Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis

This paper examines the impact of the strength of governance on firms' use of currency derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 30 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, we find that strongly governed firms tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external financing. On the other hand, weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial reasons. These results are robust to alternative measures of corporate governance, various subsamples, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency exposure, and a potential selection bias. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence of the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance on firms' use of derivatives.     

Hedging,selective hedging,or speculation? Evidence of the use of derivatives by Brazilian firms during the financial crisis

This paper analyse the use of foreign exchange derivatives by non-financial publicly traded Brazilian companies from 2007 to 2009. Using balance-sheet data on firms’ positions in derivatives and their foreign exchange exposure, the paper verifies the existence of three groups of derivative users: hedgers, selective hedgers – companies that significantly changed the volume of derivatives used during this period, but used them in line with their currency exposure – and active speculators – companies that adopted positions that would have been inadvisable had the aim been to hedge their currency exposure. Selective hedgers and speculators have one similarity: both tried to obtain gains through the continuous process of domestic currency appreciation. Confirming the optimal hedging literature, the paper shows that several firm characteristics are able to explain the use of derivatives and hedging by firms but market timing in the derivative markets is explained solely by firms’ foreign exposure, corporate governance and the macroeconomic environment.     

Exchange rate exposure and foreign exchange derivatives: do ineffective hedgers modify future derivatives use?

Recent studies examining the relationship between stock returns and exchange rate changes have provided evidence that the exchange rate exposure of non-financial companies is reduced by the use of foreign exchange derivatives. Building on such research, this study investigates whether past ineffective derivative hedging contributes to explaining future derivatives use. To the extent that companies monitor the effectiveness of their currency risk management practices, past ineffective hedgers can be expected to modify their future use of foreign exchange derivatives accordingly. In our study of 94 non-financial US multinationals, we provide evidence that the change in derivatives use from 1996–1998 to 1998–2000 can be explained in part by the ineffective hedging of currency risk in 1996–1998, controlling for variables associated with theories of optimal hedging. Additional analyses confirm that such primary results are robust to firm size, the level of foreign operations, and the use of derivatives to partially hedge currency risk. Our results imply that as exchange markets and risk management practices change, the use of derivatives to manage exchange rate risk also changes. Our contribution to this field of study is that we find evidence that past ineffective hedgers tend to increase their future use of FXDs.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Foreign exchange exposure and multinationality

We examine the relation between firms’ foreign exchange exposure and the extent of their multinationality as a proxy for operational hedging. Using a sample of 953 US firms over the period 1999–2006, we show that there is a nonlinear relation between operational and financial hedging, confirming anecdotal evidence that many highly multinational firms do not hedge with derivatives. We find that operational hedging and financial hedging are significantly inversely related to firms’ foreign exchange exposure, providing evidence that the two hedging techniques are complementary for all but the most highly operationally hedged firms. By comparing our findings for 1999–2006 with 1999–2009, we show that this complementarity breaks down when exchange rate volatility is high – as the effectiveness of financial hedging diminishes. An important message for firms is that operational hedges work, and they potentially provide better protection than financial hedging during times of stress.     

The role of derivatives in hedge fund activism

Using a hand-collected sample of hedge fund activist engagements from 1994 to 2014, this study analysed the role of derivatives in the hedge fund activism. Evidence shows abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives exceeded the abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who employed derivatives around the activist engagement disclosure period. We also find that idiosyncratic volatility of the targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives was more reduced than that of the targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives. Finally, the probability of takeovers increases for hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives.     

The Determinants of Currency Risk Management in Latin American Nonfinancial Firms

This paper investigates the determinants of currency risk management in nonfinancial firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, based on a panel data sample of firms that list as American depositary receipts from 2001 to 2004. Our evidence indicates that derivatives held for hedging purposes can yield cash flows of the same order of magnitude of capital expenditures, operational earnings, and financial expense, unlike what was previously found by Guay and Kothari (2003) for U.S. firms. We study not only the decision to use derivatives, but also the magnitude of derivatives holdings and the importance of operational hedging in firms' risk management strategies. We find that economies of scale, financial distress costs, informational asymmetry, and growth opportunities are important for risk management decisions, and that firms do not hedge because of potential tax benefits.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging?

This paper investigates operational hedging by firms and how operational hedging is related to financial hedging by using a sample of 424 firm observations, which consist of 212 operationally hedged firms (firms with foreign sales) and a size- and industry-matched sample of 212 non-operationally hedged firms (firms with export sales). We find that non-operationally hedged firms use more financial hedging, relative to their levels of foreign currency exposure, as measured by the amount of export sales. On the other hand, though operationally hedged firms have more currency exposure, their usage of financial derivatives becomes much smaller than that of exporting firms. These results can explain why some global firms use very limited amount of financial derivatives for hedging purpose despite much higher levels of currency risk exposure. We also show that hedging increases firm value.