股份制银行为13.65万亿元,国有银行是股份制银行的2.76倍。其中对公     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

我国银行业改革的侧重点选择和具体实施步骤

中国银行业需要通过进一步的改革解决目前存在的问题,但改革侧重点应放在银行产权方面还是银行业的市场方面则值得认真加以研究。本文通过从银行业效率的提高、不良资产问题的解决、银行业制度变迁的绩效等三个方面的分析,提出了在现阶段产权改革应优先于市场改革的结论。作者还具体设计了国有银行产权改革的三个步骤:第一步,通过结构重组,分立出公司制的优质子银行;第二步,对银行进行股份化改造,引入有实力的民营经济主体和境外战略投资者,构造多元化的产权结构,改善国有银行治理结构;第三步,推动商业银行上市,对商业银行实行民营化,最终实现国有股的退出。     

中东欧三国国有银行民营化的方式、进程及启示

中东欧转轨经济国家国有银行的民营化是指把银行中的国有股权进行部分或整体剥离，其目的是为了改善原国有银行的产权结构和公司治理，使银行真正成为独立的市场主体。本文主要就中东欧的波兰、匈牙利和捷克银行的民营化改革实践过程，分析和比较其国有产权剥离方式以及民营化后银行的产权结构和公司治理情况，以期对我国国有银行的产权和体制创新有所启示。     

A Comparison of Syndicated Loan Pricing at Investment and Commercial Banks

We reject the hypothesis that investment and commercial banks have identical loan-pricing policies. We find that compared to commercial banks, investment banks lend to less profitable, more lever aged firms, price riskier classes of term loans more generously, and offer relatively longer-term credits, usually with term, not commitment contracts. Investment banks typically establish higher credit spreads, although the premium declines when a commercial bank joins as syndicate co-arranger. Investment banks also price riskier classes of term loans more generously to borrowers than do commercial banks. Commercial-bank funding advantages do not appear to be a source of the pricing differences.     

关系型借贷与中小企业融资的实证分析

本文通过一个计量经济学模型来检验企业贷款是否存在关系型借贷,结果发现:大型企业的确存在关系型借贷行为,且对企业的贷款量有显著性影响;中小企业关系型借贷对于贷款量的影响较小,且并不明显。原因可能是商业银行在审批中小企业贷款时,注重对“硬”信息的考察,同时中小企业并没有同某一家或几家商业银行保持长期关系。为改善中小企业融资状况,商业银行应建立起一套完整的信用记录体系,并实现信息共享,在贷款过程中增强对“软”信息的考察,积极培育一批资质较好的中小企业客户并建立密切的联系;中小企业则应该规范财务制度并增强财务信息的透明度,同银行建立长期关系。     

地方性银行产权结构、贷款供给与地方经济发展

从经济增长和经济效率两个维度衡量地方经济发展,在对地方性银行产权结构、贷款供给与地方经济发展关系进行理论分析的基础上,采用我国67家地方性银行的数据,实证研究在贷款供给促进地方经济发展方面,不同产权性质的地方性银行是否具有差异;并进一步分析城商行与农商行在促进城市和非城市经济发展方面的差异性。研究发现：地方性银行提供的贷款越多,地方经济增长速度越快,地方经济效率也越高。在贷款促进地方经济增长方面,国有与非国有控股银行的作用无明显差异,但在贷款促进地方经济效率提升方面,国有控股银行的作用弱于非国有控股银行。城商行和农商行的贷款均能有效促进市辖区的经济发展,且作用效果无明显差异,但它们均未能明显促进非市辖区的经济发展。     

Competition,financial innovation and commercial bank loan portfolios

I examine how US commercial bank loan portfolios change in response to the rise of securitization markets and banking market deregulations over 1976–2003. Banks increasingly tilt their portfolios toward real-estate-backed loans. However, there are significant differences across banks. Larger banks and younger banks disproportionately shift their lending toward real-estate-backed loans, particularly commercial real-estate-backed loans, whereas smaller banks and older banks maintain greater shares of their loan portfolios in commercial and personal loans. When larger banks make more real-estate-backed loans, they charge lower interest rates, consistent with these banks lowering the costs of lending and expanding credit for borrowers. In contrast, smaller banks charge higher interest rates, consistent with these banks restricting lending to a select group of borrowers.     

浅议借贷管制与金融自由

在商业银行贷款行为日益市场化的今天,贷款仍是商业银行最主要的资产业务之一.随着现代经济与金融的飞速发展,各个金融机构的信贷规模迅速发展扩大,但同时带来的负面影响则是其贷款的风险越来越大,安全系数越来越小.随着全球金融一体化的发展和我国加入WTO,我国金融市场上的不确定因素急剧增加,特别是商业银行的经营管理将面临越来越严峻的考验.是继续加强对贷款的管制,还是顺应金融自由化的浪潮而放松管制,很难有明确划一的答案.本文拟通过对现行商业银行贷款在实体与程序方面所作限制的介绍与分析,找出借贷管制与金融自由化的连接点.     

不良贷款约束下的中国上市商业银行效率和全要素生产率研究——基于SBM方向性距离函数的实证分析

本文运用SBM方向性距离函数和Luenberger生产率指标测度了2003～2009年中国11家上市商业银行不良贷款约束下的效率和全要素生产率增长,并对影响效率和全要素生产率的宏观因素进行了实证分析。研究结果发现:股份制商业银行的效率优于大型商业银行,非利息收入和不良贷款是银行无效率的主要来源;中国银行业的全要素生产率是增长的,股份制商业银行的全要素生产率高于大型商业银行,主要体现在规模效率变化和技术规模变化;外资银行的进入和M_2的供给增长对中国银行业的发展起到推动作用。     

Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from private firms in China

Bribery, rather than firm performance, largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in China. Bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans. These firms also pay more in terms of bribes. Although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans, it does so only for loans originated by the big-four banks. For loans originated by smaller banks, performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access. Our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that Chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

The influence of thrift competition on bank business loan rates

This article assesses the competitive influence of thrift institutions on the pricing of commercial loans made by commercial banks. Using detailed survey information on the rates that individual banks charge for various types of commercial loans, we attempt to determine which of various proposed weightings of thrift institutions, when incorporated in measures of market concentration, best explains loan rates. After considering several weighting schemes, including those designed to approximate current regulatory practice in analyzing the competitive impact of proposed bank mergers, we find that in all but one of the cases examined, the use of a positive weight for thrift institutions explains bank loan rates, if anything, more poorly than does a weighting of zero for such institutions.     

Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?

When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.