上市公司自愿信息披露

自愿信息披露是相对于强制信息披露而言的。在西方成熟的资本市场上，管理者自愿披露的信息已经成为强制信息披露的有益补充，对提升资本市场效率起到了重要作用。从信息披露渠道看．自愿披露的信息一般包括管理人员在财务报告中对公司的盈利预期、新闻报道、通过公司的网站和其他信息渠道披露的信息。近年来．电话会议逐渐成为西方许多上市公司重要的自愿信息披露渠道。     

关于完善会计信息披露方式的探讨

<正>一、前言在股票市场的初创时期,市场信息披露制度完全是自愿的,没有任何的监管,但是事实证明在缺少监管的情况下,谎言和欺诈甚至可以颠覆整个市场——当投资者因不信任而纷纷退出市场的时候,证券市场也就失去了存在的必要。从20世纪30年代开始,强制性披露开始主导证券市场。强制性披露使整个证券市场的信息披露规范化、系统     

企业环境信息披露的理论基础透视

环境污染是目前人类遇到的最大挑战,而造成环境污染的主要原因则是企业的工业污染,对企业的环境信息进行披露是当前环境保护的一大法宝。从环境信息披露动机来看,有强制披露和自愿披露两种。但不论是何种动机,其表象之后有着深厚的理论基础。目前政府强制要求污染企业披露环境信息,其理论依据源于一是环境规制理论;二是环境公共信托理论。环境规制源于对环境问题的市场失灵,而环境公共信托理论则强调环境资源“万民共有”的法理。此外,企业会采取自愿披露环境信息的策略,其理论依据也有两点：一是利益相关者理论;二是组织合法性理论。利益相关者对环境信息的需求是推动企业主动披露环境信息的外在动力,而企业自愿披露环境信息的内在动力,则是为了获得组织合法性。     

美国上市公司信息披露制度的变迁及启示

美国证券市场信息披露制度在不同阶段有不同的特点,其变迁包括披露内容和披露手段两个方面,变迁方向是市场的高透明度.我国的信息披露制度体系中首次发行信息披露制度和持续性信息披露制度已经基本形成,应从以下三方面完善法律责任及有关救济制度:一是加大信息披露违规的处罚力度,提高违法违规的预期处罚成本;二是完善证券民事赔偿法律体系,降低预期违规收益;三是完善公司治理制度建设,建立股东代表诉讼制度.     

上市公司自愿信息披露动机研究及理论解释

自愿信息披露并非强制性的信息披露,因此上市公司具有较强的自主性。通过研究,我们发现,上市公司选择不同的自愿信息披露策略对于公司有着较大影响,本文通过一个三阶段模型研究来在披露及不披露两种策略下自愿信息披露对于公司的影响。     

上市公司自愿信息披露动机文献综述

在瞬息万变的现代社会中，信息披露越及时，对投资者的价值越大，决策有用性就越强。虽然我国目前要求企业强制披露信息，但信息披露的时间和内容都是掌握在管理者手中的．管理者是可以进行选择性披露。因此，了解管理者披露信息的动机．找出影响其自愿披露的因素，在目前显得尤为重要。     

上市公司分部信息披露动因与约束

分部信息的披露主体主要是上市公司.公司出于竞争投资者有限的资金等目的有自愿披露分部信息的动因.由于分部信息披露存在成本,在没有管制的情况下,企业出于自身利益最大化考虑,将通过对收益和成本的权衡来决定分部信息披露.由于分部信息披露的外部性、分部信息分布的不对称性等,不能完全依赖于自愿披露,必须对分部信息披露进行适度的管制,强制公司披露分部信息.     

公司战略信息的自愿披露研究——基于零七股份案例分析

正随着我国证券市场的不断发展,对信息披露的期望越来越高,这要求上市公司要更多进行自愿性披露,战略信息就是其中之一。战略信息有助于人们理解企业未来增长性和盈利力,但这并不是上市公司强制披露的信息,本文从零七股份战略信息自愿披露纷争事件入手,分析战略信息自愿披露不当的原因及其市场反应,并据此提出完善公司战略信息自愿披露的建议。     

中美证券市场信息披露制度浅析

一、信息披露与信息披露制度的内涵信息披露,又称信息公开,是指证券发行人、承销商等义务人依法将财务、经营状况等信息向有关主管机关提交,并向公众公告的行为。我国的《证券法》第三条规定,证券的发行、交易活动,必须实行公开、公平、公正的原则。在这一前提下,证券发行、交易活动的当事人具有平等的法律地位,以自愿、有偿、     

国际银行监管的新趋势:不良债权信息披露

有效的银行监管要充分重视的公众披露必要信息，由于银行体系存在的巨额不良债权已严重地影响了银行的经营环境，不良债权信息披露已成为有效银行监管重要制度，在宏观与微观层次上，不良债权信息披露都可以带来相应效用。在制度与技术方面不良权信息披露出现了一些新的趋势：强调资产价值的公允表达，由自愿披露转向强制披露，由内部信息规范转向外部信息规范。     

Do stock prices reflect undisclosed financial statement information? Evidence from the OTCBB

I exploit a regulatory change that mandated that Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) firms must comply with the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. I use this change to examine the association between equity values and financial statement data in voluntary and mandatory disclosure environments. Before the change, disclosure of financial statement information was voluntary for most of these firms. I study firms that initiate SEC filing after the change and classify them as disclosing and nondisclosing based on whether they voluntarily disclosed financial statement information before the regulatory change. In these firms’ initial SEC filings after the eligibility rule, they retroactively disclose financial statement information for the year prior to compliance with the rule. Thus I can observe previously withheld financial data. I find that the choice to voluntarily disclose is negatively associated with firm characteristics related to proprietary costs and with situations in which accounting information plays a less important role in resolving information asymmetry. For nondisclosing firms, I find evidence that equity values reflect financial statement data, even though this information was not publicly available, and that compliance with mandatory SEC disclosure requirements strengthens this association. For disclosing firms, I find evidence that suggests investors viewed their voluntary disclosure of financial statement data as credible and fail to find evidence that compliance with mandatory reporting requirements enhances this association.     

