首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
This study investigates a method for measuring knowledge structure development in novice accountants by extending Bonner and Walker [Bonner, S. and P. Walker. 1994. The effects of instruction and experience on the acquisition of auditing knowledge. The Accounting Review 69: 157–178.], which examined the effects of instruction and experience on the acquisition of declarative and procedural knowledge. We employ Pathfinder network scaling, a recently developed and validated measure of knowledge structure acquisition, to determine whether the combinations of instruction and experience previously found to be effective in promoting declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition result in the development of expert-like knowledge structures. Further, we examine the effectiveness of a simple decision aid in promoting the acquisition of expert-like knowledge structures through experience with the decision aid. Results from two laboratory experiments indicate that Pathfinder-based measures of knowledge structure can effectively capture the effects of training and decision aid use on the development of expertise. The findings suggest that assessments of knowledge structures are valuable tools for measuring the effectiveness of training programs, and such assessments can be applied in decision domains where traditional measures of knowledge acquisition are insufficient or infeasible. Finally, the results indicate that properly designed decision aids can impart expert-like knowledge structures to novice decision makers, and these knowledge structures are the key to expertise.  相似文献   

2.
This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the  difference  between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.  相似文献   

3.
We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.  相似文献   

4.
Two critical aspects of the model of auditor expertise development in Tan and Libby [1997] are that audit firms do not value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors but do value it in experienced auditors. We update the former and extend the latter. Our paper predicts and finds that audit firms now do value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors, especially when their supervisors have higher tacit knowledge. Our proxies of value include higher promotability assessments, annual evaluations, and cash bonuses. Our paper also extends Tan and Libby [1997] by positing that enhanced development of expertise and audit firm human capital are two reasons audit firms value tacit knowledge in experienced auditors. As predicted, higher tacit knowledge in experienced auditors is positively associated with higher tacit knowledge acquisition by their inexperienced subordinates and with stronger firm commitment of inexperienced subordinates having higher tacit knowledge.  相似文献   

5.
We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.  相似文献   

6.
In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.  相似文献   

7.
We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.  相似文献   

8.
The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.  相似文献   

9.
Sustainability Northwest (SNW) is a fictional not‐for‐profit organization (NPO) that seeks to develop thought leaders for a sustainable future. This instructional case allows professors to assign students with up to six different roles, including SNW's chair of the board, executive director, volunteer treasurer, and the external auditor. Unique learning objectives include (i) the application of the CPA Canada Handbook, Accounting—Part III to prepare an NPO's financial statements using fund accounting, (ii) the development of recommendations to improve an NPO's board of directors, (iii) the analysis of system flow documents to identify control weaknesses, and (iv) the preparation of an audit planning memo. Instructors can use this case in several milieus. First, professors can foster a student's ability to integrate technical knowledge by (i) assigning students all six roles in a capstone course to promote integration within an individual course or (ii) assigning multiple roles across multiple courses to promote integration across a program of studies. Second, instructors can focus on a particular technical skill by assigning specific roles. This case is ideal for senior‐level undergraduate students or graduate students.  相似文献   

10.
We investigate whether investor reactions to the announcement of a new outside director appointment significantly depend upon the director's experience in the appointing firm's industry. Our sample includes 688 outside director appointments to boards of S&P 500 companies from 2005 to 2010. We find significantly higher announcement returns upon appointments of experienced versus inexperienced directors. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use the deaths of 200 directors holding 280 outside directorships as an identification strategy and find significantly more negative announcement returns associated with the deaths of experienced versus inexperienced directors. However, while our results are robust to accounting for time‐fixed unobservable director and firm characteristics, we still cannot completely rule out endogenous firm‐director matching driving our results.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号