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1.
Asymmetric timeliness tests of accounting conservatism 总被引:7,自引:1,他引:6
J. Richard Dietrich Karl A. MullerIII Edward J. Riedl 《Review of Accounting Studies》2007,12(1):95-124
Recent accounting research employs an asymmetric timeliness measure to test the hypothesis that reported accounting earnings
are “conservative.” This research design regresses earnings on stock returns to examine whether “bad” news is incorporated
into earnings on a more timely basis than “good” news. We identify properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure
that will result in biases in the test statistics except under very restrictive conditions that are rarely met in typical
empirical settings. Using data series that are devoid of asymmetric timeliness in reported earnings, we show how these biases
result in evidence consistent with conservatism. We conclude that the biased test statistics inherent in the asymmetric timeliness
research design preclude using this method to measure conservatism; that these biases are irresolvable as they originate in
the test’s specification; and that studies employing asymmetric timeliness tests cannot be interpreted as providing evidence
of conservatism.
相似文献
Edward J. RiedlEmail: |
2.
David Abad Sonia Sanabria José Yagüe 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2009,32(3):287-308
Using Spanish data, this paper examines, for the first time, the differences in the intraday response of an order-driven market
to earnings announcements made during trading and non-trading hours. We show that the speed of reaction depends on timing
of the announcement: for overnight (daytime) announcements, the improvement in liquidity is (not) immediate. This finding
could explain why Spanish firms prefer to release the bad (good) earnings announcement in trading (non-trading) hours. This
strategic timing differs from the traditional disclosure policy in American markets, suggesting that different microstructures
may react differently to news releases and, consequently, drive the strategic timing of corporate disclosures.
相似文献
José Yagüe (Corresponding author)Email: |
3.
Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership
and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market
access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of
conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private
banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and
larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing
accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism
is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank
managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial
reporting.
相似文献
James M. WahlenEmail: |
4.
Louis T. W. Cheng Hung-Gay Fung Tak Yan Leung 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,28(1):23-54
The literature has suggested that earnings and earnings forecasts provide stronger signals than dividends about future performance
of a firm. We test the information effects of simultaneous announcement of earnings and dividends in the Hong Kong market,
distinguished by three interesting features (concentrated family-shareholdings, low corporate transparency, and no tax on
dividends). Our results show significant share price reactions to unexpected earnings and dividend changes, but dividends
appear to play a dominant role over earnings in pricing, a result contrary to findings in the literature. The signaling hypothesis
works primarily for firms with earning increases, while the maturity hypothesis works mainly for firms with earnings declines.
相似文献
Tak Yan LeungEmail: |
5.
John J. Maher Robert M. Brown Raman Kumar 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2008,31(2):167-189
We examine the valuation effects of overall demand for corporate equities combined with the influence of abnormal earnings
and unexpected funds flow. Our results indicate that the expected and unexpected net new total flow of funds into all stock
mutual funds do not by themselves have a meaningful effect on firm equity valuation. However, we find the combination of unexpected
funds flow and realized abnormal earnings have significant and important valuation effects. Importantly, the valuation impact
is greatest for those firms with high earnings growth potential that also operate in an environment characterized by high
information asymmetry.
相似文献
Raman KumarEmail: |
6.
Valuation of loss firms in a knowledge-based economy 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Recent research in accounting has documented a substantial increase in the number of loss firms. Existing theories on the
valuation of loss firms are based on adaptation/abandonment options or limited liability, assuming that these firms are operationally
distressed. In this paper, we show that many loss firms do not fit this stereotype and identify the primary value drivers
of this new type of loss firms. Our analysis helps resolve the puzzling negative relation between earnings and market value
documented in prior research. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of “hidden assets” or intangibles in the study
of loss firms.
相似文献
Jianming YeEmail: |
7.
We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance
sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary
information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information
differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management
at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations
of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.
相似文献
William R. BaberEmail: |
8.
We find no evidence of accrual mispricing for firms that disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. For these
firms, the market differentiates the discretionary from the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise. In contrast,
the market fails to distinguish between the discretionary and the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise for
firms that do not disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. These firms experience some stock price correction
around the filing date. However, the correction is only partial, resulting in a post-filing drift.
相似文献
Henock LouisEmail: |
9.
We provide an alternative explanation for the previous finding of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings.
We show that such finding could be a result of analysts’ rational behavior in the face of high earnings uncertainty rather
than their cognitive bias. Extreme earnings performance tends to be associated with higher earnings uncertainty that generally
leads to more forecast optimism. Once this effect is accounted for, the univariate result of analysts’ overreaction to extreme
good news in earnings is subsumed, leaving only their underreaction in general.
相似文献
Jian XueEmail: |
10.
We examine stock sales as a managerial incentive to help explain the discontinuity around the analyst forecast benchmark. We find that the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated with subsequent managerial stock sales. Moreover, we provide evidence that managers manage earnings prior to just meeting the threshold and selling their shares. Finally, the relation between just meeting and subsequently selling shares does not hold for non-manager insiders, who arguably cannot affect the earnings outcome, and is weaker in the presence of an independent board, suggesting that good corporate governance mitigates this strategic behavior.
相似文献
Vicki Wei TangEmail: |