Risk-based capital for credit insurers with business cycles and dynamic leverage

This paper develops a risk-based capital pricing model for credit insurance portfolios held by a vulnerable insurer. The model accounts for business cycles using a two-state Markov switching model, and allows for dynamic leverage adjustment by the insured firms. The new proposed model, which incorporates risk-based capital practice, is better for both the insurer and the insured firms. Based on the risk-adjusted performance metric, we found that the insurer is better off insuring short- and medium-term loans in expansion and steady states, while it is better off backing both short- and long-term loans in recessions. Our results also emphasize that macroeconomic uncertainty significantly impairs the creditworthiness of the insurer and insured firms.     

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

Structural effects of asset-backed securitization

This paper analyses the potential changes in the operational structure of deposit-taking financial institutions that securitize assets. Findings indicate that banks can create an asset securitization pipeline structure that enables them to increase their return on capital. In other words, through securitization banks can expand their loan provision business without increasing their liabilities or their capital levels. Using a contingent claims model, four factors that impact on the bank's decision to securitize are highlighted and analysed: (i) the level of deposit insurance; (ii) capital adequacy requirements; (iii) insolvency risk; and, (iv) the risk of credit enhancements. Furthermore, we identify key accounting and regulatory challenges that emerge for banks from the process of asset backed securitization.     

Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks

We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.     

Risk management of deposit insurance corporations with risk-based premiums and credit default swaps

In this paper, we propose a risk-based model for deposit insurance premiums and provide the closed-form formula for premiums, including early closure, capital forbearance, interest rate risk, and moral hazard. Our numerical analysis confirms the proposed pricing formula and the relative impact of the provisions for deposit insurance premiums. We illustrate how to use credit default swaps (CDSs) to manage the bank’s asset risk corresponding to the deposit insurance model. A failed bank, Washington Mutual, is used to demonstrate how to calibrate the model’s parameters and calculate fair premiums that are consistent with market risks on the basis of our proposed model and credit derivatives. Finally, a numerical experiment is designed to determine the optimal hedge ratio, which can minimise the variance of cash-flow of the deposit insurance corporations.     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

Basel III capital buffers and Canadian credit unions lending: Impact of the credit cycle and the business cycle

We take advantage of the long-standing regulation of the risk-based capital and the leverage ratio in Canada to provide empirical evidence on the relation between the credit unions' capital buffers and loans to members. Based on a unique sample of the 100 Canadian largest credit unions from 1996 to 2014, we find that both the risk-based capital buffer and the leverage buffer are positively related to changes in loans and loan growth. However, changes in these two types of buffers are negatively related to changes in the loans to assets ratios. This finding suggests that to adjust their capital buffers, Canadian credit unions curtail their loans and underscores the importance of the Basel III conservation and the countercyclical buffer requirements in fostering credit. Further, we show that the risk-based capital buffer is positively related to the credit cycle. However, a mechanical application of the rule based on the credit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) gap to activate the countercyclical buffer, would have misguided Canadian credit unions.     

Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

Fair insurance guaranty premia in the presence of risk-based capital regulations,stochastic interest rate and catastrophe risk

A multiperiod model is developed to measure the costs posed to the guaranty fund in a setting that incorporates risk-based capital regulations, interest rate risk and the possibility of catastrophic losses. The guaranty contract is modeled as a put option on the asset of the insurance company with a stochastic strike price and an uncertain maturity. The impacts of the key factors of this model are examined numerically and shown to make material differences in the costs to the guaranty fund.     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Adequacy Requirements and Interest Rate Dynamics

This paper examines the long run interaction among deposit insurance, bank deposit rates and capital adequacy requirements. Using analysis similar to the price discrimination model of Lott and Roberts (1991) we find that a competitive environment among banks would link the spread between insured and uninsured deposit rates to the size of the insurance premium. We also find that banks that choose to operate at the regulatory minimum capital level, would increase asset risk with increased capital requirements if (1) the implicit interest paid to insured and uninsured depositors is equally sensitive to changes in risk and capital adequacy and (2) the insurance premium is independent of the level of risk and capital adequacy. Under the present risk-based premium structure, asset risk has the potential to decline when the regulatory agency raises capital requirements. Finally, we examine the time series behavior of insured and uninsured interest rates to see if it is consistent with our theoretical model. We find that insured and uninsured rates, along with deposit insurance premiums, are cointegrated series as suggested by our model.     

Why is credit-to-GDP a good measure for setting countercyclical capital buffers?

We examine banks’ loan losses in Europe in 1982–2012 using a nonlinear three-factor model that takes into account output growth, real interest rate, and the ratio of private credit to GDP relative to its trend (i.e., “excessive indebtedness”). We find that a drop in output has an intensified impact on loan losses if the private sector is excessively indebted. Because increased bank credit risk should be matched with higher bank capital, the result motivates the Basel III's countercyclical capital buffers as a function of private indebtedness relative to its trend. The result also helps to explain differences in the amount of loan losses in different recessions across time and across countries. The model also indicates that low interest rates during the recent recession have clearly mitigated loan losses.     

Allocation of Capital in the Insurance Industry

ABSTRACT: This article discusses and critiques the methods that have been proposed for allocating capital in financial institutions, with an emphasis on applications in the insurance industry. The author discusses the rationale for allocating capital by line of business and explains how capital allocation can be used to maximize firm value. The implications for capital allocation of regulatory risk-based capital and the capital asset pricing model are discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of using value-at-risk and insolvency put option criteria in capital allocation are analyzed. Finally, recently proposed methods of marginal capital allocation are evaluated. One conclusion is that using the insolvency put option is superior to value-at-risk for allocating capital but that both methods fail to account for diversification across lines in the multi-line firm. The primary conclusion is that marginal capital allocation methodologies based on option-pricing models that recognize the effects of diversification are the best approach for allocating capital in the financial industry.     

Macroprudential stress testing of credit risk: A practical approach for policy makers

Drawing on the lessons from the global financial crisis and especially from its impact on the banking systems of Eastern Europe, the paper proposes a new practical approach to macroprudential stress testing. The proposed approach incorporates: (i) macroeconomic stress scenarios generated from both a country specific statistical model and historical cross-country crises experience; (ii) indirect credit risk due to foreign currency exposures of unhedged borrowers; (iii) varying underwriting practices across banks and their asset classes based on their relative aggressiveness of lending; (iv) higher correlations between the probability of default and the loss given default during stress periods; (v) a negative effect of lending concentration and residual loan maturity on unexpected losses; and (vi) the use of an economic risk weighted capital adequacy ratio as the relevant outcome indicator to measure the resilience of banks to materializing credit risk. The authors apply the proposed approach to a set of Eastern European banks and discuss the results.     

Credit Derivatives and the Default Risk of Large Complex Financial Institutions

This paper proposes and implements a multivariate model of the coevolution of the first and second moments of two broad credit default swap indices and the equity prices of sixteen large complex financial institutions. We use this empirical model to build a bank default risk model, in the vein of the classic Merton-type, which utilises a multi-equation framework to model forward-looking measures of market and credit risk using the credit default swap (CDS) index market as a measure of the conditions of the global credit environment. In the first step, we estimate the dynamic correlations and volatilities describing the evolution of the CDS indices and the banks’ equity prices and then impute the implied assets and their volatilities conditional on the evolution and volatility of equity. In the second step, we show that there is a substantial ‘asset shortfall’ and that substantial capital injections and/or asset insurance are required to restore the stability of our sample institutions to an acceptable level following large shocks to the aggregate level of credit risk in financial markets.     

《新资本协议》对商业银行信贷运行的影响——兼论其宏观经济效应

《新资本协议》的出台和实施是银行监管历史上一个具有里程碑意义的事件。本文认为,《新资本协议》特别是内部评级法极大地提高了资本监管的风险敏感度,将对商业银行的信贷增长方式、信贷结构调整和贷款损失准备计提、以及宏观经济运行产生一定的影响。按照目前我国商业银行资本充足水平和资产质量,无论是实施标准法还是内部评级法都将强化信贷扩张的资本约束效应。我国应慎重选择《新资本协议》的实施时机,避免由此对信贷供给和宏观经济运行造成的负面冲击。     

基于精算方法的信用风险的量化

比较了保险风险和信贷风险的基本特征后可以发现,精算模型的方法和思路可以用来描述商业银行的信用风险.可以通过定性分析和定量分析相结合的方式,推导出适用的信用风险量化管理模型.在数据整理和检验的基础上,借鉴寿险精算的生命模型思想可以建立"正常-损失"模型,进而实现对贷款损失率的解释;借鉴非寿险准备金测算的方法,可以采用链梯法测算商业银行短期贷款业务应提取的贷款坏账准备金数额.在上述方法的基础上,可以将"正常-损失"模型与链梯法结合起来,测算长期贷款的坏账准备金.     

基于精算方法的信用风险的量化

比较了保险风险和信贷风险的基本特征后可以发现，精算模型的方法和思路可以用来描述商业银行的信用风险。可以通过定性分析和定量分析相结合的方式，推导出适用的信用风险量化管理模型。在数据整理和检验的基础上，借鉴寿险精算的生命模型思想可以建立“正常-损失”模型，进而实现对贷款损失率的解释；借鉴非寿险准备金测算的方法，可以采用链梯法测算商业银行短期贷款业务应提取的贷款坏账准备金数额。在上述方法的基础上，可以将“正常-损失”模型与链梯法结合起来，测算长期贷款的坏账准备金。     

Value-at-risk vs. building block regulation in banking

Existing regulatory capital requirements are often criticized for only being loosely linked to the economic risk of the banks' assets. In view of the attempts of international regulators to introduce more risk sensitive capital requirements, we theoretically examine the effect of specific regulatory capital requirements on the risk-taking behavior of banks. More precisely, we develop a continuous time framework where the banks' choice of asset risk is endogenously determined. We compare regulation based on the Basel I building block approach to value-at-risk or ‘internal model’-based capital requirements with respect to risk taking behavior, deposit insurance liability, and shareholder value. The main findings are: (i) value-at-risk-based capital regulation creates a stronger incentive to reduce asset risk when banks are solvent, (ii) solvent banks that reduce their asset risk reduce the current value of the deposit insurance liability significantly, (iii) under value-at-risk regulation the risk reduction behavior of banks is less sensitive to changes in their investment opportunity set, and (iv) banks' equityholders can benefit from risk-based capital requirements.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.