中国银行资本监管模式选择研究

有效银行资本监管涉及降低银行倒闭风险所得到的社会收益与抑制金融业发展所产生的社会成本之间的平衡问题,理想的银行资本监管应随着这些成本和收益的变化而调整,设计一种激励相容的银行资本监管制度成为对银行资本监管的现实需要,无论是标准化模式还是内部模型法都是对银行具体风险评价和风险管理方法的约束,整体监管模式建立在预先承诺制的基础之上,注重激励相容、发挥市场约束和银行自身管理的作用,在适用性、稳定性、可操作性等方面都比内部模型法具有优势。     

社会约束:构建激励相容银行监管体制的有效途径——基于对新加坡、阿根廷、香港经验的借鉴

近年来,我国银行业的发展相当迅速,但银行内部风险控制制度仍然欠缺,政府监管虽防止了大规模的银行危机,也有其局限性,因此,应完善和加强社会约束机制在我国银行监管中的作用,既提高银行外部监管的有效性,又促进银行业的发展。文章从弥补政府监管局限性的角度分析了社会约束在构建激励相容银行监管体制中的必要性,借鉴新加坡、阿根廷、香港在社会约束建设方面的经验,对我国社会约束建设提出了相应建议。     

银行资本的收益与成本分析

银行资本水平多少合适是危机后最具争议的话题之一。支持加强资本监管的观点指出银行高杠杆率会带来风险,而全球金融危机的成本巨大;反对者认为提高资本要求会增加银行信贷成本从而阻碍经济发展。本文对银行资本的成本收益进行了综合分析,得出以下结论 :1.相当于风险加权资产15%-23%的资本金足以抵补过去任何一次危机中银行发生的损失(尤其适用于发达国家);2.由于制度不同,不同监管地区的合适资本要求也不相同,在危机中一般新兴市场银行损失更大,因而对其资本要求更高;3.向更高资本要求转变的短期成本要远高于长期成本,因而提高监管标准应循序渐进;4.强化监管可能使市场主体产生更强的监管套利冲动,其行为可以转向较少受监管的影子银行等领域,为此需扩大监管边界。     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验,结果表明,我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险,但对于达不到监管要求的银行,实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平.实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因,资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效.市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化.改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础.     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验，结果表明，我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险，但对于达不到监管要求的银行，实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平。实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因，资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效。市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化。改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础。     

资本约束、激励相容与银行业监管

金融风险可以划分为商业性金融风险和制度性金融风险.制度性金融风险是我国银行业面临的最主要风险,因此银行监管激励相容度是更适合我国国情的概念.在银行发展史上,呈现出两种迥异的银行成长模式:一种是资金约束型的数量成长模式;一种是资本约束型的质量成长模式,资本约束型的质量成长模式是商业银行的必然选择.资本约束机制与激励相容机制共同发挥作用是银行监管激励与约束机制有效运作的必要条件.激励相容和资本约束要以监管绩效为基础协调发挥作用、不可分割.资本约束与激励相容理念不仅体现在理论研究中,而且体现在国际银行业监管实践中.     

货币政策操作需要考虑银行资本监管吗

持续宽松的货币政策与巴塞尔协议下银行资本监管的共同作用,可能是本次美国次贷危机产生和经济持续波动的主因之一。巴塞尔协议下的银行资本监管,较大地改变了信贷资金的流向和经济运行规律,从而必然影响到货币政策发挥作用的基础条件与传导途径。本文结合经济周期对银行资本约束下的IS-LM模型进行了扩展分析,发现银行资本约束会通过影响银行信贷渠道使货币政策产生非对称性效果,从理论上论证了货币政策的操作必须考虑银行资本监管。本文还运用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法检验了2000～2009年我国货币政策与银行资本监管联合效率,表明在引入银行资本监管后货币政策实现经济目标的联合效率下降。因此,为了达到稳定物价与产出的总体目标,在货币政策反应函数中必须考虑银行资本及其监管状况。     

我国银行资本管理的现实问题思考

资本这一概念本身是指所有者的出资，银行资本的功能主要包括四个方面：（1）吸收融资和运营损失，为破产风险提供保护；（2）为新银行提供组织、运营所需资金；（3）提升公正以及存款人对银行的信心，确保银行的财务实力，（4）银行资本的增长应当与贷款以及其他风险资产的增长相匹配，达到监管当局和金融市场的要求。对银行而言，银行资本包含三层基本的含义：监管资本、经济资本和最优资本。     

