中国寿险市场存在逆向选择吗?——来自CHARLS数据的经验证据

我国寿险市场是否存在逆向选择问题,在理论和实证两个方面缺乏细致的讨论。本文利用CHARLS数据和正相关理论检验了我国定期寿险和终身寿险市场中的逆向选择问题。我们选取了死亡率这一远期指标和健康状况这一近期指标来衡量消费者的死亡风险,从广延边际和集约边际两个方面利用正相关理论进行了深入的研究。实证结论表明,以死亡率和健康状况衡量的死亡风险与寿险消费负相关或者不相关,即我国寿险市场并不存在逆向选择问题。然后,我们讨论了模型的内生性问题,并根据年龄变量检验了结论的稳健性,实证结果表明我们的结论是稳健的。最后,本文利用双变量Probit模型设计了一个机制,并利用该机制验证了利他动机是我国寿险市场不存在逆向选择的原因之一。     

中国寿险市场存在逆向选择吗?——来自CHARLS数据的经验证据

我国寿险市场是否存在逆向选择问题,在理论和实证两个方面缺乏细致的讨论。本文利用CHARLS数据和正相关理论检验了我国定期寿险和终身寿险市场中的逆向选择问题。我们选取了死亡率这一远期指标和健康状况这一近期指标来衡量消费者的死亡风险,从广延边际和集约边际两个方面利用正相关理论进行了深入的研究。实证结论表明,以死亡率和健康状况衡量的死亡风险与寿险消费负相关或者不相关,即我国寿险市场并不存在逆向选择问题。然后,我们讨论了模型的内生性问题,并根据年龄变量检验了结论的稳健性,实证结果表明我们的结论是稳健的。最后,本文利用双变量Probit模型设计了一个机制,并利用该机制验证了利他动机是我国寿险市场不存在逆向选择的原因之一。     

金融创新如何缓解信任品市场失灵?——中国食品安全责任强制保险的自然实验

信任品市场(如食品、医药等)存在的问题一直困扰着中国和世界很多国家。关于产品和服务质量的信息不对称(道德风险和逆向选择)会导致信任品市场失灵。缓解信任品市场失灵,一种常见的解决方案是政府监管;而经济学家认为更加基于市场的解决方案(例如强制责任保险等金融创新)可能更为有效。在理论上,强制责任保险有两种相反的效应:保险公司的监督减少了道德风险 vs. 保险加剧了企业的道德风险,但一直亟待实证检验。幸运的是,中国食品安全责任强制保险的改革实验走在了世界的前列。本文利用了中国在不同地区、不同时间推行的这个自然实验,通过双重差分的方法识别出责任保险对于信任品市场的因果效应。本文的研究发现,强制责任保险能显著降低食品安全事故发生概率。这表明政府强制推行的金融创新可以成为信任品市场失灵的一种有效的替代性解决方案。     

A note on increased probability of loss and the demand for insurance

It is shown that the effect of increased probability of loss on the demand for insurance depends on whether both insured and insurer are aware of the change. When both insurer and insured share the same beliefs about the probability of loss (symmetric information), an increase in the loss probability may lead risk-averse agents to demandless insurance.     

An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection

The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research.     

Werbeanzeigen von Versicherungsunternehmen zur Aufklärung über Gesundheitsrisiken

Insurers offering health-related services as accident insurance, health insurance coverage or nursing insurance for instance have a legitimate interest in reducing costs of ill insured. Information about health-conscious behavior and health risks provided by advertisement may contribute this impact. In an experimental study, we analyze the effect of credibility of advertisement and independent third-party trustmark on health risk perception and health behavior intentions. Results demonstrate significant influence of credibility of advertisement on health risk perception and higher credibility for advertisement with independent trustmark. Furthermore, higher health risk perception conducts to healthier behavior intentions.     

从博弈论看保险市场信息不对称的本质及规范举措

博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业，保险人与被保险人之间存在着严重的信息不对称，特别是被保险人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险人的违规操作等现象普遍存在，长期困扰着保险界。     

Econometric Methods for Testing for Asymmetric Information: A Comparison of Parametric and Nonparametric Methods with an Application to Hospital Daily Benefits

Since Chiappori and Salanié, testing for asymmetric information has become tantamount to testing for a positive relation between risk and coverage which is predicted by (equilibrium) models for adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper we review parametric tests and a recently developed nonparametric test (Su and Spindler) and discuss the underlying assumptions. As an illustrative example, we apply the tests to hospital daily benefits which is part of the accident/disability insurance. We compare the results and show that the pattern of asymmetric information is mixed. The main finding is that we detect asymmetric information for low insured sums, but not for high insured sums which is a surprising result. We can also show that in certain ranges both types of test deliver similar results, while under certain circumstances, approaches using aggregation to binary variables might run into difficulties.     

Das deutsche und Schweizer Krankenversicherungssystem: Kosten,Leistungen und Anreizwirkungen aus Sicht der Versicherten

In the last years changes in the financing and in the service catalogue of the German health insurance system have been intensively discussed. The problematic incentive structures regarding the behaviour of the insured are frequently mentioned in these discussions. In particular, German insured have only little interest in a cost-efficient treatment of illness. At the same time the Swiss health insurance system is an example in which the insured show a higher cost consciousness. In the following article, the health insurance systems of Germany and Switzerland are compared from the perspective of the insured on the basis of the information-economic terms “moral hazard” and “adverse selection.” We find that both systems can learn from each other in reducing incentive problems.     

A Voluntary Deductible in Social Health Insurance with Risk Equalization: “Community‐Rated or Risk‐Rated Premium Rebate?”

On January 1, 2006 a new mandatory basic health insurance will be introduced in the Netherlands. One aspect of the new scheme is that the insured can choose to have a deductible. This option should increase the individual responsibility and reduce moral hazard. In the new scheme, a risk equalization system is aimed at avoiding preferred risk selection and insolvency of insurance companies with a relatively high‐risk pool. A crucial issue with respect to a voluntary deductible in this type of social health insurance is whether the premium rebate should be community rated or risk rated. The Dutch government has chosen the former, which means that the premium rebate will be independent of health status and risk. Our analysis shows that, in a situation with “accurate” risk equalization, a community‐rated premium rebate could lead to an adverse selection spiral. Over time, this spiral results in none of the insured taking a deductible and thus no reduction in moral hazard.