首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 171 毫秒
1.
从股权结构到股东关系   总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2  
近80年来,国内外学者围绕股权结构问题开展了广泛且颇具影响力的研究。其中,对股权结构定性或定量的测度是所有研究开展的基础。本文系统总结了股权结构相关研究的内容、技术路线及对股权结构的刻画方式。分析表明,仅从产权维度和垂直方向认识股权结构及代理问题存在明显的局限和偏差。为此,本文从横向网络以及股东之间多种形式的契约出发,考察股东关系对公司产权分布体系的影响。在股东关系的框架下,我们重构了公司股东的产权、利益和势力结构,并用一套较详细且操作性较强的指标体系对股东关系进行了刻画。本文提出的"关系基础"的股权结构将为深化与拓展股权结构、公司治理和投资者保护等研究提供有益的帮助。  相似文献   

2.
股权结构是公司治理结构的重要组成部分和基础,它是实现公司的有效治理和股东利益最大化的关键因素之一。对于当前我国上市公司数目不断攀升的现状,深入探讨股权结构对公司治理的作用和影响,对于提高上市公司治理效率和保护投资者利益具有重要的现实意义。  相似文献   

3.
一、问题1.分散的股权结构使投资者忽视公司治理。由于股权结构分散,股东在对金融机构行使监管权上不够积极。由于银行监管具有外部性特点,实施监管的股东无法获得监管产生的全部收益,而其他未实施监管的股东却能够无偿得到因银行治理加强而产生的额外收益,使得股东之间存在"搭便车"现象。这一问题并未因机构投资者的大量存在而获得显著改善。同  相似文献   

4.
本文将双重股权结构视为拥有高倍投票权的内部股东与同股同权外部股东的集体选择,以1991-2018年赴美上市的中概股公司为样本,从选择原因和选择结果两个视角探讨外部股东为何自愿放弃投票权而选择双重股权公司.研究发现:企业在产品市场中的竞争优势越强,上市时选择双重股权结构的概率越大,这在新经济公司样本中表现的更明显;而选择该结构后也将更有利于实现企业绩效和股东价值.从机理来看,产品市场竞争优势通过显示内部股东的能力来影响外部股东对双重股权公司的选择.研究启示外部股东可参考企业在产品市场上的竞争优势来选择投资双重股权公司,而上市公司也应增加其产品市场竞争优势的信息披露以加强外部股东利益保护.  相似文献   

5.
股权结构是现代企业治理结构的核心,是平衡企业权力与利益的重要机制。我国沿用的股权制度为单一的"同股同权"结构,已逐渐难以适应部分现代化企业的发展要求,亟需进行多样化变革。"双重股权"结构在国际上应用已久,而对于国内资本市场仍是一种新生制度。本文对双重股权结构的相关理论进行梳理,剖析该制度在各种理论情境下的适用性,在权衡其利弊的基础上,探讨双重股权结构对推动创新创业企业发展和深化国有企业改革的重要意义,最终提出分类分步推行双重股权制度的建议。  相似文献   

6.
姜宇 《福建金融》2020,(3):27-32
双重股权结构虽然颠覆了我国《公司法》现行的以“同股同权”为原则的单一股权结构,但因其可满足科创企业的特殊治理需求、抵御敌意收购、鼓励管理层重视公司长久发展、投入高度匹配的人力资本等优势,在国内资本市场逐渐获得了认可。但双重股权结构会加剧公司控制权和经济利益的背离,以及因背离程度的加深所诱发的公众投资人参与权弱化、代理成本显著增加等风险。因此,我国科创板引入双重股权结构在为创新型经济发展注入活力的同时,仍需建立控制权约束机制来规避控制权被滥用的风险,从而为维护中小股东利益提供制度保障。  相似文献   

7.
股权结构是公司治理结构的重要组成部分和基础,对企业来说,是否具有完善的公司治理,决定了它的生死存亡。因为股份制已成为现代企业制度的基本形式,投资者只有在确信自己的利益能够受到保护之后才会向企业投资,而良好的公司治理正是保护投资者利益的重要制度。  相似文献   

