大股东掏空与盈余管理关系研究——基于掏空效应引入盈余管理模型视角

大股东与中小股东的利益冲突是现代企业发展过程中广泛存在的重要问题。本文基于委托代理问题与大股东掏空路径,选取2012－2019年A股上市公司数据,将大股东掏空效应引入Kothari et al.（2005）修正的Jones模型,计算应计盈余时剔除关联交易行为与资金占用的影响,比较剔除前后可操纵利润的差异,对大股东掏空与盈余管理的关系进行实证研究。鉴于大股东掏空本身对盈余管理模型计算有影响,本文的做法可以形象反映掏空对盈余管理的影响路径,即大股东通过实现关联交易和资金占用,导致可操纵应计利润减少,企业会通过其他手段进行盈余管理。另外,还考虑不同产权性质的影响,结果发现国企相对于非国企来说,以掩盖大股东掏空为动机进行应计盈余管理的动机更强。     

浅析上市公司关联交易对盈余管理的影响

盈余管理行为是一个普遍的企业行为,这一行为在我国上市公司中表现的尤为明显。为达到盈余管理目的,上市公司经常采用各种方式,如计提和转回资产减值准备,调整会计准则范围内的应计项目以及构造关联交易等。本文通过研究发现上市公司关联交易规模与盈余管理程度正相关,即上市公司关联交易规模越大,则其盈余管理程度就越高。最后本文针对我国目前上市公司利用关联交易进行盈余管理的现状提出相关建议。一是进一步完善关联方关系及其交易准则;二是对于具有配股动机的上市公司进行更加严格的监督;三是加大对关联交易盈余管理的监管和惩处力度。     

关联交易和会计盈余的价值相关性

通过对2001年上市公司关联销售的研究分析，初步发现了关联交易影响了会计盈余信息的价值相关性。当上市公司向其关联方的商品销售达到较大比重时，其报告的会计盈余数据具有较低的价值相关性。但同时,市场对较低比例的关联交易似乎比较认可，并不影响盈余数据的价值相关性。总体上。盈余的价值相关性随着关联销售比重增加而显著地表现为一种倒U型的非线性关系。结合实证结果，本文尝试分析其中的原因。     

关联交易对上市公司盈余质量的影响分析——基于沪市A股上市公司的经验研究

随着国内资本市场的发展,关联交易的规模也在不断扩大,表现出交易频率高、涉及金额大的特点。关联交易具有正反两面的效应,即既可以降低交易成本、提高经营效率,又可以成为上市公司盈余管理的手段。本文主要从盈余动机的角度出发,以近三年沪市A股上市公司为研究样本,研究结果表明,我国上市公司的关联交易规模呈逐年上升趋势,且存在明显配股动机。关联交易会对盈余质量产生显著影响,且这种影响随关联交易规模的扩大表现出先上升后下降的的趋势。     

市场化改革的微观作用机制:关联交易视角

改革开放30多年来,我国各地区的市场化程度不断提高。大量学术研究和社会实践表明,市场化改革在宏观上有助于提高资本配置效率、促进经济增长。那么,市场化改革赖以发挥作用的微观机制是什么?目前这一问题尚未得到系统的解答。鉴于上市公司普遍存在的关联交易及其掏空后果一直为社会公众所诟病,本文以此为切入点考察市场化改革的微观作用机制。本文采用更直接的方法衡量关联交易的掏空后果,通过对我国2000—2008年11 946个上市公司样本的实证分析发现,市场化改革越彻底的地区,上市公司与控股股东的产品购销和资金往来等关联交易越少。并且,市场化程度的提高明显缓解了控股股东通过关联交易转移利润的掏空后果。因此,减少关联交易程度、缓解关联交易的掏空后果是我国市场化改革优化资源配置的一种重要微观机制。     

现金持有水平、投资者保护与关联交易

以沪深两市的非金融类上市公司为样本,考察现金持有水平、投资者与关联交易之间的关系,结果发现上市公司的现金持有水平与关联交易显著正相关,这意味着上市公司的现金持有水平越高,基于大股东掏空的关联交易侵占越多;在投资者保护较差的公司,现金持有水平与关联交易之间的正相关关系更强,这说明有效的投资者保护体系能够起到约束大股东通过关联交易从上市公司转移现金的作用。因此进一步引导和规范上市公司的现金分红,以及加强投资者保护的执法力度,是治理关联交易的有效选择。     

定向增发股份解锁后机构投资者减持行为与盈余管理——来自我国上市公司定向增发新股解锁的经验数据

我国上市公司股权再融资中普遍存在盈余管理问题。我国上市公司在认购的定向增发新股股份解锁前存在正的盈余管理现象,但是上市公司在不同类型投资者实际减持前所进行的盈余管理程度存在着差异:在关联股东实际减持认购的股份前,上市公司进行正向盈余管理的程度更高,并且关联股东的减持比例与上市公司盈余管理存在显著的正相关关系,表明上市公司利用盈余管理向关联股东在实际减持中进行利益输送的程度更高,而非关联股东在实际减持中,非关联股东的减持比例与盈余管理程度无显著关系,上市公司利用盈余管理向非关联股东进行利益输送的效应不明显。     

上市公司关联交易盈余管理探析

关联交易盈余管理既有建设性效应,也有非建设性效应,其建设性效应表现为可能节约交易费用,产生规模效应,有助于企业经营目标的实现.但过度的关联交易盈余管理会损害会计信息的质量,产生巨大的危害.本文分析了上市公司进行关联交易盈余管理的动机和手段,以及关联交易盈余管理的建设性和非建设性效应,最后给出了规范上市公司关联交易盈余管理的几点建议     

