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1.
Corporate cash holdings: Evidence from Switzerland 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Wolfgang Drobetz Matthias C. Grüninger 《Financial Markets and Portfolio Management》2007,21(3):293-324
This paper investigates the determinants of cash holdings for a comprehensive sample of Swiss non-financial firms between
1995 and 2004. The median Swiss firm holds almost twice as much cash and cash equivalents as the median US or UK firm. Our
results indicate that asset tangibility and firm size are both negatively related to corporate cash holdings, and that there
is a non-linear relationship between the leverage ratio and liquidity. Dividend payments and operating cash flows are positively
related to cash reserves, but we cannot detect a significant relationship between growth opportunities and cash holdings.
Most of these empirical findings, but not all of them, can be explained by the transaction costs motive and/or the precautionary
motive. Analyzing the corporate governance structures of Swiss firms, we document a non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and cash holdings, indicating an incentive alignment effect and an opposing effect related to increasing risk aversion.
Finally, our results suggest that firms in which the CEO simultaneously serves as the COB hold significantly more cash.
相似文献
Matthias C. GrüningerEmail: |
2.
This paper examines the relationship between the ability of a firm to sell its real assets and its cash holdings behavior. A substitution effect exists between the size of cash balances and the liquidity of a firm’s real assets when access to external capital markets is limited. Among financially constrained firms, higher asset liquidity is related to lower cash holdings. Additionally for financially constrained firms, the market value of cash is lower for firms with higher asset liquidity. 相似文献
3.
Yimei Man 《Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance》2021,32(1):13-30
In this article, we investigate the link between agency costs (AC) and earnings management (EM) in China. We find a significant and positive relationship between AC and EM based on the static model that suggests opportunistic EM in China. However, we find an insignificant relationship between AC and EM when we use the dynamic model that takes into account the endogeneity issue. Therefore, our results provide further support to the growing literature on the concerns of endogeneity issues in corporate governance studies, since failing to take these into account can lead to spurious results. 相似文献
4.
Narjess Boubakri Sadok El Ghoul Walid Saffar 《Journal of Multinational Financial Management》2013,23(4):338-355
Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak. 相似文献
5.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2020,16(2):100201
This study directly investigates the relationship between the firm’s information environment and its cash holding decision using two separate country-level events as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment: the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws and the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. Analysing a large international sample, we find that firms reduce their cash holdings after both exogenous information shocks. We also find that the reductions are greater for firms facing greater financing constraints and agency issues, and for those for which the informational shocks are stronger. Further analyses reveal a reduction in firms’ average cash savings rate, an increase in performance, an increase in the use of external debt, a decrease in abnormal investment, and an increase in the value of cash holdings. Taken together, our results suggest that an improvement in the information environment mitigates both the adverse selection and moral hazard problems thereby, leading to a reduction in cash reserves held for transaction and precautionary motives, and the likelihood of entrenched managers building large cash balances for private benefit. 相似文献
6.
The most efficient corporate governance structure will vary by firm depending on the costs and benefits of different governance mechanisms. For IPO firms, warrants might act as a substitute for other governance mechanisms ( Schultz, 1993 ). Alternatively, warrants might serve as a signal of high quality, and thus effectively governed, firms ( Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997 ), in which case they would act as a complement to other governance mechanisms. We test these competing hypotheses by examining a sample of unit IPO firms (firms issuing warrants with shares) matched to a comparable sample of shares-only firms and show that warrants act as a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The research is also of interest because it shows an interaction between the financing decisions of firms and their corporate governance that has not been documented previously. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between shareholder protection and corporate cash holdings under the impact of the global financial crisis. With a sample of 192,807 observations across 40 countries during the period 2002–2015, I find that the global financial crisis mitigates the controlling effect of shareholder protection on corporate cash holdings. In addition, this mitigating role is stronger in financially constrained firms. Overall, the results suggest that managers are more likely to expropriate shareholders through corporate liquidity policy during a financial crisis. 相似文献
8.
Kenneth A. Borokhovich Kelly R. Brunarski Yvette Harman James B. Kehr 《The Financial Review》2005,40(1):37-65
We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings. 相似文献
9.
10.
Tirimba Obonyo 《Review of Financial Economics》2023,41(2):136-151
This study investigates how stock liquidity affects the compensation incentives faced by the directors on the board. The results show that the proportion of cash-based compensation in the directors' compensation package increases when the firm's shares are less liquid: a one standard deviation increase in the bid-ask spread from the mean is associated with a 3% larger fraction of cash in the directors' compensation package. The effect is more pronounced for firms whose management does not issue Earnings Per Share (EPS) guidance and for firms whose Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) themselves have higher pay in cash and lower pay in the form of equity. These results suggest the compensation incentives offered to directors in firms with illiquid shares result in the interests of shareholders being less aligned with those of the directors compared with firms with liquid shares. 相似文献