Private Benefits of Control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.     

控制权私人收益相关研究综述

所有权集中的治理结构使得内部人和外部人之间的委托代理问题成为关注的焦点,而引入控制权私人收益概念则可以更为深刻地认识到存在收益独占性问题以及资本结构、公司治理影响到谁占有什么收益等问题。本研究围绕以控制权私人收益为切入点的文献资料从概念定义、度量方法以及相关研究进展等方面进行文献回顾,以对现有研究进行梳理。本研究发现现有研究存在对控制权私人收益概念界定不清,度量方法不够准确,研究不够深入等问题。最后提出未来的研究方向。     

内部资本市场 公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析

基于内部资本市场理论,当企业集团对内部各成员部门不是100%控股时,资源在内部资本市场的转移会产生较大的摩擦,内部资本市场存在效率不足。在处于转轨时期的中国企业,公司治理尚不完善、代理问题比较严重,势必影响内部资本市场功能的正常发挥。本文以华通天香集团为例,分析了上市公司内部资本市场运作的主要路径及产生的经济后果,发现原本在于提高资本配置而存在的内部资本市场部分地被异化为进行利益输送的渠道。另外,在本例中没有发现企业进行明显的跨部门交叉补贴证据。     

合理掏空动机、超额掏空动机与控制权私有收益

以2004—2007年我国上市公司为样本,实证研究结果发现：（1）控股股东的”合理掏空动机”与”超额掏空动机”伴随着现金流权的上升呈现的是一种此消彼长的关系,而这两类动机都会引致控股股东对于控制权私有收益的追逐,但是二者的作用机理却是完全不同的;（2）伴随着现金流权的影响,控股股东的”超额掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的正向效应和”合理掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的负向效应的综合作用结果是不同的。     

Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison

We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as ?4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors.     

股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本

本文从我国证券市场的特点和上市公司治理结构的特点出发,分析了在股权分置下和存在控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占时股权融资活动对控股股东股权价值的影响,然后对融资成本的定义进行拓展,计量出我国上市公司控股股东的股权融资成本和债务融资成本,指出控股股东的股权融资成本远远低于其债务融资成本是我国上市公司存在强烈股权融资偏好的重要原因。     

SARS初愈后的法律反思

就像从潘朵拉的盒子里放出的魔鬼,SARS吞噬了不少人的生命、自由和信心,这是一场公共卫生的危机,但在危机的背后,我们还应该有进一步的思考和行动.     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

国有股权、债务结构与大股东利益侵占

利用2010—2012年我国A股市场国有上市公司数据,研究了债务融资及其不同的组成部分在治理大股东侵占中小股东利益方面的作用。研究发现,债务融资与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著负向关系,即国有企业债务融资行为对大股东利益侵占具有治理作用;短期借款、非公开债务与公开债务均与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著正向关系、长期借款却无法充分发挥其治理作用。其政策含义是,债务融资在治理大股东对国有上市公司利益侵占时,应当关注短期借款以及债务的布置结构所带来的不利影响。     

Investor Behavior and the Benefits of Direct Stock Ownership

Using an experiment to rule out reverse causality, we examine whether a small investment in a company's stock leads investors to purchase more of the company's products and adopt other views and preferences that benefit the company. We preregister our research methods, hypotheses, and supplemental analyses via the Journal of Accounting Research’s registration‐based editorial process. We find little evidence consistent with these hypotheses for the average investor in our sample using our planned univariate hypothesis tests, and planned Bayesian parameter estimation shows substantial downward belief revision for more optimistic ex ante expectations of the treatment effects. In planned supplemental analyses, however, we do find that the effects of ownership on product purchase behavior and on regulatory preferences are intuitively stronger for certain subgroups of investors—namely, for investors who are most likely to purchase the types of products offered by the company and for investors who are most likely to vote on political matters. The results contribute to our understanding of the benefits of direct stock ownership and are informative to public company managers and directors.     

Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms

We examine earnings management practices of insider controlled firms across 22 countries to shed light on the link between consumption of private benefits and earnings management. Insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management than noninsider controlled firms in weak investor protection countries. Consistent with the private benefits motive, insider controlled firms with greater divergence between cash‐flow rights and control rights are associated with more earnings management in these countries. Growth opportunities attenuate the association between insider control and earnings management even in weak investor protection countries. We also find some weak evidence that insider controlled firms are associated with less earnings management in strong investor protection countries. Overall, our results highlight a strong link between private benefits consumption and earnings management.     

