上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量关系的实证研究

本文在阐述控股股东特征与盈余质量相关理论的基础上,以我国A股制造业上市公司2011年度数据为研究对象,运用多元回归分析法对我国上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量的关系进行分析。实证结果显示:控股股东的身份构成、控股股东的持股比例、控股股东担任总经理或董事长与盈余质量呈负相关关系,其他股东的制衡能力、独立董事占董事会的比例与盈余质量呈正相关关系。     

控股股东股权质押、企业社会责任与真实盈余管理

本文从利益相关者角度出发,采用2015-2017年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验企业社会责任对控股股东股权质押企业的真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现:控股股东股权质押能够诱发企业利润操纵行为,而企业社会责任的履行能够约束控股股东及管理层的利润操纵行为。进一步研究发现,企业对不同的利益相关者承担的责任不同,对控股股东及管理层的利润操纵行为的治理效应也不同。     

三个审计师签字与盈余反应系数

审计准则规定,审计报告应由两名具备相关业务资格的审计师签字。然而,审计报告中出现三个审计师签字现象,并呈逐年增长趋势,投资者如何看待这一自发行为？为此,使用盈余反应系数度量投资者感知的审计质量,分析三个审计师签字对盈余反应系数的影响。研究发现,三个审计师签字伴随着更高的公司盈余反应系数。异质性检验发现,三个审计师签字对公司盈余反应系数的正向影响,在投资者专业能力低、公司交易风险高或者审计师行业专长能力低的样本组中更显著。经济后果检验发现,三个审计师签字能改善公司的财务业绩和市场业绩。该研究有助于分析三个审计师签字的经济后果,也为相关部门后续规范审计师签字行为提供依据。     

连锁非控股股东的内部治理效应研究——基于控股股东掏空视角

本文选取2007-2020年A股上市公司样本,对连锁非控股股东的内部治理效应进行考察。研究结果表明非控股股东行业内连锁持股与控股股东掏空负相关,进一步研究发现,企业的产品市场势力水平强化了非控股股东连锁持股的内部治理效应,而机构投资者信息优势与行业连锁持股信息优势存在一定的替代效应。机制检验表明,非控股连锁股东对企业控股股东自利性行为的抑制作用分别通过企业间的信息资源整合与对控股股东的退出威胁实现,具体路径为向持股单位委派董事、监事和高级管理人员。同时,非控股股东连锁持股的内部治理效应降低了企业的经营风险,有效保护了中小股东的合法权益。     

所有权结构、盈余质量与股东回报——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003年-2016年沪深两市A股非金融行业上市公司数据作为研究样本,运用回归分析法研究所有权结构对股东回报的影响,以及盈余质量对股东回报的影响。通过实证分析得出合理的所有权结构能有效提升股东回报,盈余质量对股东回报具有显著影响,高质量的盈余能够有效提升股东回报的结论。     

A股上市公司盈余反应系数的季节性差异研究

本文以2003年1季度至2022年4季度A股上市公司为样本,研究发现盈余反应系数存在显著的季节性差异,具体表现为1季度的盈余反应系数大幅高于其他季度,分别比2、3、4季度的盈余反应系数高77.27%,44.44%和85.71%,且这一季节性差异在绝大多数年度和绝大多数行业中稳定存在。本文从盈余信息含量、盈余信息在非盈余公告窗口的价格效应、盈余公告的信息含量和盈余信息的披露格式、同期事件、市场和宏观因素等不同视角对上述现象的成因进行了探索,我们发现盈余信息含量、盈余信息在盈余公告前的价格效应在非常有限的程度上解释了盈余反应系数的部分季节性差异,但已有线索还远不足以对此提供完备的解释。此外,也有较弱的证据显示3季度的盈余反应系数大于2、4季度。     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

控股股东通常使用关联交易追求控制权收益(包括私有收益和共享收益)。在不同控制权收益驱使下,关联交易对盈余质量的影响也完全不同。本文使用2001、2002年中国上市公司的数据检验发现,当控股股东持股在50%及以下时,更多通过关联交易追求控制权私有收益,结果降低了盈余质量;而当控股股东持股超过50%时,偏好通过关联交易获取控制权共享收益,最终提高了盈余质量。     

内部控制、应计质量与盈余反应——基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009年中国A股上市公司为样本,从财务信息内部生产和投资者反应两个视角研究内部控制质量与会计信息质量之间的关系。研究表明:在信息生产方面,高质量的内部控制提高了应计质量;在投资者反应方面,内部控制质量越高,盈余反应系数越大。这证实了内部控制的财务报告目标,也证实了内部控制制度在我国的适用性。我国政府监管部门目前正在积极建立和实施内部控制体系,本文的研究结论为其提供了经验数据支持。     

Large shareholders and the pressure to manage earnings

We present empirical evidence that firms inflate earnings around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider blockholdings, but not in their absence. The finding is robust to several alternative explanations, including differences in firm characteristics, growth, performance, CEO incentives, and capital usage. While we do not dispute that CEOs behave opportunistically, we challenge that earnings management is solely a symptom of weak governance. We conclude that strengthening shareholder power to alleviate the conflict between shareholders and management can also have the unintended consequence of intensifying the conflict between current and future shareholders.     

