上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量关系的实证研究

本文在阐述控股股东特征与盈余质量相关理论的基础上,以我国A股制造业上市公司2011年度数据为研究对象,运用多元回归分析法对我国上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量的关系进行分析。实证结果显示:控股股东的身份构成、控股股东的持股比例、控股股东担任总经理或董事长与盈余质量呈负相关关系,其他股东的制衡能力、独立董事占董事会的比例与盈余质量呈正相关关系。     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

盈余管理、控制权私利与投资者保护综述

我国上市公司的盈余管理主要是基于规避政府监管的动机,而这个动机产生的根源是控股股东攫取控制权私利的激励.控股股东为了能够掏空上市公司,需要借助于盈余管理,因此掏空总是伴随着盈余管理.国家层面上的投资者法律保护能够约束控股股东,限制控制权私利,使控股股东失去盈余管理的动机,因此盈余管理与投资者保护负相关.     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

控股股东通常使用关联交易追求控制权收益(包括私有收益和共享收益)。在不同控制权收益驱使下,关联交易对盈余质量的影响也完全不同。本文使用2001、2002年中国上市公司的数据检验发现,当控股股东持股在50%及以下时,更多通过关联交易追求控制权私有收益,结果降低了盈余质量;而当控股股东持股超过50%时,偏好通过关联交易获取控制权共享收益,最终提高了盈余质量。     

终极产权性质、第一大股东对盈余质量的影响分析

以我国2006年底已经实施了股改的深沪两地A股上市公司2007～2008年的经验数据为样本,采用收益-盈余模型检验了终极产权性质、第一大股东与盈余质量之间的关系,研究发现:对于已经实施了股改的上市公司,股权仍然相对集中;当上市公司属于国家终极控制时,盈余质量会较高;第一大股东持股比例与盈余质量正相关;第一大股东对上市公司董事会的控制能力与盈余质量正相关;其他大股东对控股股东的制衡能力对盈余质量的影响不显著.     

我国上市公司关联交易盈余管理解析

我国上市公司与其控股大股东，利用关联交易盈余管理侵犯广大中小股东、债权人利益的情况可谓屡见不鲜，这与我国股市所特有的关联交易盈余管理的特点有关。由于关联交易盈余管理的经济实质及危害。须对关联交易盈余管理赖以存在的制度缺陷进行改进。     

控股股东控制、多元化经营与盈余管理

本文考察控股股东控制下的具有价值折损效应的多元化经营公司对盈余管理方式的选择问题。在对控股股东控制下的具有价值折损效应的多元化经营公司具有实施盈余管理动机的分析基础上,本文研究发现,出于成本的考虑,其实施了更高程度的正向应计盈余管理。     

连锁股东与分析师盈余预测

基于逐渐普遍的连锁股东现象,学术界对其发挥的效应是协同治理还是竞争合谋的讨论也越发激烈。本文从分析师盈余预测视角考察连锁股东如何影响分析师预测行为。研究发现,连锁股东能提高分析师盈余预测质量,降低预测偏差,减少分析师之间的预测分歧度。机制检验发现,连锁股东通过发挥协同效应和治理效应提高分析师预测质量。进一步分析发现,连锁股东的协同治理具有行业效应,因连锁股东形成的同行业企业群越大,连锁股东对分析师盈余预测影响越强;考察主体异质性发现,外资和机构型连锁股东对分析师预测质量的促进作用更强,且连锁股东更能提高低能力分析师的预测质量。本研究从外部信息中介角度丰富了连锁股东的经济影响,提供了通过完善微观企业股东治理改善资本市场运行效率的理论依据。     

上市公司盈余管理治理研究

盈余管理是企业管理人员为了获得私人利益，而有意地对对外财务报告进行的控制。目前，我国上市公司普遍存在着过度盈余管理的倾向。从某种意义上讲，这种过度盈余管理的危害不亚于会计作假。它使会计沦为一种“数字游戏”，加剧了上市公司的会计风险，损害了市场对资源的有效配置，更侵犯了小股东的利益。长此以往必然影响我国资本市场的健康发展。因此，加强对盈余管理的治理已迫在眉睫。笔者认为应从如下几个方面入手。一、优化产权结构我国上市公司的股权结构极不合理，未流通股占上市公司总股本的大部分，国有股处于控股地位且股权过于…     

关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

近年来,关联交易盈余管理愈演愈烈,极大地损害了投资者的利益。以往大量研究提供了上市公司操纵应计项目及线下项目进行盈余管理的证据,本文则以中国上市公司2002--2004年的面板数据为研究样本,首次大样本检验关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理的关系。本文的主要结论包括：（1）有配股盈余管理动机的公司的第一类关联交易（通常计入线上项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本,第三类关联交易（担保抵押类关联交易）比例显著低于控制样本。（2）有避亏盈余管理动机的公司的第二类关联交易（通常计入线下项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本。（3）有盈余管理动机的公司,当其附属企业集团时,或者其控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,其关联交易比例更高。（4）第一类关联交易与线下项目显著负相关,有盈余管理动机的公司,线下项目较低时第一类关联交易比例较高。（5）配股公司配股后的关联销售和关联采购比例显著低于配股前。扭亏为盈的公司扭亏当年的第二类关联交易比例显著高于扭亏前一年。综上所述,计入线上项目的关联交易是上市公司为获取配股资格而进盈余管理的重要手段,计入线下项目的关联交易是上市公司为避免亏损而进行盈余管理的重要手段;上市公司控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,或控股股东隶属某一企业集团时,关联交易盈余管理行为更严重;进行盈余管理时,线下项目与计入线上项目的关联交易具有替代性。     

Multiple blockholders and earnings management

This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type – state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.     

Stable Shareholdings,the Decision Horizon Problem and Earnings Smoothing

Prior studies argue that stable shareholders do not encourage firm managers to manage their earnings to achieve short‐term earnings goals. They also state that firm managers with stable shareholders have an incentive to report smooth earnings to maintain long‐term relationships with such shareholders. We focus on cross‐shareholdings and stable shareholdings owned by financial institutions as stable shareholdings in Japan, and investigate the effect of these ownership structures on earnings management patterns. Specifically, we hypothesize that stable shareholdings are positively associated with the informational components of earnings smoothing. Consistent with our hypothesis, we first find that as stable shareholdings increase, managers are more likely to conduct earnings smoothing that provides useful information to stable shareholders. Further, our additional analysis shows that stable shareholdings reduce incentives for managers to cut discretionary expenditures to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks, implying that stable shareholdings could reduce the possibility of a myopic problem. These results suggest that managers with stable shareholdings tend to report smoother and less volatile earnings, and do not tend to pursue earnings management to attain short‐term earnings targets.     

The effects of trading rights and ownership structures on the informativeness of accounting earnings: Evidence from China’ split share structure reform

This paper examines how the removal of trading restrictions and ownership structures affect earnings informativeness by investigating the changes in the earnings-return relation around China’s split share structure reform. I find the reform has a negative impact on the relationship between controlling shareholders’ ownership and earnings informativeness, which is consistent with the idea that the removal of trading restrictions gives controlling shareholders incentives to influence the stock price through managing earnings. I also find that earnings informativeness decreases with the reduction in controlling shareholders’ ownership. This dilution effect is more significant for firms with non-state controlling shareholders or with controlling shareholders that are not monitored by other large shareholders. The results are consistent with the notion that controlling shareholders provide less informative earnings in response to the dilution of their ownership to avoid the constraints arising from the increased monitoring by outside investors.     

Share pledges,tone of earnings communication conferences,and market reaction: evidence from China

We investigate how share pledging affects firms’ disclosures and influences investors in Chinese stock market. The tone of firm disclosures when there are shares pledged by controlling shareholders is more positive than that of firms without them. Considering tone inflation motivation and ability simultaneously, we find share pledge risk has an inverted U‐shaped relation with tone. Investors react positively to tone in short‐run windows, and firms with controlling shareholders’ pledges have higher stock returns for earnings communication conferences. We identify an inverted U‐shaped link between margin distance of controlling shareholders and stock returns for earnings communication conferences.     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective

This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999–2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms.     

Are Controlling Shareholders Influencing the Relationship Between CSR and Earnings Quality? Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This article examines how controlling shareholders may affect the relationship between the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings quality. We find that controlling shareholders have a significant impact on the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality; the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality is significantly positive in privately owned enterprises but not state-owned enterprises; and, among state-owned enterprises, the relationship is weaker at enterprises controlled by the central government than at those controlled by local governments. Our article highlights the differential impacts of controlling shareholders on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality.