Asset Securitizations and Credit Default Swaps

This study examines the effects of off‐balance sheet versus on‐balance sheet securitizations on the originator's credit risk in the default swap (CDS) market across the recent business cycle from 2002 to 2009. I find that on‐balance sheet securitizations demonstrate greater effects on the originator's CDS premium than off‐balance sheet securitizations in the business cycle. While off‐balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator's CDS premium become significantly stronger after 2007 when the economy declines, on‐balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator's CDS premium do not experience a significant change with the onset of the recession. The results suggest that the CDS market views originators as having greater probabilities not to honour their implicit guarantees for off‐balance sheet securitizations during the economic downturn. The results also indicate that on balance sheet and off‐balance sheet securitizations have distinctly different risk properties. It would be beneficial to investors if regulations take into considerations the changing credit risks of off‐balance sheet securitizations and the different structures of asset securitizations.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Creating Value Through Best‐In‐Class Capital Allocation1

With the economy showing signs of recovery, companies are shifting their focus from liquidity and balance sheet concerns back towards capital allocation and value creation. This article provides a comprehensive framework to examine shareholder value creation through capital allocation, and discusses important capital allocation lessons that have re‐emerged over the last few years. Notable among the key lessons are the following:

• ? Growth alone does not guarantee value creation, which suggests that companies should allocate capital based on the economic value of each investment opportunity.
• ? The limits of diversification in a financial crisis should be considered when allocating capital and managing liquidity.
• ? Companies should be conservative with base‐case cash flow projections and incorporate the possibility of downside scenarios into their projections.
• ? It is important to incorporate all forms of capital when managing liquidity.
• ? Whether using a long‐term or current‐market approach, companies should be consistent throughout the cycle in their cost of capital methodology.
• ? Companies should continually rethink investments and allocate capital in an attempt to maintain a competitive advantage.
• ? Evaluate returns relative to risk and cost of capital, and not against the company's average ROIC.
• ? Comparing the IRR of share repurchases to new investments is not an apples‐to‐apples comparison.

Finally, companies should concentrate on the strategic uses and value of particular assets and not allow their decisions to be driven by the value they might receive relative to their initial cost.     

Pricing of off‐balance sheet debt: how do bond market participants use the footnote disclosures on operating leases and postretirement benefit plans?

In this study, we examine whether the public debt market prices information on off‐balance sheet debt arising from operating leases and postretirement plans. We find that bond‐rating agencies price off‐balance sheet debt arising from operating leases and the coefficient on off‐balance sheet debt measure of operating leases is similar to that of capital leases on the balance sheet. Regarding postretirement benefit plans, we find that bond‐rating agencies do price postretirement benefit obligations that are reported in balance sheet but do not price such obligations disclosed in footnotes. We find similar results when we examine corporate bond yields on new debt issues.     

Entry Mode Choice and Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese FDI in China

This paper examines entry mode choices between wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) and joint ventures (JVs) and the impact on performance for Taiwanese foreign direct investment in China. Taiwan and China share common cultural traits, so Taiwanese investors inherently prefer WOSs because these investors are acquainted with local conditions in China. This paper shows that even if WOSs are a natural choice, transaction cost theory is applicable in explaining the adoption of JVs by Taiwanese firms when investing in China. Firms that choose WOSs generally have higher sales growth and superior profitability. However, the smaller the subsidiary and the less experienced the firm, the more likely that JVs will have better performance.     

Does voluntary balance sheet disclosure mitigate post-earnings-announcement drift?

Theory suggests that balance sheet information such as total assets, total equity, or total liabilities complements earnings information in helping investors assess a firm’s profitability and estimate earnings growth. The voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information at earnings announcement could help investors gather and process this information at a lower cost. We therefore predict that voluntary balance sheet disclosure at the time of an earnings announcement helps investors promptly understand the implication of current earnings news for future earnings and subsequently reduces post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Consistent with these predictions, our results show that when firms provide voluntary balance sheet disclosures, the earnings response coefficient in the event window is significantly higher and the corresponding PEAD is significantly lower. We further find that the impact of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD is more pronounced when the magnitude of balance sheet value surprise is larger, when balance sheet value is more informative about future earnings, when earnings uncertainty is higher, or when information cost is higher, consistent with our conjectures that helping investors to better understand future earnings performance and lowering information costs are key mechanisms underlying the effect of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD.     

Attracting Long‐Term Shareholders

Corporate CEOs often say they don't hear enough from shareholders about strategic issues related to long‐term value creation. At the same time, they claim to hear with predictable regularity from short‐term investors about their success (or failure) in hitting consensus earnings targets. But as the authors of this article begin by noting, there is mounting evidence that companies get the shareholders they deserve—that companies that provide quarterly earnings guidance and otherwise focus investor attention on near‐term earnings targets tend to attract more transient investors. The authors go on to argue that companies with a compelling long‐term vision can expect to benefit not only from more farsighted managerial decision‐making, but also from building a base of longer‐term investors who share management's view of success, and how it can and ought to be achieved. Such a shift in strategic focus and disclosure toward longer‐run performance creates a virtuous cycle—one in which companies that gain the interest and backing of investors with longer horizons end up reinforcing management's confidence to undertake value‐adding investments in their company's future. Even if most companies can't pick their shareholders, they can develop an investor engagement strategy designed to attract long‐term investors. In this article, the chairman and president of FCLTGlobal outline the underlying strategy behind long‐term investor relations and the four key components of such an approach.     

Determinants of individual investment decisions in investment‐based crowdfunding

We investigate determinants of investment decisions in investment‐based (equity and bond) crowdfunding campaigns, using a novel investment‐, investor‐ and campaign‐level database, where equity refers to investments in entrepreneurial start‐ups and bonds to large real estate projects. We find that investors who have higher social interactions invest more. Social interactions are important in an equity crowdfunding context but do not affect participation in bond investments. This is consistent with the view that investors' social networks help reduce information asymmetry. Women invest less in the riskiest (equity) investments but more in safer ones (bonds). These findings are better explained by differences in risk aversion than differences in overconfidence between men and women. Overall, the findings contribute to the understanding of how investment‐based crowdfunding can be a viable source of entrepreneurial finance and how entrepreneurs' campaign decisions affect investor participation in this new form of entrepreneurial finance.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

R&D AND CAPITAL MARKETS

The substantial growth of R&D expenditures over the last two decades, together with the continuous substitution of knowledge (intangible) capital for physical (tangible) capital in corporate production functions, has elevated the importance of R&D in the performance of business enterprises. At the same time, however, the evaluation of corporate R&D activities by investors is seriously hampered by antiquated accounting rules and insufficient disclosure by corporations. Despite the fact that the expected benefits of R&D stretch over extended periods of time, corporate investments in R&D are immediately written off in financial reports, leaving no trace of R&D capital on balance sheets and causing material distortions of reported profitability. After a brief review of statistics documenting the growth and economic importance of corporate R&D in the U.S., the article presents a comparison of R&D disclosure regulations among industrialized nations that shows U.S. rules to be the least flexible in allowing management discretion in how they measure and report R&D. Next the author surveys the large and growing body of empirical research on R&D, which provides strong testimony to the substantial contribution of R&D to corporate productivity and shareholder value. Moreover, despite widespread allegations of stock market “short termism” throughout the 1980s and early '90s, the research indicates “unequivocally” that capital markets consider investments in R&D as a significant value-increasing activity. But if investors clearly demonstrate a willingness to take the long view of R&D, there is also evidence of undervaluation of some R&D-intensive companies—particularly those with low profitability—as well as other potential costs to corporations and investors stemming from inadequate public information about R&D. To help correct the reporting biases and distortions of R&D, the author offers some suggestions for investors and analysts that follow R&D-intensive companies. In particular, he proposes (1) adjustment of reported data to reflect the capitalization and amortization of (instead of expensing) corporate R&D and (2) the use of various quantitative measures for gauging research capabilities and output, including citations of the firm's patents and measures indicating the share of current revenues coming from products developed within recent years.     

The Puzzle of Financial Reporting and Corporate Short‐Termism: A Universal Ownership Perspective

This study considers the controversy surrounding financial reporting and corporate short‐termism as a puzzle. The question remains as to why corporate managers and investors persist in exhibiting behaviours that trade off long‐term value creation for meeting short‐term financial targets. Using inter‐temporal choice theory, the myopia characterising decision‐making is entirely rational, given the set of incentives faced. This study views the puzzle through the prism of universal owners (pension and superannuation funds), arguing that the investment policies or ‘mandates’ implemented by these financial behemoths is the source of the myopic behaviour. The paper explores a range of policies that universal owners may consider implementing to ensure that the payoffs to corporate managers and investors are optimised through the pursuit of long‐termism.     

Agency hazard,managerial incentives,and the wealth effects of joint venture investments

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores whether the separation of ownership (by shareholders) and control (by managers) in firms is an essential determinant of the valuation effect of joint ventures (JVs). This is achieved by examining the efficacy of incentive alignment mechanisms and their contingency effects. Based on a sample of 963 U.S. firms' JV investments, the results show that poor JV performance is linked to lower levels of executive ownership and reduced equity compensation. The possibility of managers acting for their own self-interest in corporate JV investments is further supported by the stronger positive performance effect of incentive alignment mechanisms documented when firms have a higher level of free cash flow or undertake JVs in unrelated business domains. Both performance measures of short-run announcement effects and long-run stock returns yield similar results. Our results underscore the importance of governing executives' self-interested actions in their JV engagements.     

