Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion

This paper extends the extant literature in understanding the effects of equity and debt on delinquency and default by focusing on a variant of borrower equity where part of equity is “protected”. The CPF scheme in Singapore stipulates that the refund of borrower’s retirement funds utilized for property purchase prior to September 2002 takes priority over loan obligations. A decision to utilize CPF for property purchase actually increases ex post delinquency and default risk as it effectively reduces cash equity commitment. In particular, any erosion in house value that places protected equity at risk translates into potential wealth reduction or financial liability for the borrower. While loss aversion is evident for non-distressed sellers, the effect of equity losses for distressed borrowers is not as clear. Our research suggests that averting losses in committed equity may be a secondary consideration for borrower subject to income shocks, recognizing that delinquency and default are precursors to foreclosure. Interestingly, we find that the borrowers are strongly averse to incurring protected equity-induced wealth loss or financial liability. This study suggests that the first-lien “anomaly” associated with CPF refund may reduce delinquency and default risks for mortgage backed securities.

Relationship Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services

We investigate pricing effects of the joint production of loans and security underwritings. We control for firm and borrower characteristics, including differences in sequencing, which are important for pricing. Contrary to previous studies, when banks combine lending and underwriting within the same customer relationship they charge premiums for both loans and underwriting services. Abstracting from effects of joint production within relationships, depository banks engaged in underwriting price lending and underwriting more cheaply than stand alone investment banks. One advantage borrowers enjoy from bundling products within a banking relationship is a form of liquidity risk insurance, which is manifested in a reduced demand for lines of credit. We also find evidence of a “road show” effect; firms enjoy loan pricing discounts on loans that are negotiated at times close to the debt underwritings, whether or not the same bank provides both services. Relationship effects are only visible when lending and underwriting both occur, and are stronger for equity-loan relationships than for debt-loan relationships. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Venture-backed Private Equity Valuation and Financial Statement Information

The relationship between (a) private and public equity market valuations and (b) financial statement information is examined for a sample of 502 venture capital backed companies from six different industries over the 1993–2003 period. Financial statement information explains a sizable component of the levels of and changes in valuation in both the Pre-IPO and Post-IPO periods. The findings support prior research for Post-IPO companies that revenues are value enhancing and costs are value diminishing. For the Pre-IPO period, we find that cost of sales; sales, marketing, general and administrative; and research and development are value enhancing—even when revenues are included in the analysis. This is consistent with costs incurred by early-stage, venture-backed companies having a strong “investment aspect” as the companies build a platform/infrastructure to grow revenue and validate their business model(s). We document the growth of early stage companies for revenues and costs in both calendar time (by round of private equity financing) and event time (relative to their eventual IPO).

The value relevance of corporate restructuring charges

We document in this study that investors react positively to restructuring that is expected to be successful in improving firm performance. Investors’ reaction is significantly negative to unsuccessful firms when the magnitude of restructuring charges is high. Our results also show that investors’ reaction is significantly positive to restructuring that is intended to save costs through “workforce reduction” and “facility closings/consolidations”, but it is insignificant when restructuring is undertaken to recognize decline in asset values by asset write-offs and/or write-downs. Investor reaction is measured by 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns, whereas successful restructuring to improve the firm performance is based on the change in operating performance, measured by the industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE), over two subsequent years after restructuring.

Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?

Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.

Bank Competition,Risk, and Subordinated Debt

This paper studies a dynamic model of banking in which banks compete for insured deposits, issue subordinated debt, and invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The model allows banks to choose their level of risk after the interest rate on subordinated debt is contracted. We show that requiring banks to issue a small amount of subordinated debt can reduce their gambling incentives. Moreover, when equity capital is more expensive than subordinated debt, adding a subordinated debt requirement to a policy regime that only uses equity capital requirements is Pareto improving.

Regulator Scrutiny and Bank CEO Incentives

This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.

Asymmetric timeliness tests of accounting conservatism

Recent accounting research employs an asymmetric timeliness measure to test the hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are “conservative.” This research design regresses earnings on stock returns to examine whether “bad” news is incorporated into earnings on a more timely basis than “good” news. We identify properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that will result in biases in the test statistics except under very restrictive conditions that are rarely met in typical empirical settings. Using data series that are devoid of asymmetric timeliness in reported earnings, we show how these biases result in evidence consistent with conservatism. We conclude that the biased test statistics inherent in the asymmetric timeliness research design preclude using this method to measure conservatism; that these biases are irresolvable as they originate in the test’s specification; and that studies employing asymmetric timeliness tests cannot be interpreted as providing evidence of conservatism.

Credit default swap prices as risk indicators of listed German banks

This paper explores empirically the usefulness of credit default swap (CDS) prices as market indicators. The sample of reference entities consists of large, internationally active German banks and the observation period covers 3 years. By analysing the explanatory power of three risk sources: idiosyncratic credit risk, systematic credit risk and liquidity risk, we gain important insights into modeling the dynamics of CDS spreads. The impact of systematic risk, for example, has three components; one is related to the overall state of the economy, another related to the risk of the internationally active banking sector, and the third is an unobservable systematic factor. Default probabilities, inferred from a tractable reduced form model for CDS spreads, are compared with expected default frequencies from the Moody’s KMV model. The results lend empirical support to the hypothesis that structural models can be less informative than reduced-form models of CDS spreads in the case of banks with major investment banking activities as the leverage loses explanatory power. Although the CDS market appears to have matured over the observation period, during certain periods premiums for liquidity risk can increase substantially thus limiting the value of CDS spreads as market indicators. We conclude that equity prices and CDS premia should be considered together to fully exploit the information content of both market indicators and to mitigate their respective drawbacks.