股权集中、股权制衡与会计稳健性

运用我国A股上市公司2002～2004年的数据,本文研究上市公司两个股权结构变量——股权集中度与股权制衡度——对会计盈余信息质量特征之一的会计稳健性的影响。研究表明,股权集中度高的上市公司将不利于会计盈余信息质量的提高,少数大股东可能通过及时确认“好消息”以及滞后确认“坏消息”的方式来掩盖对中小股东的“掏空”行为,会计盈余稳健性较低;而股权制衡度较高的上市公司会计盈余就有较高的稳健性,这将有利于抑制少数大股东对会计盈余信息的操纵从而保护中小投资者财富不受侵占。     

对上市公司关联交易中存在问题的实证分析

本文从关联交易定价政策的模糊披露、关联交易与上市公司的盈余管理、关联交易中的控股股东不法行为三个方面进行了实证分析,揭示了我国上市公司关联交易信息披露中存在的主要问题.     

Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies

We examine a sample of related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders during 2001–2002. Minority shareholders in these firms seem to be subject to expropriation through tunneling but also gain from propping up. On balance, there seems to be more tunneling than propping up. Both types of firms have larger state ownership compared to the rest of the Chinese market but firms that are propped up are larger and have larger state ownership than firms subject to tunneling. Propped up firms are more likely to have foreign shareholders and to be cross-listed abroad compared to firms that are subject to tunneling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating performance in the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction. Finally, we find that related party transactions representing tunneling are accompanied by significantly less information disclosure compared to related party transactions representing propping.     

Political Connections and Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper examines whether politically connected firms use related party transactions as a tunneling mechanism in Indonesia. We further investigate whether the presence of tunneling compels managers to manage earnings to conceal such expropriation of resources. Our study is motivated by conflicting evidence in the extant literature about the role of political connections and related party transactions. Using data from Indonesia, we document that politically connected firms use related party loans to tunnel resources, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms with government connections. We further document that politically connected firms manage earnings to conceal their tunneling activities. By documenting the role of related party transactions as a specific channel through which connected firms expropriate resources, we enrich the political connection and related party transactions literature.     

Related party transactions and firm value: The moderating role of corporate social responsibility reporting

This study investigates the influence of related party transactions (RPTs) on firm value. Further, it examines whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting reflects its corporate values and ethical concerns, therefore mitigating the value-destroying effects of RPTs. Based on 274 observations from publicly listed firms in Indonesia, our results show that RPTs (i.e., related party sales) are negatively related to firm value. Further, we find that in the presence of better CSR reporting, the relationship between RPTs and firm value becomes more positive. This is in line with the view that CSR reporting, which reflects firms’ ethical concerns, may serve as a mechanism against managers’ opportunism. However, we find that related party payables have a positive relationship with firm value. Further investigation reveals that, although certain RPTs show a short-term, value-enhancing effect, these transactions seem to result in subsequent tunneling activities, suggesting managerial opportunism in the long term.     

商标剥离决策与关联交易

本文分析了上市公司的商标剥离决策与关联交易之间的关系,发现商标所有权属的划分为母公司提供了除股权以外的控制上市公司的新手段,而无偿取得所有权或者使用权的方式将商标培育成本在改制过程中转嫁给了母公司,客观上造成母公司会在企业上市后通过一定的关联交易转移利益、弥补成本的强烈动机。具体表现为:其它条件均等的情况下,母公司掌握商标所有权的上市公司的关联交易金额水平大于商标所有权归上市公司的样本组;无偿获得商标所有权或者使用权的上市公司的关联交易发生额大于有偿取得的样本组;以不确定的金额从母公司获得商标使用权的上市公司的关联交易发生额高于以确定金额从母公司获得使用权的样本。     

关联交易资金占用与内部资本市场资源配置

关联交易资金占用行为通常被视作大股东对上市公司的掏空而出现在诸多文献当中。但是从企业集团内部资本市场资源配置的视角来分析,这种行为可能是出于提高企业集团资金使用效率的目的。利用我国A股上市公司2009~2011年度的关联交易数据,对我国上市公司关联交易资金占用情况与上市公司面临的融资约束、经营不确定性之间的关系进行了实证检验,结果支持了关联交易资金占用行为的企业集团内部资本市场资源配置假说。     

Impact of the Share Structure Reform on the Role of Operating Related Party Transactions in China

Prior literature suggests that related party transactions may have a potentially detrimental effect on firm valuation because it undermines the corporate governance benefits a firm offers to minority shareholders. The share structure reform provides a unique opportunity to study to what extent the negative valuation effect of related party transactions interacts with corporate governance. Our empirical analysis confirms that related party transactions are detrimental to firm valuation. More importantly, we show that the negative effect of operating related party transactions on firm valuation declined after the share structure reform, partly due to the fact that the quality of corporate governance improved after the reform.     

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.     

Controlling shareholder,expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.     

Do related party transactions affect family firm valuations?

We examine the likelihood and value relevance of related party transactions in family firms. Based on an extensive hand-collected sample, we find that founder-led family firms are more likely to enter into related party transactions than other firms. We also find that the founder-led family firm valuation premium is reduced when these firms disclose related party transactions, especially opportunistic related party transactions. We also examine the significant change in related party transaction reporting regulations enacted in 2006 and find that it led to a decline in the number of value-decreasing related party transactions for founder-led family firms. We find a corresponding decrease in the detrimental effect of related party transactions on founder-led family firms’ valuation. Our results suggest that changes in the 2006 SEC related party transaction reporting regulations better protected minority shareholders from wealth extraction via related party transactions in founder-led family firms.