会计准则执行机制的性质及实施——基于契约理论视角的分析

会计准则执行机制是保证会计准则有效执行的制度安排。本文在梳理契约理论的基础上,分析了会计准则执行机制的性质为显性契约与隐性契约的联结,并进一步提出了会计准则执行机制的框架体系:正式制度与非正式制度相结合,即被动履行机制与主动履行机制相结合。     

利益制衡与审计者独立性

本文解读了审计委托中的一种显性合约和两种隐性合约安排,剖析了合约关系中的五种利益关系,以及它们形成的两种相反力量对审计者独立性的制衡。本文认为,审计者的独立性反映了他在各种力量制衡下的利益倾向性,独立性完全可以通过适当安排的利益驱动得以保障。     

国家审计机关独立性、文化差异与审计工作报告质量——基于跨国数据的实证分析

审计工作报告是国家审计机关提供的最为重要的审计结果,其质量会受到国家审计机关独立性和文化等非正式制度的影响.本文选用跨国面板数据,研究国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的影响,以及文化差异如何调节国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的影响.研究发现,国家审计机关独立性可以有效提升审计工作报告质量;在权力距离大、个人主义、男性导向和不确定性规避程度高的文化下,国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的提升作用更显著.研究结论对于在中国特色社会主义审计制度下,坚持和巩固国家审计机关独立性,加强审计精神文化建设,从而提升审计工作报告质量具有重要意义.     

国家审计机关独立性、文化差异与审计工作报告质量——基于跨国数据的实证分析

审计工作报告是国家审计机关提供的最为重要的审计结果,其质量会受到国家审计机关独立性和文化等非正式制度的影响.本文选用跨国面板数据,研究国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的影响,以及文化差异如何调节国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的影响.研究发现,国家审计机关独立性可以有效提升审计工作报告质量;在权力距离大、个人主义、男性导向和不确定性规避程度高的文化下,国家审计机关独立性对审计工作报告质量的提升作用更显著.研究结论对于在中国特色社会主义审计制度下,坚持和巩固国家审计机关独立性,加强审计精神文化建设,从而提升审计工作报告质量具有重要意义.     

从独立性视角重构企业审计体系

当前,审计信任危机在很大程度上缘于独立性的丧失,独立性是实质上的独立与形式上独立的统一。它是审计职业存在的基础,也是避免法律诉讼的有效保障,是构建诚信体系的支柱。健全的审计体制安排是保证审计独立的前提条件,本文从对独立性的诠释谈起,分析了现行制度框架下,审计独立性所面临的挑战,并对中国审计制度设计进行了探讨。     

设立审计委员会 提高内审独立性——基于制度经济学的解释

我国上市公司由于其特殊的股权结构，国有股一股独大，所有者缺位，内部人控制严重，使得社会公众股股东的利益得不到保护，内部审计作为监督经理人的一种内部控制机制由于其独立性差没有发挥应有的作用，审计委员会制度的建立作为规范内部审计的一种制度安排可以提高内部审计的独立性，     

证券市场审计合谋形成的经济学分析

除了审计师追求经济利益最大化的经济人属性与机会主义倾向,我国证券市场审计合谋的根本原因在于法律和声誉这两个互补机制均处于失效状态。相关审计制度存在漏洞,执行机制存在缺陷,审计声誉机制几乎失效,致使法律制度的外在威慑力、声誉机制的内在促动力均无法得到有效发挥。     

产权性质、信誉机制与审计契约安排

企业是一系列契约的集合（Coase,1937）,而审计也是这一系列契约中的一种。企业这一系列契约集合是一个相互影响的整体,是一个系统,系统的各个部分之间相互影响。各契约之间最终达到一种均衡,这种均衡就是使得企业的契约成本最小化。不同的企业,在不同的制度约束下会形成不同的契约均衡。而产权及其性质是一种最基本的制度约束。产权性质不同,导致了证券市场上最终控制人性质的差异不同,而不同性质的最终控制人自身又隐含着不同的信誉机制,     

美国证券交易委员会执法体制对我国证券监管的启示

本文简要介绍了美国证券交易委员会监管程序,该程序包括案件调查程序和案件处理程序两大部分,其中前者又由非正式调查程序和正式调查程序组成,后者由案件移送程序、民事救济程序和行政执法程序组成,在此基础上提出我国应当从以下方面借鉴美国的经验来完善我国的证券业监管;证券监管机构应当成为执法主导者、完备立法体系、借鉴司法手段、引入协商机制、案件处理方式多样化等。     

我国农村信用社的非正式制度分析

我国的农村经济发展尚面临许多瓶颈,其中农村金融问题尤其令人关注.农村信用社在农村金融市场体系中占据了举足轻重的地位,决定着农村金融改革与发展的成败.但我围农村信用社不仅在正式制度安排方面尚不规范,而且还受到了非正式制度的制约.农村信用社企业文化的缺失直接制约了其经营业务的开展;而农村长期形成的习俗与社会关系抵押等非正式制度因素以及衍生的非正式金融,则间接影响了农村信用社的发展.因此,必须加快农村信用社的非正式制度改革,加强非正式制度与正式制度的协调合作.     

A competitive model of the informal sector

In developing nations, formal workers tend to be more experienced, more educated, and earn more than informal workers. These facts are often interpreted as evidence that low-skill workers face barriers to entry into the formal sector. Yet, there is little empirical evidence that such barriers are important. This paper describes a model where, in equilibrium, the characteristics of formal and informal workers differ systematically, even though labor markets are perfectly competitive. The informal sector emphasizes low-skill work, as in the data, because informal managers have access to less outside financing, and choose to substitute low-skill labor for physical capital.     