Ownership and performance in Chinese manufacturing industry

The relation between various ownership types and performance measures for 1036 firms in China is examined. State owned enterprises (SOE) are consistently less profitable than mixed enterprises (ME), collective owned enterprises (COE), joint ventures (JV), and foreign owned enterprises (FOE). The SOEs and FOEs are also less productive than MEs, COEs and JVs. The surprisingly low productivity for FOEs may result from the learning curve for international investors doing business in China. Owned by local governments, COEs are more profitable and productive than the central government owned SOEs, possibly because of closer monitoring and harder budget constraints, and better employees and management. The performance of MEs, mostly newly privatized firms, is weaker when related to assets, possibly due to the anomaly that capital investments following their public offerings are not yet on line. The co-existence of economies of scale and over-employment is also evident among Chinese enterprises.     

Economic consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs

This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write‐offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write‐off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write‐offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write‐off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write‐offs. I also provide evidence that write‐off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst‐forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.     

Luck versus Skill in the Cross‐Section of Mutual Fund Returns

The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark‐adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true α) in the extreme tails of the cross‐section of mutual fund α estimates.     

Global Public‐Private Investment Partnerships: A Financing Innovation with Positive Social Impact

Global bond markets, along with banks and governments, are the main source of funding for investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure and the transition to clean energy. Although such bonds are a relatively recent innovation, the green bond market has grown rapidly from its start in 2008 to around $800 billion in outstanding issues. The problem, however, is that green bonds, which represent less than 1% of global bond markets, have been issued disproportionately by government‐sponsored entities, corporations, and municipalities in developed markets. In the emerging market countries where the infrastructure investments are most needed, they barely exist. The authors describe a new investment vehicle, called the AP EGO fund, whose mission and MO are to channel the vast global pools of institutional savings that are now invested in low or (even negative) yield fixed‐income assets—as much as $17 trillion in 2019—to higher‐return emerging markets green investments, in particular sustainable infrastructure, by creating a new asset class: emerging‐market green bonds issued by banks. The AP EGO fund is premised on and involves a reworking of the public‐private partnership (PPP) into a form they call the global public‐private investment partnership (or GPPIP). Unlike the PPP, which combines a public agency with a private operator, the GPPIP has four instead of just two partners. In addition to the standard public agency and the private concession operator, there is a development bank—in this case the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the financial markets affiliate of the World Bank—and private investors that include emerging‐market banks as well as global institutional investors. Along with the mediating role played by a public agency like the IFC, the AP EGO Fund is fundamentally different from other PPPs in that it takes the form of a special purpose securitization vehicle whose shares are backed by a pool of green bonds issued by emerging market banks in multiple emerging market countries. And besides its application to a new asset class, the fund also breaks new ground by applying a securitization technique with a fund structure designed with an embedded “first‐loss” protection to a global pool of green bonds originated in emerging market economies. By means of this structuring, the green‐bond‐backed fund shares issued by the AP EGO are now providing developed market institutional investors with somewhat higher‐yielding fixed income securities that nevertheless carry an investment‐grade rating.     

Information Discovery in Share Lockups: Evidence from the Split‐Share Structure Reform in China

We document a prominent abnormal stock return of –14% during the [–120, +20] day window around 482 lockup expirations in the split‐share structure reform in China. The abnormal stock returns (selling volumes) are positively (negatively) correlated with firm information transparency and postreform performance improvement, but negatively (positively) related to the level of agency problems, suggesting the existence of information‐based trading during the lockups. We present important evidence that institutional investors, especially mutual funds, possess superior information discovering capabilities than that of individual investors. Our findings confirm the information roles of lockups as a tool to signal firm quality and a commitment device to alleviate agency problems.     

BETA,SIZE, RISK,AND RETURN

We relate the cross‐section of stock returns to firm size, beta, and total risk. We find that as extreme monthly security returns are censored from the data, the significance level decreases rapidly for the size variable and increases for beta and total risk. An analysis of up and down markets reaffirms our findings. Consequently, average returns relate positively with beta, negatively with total risk, and not at all with firm size. We infer that investors willingly accept a lower average return on high‐total‐risk investments as the trade‐off for buying a chance at an extreme positive return. JEL classification: G1.     

When are investment projects in the same risk class?

If two investments have the same pay‐off covariance with the market but one has higher expected pay‐off, which asset according to the CAPM has most risk? One answer is that as far as risk goes the two assets are the same, because they have the same covariance with the market. The correct answer, pointed out nearly four decades ago by Eugene Fama, but long overlooked, is that investments have the same risk, the same returns beta and the same CAPM discount rate if and only if they have the same ratio of ex ante pay‐off covariance to pay‐off mean. This insight clarifies much of the conventional wisdom that surrounds capital budgeting and ‘risk‐adjusted’ discount rates, while also displaying the mechanics by which information arrival affects the CAPM cost of capital.