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures

A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager's willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.     

An Experimental Market's Investigation of Discretionary Financial Disclosure

The extent to which market forces can induce full financial disclosure by managers has long been an issue of interest to regulators. Investigating this phenomenon with naturally occurring data produces a major obstacle: since managers' private information sets are unknown, it is necessary to make assumptions about them in order to interpret the nature (e.g., favourable or unfavourable, income increasing or income decreasing) of the information that is disclosed. The validity of the inferences relies critically on the validity of these assumptions. The present study uses a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses derived from prior analytical and empirical research: (H1) When disclosure costs are zero, managers voluntarily disclose all (good and bad) news; (H2) When disclosure costs are positive. managers only disclose news which exceeds some threshold: and (H3) The mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information induces an increase in the disclosure of correlated. proprietary information. One hundred and fifty-six subjects participated in markets with one firm manager and three investors. Over thirteen independent periods, the managers decided whether to truthfully disclose the liquidation value of the asset under their stewardship, and the investors submitted competing bids for the asset. With costless disclosure. investors price-protected themselves when managers withheld information, but the price penalty that they imposed was insufficient to induce full disclosure. With positive disclosure cost, investors reduced the price penalty that they imposed for non-disclosure, and managers disclosed proportionally fewer of the less extreme good news. Finally, mandatory disclosure of information had no significant impact on the voluntary disclosure of correlated proprietary information. Discussion centres on our failure to support the (equilibrium) prediction from analytical research that full disclosure should obtain when disclosures are costless. Several limitations of the study are examined. and it remains an open question whether additional trials (periods) in the present study might have provided full disclosure.     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

Mandatory disclosure and learning from external market participants: Evidence from the JOBS act

This paper examines whether mandatory disclosure affects the extent to which firms learn from external market participants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mandatory disclosure should increase the total amount of information in financial markets. However, disclosure can also reduce investors' incentives to acquire and produce information. Using the JOBS Act to identify variations in disclosure requirements, this paper finds that firms with reduced disclosure requirements attract more informed investors and learn more from financial markets than those with stricter disclosure requirements. This learning is concentrated among firms that attract sophisticated investors, particularly those with industry expertise, and weakens once firms are forced to disclose more information. Overall, the results suggest that one benefit from regulators’ recent efforts to reduce U.S. firm disclosure requirements is an increase in firm learning.     

公平和效率为导向的内部控制信息披露方式的转变

自《萨班斯--奥克斯利法案》颁布以来,美国上市公司内部控制信息披露方式由自愿性披露转变为强制性披露.而在2008年我国五部委联合发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》标志着我国上市公司内部控制信息也开始向强制性披露方式转变.论文试图用经济学的公平与效率理论分析内部控制信息由自愿性披露方式转变为强制性披露方式背后的原因,经过分析...     

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report

This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value‐relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.     

Information relevance, reliability and disclosure

This paper examines the relation between information’s properties, such as reliability and relevance, and public disclosure policy. It shows that the optimal accounting system often involves a carefully balanced combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, with mandatory reporting focused on more reliable information. The emphasis on reliability causes the welfare-maximizing mandatory report to consistently lag behind the financial market in incorporating value-relevant information.     

Do site visits mitigate corporate fraudulence? Evidence from China

Corporate site visits emerge as an increasingly important means of information acquisition process for analysts and institutional investors. In this study, we test whether and how site visits mitigate corporate fraud risk using a unique dataset of site visits to Chinese listed firms. We find that corporate site visits can substantially reduce the incidence of corporate fraud, which is robust to adding a series of control variables, alternative model specifications and alternative measures of corporate fraud, as well as accounting for endogeneity issue and controlling for firm and time fixed effects. This negative effect is more pronounced for firms with poorer information environment and for firms with weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, we examine the mechanisms underlying the negative association between site visits and corporate fraud. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by providing complementary evidence that site visits are important venues for analysts and institutional investors to collect firm-specific information and monitor the management of firms in China. Our findings also provide significant practical and policy implications for investors and regulators who seek to promote corporate information disclosure and mitigate the risk of corporate fraud.     

Does voluntary balance sheet disclosure mitigate post-earnings-announcement drift?

Theory suggests that balance sheet information such as total assets, total equity, or total liabilities complements earnings information in helping investors assess a firm’s profitability and estimate earnings growth. The voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information at earnings announcement could help investors gather and process this information at a lower cost. We therefore predict that voluntary balance sheet disclosure at the time of an earnings announcement helps investors promptly understand the implication of current earnings news for future earnings and subsequently reduces post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Consistent with these predictions, our results show that when firms provide voluntary balance sheet disclosures, the earnings response coefficient in the event window is significantly higher and the corresponding PEAD is significantly lower. We further find that the impact of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD is more pronounced when the magnitude of balance sheet value surprise is larger, when balance sheet value is more informative about future earnings, when earnings uncertainty is higher, or when information cost is higher, consistent with our conjectures that helping investors to better understand future earnings performance and lowering information costs are key mechanisms underlying the effect of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD.