Bearing an imprint: CEOs' early-life experience of the Great Chinese Famine and stock price crash risk

We propose and test whether adverse life events experienced by CEOs are associated with firms' stock price crash risk. Based on a large sample of Chinese companies from 2000 to 2015, we find evidence that companies whose CEOs experienced the Great Chinese Famine in early life have lower stock price crash risk than those with CEOs who did not experience the famine. Further, the negative association between famine experience and crash risk is more pronounced for firms whose CEOs have greater decision-making powers and for non-State-owned enterprises. We also find direct links between famine experience and various factors that have already been documented as determinants of crash risk. Our results support behavior economics theory on imprinting: CEO memories of adverse life experiences have an indelible effect on their decision-making processes, which in turn influence how the financial information is provided and disclosed to the stock market.     

Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.     

Earnings Warnings and CEO Welfare

Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation committees take warnings into account in setting CEO compensation. We find that warnings are significantly negatively (positively) associated with CEO bonus (option grants), suggesting that compensation committees adjust CEO compensation towards a more high‐powered structure after warnings. However, the sensitivity of bonus or option grants to earnings and stock returns is not affected except for bonus sensitivity to stock returns. We also find weak evidence of an increase in forced CEO turnover after warnings, accompanied by a significant increase in its sensitivity to stock returns. This benefits CEOs with higher ability but imposes more risk on other CEOs. These findings provide a partial explanation of why not every CEO facing a negative surprise decides to issue a warning. Our results are robust to various specifications. In particular, the impact of warnings on compensation appears invariant to the timing or the number of warnings. Overall, these findings suggest that the signal from warnings is used in determining CEO compensation and retention.     

Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

CEO facial structure and stock price crash risk

This study conducted an empirical analysis of a manually collected sample of chief executive officer (CEO) facial structure measurements (facial width-to-height ratio [FWHR]) to examine the relationship between FWHR and stock price crash risk. The samples were collected for the period 2008–2019 from Chinese A-share listed firms. The results revealed a positive impact of FWHR on stock price crash risk. The positive impact is more pronounced for firms in which CEOs are entrusted with greater powers, firms that appoint a higher number of independent directors, or which function in a more competitive product market. Various robustness and endogeneity tests confirm our main conclusions.     

CEO power and stock price crash risk in China: Do female directors' critical mass and ownership structure matter?

This study investigates how CEO power is associated with stock price crash risk. We further examine the moderating roles of female directors' critical mass and ownership structure on the relationship between CEO power and stock price crash risk. Employing one of the largest datasets to-date of Chinese listed firms over the 2005–2015 period (13,421 firm-year observations), we find that CEO's power to increase the likelihood of stock price crash risk is significantly mitigated when the percentage of: (a) female directors; and (b) ownership by blockholders and institutions, is high within firms. We interpret our findings within a theoretical framework that draws insights from neo-institutional, managerial power and critical mass theories. The findings are robust to the use of alternative measures, estimation methods and endogeneity issues.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum

We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news.     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

The Young and the Restless: A Study of Age and Acquisition Propensity of CEOs of UK Firms

Using a large sample of CEOs of UK firms, we show that CEO age is a key determinant of acquisition activity. We find that younger CEOs are more likely to acquire another firm and spend more on large capital expenditures. We argue that while younger CEOs of both UK and US firms undertake more acquisitions than their older peers, their motivations for acquisitions might differ. We find that the stock market perceives acquisitions by younger CEOs to be of a higher quality. Following previous studies, we use CEO tenure as a proxy for reputation, and find that large acquisitions enhance CEO reputation, especially for younger CEOs. In contrast to the previous findings for CEOs of US firms, we determine that the compensation of CEOs in the UK does not increase after acquisitions. This absence of a compensation incentive for CEOs of UK firms is consistent with the idea that the UK compensation structure is more restrictive and has a smaller equity‐based component. Our evidence is also inconsistent with an overconfidence effect. Overall, our results provide consistent evidence of executive signaling by younger CEOs of UK firms eager to distinguish themselves.     

Zero-leverage policy and stock price crash risk: Evidence from Korea

This study examines the difference in stock price crash risk between zero-leverage and non-zero-leverage firms. We find that zero-leverage firms have a significantly higher future stock price crash risk than non-zero-leverage firms. Next, we find that the positive relation between zero-leverage policy and future stock price crash risk is more pronounced when firms have higher controlling shareholders' ownership and foreign ownership. We also find that the positive relation is more pronounced for firms with low cash holdings than for those with high cash holdings. Further, we find that the positive relation is stronger for dividend-paying firms than non-dividend-paying firms. Our results are robust to alternative estimation specifications and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings shed light on the extent to which extreme corporate financial policy has an impact on future stock price crash risk. Our empirical evidence also provides meaningful implications for how stakeholders (especially investors) predict stock price crash risk in the context of extremely conservative capital structure.     

CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies

Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.     

海归高管抑制了股价崩盘风险吗？

以我国A股上市公司2009—2017年数据为样本,研究高管的海外经历对公司未来股价崩盘风险的影响。发现海归高管有助于降低公司未来股价的崩盘风险,在多种稳健性检验并控制内生性问题后,以上结论仍然成立。另外,海归高管降低股价崩盘的效果在分析师关注较少的企业以及外部审计质量较弱的企业中表现得更加明显。机制分析表明,海归高管通过降低公司过度投资以及提高会计信息质量来抑制股价崩盘风险。     

News-based ESG sentiment and stock price crash risk

From the perspective of ESG news-based sentiment, we examine the impact of ESG performance on stock price crash risk. This paper constructs a sentiment index based on ESG news to measure public opinion of listed firms. First, there is a significant negative relationship between ESG news sentiment and stock price crash risk, indicating that higher ESG news sentiment can reduce the crash risk. Second, heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that ESG sentiment has a greater impact on crash risk reduction for firms with lower analyst coverage, lower information transparency, voluntary ESG information disclosure and non-state-owned. In addition, mechanism tests indicate that ESG sentiment affects stock price crash risk by reducing negative ESG incidents, information asymmetry, and agency costs. This paper examines the research inference that ESG news sentiment is beneficial in reducing stock price crash risk and expands the research on the governance mechanism of stock price crash risk.     

CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

CEO contractual protection and debt contracting

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contractual protection, in the forms of CEO employment agreements and CEO severance pay agreements, is prevalent among S&P 1500 firms. While prior research has examined the impact of these agreements on corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on the impact from debt holders’ perspective. We find that, compared with other loans, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection on average contain more performance covenants and performance-pricing provisions. This effect increases with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and opportunities, but it decreases with CEOs’ preference for and opportunity of enjoying a quiet life. Furthermore, for loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection, debt holders include stricter covenants, charge a higher interest rate and use a more diffuse syndicate structure. Collectively, these results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.     

基于制度环境视角的非效率投资与股价崩盘风险研究

研究宏观层面的治理因子对企业非效率投资的调节作用,进而研究价格崩盘的成因。发现：较高的市场化进程、较低的政府干预程度和完善的法治环境都有助于抑制由非效率投资行为引发的股价崩盘风险。进一步的研究表明,企业非效率投资主要由代理成本而非信息不对称问题产生,进而影响价格崩盘;国有企业非效率投资对股价崩盘风险的影响大于非国有企业,但是制度环境的抑制作用对国有企业样本不明显。本文的研究结果为从宏观层面降低股价崩盘风险提供了经验证据,为维护我国股市稳定发展,推进国家治理体系建设提供了政策启示。     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.