交叉上市、信息不对称与风险特征

本文以"A+H"交叉上市公司价格差异为研究对象,对A股、H股股票价格之间差异及其变化进行研究。根据对36家A+H股上市公司近期9个月溢价水平的分析发现,信息不对称理论能够解释AH股溢价扩大的现象,投资者与公司之间信息不对称问题得到缓解的趋势不明显,反而有所强化;国有股特征导致AH溢价缩小,海外投资者对国有股份的认同度提升;流动性理论、不同风险偏好理论不能解释AH溢价变化,数据分析支持信息不对称理论、风险特征理论和需求理论。     

Public versus Private Ownership and Fund Manager Turnover

We examine the correlation between organizational structure (public vs. private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of United States offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded and privately held firms have different incentive structures and, as such, should differ in their treatment of internal control mechanisms, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a greater likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards are more independent.     

Bankruptcy, Warrants, and State-Contingent Changes in the Ownership of Control

We consider the design of securities that govern the distribution of cash flows and control rights for an investment project. An entrepreneur, endowed with managerial talent, contracts with an outside investor for required capital. Optimal contracts stipulate that the ownership of control and the distribution of cash flows are specified on a state contingent basis to manage the distortions that develop from the use of outside financing and so make the best use of the advantage in project management enjoyed by insiders. Our results illustrate that the use of warrants and convertible securities, which transfer control of the firm to outsiders in good states, and bankruptcy, which transfers control to outsiders in bad states, are related features of optimal contracts. Our model also indicates that firms will benefit from direct access to two types of bankruptcy processes resembling Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 (including deviations from absolute priority) of the bankruptcy code. This results differs from observed practices since stockholders cannot waive their rights for protection under Chapter 11. We show that when direct access to Chapter 7 is highly valuable, market participants have found clever ways to obtain it.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G32 and G33.     

股利政策、股权制衡与公司成长性

本文以我国2005年-2007年中小板市场上市公司为样本（面板数据）,从公司成长性的角度考察了股权结构对现金股利政策的实证影响。具体检查了现金股利和第一大股东、股权制衡以及公司成长性之间的计量关系,经验结果表明：中小板公司的第一大股东具有强烈的发放现金股利的激励,公司成长性不能弱化第一大股东对现金股利的偏好,其他大股东不能够对第一大股东的行为进行监督和牵制,甚至存在附和第一大股东的倾向。     

民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

融资难是制约民营企业发展的关键因素,而这种金融困境从根本上讲是一种信用困境。本文构建的理论模型论证了民营企业的政治关系对其融资中的作用,并以中国民营上市公司2002～2005年的经验数据为样本,实证检验了民营企业的政治关系对减轻融资约束的作用。研究发现,相对于没有参与政治的民营企业来说,有政治关系的民营企业其外部融资时所受的融资约束更少;同时,越在金融发展水平低的地区,民营企业的政治关系对其融资的帮助越明显。     

控制权收益与超控制权收益：一个文献综述

控股股东被认为能够监督公司的管理和运营从而降低代理成本,另一方面控股股东也能够利用控制权牟取控制权收益,侵占中小股东和其他利益相关者利益,后者日益成为研究的焦点。然而,近年来学者们开始关注到控制权收益也有合理性的一面,并在此基础上提出了超控制权收益的概念。本文通过对相关文献的回顾和评述,尝试指出进一步研究的方向。     

机构持股、终极产权与内部控制缺陷

依据机构持股具有的"有效监督"假说和"利益冲突"假说,本文从三个维度实证检验机构持股对内部控制缺陷的影响。研究发现:机构持股与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,大机构投资者(持股比率大于3%)对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更强,验证了机构持股的"有效监督"假说;与非独立型机构投资者相比,独立型机构投资者对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更大;与短期机构投资者相比,长期机构投资者更能抑制内部控制缺陷的产生。此外,终极产权性质会影响机构持股对内部控制缺陷的治理监督作用,总的来说,机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在非国企中更为明显,且不同类型机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在国企与非国企中存在差异。     

Ownership and Control of German Corporations

In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we finda strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance,little association of concentrations of ownership with managerialdisciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structurescan be used for control purposes. The static relationship ofownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to theUnited Kingdom and the United States. However, there are markeddifferences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership.There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changesin control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to theholders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provideevidence of low overall benefits to control changes and theexploitation of private benefits of control.     

The Origins of the German Corporation - Finance, Ownership and Control

The ownership of German corporations is quite different today from that of Anglo-American firms. How did this come about? To what extent is it attributable to regulation? A specially constructed data set on financing and ownership of German corporations from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century reveals that, as in the UK, there was a high degree of activity on German stock markets with firms issuing equity in preference to borrowing from banks, and insider and family ownership declining rapidly. However, unlike in the UK, other companies and banks emerged as the main holders of equity, with banks holding shares primarily as custodians of other investors rather than on their own account. The changing pattern of ownership concentration was therefore very different from that of the UK with regulation reinforcing the control that banks exercised on behalf of other investors.