存款保险条例 2014年10月29日国务院第67次常务会议通过自2015年5月1日起施行

第一条为了建立和规范存款保险制度,依法保护存款人的合法权益,及时防范和化解金融风险,维护金融稳定,制定本条例。第二条在中华人民共和国境内设立的商业银行、农村合作银行、农村信用合作社等吸收存款的银行业金融机构(以下统称投保机构),应当依照本条例的规定投保存款保险。投保机构在中华人民共和国境外设立的分支机构,以及外国银行在中华人民共和国境内设立的分支机构不适用前款规定。但是,中华人民共和国与其他国家或者地区之间对存款保险制度另有安排     

FDIC关于本国银行境外分行存款保护的最新修订与启示北大核心

本文首先研究英国金融服务局发布咨询文件加强对外国银行分支机构监管的原因以及对美国FDIC因此而面临潜在的全球存款人债务风险。进一步分析美国目前对境外分行存款覆盖范围认定存在的问题,FDIC在修订草案中对存款资格认定的主要法律依据以及由此产生的存款人优先受偿机制,FDIC对本国银行的境外分行存款人提供附条件的"存款债务"保护的原因。由于FDIC本次对境外分行存款保护的修订涉及到存款保险跨境协调的有效性,最后研究了美国FDIC在保护存款人和维护存款保险基金安全方面最新的改革建议与方向,以及对存款保险跨境监管协调机制发展的启示。     

世界存款保险制度的发展趋势

存款保险制度在全球的传播发展越来越快。20世纪60年代有9个国家创建了存款保险制度;70年代增加了7个国家;80年代,频繁爆发的银行危机促使越来越多的国家和地区加入到存款保险之列,10年间有19个国家和地区建立了存款保险制度;90年代,由于银行问题特别是发展中国家的银行问题继续恶化,约有三分之一的国家和地区在该时期建立了存款保险制度。     

美国存款保险制度及对我国的启示

现在全世界共有70多个国家和地区建立了自己的存款保险制度，该制度最早起源于美国。经过70余年的历史变迁，存款保险制度在美国已日趋成熟和完善，并形成了自身的四大特点。作为一个正致力于使银行体系向着健康，规范、安全方向发展的国家，我国可从美国的存款保险制度中得到以下启示：必须制定存款保险法律法规，严格审查存款保险对象的资格，在此基础上还要合理确定存款保险费率。     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

危机后国际存款保险机构发展的主要趋势及对我国的启示

2008年金融危机爆发后,存款保险机构在应对银行倒闭,防范大规模挤兑方面发挥了重要作用。作为本轮金融危机的经验教训,存款保险机构的跨部门和跨国协调愈发受到重视,机构的保险限额和职能也纷纷作出相应调整。作为存款保险制度的重要组成部分,研究金融危机爆发后国际存款保险机构的发展趋势,对我国推出存款保险制度具有较强的现实意义。     

我国商业银行危机处置与存款保险立法模式选择

本文对我国商业银行风险处置的价值定位及有关市场退出的法律体系进行了梳理,探讨提出了我国存款保险机制的主要框架,对存款保险立法的四种模式进行了比较选择,建议尽快制定《存款保险条例》,并通过司法实践逐步完善存款保险机制与银行破产退市程序的有效衔接。     

境外所得税负分析

从来源上看,我国企业境外所得主要有两种:一是在境外分支机构的经营所得:二是直接来自境外的收入。境外分支机构经营所得要承担境外企业所得税,而境外直接收入要在境外缴纳预提税。作为我国的居民纳税人,企业境外所得还需要在我国缴纳企业所得税,由此形成了企业境外所得的重复征税问题。境外所得的税负是企业跨国经营的重要成本之一,财务工作者应积极研究并采取有效措施降低企业跨国经营的税负成本。     

子行还是分行:银行跨国经营的组织形式选择

伴随着国际资本流动与外资银行进入障碍的减少,跨国银行扩张迅速。在跨国银行海外拓展中,首先要面对采用何种组织形式进入东道国的问题。不同的组织形式,决定了母国与东道国监管机构的不同监管责任及跨国银行母银行与其分支机构间的债务结构。由于对跨国银行子行与分行形式利弊的不同理解及接受程度,各国采取了不同的监管策略,成为影响子行分行形式选择的关键因素,而所有权优势、跨国银行自身的经营策略也起了重要作用。     

银行风险处置模式及相关成本的国际比较

银行风险处置是金融供给侧结构性改革的一项重要工作，也是银行业健康持续发展的关键。本文首先对美、日、欧盟等主要国家的银行风险处置模式进行分析总结，得出由存款保险公司负责风险处置实际操作，承担主要处置成本已成为国际普遍做法。其次，在分析美国联邦存款保险公司近50年来处置成本数据的基础上，对不同处置模式下的存款保险基金使用成本进行比较，得出“成本最小化”原则下银行风险处置的最佳模式。最后，尝试提出符合我国实际的银行风险处置模式，以期为实现我国存款保险基金使用成本最小化，有序处置银行风险提供借鉴参考。     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks

Abstract:  Banking sector globalization has caused an expansion in foreign-owned bank assets. In this paper we analyse the effects of a MNB's liability structure upon its investment in a foreign country. We develop a model in which capital adequacy requirements introduce some deliberate underinvestment which counters deposit insurance-induced overinvestment. Diversification is unattractive with fixed bank capital requirements, because it reduces the expected value of the deposit insurance net. This effect applies in multinational banks (MNBs), where shocks to the home country economy alter the value of the deposit insurance net and hence affect overseas lending incentives. Thus, MNBs act as a channel for financial contagion. We discuss the policy implications of our results.     

市场约束、显性存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于回归控制法的研究

基于我国利率市场化进程日趋完善和新推出显性存款保险制度的金融大背景,本文从市场约束与显性存款保险制度的视角,将显性存款保险制度政策视为一个“准自然实验”,采用2010~2016年的面板数据,研究了存款保险制度及其与市场约束的相互作用对银行风险承担的影响,并藉此评价了其政策效应。研究结果表明:(1)我国不同类别商业银行的两类市场约束效应存在较大差别。就价格约束效应而言,对地方银行显著有效,而对全国性银行和外资银行则不显著;就数量约束效应而言,三类银行均不显著。(2)基于回归控制法的估计结果表明,存款保险制度的实施对银行风险承担有显著的正向影响,且其对地方银行的冲击强于全国性银行。(3)进一步基于非线性双重差分的估计结果显示,存款保险制度显著弱化了市场约束对银行风险承担的负向影响,表明我国存款保险制度的政策影响逐渐开始发挥出来。     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008—2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响。对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量。利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响不大,但显著提升了股份制商业银行和城市商业银行的风险承担行为;在银行个体异质性方面,存贷比和净资产收益率越高的银行存款保险制度对其风险承担行为的促进作用越强,资本充足率则相反。     

国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and changes in the deposit insurance system on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. In an environment of less restrictive bank supervision and a deposit insurance policy that favored state banks, we find that depositors exacted a price for risk-taking. After a new law increasing insurance coverage for private banks went into effect, however, bank specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. We report, however, that the three fully guaranteed state banks pay significantly lower rates than private banks. Moreover, other state-owned banks, with the same explicit guarantee as private banks, pay significantly lower rates than private banks, so it appears that depositors treat these state-owned banks as if they have a larger implicit guarantee.     

Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment

This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank- and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.     

Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicatesthat a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates thecost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14economies to assess the relationship between the risk-takingbehavior of banks and their corporate governance structure.The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tendto take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownershipengage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, asa proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has somepower in predicting bank distress.     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

Islamic Banks,Deposit Insurance Reform,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.