Financial Market Fragmentation and Reforms in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania

This article reports the findings from surveys of formal andinformal institutions and their clients in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria,and Tanzania. It investigates the hypothesis that reformingfinancially repressive policies would not be sufficient to overcomefragmentation of financial markets because of structural andinstitutional barriers to interactions across different marketsegments. The four countries have substantially fragmented financialmarkets, with weak linkages between formal and informal segmentsand interest rate differentials that cannot be adequately explainedby differences in costs and risks. Nevertheless, the relativelylow transaction costs and loan losses of informal institutionsindicate that they provide a reasonably efficient solution toinformation, transaction cost, and enforcement problems thatexclude their clients from access to formal banking services.The findings imply that financial liberalization and bank restructuringin the African context should be accompanied by complementarymeasures to address institutional and structural problems, suchas contract enforcement and information availability, and toimprove the integration of informal and formal financial markets.     

正规金融与非正规金融:机制、效率与实证挑战

正规金融与非正规金融的定位和关系,不仅是重要的学术问题,也是影响间接金融体系改革方向的关键。本文从机制视角建立学理框架,从信息和履约两个基础维度,讨论正规金融与非正规金融的相对效率及决定因素,并通过系统梳理相关文献,指出现有实证研究的成果与挑战;进而结合中国特征,讨论如何提高正规金融与非正规金融的效率,最后提出未来研究方向。本文认为,正规金融与非正规金融因信息和履约机制不同而各有其独立存在价值,其相对效率取决于不同经济发展阶段的社会网络基础和征信、法律体系,现有实证文献对两者作用的分歧主要源于分类、样本局限和内生性处理。本文从机制视角进行分析,体现了正规金融和非正规金融的金融属性,为探索相关领域学术研究和政策制定提供启示。     

Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship

We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at any point in time, but writing formal contracts is costly. A contract can describe the external environment and the parties' behavior in a more or less detailed way, and the cost of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally enforced) and informal (self‐enforcing) contracts. The presence of writing costs has important implications both for the optimal structure of formal contracts, particularly the tradeoff between contingent and spot contracting, and for the interaction between formal and informal contracting. Our model sheds light on these implications and generates a rich set of predictions about the determinants of the optimal mode of contracting.     

National Culture and Profit Reinvestment: Evidence from Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises

We examine the role of national culture—an important informal institution—in the profit reinvestment decisions of small firms in emerging markets. Prior economic development literature focuses on formal institutions as determinants of growth. However, in emerging markets where formal institutions are less developed, informal institutions should have more of a direct versus indirect impact through formal institutions. We find that Schwartz's cultural dimensions of Embeddedness and Hierarchy negatively affect profit reinvestment, and that access to external financing (strength of property rights) is more important for reinvestment decisions in countries with low (high) Embeddedness and Hierarchy.     

Social Trust,Institution, and Economic Growth: Evidence from China

Recent research has demonstrated the important role of social trust in economic growth. As a form of informal institution, social trust and formal institution are inextricable and intrinsically related. This article aims to investigate the relationship between social trust and institution, and their combined effects on economic growth. In an empirical investigation of cross-provincial data in the period 2001–2009 in China, our estimates suggest that the increase in social trust significantly promotes economic growth. The improvement of formal institution is also beneficial to economic growth. The effect of social trust on economic growth depends on the institution level, and this effect weakens with institutional strength.     

Does an Agency‐Type of Audit Model Fit a Stewardship Context? Evidence from Performance Auditing in Dutch Municipalities

The degree of auditor independence is an important issue in the performance auditing literature. However, little attention has been paid to the influence of the context in which an audit body operates. This paper investigates how an audit model with a high degree of auditor independence, which is consistent with agency theory's rather formal view of relationships in organizations, functions in a context with more informal relationships, as implied by stewardship theory. Based on two case studies and a survey, the paper concludes that Dutch councilors are more satisfied with audit reports if in their municipality there is a fit between context and audit model.     

The trust-control nexus in public private partnership (PPP) contracts

This study examines the trust-control nexus in the context of public private partnership (PPP) contracts. It draws on the literature and the case of two UK school PPP contracts with varying degree of trust among the partners to illustrate the role of control in building competence trust and goodwill trust, and how trust in turn affects control. Prior to entering into the PPP contract, under a condition of high risk and low trust, reliance was placed on formal control to evaluate competence trust for the purpose of selecting a preferred bidder, whilst goodwill trust, which takes time to evolve, played no role in the selection process. During contract implementation, formal control formed the basis for demonstrating competence and nurturing goodwill trust. Trust subsequently determined the extent of reliance on formal control and informal control. In the case of School 1, high level of trust led to a reliance on informal control which enabled partners to focus resources on solving problems, whilst formal control operated in the background. In the case of School 2, low level of trust and perceived lack of transparency led to a demand for additional formal control. This study adds to the trust-control literature by shedding light on how trust relates to control, in the context of long-term PPP contracts which are difficult to specify in advance.     

基于“差序格局”理论的互助联保组织变迁研究

传统的为解决农户、小微企业等弱势群体担保资源不足而兴起的以单一契约约束为主的互助联保贷款,因违约率持续上升而面临困境。而契合中国圈层文化,引入契约安排之外的非正式“差序控制”构建的联保组织,则在有效控制违约风险、支持融资弱势群体发展等方面表现出良好的适应性。     

Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach

Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are nonverifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed measurements), we show that the weights in the index reflect a tradeoff between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves with higher precision of the index measure, because this strengthens incentives, and correlations between measurements may for this reason be beneficial. There is a caveat, however, because the index contract is not necessarily optimal for very precise measurements, although it is shown to be asymptotically optimal. We also consider hybrid measurements, and show that the principal may want to include verifiable performance measures in the relational index contract in order to improve incentives, and that this has noteworthy implications for the formal contract.