8.
双层股权结构突破了传统的"同股同权"、"一股一票"的治理模式,通过发行特别表决权股的方式将公司控制权集中于创始人身上,既满足了创始人的融资需求,又保持了其对公司控制权的愿望,还促进了风险投资基金等机构投资者的投资需求,有利于投资者和融资者的合作,促进资本与创新的对接。2019年上交所新推出的科创板也开始逐渐散发出其应有的活力,对此法律应如何为新经济公司上市融资创造有利条件,司法实践在面对相关法律问题时又应如何处理?这些问题成为我国资本市场改革在法律层面面临的巨大挑战。本文以优刻得公司的招股计划说明书为例,从理论和实践上对其进行分析,并从引入"日落条款"、完善信息披露制度、控制人信义义务及健全监督机制并完善股东诉讼制度这三方面入手,以更好平衡控股人和投资者的双方利益。  相似文献   

9.
双重股权结构通过"同股不同权"的制度设计,让公司创立人实现了以非控股股东身份控制公司的目的。虽然存在较大的争议,但在国外,这种结构已被得到大范围的接纳。本文总结了双重结构的相关概念及其优劣势比较,并结合中国资本市场的具体情况,进行了初步的适用性探讨。  相似文献   

10.
公司的股权集中度问题是公司不同主体利益分配和剩余索取权安排的基础问题,同时也是公司治理的核心。股权集中的程度决定了公司代理问题的基本性质,即在公司治理过程中面临的主要冲突是存在于管理者与股东之间还是控股股东与中小股东之间,学者们对此却有着不同的见解。同时,学术界在用何种指标来衡量投资者利益保护问题上,也未达成一致意见。本文从公司治理理论出发,构建投资者利益保护评价指标体系,研究公司股权集中度与投资者利益保护之间的关系。实证结果表明,公司第一大股东持股比例越大,越不利于投资者保护;公司股东的持股比例差距越小、分布越均衡,越利于投资者保护;同时,第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例的比值不宜过大,两大股东的股权制衡,有利于投资者利益的保护。相对于股权集中,公司股权的制衡是更有利于投资者的利益保护。  相似文献   

11.
郑志刚  李邈  雍红艳  黄继承 《金融研究》2022,503(5):152-169
在资本市场推行注册制改革的背景下,维护中小股东利益成为保障注册制改革效果,助力资本市场平稳运行的关键。本文实证考察了作为非实际控制人的中小股东如何利用一致行动参与公司治理。研究表明,中小股东通过一致行动形成投票表决权的集中配置,进而制衡大股东,从而改善公司绩效。在治理机制方面,中小股东一致行动对绩效的改善,一方面源于其帮助中小股东在股东大会上提出更多代表自身利益的议案,在董事会中委派更多董事,在决策过程中形成更大影响力;另一方面则源于其帮助中小股东实现对大股东的制衡和对经理人的监督,从而抑制实际控制人的“隧道挖掘”行为,缓解内部人控制问题。进一步研究发现,中小股东一致行动的作用效果受到一致行动人的持股比例、形成动机、上市公司的投票表决制度以及一致行动人类型的影响。  相似文献   

12.
We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.  相似文献   

13.
In South Korea, as in some other troubled Asian economies, banks and large public corporations have been run more in the interest of the government and the controlling share-holder group than to maximize efficiency and overall shareholder wealth. Any serious attempt to reform the South Korean economy must thus include significant changes in its system of corporate governance. After discussing in general terms how corporate ownership and control can affect economic performance, this article examines the corporate governance institutions that prevail in different countries, with particular attention to the U.S., Japan, and Germany. From such comparative analysis it then develops a set of criteria for appraising the effectiveness of corporate governance systems that are applied to the specific case of South Korea. The article concludes with number of suggestions for reforming the South Korean corporate governance system, including:
  • 1 greater legal protection for minority shareholders from transactions involving potential conflicts of interest; and
  • 2 strengthening of the incentives of management and large corporate holders, such as house or main banks, to maximize value (as the author notes, “charging management or the board with a legal mandate to ‘balance’ the interests of various constituencies or stakeholders is merely to diminish any legally enforceable responsibility to shareholders”).
As the article notes in closing, the main beneficiaries of such governance reforms will not be the new shareholders–including those foreign investors who might be persuaded to buy the stocks–but rather the existing owners, whose shares will command a higher price from “outside” investors. And the greatest beneficiary will be the South Korean nation as a whole, since the resulting improvements in corporate performance and reductions in cost of capital will increase productivity and international competitiveness.  相似文献   

14.
Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance.As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, boardindependence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration,CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The resultsfrom a broad cross-section of large U.S. public firms are inconsistentwith recent claims that entrenched managers design their owncompensation contracts. The interactions of the corporate governancemechanisms with total pay-for-performance and excess compensationcan be explained by governance substitution. If a firm has generallyweaker governance, the compensation contract helps better alignthe interests of shareholders and the CEO.  相似文献   

15.
This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to implement the corporate governance system that favors their interests within a framework of highly concentrated ownership and poor legal protection for investors. A metric for corporate governance based on the fulfillment of non-mandatory rules of good corporate governance is used. System GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimates for a balanced panel data of Brazilian firms reveal that the ownership concentration is detrimental to corporate governance quality and the quality of board composition. In accordance with the expropriation effect on principal-principal agency conflicts, by weakening the corporate governance system and board composition, large controlling shareholders may use private benefits of control. As proposed by the substitution effect, in a complementary way, controlling shareholders may renounce strong boards and directly perform management monitoring, mitigating agency conflicts with managers. Finally, the ability of large shareholders other than the main blockholder is not enough to contest his/her power to shape the corporate governance system. The work provides evidence of the prominence of the principal–principal agency problem in an emerging market, by analyzing the effect of ownership concentration over the quality of the corporate governance system, and also that other large non-controlling shareholders are not able to contest the power of the main blockholder.  相似文献   

16.
This paper analyses both ultimate ownership and investors’ protection in determining corporate value for a sample of firms from 12 Western European countries. The analysis is based on two data sets which consider the presence of an ultimate controller, as well as, the level of separation of cash flow rights and voting rights in the controlling stake. It examines the effect of the rights given to both creditors and shareholders, and the degree to which these rights are enforced with a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system. The main findings suggest that it is likely that firms tend to adjust their ultimate controlling structure to overcome the value-decreasing risks associated with country laws that offer low investors’ protection. This information is a valuable tool for managers in order to strategically adapt institutional corporate governance practices.  相似文献   

17.
While China had been vigorously pursuing economic reform since the late 1980s, it wasn't until the 2005–2006 time period that non-tradable stock reform took place. The case of Hunan Valin Steel provides a rich look inside about the dynamics of the non-tradable share reform in China, and demonstrates the impact of good financial design helping the company to turn aside the financial distress, while minimizing costs to benefit the stockholders. Moreover, this case provides an illustration of the challenges posed by agency problems in China, with conflicted interests between tradable shareholders (public investors) on one hand and non-tradable shareholders (governments and state-owned enterprises) on the other. Not only does the split share structure result in conflicted interests and asymmetric information between managers and owners, but it also made it difficult to establish effective corporate governance.  相似文献   

18.
This paper examines the effect of controlling shareholders on stock price synchronicity by focusing on two salient corporate governance features in a concentrated ownership setting, namely, ultimate cash flow rights and the separation of voting and cash flow rights (i.e., excess control). Using a unique dataset of 654 French listed firms spanning 1998–2007, this study provides evidence that stock price synchronicity increases with excess control, supporting the argument that controlling shareholders tend to disclose less firm-specific information to conceal opportunistic practices. Additionally, this study shows that firms with substantial excess control are more likely to experience stock price crashes, consistent with the conjecture that controlling shareholders are more likely to hoard bad information when their control rights exceed their cash flow rights. Another important finding is that firms’ stock prices are less synchronous and less likely to crash when controlling shareholders own a large fraction of cash flow rights. This is consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders have less incentive to adopt poor disclosure policies and to accumulate bad news, since high cash flow ownership aligns their interests with those of minority investors.  相似文献   

19.
公司管理层发起恶意收购的动因是多方面的,而其中很多是与公司财富的增加和股东利益的改善相背离的。因此,如果没有相对完善的法人治理结构有效约束管理者行为,恶意收购将有可能导致公司财富与股东利益的损失。在我国法人治理结构尚不十分健全的情况下,《公司法》与《上市公司收购管理办法》对恶意收购的鼓励可能是不适当的。  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号