Controlling shareholders and market timing in share issuance

We examine market timing in the equity issuance of firms controlled by large shareholders using a hand-collected data set of controlling shareholders' ownership stakes in Chile between 1990 and 2009. When a firm issues shares, the controlling shareholder can either maintain or change his ownership stake depending on how many of the new shares he subscribes. Issuance predicts poor future returns and is preceded by high returns, but only when the controlling shareholder's stake is significantly reduced. Consistent with market timing, the results are stronger in the absence of institutional investors and in hot issuance markets.     

Controlling shareholders,board structure,and firm performance: Evidence from India

We examine the prevalence and performance impact of controlling shareholders and study corporate board structures and ownership structures in 1796 Indian firms. Families (founders) are present on the boards in 63.2 (65.5) percent of the sample firms. On average, founders own over 50% of outstanding shares. In contrast to the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003) in the U.S. context, we find that controlling shareholder board membership in Indian firms has a statistically significant negative association with Tobin's Q. Higher proportion of independent directors, higher institutional ownership or larger firm size does not appear to mitigate this relationship. Overall, board membership of controlling shareholders appears to be costly for minority shareholders.     

Insider sales based on short-term earnings information

I find strong evidence of insiders selling shares prior to imminent bad earnings news through their Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. While Rule 10b5-1 selling plans may conjure images of regular selling over a sustained period of time, I find that insiders’ sales under these plans often consist of a small number of sales (the median plan consists of four sales) and commonly occur over a short period of time (the median plan lasts less than 150 days). Abnormal stock returns, earnings surprises, and abnormal earnings announcement returns are all significantly negative following plans that are short-term in nature, but not following plans that are long-term in nature. Although Rule 10b5-1 does not specify a minimum length for selling plans, finding that sales within short plans significantly outperform sales within longer plans suggests that restrictions on plan length would reduce the incidence and appearance of informed selling through Rule 10b5-1 plans.     

Options and earnings announcements: an empirical study of volatility, trading volume, open interest and liquidity

In this paper we study the impact of earnings announcements on implied volatility, trading volume, open interest and spreads in the stock options market. We find that implied volatility increases before announcement days and drops afterwards. Also option trading volume is higher around announcement days. During the days before the announcement open interest tends to increase, while it returns to regular levels afterwards. Changes in the quoted spread largely respond to higher trading volume and changes in implied volatility. The effective spread increases on the event day and on the first two days following the earnings announcement.     

The impact of tax holidays on earnings management: An empirical study of corporate reporting behavior in a developing-economy framework

This study investigates whether foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China alter their corporate reporting behavior in response to a known schedule of tax-rate increases. The context of this investigation is a tax-incentive scheme that allows firms to pay taxes at a reduced rate for a limited period of time, and then at a higher rate when this period expires. If managers attempt to maximize firm value by minimizing tax costs, then the spread of tax rates in the periods surrounding the rate change may provide a substantial incentive for them to accelerate revenue and defer expenses. Consistent with this hypothesis, the empirical results indicate that firms report significantly higher discretionary current accruals for the years before tax-rate increases. The evidence, which indicates that firms manage earnings upward to take advantage of lower tax rates that are available in certain years, has important implications for tax policymakers.     

Investor and price response to patterns in earnings surprises

As part of their model to explain short-term positive and long-term negative auto-correlation in stock returns, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of Finance 49, 307–345] suggest that investors may extrapolate trends in earnings performance. I test this portion of their model by examining investor trading patterns in firms that experience consecutive same-sign earnings surprises. Consistent with their model, after controlling for regularities in trading activity, I find that the net buying of small investors increases with the number of consecutive positive earnings surprises. I further find that purchasing activity of small investors subsequent to consecutive positive surprises is significantly negatively correlated with returns throughout the remainder of the year. These results suggest that such investors are not simply rationally updating after public news announcements. My results are robust to controlling for auto-correlation in earnings surprises.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

Empirical anomalies based on unexpected earnings and the importance of risk adjustments

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Reinganum's study which indicates that abnormal returns could not be earned unexpected quarterly earnings information, and to document precisely the response of stock prices to earnings announcements. This study, using a very large sample of stocks and daily returns, represents the most complete and detailed analysis of quarterly earnings reports that has been performed to date. Our results are contrary to those of Reinganum and show that abnormal returns could have been earned almost any time during the 1970's. Our analysis also indicates that risk adjustments matter little in this type of work. Finally, we find that roughly 50% of the adjustment of stock returns to unexpected quarterly earnings occurs over a 90-day period after the earnings are announced.     

Earnings characteristics and analysts’ differential interpretation of earnings announcements: An empirical analysis

This study provides empirical evidence on factors that drive differential interpretation of earnings announcements. We document that Kandel and Pearson's forecast measures of differential interpretation are decreasing in proxies for earnings quality and pre‐announcement information quality. This evidence yields new and useful insights regarding which earnings announcements are less likely to generate newfound disagreement among analysts and investors. Recent research suggests that investor disagreement can increase investment risk, increase the cost of capital, and cause stock prices to deviate from fundamental value. Therefore, our results support prior intuition that increasing the quality of earnings and pre‐announcement information can improve the efficiency of capital markets.