资本约束、激励相容与银行业监管

金融风险可以划分为商业性金融风险和制度性金融风险。制度性金融风险是我国银行业面临的最主要风险，因此银行监管激励相容度是更适合我国国情的概念。在银行发展史上，呈现出两种迥异的银行成长模式：一种是资金约束型的数量成长模式；一种是资本约束型的质量成长模式，资本约束型的质量成长模式是商业银行的必然选择。资本约束机制与激励相客机制共同发挥作用是银行监管激励与约束机制有效运作的必要条件。激励相容和资本约束要以监管绩效为基础协调发挥作用、不可分割。资本约束与激励相容理念不仅体现在理论研究中，而且体现在国际银行业监管实践中。     

资本监管、风险承担与货币政策传导机制——研究综述与展望

频频爆发的银行危机暴露了以资本监管为核心的巴塞尔协议的内在缺陷,学术界就资本监管的微观效应和宏观效应展开了激烈的讨论.从文献研究的角度,通过回顾和分析理论界关于资本监管、银行风险承担和货币政策传导机制三者之间复杂关系的研究,可以看出,在微观意义上,关于资本监管对银行风险承担行为影响的研究忽视了对资本监管框架效应的分析;在宏观意义上,资本监管的强化给货币政策传导机制带来了新的渠道,即银行资本渠道和风险承担渠道.这两种新的传导机制在后金融危机时代,是研究宏观审慎监管框架下货币政策效应的核心命题.     

Bank spread with uncertain deposit level and risk aversion

This paper derives a model of the banking firm under uncertainty and risk aversion. The selection of the bank's optimal spread between loan and deposit rates is emphasized. The model's results provide some implications for bank asset quality, capital regulation and deposit insurance. For example, it is shown that increases in the level of equity capital tend to increase the bank's spread under DARA. This implies an improvement in bank asset quality. On the other hand, as the deposit supply function becomes more volatile, the bank's spread narrows, which implies a decline in the quality of the bank's assets.     

An Alternative View on Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry

We present an alternative view on regulatory distortions in the banking industry. We use the duopoly model developed by Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (BDM, 2000), where a bank with low monitoring costs faces a bank with high monitoring costs. We show that when the initial level of the capital requirement is low, an increase of the minimum ratio between capital and total assets causes a higher decrease in profits at the bad bank than at the good bank. This finding contrasts with BDM's theorem 1, which predicts that a regulation imposing an identical increase in production costs on both banks will cause a greater loss in profits at the good bank than at the bad bank. We also look at the impact of an increase in the minimum ratio between capital and total assets on the profits of a representative bank in three other competitive environments identified in BDM. We find that the decrease in the representative bank's profit caused by an increase in the capital requirement is larger when the bank faces competition from an unregulated firm than when it faces a regulated competitor or no competitor at all. This result is consistent with BDM's theorem 2.     

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process.     

混合型资本工具与商业银行资本结构优化

资本管理是银行风险管理的核心内容,银行通过资本结构的合理安排,不仅能有效覆盖风险,满足资本监管要求,还能同时提高财务效率。本文结合混合型资本工具的特点及各国监管规定,分析了商业银行的最佳资本结构选择,并提出了我国商业银行的应对策略。     

A theory of bank regulation and management compensation

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratiosmay be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead,a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives,in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentivefeatures of top-management compensation. With this scheme, weshow that bank owners choose an optimal management compensationstructure that induces first-best value-maximizing investmentchoices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize theparameters of the optimal management compensation structureand the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presenceof a single or multiple sources of agency problems.     

资本监管与银行最优资本结构

资本监管已成为现代商业银行监管体系的核心,而现有研究对资本监管的重要性缺乏系统的理论研究。基于此,本文从MM理论出发,逐步分析并得出:银行自身经营的特殊性、银行作为一般企业所追求的企业价值最大化行为以及银行作为特殊企业所得到的银行安全网保护等因素使得银行形成不断提高最优资产负债率和降低资本充足率的内在机制,逐步分析不同情形下的银行最优资本结构,进而说明资本监管对于维系银行经营的稳健性和审慎性以及减少银行破产而导致的负外部性等方面的重要作用。     

The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28.     

建立符合我国国情的存款保险制度的设想

随着我国加入WTO进行的加快,商业银行上市已是大势所趋,日益激烈的竞争加剧了我国金融业的系统性风险。目前商业银行的风险监管和救助主要依靠的中央银行和“最后贷款人”制度,这不利于推进政府市场的金融改革的宏观调控,因此,我国应借鉴发达国家的经验,尽快建立存款保险制度。     

Politics,credit allocation and bank capital requirements

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable.     

On the determinants of bank interest margins under credit and interest rate risks

This paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm-theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion. The model demonstrates how cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank's market power, to the operating costs, to the degree of credit risk, and to the degree of interest rate risk. An increase in the bank's equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk. The effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market. Our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior.