Audit Firm Portfolio Management Decisions

We examine client acceptance and client continuance decisions of a large audit firm to provide empirical evidence on the extent and nature of risk avoidance that the firm uses to purposefully manage its client portfolio. Our results support several key new inferences regarding audit firm portfolio management decisions. First, the results show that this firm is shedding the riskier clients in its portfolio, consistent with the risk avoidance theory of audit firm portfolio management. Second, the results show that the firm's newly accepted clients are less risky than its continuing clients. Although results of both the client continuance and client acceptance decisions imply a less risky portfolio emerging over time, there are greater differences in risk between continuing and discontinued clients than between continuing and newly accepted clients. Third, we find that audit risk factors are more important in audit firm portfolio management decisions than are financial risk factors. Finally, we find no evidence that audit pricing affects the client acceptance and continuance decisions of this firm, controlling for risk and other client characteristics.     

The Role of Risk Management and Governance in Determining Audit Demand

Abstract:  Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of a production function ignoring potential demand forces that may drive the level of the audit fee. Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee. Using data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether audit fees are higher when these demand forces exist. In general, we expect that external auditing will increase in situations where there are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders. Consistent with our theory and expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members. Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as they are voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls.     

The attitude of Libyan auditors to inherent control risk assessment

Previous empirical evidence contradicts the practices of audit risk assessment recommended by the professional auditing standards. Key differences represent the presumption that auditors can readily distinguish between different categories of risk, how they assess such risks in practice, their application to the different account levels and their capacity to differentiate between what may constitute potentially high or low risks. The paper addresses these differences in the context of the Libyan auditors’ perceptions and practices. The nature and development of the audit profession in Libya makes this a good comparator for the US and UK contexts of audit behaviour. Equally importantly, the religious, political and socio-cultural context combined with Libya's role as an emergent economy is representative of many other economies in the world, thus providing a good comparator for assessing the validity and applicability of the established auditing management principles and procedures. One hundred and sixty four practicing auditors in Libya were investigated, initially by questionnaire and subsequently interview of a smaller sample of 20 auditors. The evidence reinforces prior empirical evidence that inherent and control risks are assessed interdependently, auditors are aware of the risk differentials depending on the level of account and are cognizant of factors normally associated with potentially high and low risk levels.     

Code of ethics quality and audit fees

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.     

制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见

客户重要性是否影响审计师独立性,是审计理论界和实务界都非常关注的话题。本文以企业集团作为一个整体来研究集团客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响,发现集团客户经济依赖性会损害审计师的独立性,这种现象对于小规模事务所而言尤为严重。此外,本文还进一步考察了2007年新会计准则、审计准则及事务所民事诉讼风险加强等制度环境变化对审计师行为的影响。研究发现,在制度环境改善之后,审计师执业总体上变得更加谨慎,大规模事务所尤其如此。     

A Framework for Identifying (and Avoiding) Fraudulent Financial Reporting*

This commentary analyzes the relationship of fraud risk assessments to other risk assessments by auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board notes that this is a problem area of current practice. Effective detection of fraudulent financial reporting requires an integrative accounting/auditing conceptual framework. As a result, this paper is as much about accounting theory as it is about auditing. To simplify the development of such an integrated framework, this paper uses an expanded risk model. This effectively results in a risk perspective on fraudulent financial reporting. There are many potential implications but the major findings are as follows. First, the study identifies the crucial role of benchmarks based on acceptable levels of risk to help differentiate between intentional and unintentional misstatements. Such differentiation is critical to successfully implementing the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 and international standards ISA Nos. 240, 540, and 700. Second, the paper shows the importance of not allowing the major categories of risks identified here from getting too high. This paper explains the need to set acceptable levels of these risks, either by standard‐setters as a matter of broad policy, or by individual practitioners as part of the terms of specific engagements. I propose that a major factor in the concept of “present fairly” be the acceptable levels of accounting risks that are defined here, especially the risks due to intentional forecast errors. Third, this paper clarifies how the fraud risk of SAS No. 99, and similar international standards, relates to the current audit risk model framework.     

Empirical Evidence on the Implicit Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships

This study investigates the implicit financial incentives of individual Big 4 audit partners by examining the association between a partner's compensation and characteristics of the audit firm, audit partner, and individual partner clientele for Big 4 firms in Sweden. Using tax and financial data for individual audit partners and clients, our empirical findings indicate that there is significant variation in the implicit determinants that are associated with compensation across the Big 4. We find that audit partners’ compensation is positively associated with the size of their clientele or the number of publicly traded clients, both of which represent revenue‐generating opportunities. Similarly, compensation and developing an industry specialization are positively related. In three firms, gaining clients is clearly related to an increase in compensation, while losing a client is associated with a reduction in partner income in only one firm. We find that audit partner income is more sensitive to performance‐related incentives, such as attracting new clients, as partners progress in their career. Finally, we find evidence that audit failures, proxied by reporting errors related to issuing a going concern opinion, are associated with lower compensation. These results should be of interest to the auditing profession, audit firms, and regulators when they consider the effects of implicit incentives of partner compensation on audit quality.     

Responsiveness of Auditors to the Audit Risk Standards: Unique Evidence from Big 4 Audit Firms

We examine the effect of changes in audit risk standards on the conduct of financial statement audits in a European setting. We investigate this by analysing the audit hours and audit fees for clients of Big 4 audit firms in Finland in 1996 and 2010. Our results show that audit firms became more sensitive to clients’ business risk due to the introduction of the new audit risk standards, with more audit hours allocated to owner-managed companies in 2010 than in 1996, and fewer audit hours allocated to low-risk clients in 2010 than in 1996. Also, the labour mix in the audit team changed for owner-managed companies, with a greater work load carried by junior auditors in 2010 than in 1996. Regarding the price of audit, we find an increase in audit fees for clients with high business risk, while audit fees remained at roughly the same level for low-risk clients. These findings should be of interest to the auditing profession and those involved in the development of auditing regulations.     

Risk-preparedness mechanism and audit quality: Evidence from mandatory increase of professional indemnity insurance and professional risk fund

We examine the risk-preparing benefits of Chinese audit firms’ professional indemnity insurance (PII) and professional risk fund (PRF) by using the Notice on Adjusting the Application Requirement of Audit Firms for Securities Qualifications as an exogenous shock. This policy requires audit firms to raise the sum of the cumulative compensation limit of their PII and PRF from 6 million to 80 million yuan. It is found, first, that the capital market regards this policy revision as a signal to strengthen investor protection and responds positively; client firms with high audit risks have a stronger response. Second, auditors’ governance of financial information has strengthened, resulting in the significant improvement of their clients’ financial reporting quality, with a stronger effect on firms with higher earnings management risk. There is no evidence that audit firms pass the costs on to their clients. Finally, the mismatch between auditors and new client firms is alleviated. We show that in an emerging market with weak investor protection, establishing a sound risk-preparedness mechanism for audit firms and strengthening the capacity for civil compensation ex post greatly improve the adaptive degree between international auditing standards and the legal environment of China, thereby enhancing the overall service quality of the audit market.     

Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors’ risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.     

The effect of strategic and operating turnaround initiatives on audit reporting for distressed companies

Empirical research on the effect of turnaround initiatives on audit reporting is scant. This paper addresses this gap by examining audit reporting for distressed companies and its association with a broad array of strategic and operating turnaround initiatives. In particular, we study the association between business risk information and going-concern decisions for distressed clients. Using a sample of distressed firms in the US manufacturing industry, we find that both short-term cash flow potential as well as strategic growth and hence long-term cash flow potential are necessary for strategic turnaround initiatives to have a mitigating impact on the auditor’s going-concern decision. Strategic turnaround initiatives for which only one of these two conditions holds and operating turnaround initiatives appear to function as going-concern risk factors as they are associated with a higher likelihood that a going-concern opinion will be issued. We also find that specialist and non-specialist auditors assess the mitigating potential of some but not all turnaround initiatives differently. Overall, our results suggest that auditors’ strategic risk assessment (typically done in a business risk auditing context) is associated with the outcome of the audit process (the opinion).     

The effect of non-audit services on client risk, acceptance and staffing decisions

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited auditing firms from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients and left open the possibility that other currently non-prohibited services could also be banned. This prohibition hinges, in part, on regulatory concerns that auditors were willing to accept prospective higher risk clients in order to obtain more profitable non-audit service engagements. Accounting firms rejected this claim. Given the prospect that more non-audit services could be prohibited, we revisit this debate by examining these competing claims in an experiment in which we manipulate risk and the potential to sell non-audit services and then observe the impact of these variables on auditors’ client acceptance and subsequent staffing decisions. Specifically, audit partners received client information and were asked to make an acceptance decision and propose a staffing plan for a potential engagement. We find that a higher (lower) level of risk decreased (increased) the likelihood of acceptance and this relation did not vary with the potential to provide non-audit services. These results do not support the regulators’ claims but are consistent with the firms’ claims. Further, we found that more experienced auditors were assigned to the prospective client whose management had lower integrity. This staffing plan is consistent with a risk adaptation strategy for the client with lower integrity. The prohibition of certain non-audit services has been justified on the grounds that auditors might engage in systematic opportunistic behavior. However, our results do not find such behavior which should inform the current PCAOB deliberation over whether additional services should be banned. Alternatively, different justification must be found for the prohibitions.     

Financial reporting consequences of natural disasters: Evidence from the impact of resource constraints at audit offices on non-affected clients

Disaster-affected clients demand significant additional effort from their audit office, and hence strain the audit office’s resources available to other non-disaster-affected clients. We consider audit offices with disaster-affected clients to be strained offices and find that, compared with clients audited by non-strained audit offices, non-disaster-affected clients audited by strained audit offices are more likely to have their financial statements restated. This result suggests the financial reporting quality of companies not directly exposed to disasters could also be negatively affected by the disasters, due to their auditors’ strained-resource issue. We further find such a negative effect is more pronounced when the degree of resource constraints is greater and when the audit office lacks client experience or industry expertise. We offer novel evidence of financial reporting consequences of natural disasters, focusing on the externality of disasters on companies not directly affected by disasters. The findings have important implications for regulators in making disaster-related policies, for auditors in managing their client portfolios, and for companies in making auditor choice decisions.     

Workforce environment and audit fees: International evidence

Using a dataset from 30 countries over the period from 2002 to 2017, we examine the effects of auditing clients’ workforce environment on audit fees as well as the role that national labor market flexibility plays in this relationship. We find evidence that audit fees are significantly lower for firms with a good workforce environment, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as less risky; as a result, auditors expend less effort and/or charge a lower risk premium. Furthermore, we find this effect to be stronger for firms in countries with a more flexible labor market. Our mediation test results indicate that the relationship between the audit client workforce environment and audit fees is mediated by media coverage of workforce controversies. Our study contributes to the international audit fee literature by identifying employee welfare as a distinct audit pricing factor, above and beyond the effects of overall corporate social responsibility practices.     

The effects of experience and task difficulty on accuracy and confidence assessments of auditors

This study extends prior research in psychology and auditing by examining the effects of audit experience and task difficulty on control risk evaluation. It also examines whether the effect of framing is mitigated by the simultaneous presentation of information. Ninety‐eight auditors performed a control risk evaluation task and recorded their judgement and their confidence. We find that judgement confidence increases with audit experience and that judgement confidence decreases as perceived task difficulty increases. However, we find no relation between audit experience and judgement accuracy or between perceived task difficulty and judgement accuracy. In addition, we find a significant negative relation between judgement confidence and judgement accuracy, which indicates that the participants' confidence is not appropriate. As expected, there is no framing effect when information is presented simultaneously.     

Agency conflicts in co-regulation: Evidence from IPO application screening in China

We examine agency conflicts in co-regulation using the unique data on audit firms with partners serving on the Stock Issuance Examination and Verification Committee (SIEVC), referred to here as SIEVC-connected audit firms, in China. We find that audit firms' SIEVC connection helps enhance the likelihood of their client companies passing SIEVC's IPO screening. We further demonstrate that to trade off opportunistic gains against reputational and legal costs, SIEVC-connected audit firms tend to work with those IPO applicant companies with overall quality no worse than others. Finally, we show that to seek the greatest possible opportunistic gains and reduce reputational and legal costs, SIEVC-connected audit firms strategically choose to work with the IPO applicant companies with good observable quality and poor unobservable quality. Our findings imply that due to agency conflicts, private entities participating in co-regulation tend to seek their own benefits by helping their connected parties obtain resources. In addition, IPO applicant screening on unobservable quality aggravate agency conflicts and induce more opportunistic behavior on the part of private parties participating in co-regulation. While such opportunistic behavior weakens the fairness of resource allocation, it does not reduce the efficiency of resource allocation.     

The Effect of Client Fee Dependence on Audit Independence

This paper examines the effect of client fee dependence on the independence of audit firms. For the largest 25 audit firms for which fee revenue and total revenue could be determined, three research approaches were used to identify whether inappropriate audit opinions are being issued to large-fee clients. All situations identified by an audit opinion prediction model as having a high probability of qualification were duly qualified. It was found that for the top 25 audit firms, the level of fee dependence from any one client was substantially below the level suggested in auditing standards. In summary, the investigation was unable to identify any instances of fee dependence impairing the independence of auditors.     

An analysis of attributes that impact information technology audit quality: A study of IT and financial audit practitioners

The importance of information technology (IT) auditing has grown with increased reliance on IT for business operations and new regulations regarding the assurance of IT for these operations. Prior work on IT and financial auditing has suggested several general frameworks that may affect IT audit quality; however, the prior work has not provided measurable constructs nor has it considered whether these proposed constructs are the same or different. Building on prior work that has proposed frameworks of IT audit quality, we identify and evaluate potential constructs suggested by these frameworks as well as financial auditing literature. We develop a survey tool and ask IT and financial accounting practitioners to assess the impact of these items on IT audit quality. A factor analysis is used to refine the set of IT audit quality factors identified, and we are able to provide insight into the prioritized impact of each factor on IT audit quality. In comparison to prior research, we find that additional factors are significant for IT audit quality and that the relative importance of the factors for IT audit quality differs for IT versus financial auditors.     

The impact of audit firms’ characteristics on audit fees following information security breaches

Given the importance of auditors’ assessing business risks and evaluating internal controls, we investigate whether an audit firm’s industry expertise, tenure, and size can help its auditors better understand external and internal threats faced by the client with less effort. Using reported information security breach incidents from 2004 to 2013, we find that, consistent with prior studies, audit fees are higher after the occurrence of an information security breach. However, such an association is negatively moderated when the audit firm has industry-specific expertise, longer experience with the client, and is one of the Big 4 firms. Our results suggest that because of their better knowledge about a specific industry, increased familiarity with the client’s operations, and more resources to understand a client’s vulnerabilities and/or information security policies and procedures, these auditors are more capable of assessing the potentially changing information security risks implied by the occurrence of information security breach incidents. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.