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1.
运用Copula-CoVaR模型和动态面板数据模型,依据2015—2021年中国基金市场数据,考量基金投资管理和内部治理对极端风险的影响。结果显示:开放式基金受极端风险的影响,形成了显著和持续的风险溢出效应;基金投资管理和内部治理特征对其极端风险影响显著;投资集中度降低了基金极端风险;主动投资行为、资金流入量、经理人数量、经理投资年限、成本率、公司规模等会增大其极端风险;按照历史业绩、投资风格、行业主题对基金分组,极端风险影响因素在组内和组间呈现出一定的异质性。  相似文献   

2.
风险与收益的关系一直以来是学术界关注的重点问题,媒体新闻的内容和情绪会改变投资者决策并影响股票市场,因此从新闻情绪的角度分析风险收益的关系是十分有意义的。本文采用新闻文本数据构建了新闻情绪这一指标,并利用滚动回归的方法构建新闻情绪风险指数,基于2005—2020年的中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据对新闻情绪风险和股票收益之间的关系进行研究。研究结果表明,新闻情绪风险较高的公司具有更高的市场风险和波动性,同时这些公司还具有市值较小、上市时间较短的特征;此外,新闻情绪风险较高的投资组合具有较低的超额收益,在公司规模相同的条件下依旧得到了相同的结论。由此可见,中国股票市场存在新闻情绪的低风险定价异象。  相似文献   

3.
随险资投资限制的放开,保险机构已然在中国资本市场中占据重要地位。从机构投资者异质性出发,本文考察了险资股东对上市公司投资决策的影响及相应市场后果。研究主要发现:第一,与其他机构投资者相比,保险机构偏好稳定、长期的投资策略,更具战略投资者特征;第二,险资持股公司的并购支出更少,并购绩效更好,投资支出更少,投资效率更高;第三,险资持股公司的市场风险更低,市场业绩更好。本文发现表明,保险机构有效提高了公司投资决策效率,进而降低了企业风险、得到了市场认可,在中国市场中扮演着战略投资者的角色。基于大样本证据与现实案例,文章有利于加深对保险机构投资者的认识,也为监管政策制定、公司治理优化和投资者决策提供建议。  相似文献   

4.
为探究控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响机理,本文选取2012—2020年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用固定效应模型实证检验控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响、不同产权性质下控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响差异,以及企业社会责任在二者关系中的调节效应。研究结果表明:控股股东股权质押会增加上市公司的财务风险;相对于国有上市公司而言,非国有上市公司控股股东股权质押对财务风险的正向影响会更加强烈;控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响效应在社会责任表现较差的企业中更为明显。本研究为上市公司防范财务风险,为政府与监管机构监督股权质押行为提供了新的视角和理论依据。  相似文献   

5.
本文从信息不对称和代理问题出发来研究企业的投资偏好,高管对风险的偏好将影响投资行为,对高管激励组合不同将改变其风险偏好,进而改变其投资偏好以达到优化投资结构,降低代理成本,提高公司价值。  相似文献   

6.
本文从信息不对称和代理问题出发来研究企业的投资偏好,高管对风险的偏好将影响投资行为,对高管激励组合不同将改变其风险偏好,进而改变其投资偏好以达到优化投资结构,降低代理成本,提高公司价值。  相似文献   

7.
朱孟楠  徐云娇 《金融研究》2022,510(12):36-54
本文基于2001—2019年上市公司年报中关于外汇衍生品的使用信息,研究发现,使用外汇衍生品的上市公司相比未使用的公司发起并购的概率更低,但并购的市场和经营绩效有所提高。主要原因在于,中国上市公司进行并购通常以企业自有资金进行现金支付,外汇衍生品的使用大幅降低了公司出于预防性动机而持有的现金,从而降低了公司发起并购的概率。此外,进行汇率风险对冲可避免公司因持有大量自由现金流而发生的过度投资行为,从而提高了公司的投资效率。总体而言,使用外汇衍生品进行汇率风险对冲可使上市公司更注重并购质量而非并购数量,从而实现“少而精”的投资策略。本文研究对进一步厘清企业使用外汇衍生品的相关影响提供了一定参考。  相似文献   

8.
上市公司担保行为及其财务风险的实证研究   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
对上市公司担保行为的特征统计描述,以及对不同类型的担保行为给上市公司财务状况带来影响的实证分析表明:担保行为在一定程度上承担了资本市场的融资功能;需求担保更多的是那些业绩比较差、财务风险比较大的上市公司,违规担保和恶性担保行为并没有得到遏制;而且担保行为之后上市公司的财务状况不断恶化.  相似文献   

9.
FRR48的颁布和实行,从定量的角度要求上市公司正确评价自身面临的市场风险,无疑加大了上市公司的信息披露程度,使监管层和投资者更详细地了解公司的风险,有利于加强监管和投资价值判断。……  相似文献   

10.
通过构建我国产险公司资产风险资本额的测算模型,比较V水估计方法后选择Delta—EWMA方法估算资产风险系数,对产险公司的实证分析结果表明:股票、证券投资基金、货币市场投资暴露的风险大,其资产风险资本额比例远高于其资产持有量比例。  相似文献   

11.
Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.  相似文献   

12.
We propose and test whether adverse life events experienced by CEOs are associated with firms' stock price crash risk. Based on a large sample of Chinese companies from 2000 to 2015, we find evidence that companies whose CEOs experienced the Great Chinese Famine in early life have lower stock price crash risk than those with CEOs who did not experience the famine. Further, the negative association between famine experience and crash risk is more pronounced for firms whose CEOs have greater decision-making powers and for non-State-owned enterprises. We also find direct links between famine experience and various factors that have already been documented as determinants of crash risk. Our results support behavior economics theory on imprinting: CEO memories of adverse life experiences have an indelible effect on their decision-making processes, which in turn influence how the financial information is provided and disclosed to the stock market.  相似文献   

13.
We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news.  相似文献   

14.
CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.  相似文献   

15.
The recent spate of corporate scandals worldwide has again raised serious concerns about the quality of corporate governance. We examine the governance effects on investment expenditure in the year of CEO retirement. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during 1990–1998, we find no evidence of changes in capital or research and development expenditure when CEOs are on the verge of retiring. In addition, neither board size nor leadership structure (separating the posts of CEO and chairman) influence corporate investment during the CEO's final year. However, we do show that there are some important governance effects. Cutbacks in fixed asset spending at the time of CEO departure are less likely in firms with executive-dominated boards. There is evidence that stock ownership of outside directors is associated with increased capital expenditure when the CEO retires. Finally, further analysis suggests that insider board monitoring and outsider equity ownership may act as substitute mechanisms in ensuring that retiring CEOs focus on value creating activities.  相似文献   

16.
This article brings a broad range of statistical studies and evidence to bear on three common perceptions about the CEO compensation and governance of U.S. public companies: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, it has declined since then— by more than 30%—from peak levels that were reached around 2000. Moreover, when viewed relative to corporate net income or profits, CEO pay levels at S&P 500 companies are the lowest they've been in the last 20 years. And the ratio of large‐company CEO pay to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than the levels that prevailed before the 1960s. What's more, in studies that begin with the late '70s, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. And when set against the compensation of other highly paid groups, today's levels of CEO pay, although somewhat above their long‐term historical average, are about the same as their average levels in the early 1990s. At the same time, the pay of U.S. CEOs appears to be reasonably highly correlated with corporate performance. As evidence, the author cites a 2010 study reporting that, over the period 1992 to 2005, companies with CEOs in the top quintile (top 20%) of realized pay in any given year had generated stock returns that were 60% higher than the average companies in their industries over the previous three years. Conversely, companies with CEOs in the bottom quintile of realized pay underperformed their industries by almost 20% in the previous three years. And along with lower pay, the CEOs of poorly performing companies in the 2000s faced a significant increase in the likelihood of dismissal by their own boards. When viewed together, these findings suggest that corporate boards have done a reasonably good job of overseeing CEO pay, and that factors such as technological advances and increased scale have played meaningful roles in driving the pay of both CEOs and others with top incomes—people who are assumed to have comparable skills, experience, and opportunities. If one wants to use increases in CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or “board capture,” one also has to explain why the other professional groups have experienced similar, or even higher, growth in pay. A more straightforward interpretation of the evidence reviewed in this article is that the market for talent has driven a meaningful portion of the increase in pay at the top. Consistent with this conclusion, top executive pay policies at roughly 97% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd‐Frank mandated “Say‐on‐Pay” votes in 2011 and 2012, the first two years the measure was in force.  相似文献   

17.
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period leading to the current banking crisis. Using a sample of large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs with greater managerial control, achieved through various corporate governance mechanisms, take less risk. BHCs that pay CEOs high base salaries also take less risk, while BHCs that grant CEOs more in stock options or that pay CEOs higher bonuses take more risk. The evidence is generally consistent with BHC managers exhibiting greater risk aversion than outside shareholders, but with several factors affecting managers’ risk‐taking incentives.  相似文献   

18.
This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk.  相似文献   

19.
Using a large sample of CEOs of UK firms, we show that CEO age is a key determinant of acquisition activity. We find that younger CEOs are more likely to acquire another firm and spend more on large capital expenditures. We argue that while younger CEOs of both UK and US firms undertake more acquisitions than their older peers, their motivations for acquisitions might differ. We find that the stock market perceives acquisitions by younger CEOs to be of a higher quality. Following previous studies, we use CEO tenure as a proxy for reputation, and find that large acquisitions enhance CEO reputation, especially for younger CEOs. In contrast to the previous findings for CEOs of US firms, we determine that the compensation of CEOs in the UK does not increase after acquisitions. This absence of a compensation incentive for CEOs of UK firms is consistent with the idea that the UK compensation structure is more restrictive and has a smaller equity‐based component. Our evidence is also inconsistent with an overconfidence effect. Overall, our results provide consistent evidence of executive signaling by younger CEOs of UK firms eager to distinguish themselves.  相似文献   

20.
Drawing on the psychological contract theory, we examine how the celebrity status of chief executive officers (CEO) influences corporate investment behavior. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2019, we find that celebrity CEOs increase corporate investment levels, leading to lower investment efficiency. In addition, they employ more impression management tactics to signal their superior managerial ability, and dodge possible rejections of their investment decisions by having fewer board meetings. Furthermore, since the perceived psychological contract is dynamic, we provide evidence that the association between the celebrity CEO and corporate investment is more pronounced when a firm faces environmental uncertainty, and pressures from intensive industry competition and peers' performance. Our study contributes to corporate finance literature and results indicate that CEOs with celebrity status are pressured to maintain a psychological contract, which in turn, reduce the efficiency of corporate resource allocation.  相似文献   

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