Optimism and auditor liability

There is strong evidence that individuals are optimistic in the sense that they underrate the probability of a negative event occurring. This paper provides a positive theoretical analysis of how auditor optimism affects their incentives to take care under two liability rules: strict liability and a negligence rule. Under strict liability, auditors are held liable when they cause damages to investors. Under a negligence rule, auditors are held liable when they cause damages and in addition, act negligently, that is, fail to meet the standard of due care specified in legal and professional rules. I find the following results. (1) If due care is sufficiently close to the efficient level, a negligence rule distorts auditors’ incentives less than strict liability. Under strict liability, optimism makes the auditor overestimate the chances of finding material mistakes and thus induces suboptimal care. (2) If due care is too strict, the auditor will not exert due care but the same level of suboptimal care under either liability rule. (3) With increasing optimism and in the absence of punitive damages, strict liability becomes less preferable to a precise negligence rule. This statement also holds for vaguely defined standards of due care if due care is sufficiently strict or if auditor optimism is sufficiently high. (4) Punitive damages counteract suboptimal incentives generated by auditor optimism, especially under strict liability.     

Apportionment in Actions Against Auditors

Auditors are faced with an increasingly litigious environment. There are several options available to them. One is to seek apportionment with either clients or third parties by the application of the tenets of contributory negligence. Applications of this concept of contributory negligence in U.K. and British Commonwealth cases involving auditors are examined in this paper. Finally, there is a discussion of possible future developments of this branch of law as it affects the role and responsibilities of auditors.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

Auditors’ self-perceived abilities in conducting domain audits

This study investigates the extent to which auditors’ ratings of self-perceived abilities correspond with their actual performance, and whether these perceptions are influenced by audit experience and effectiveness when conducting audits within their domain of specialization. One hundred forty-four (144) industry-specialized audit seniors and managers reviewed two sets of audit working paper cases, one in banking and one in healthcare. At the end of the review, the auditors rated their ability to perform an audit in their domain. The analysis of these ratings shows that auditors significantly inflated their perceived abilities relative to actual performance. The results indicate that differences in auditor rank are insignificant in terms of this propensity to overestimate self-perceived abilities relative to actual performance; however, above median effective auditors are far less overconfident than below median effective auditors. These results have implications for the audit profession in terms of training, assignments, performance evaluation, and the use of decision aids to mitigate the propensity toward overconfidence.     

The Court's Power of Discretionary Relief in Actions Against Auditors

Since 1929, successive Companies Acts have empowered the courts to relieve a company auditor, wholly or partly, from liability for negligence having regard to all the circumstances of the case and if the auditor has acted ‘honestly and reasonably’. This power is now contained within section 727 of the Companies Act 1985. By reference to decided cases in the UK and in those Commonwealth countries where similar legislation exists this article reviews the manner in which the courts have interpreted this section and explores the reasons why they have rarely, if ever, chosen to use their powers under this section in favour of auditors.     

Apportionment in Contract Actions: New Zealand's Innovative Approach

Gwilliam (1988a) examined the application of the concept of contributory negligence in U.K. and British Commonwealth cases involving auditors. This paper examines recent developments in New Zealand regarding contributory negligence as a defence in contract. Further, it criticizes Gwilliam's discussion of policy issues and suggests that, for New Zealand and Australia, the fundamental issue is whether apportionment is appropriate for an audit contract. It supports moves to introduce some form of legislation which will limit the liability of auditors.     

Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors?

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high-ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low-ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor's expertise.     

Auditor Reputation Under Different Negligence Regimes

Do auditor reputation effects evolve the same way under precise negligence as under vague negligence? Or are there differences? We assume that investors update their beliefs on unobservable auditor quality when an auditor discloses an inaccurate report. We call this a reputation effect. A necessary condition for reputation effects to occur is that, ex ante, investors expect ‘good’ auditors to take more care than ‘bad’ auditors such that ‘good’ auditors are less likely to issue an inaccurate report. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that wealthier (‘good’) auditors tend to take more care than less wealthy (‘bad’) auditors. We find that under vague negligence, reputation effects will occur, inducing both types of auditor to increase the level of care taken. A ‘good’ auditor is likely to exert excessive care. Then, even in the absence of auditor risk aversion, a (properly defined) liability cap is necessary to induce efficient incentives. A contractual liability cap is preferable to a legally fixed liability cap. Under precise negligence, a ‘good’ auditor will exert the standard of due care. However, a ‘bad’ auditor will also do so if sufficiently wealthy. Consequently, ex ante, investors do not expect different levels of care to be taken or reputation effects to occur. A liability cap is not desirable. This paper highlights the importance of non‐legal sanctions in auditor liability. Finally, it links the ‘reputation’ and ‘deep pocket’ hypotheses, both of which have attempted separately in the past to explain the positive correlation between auditor size and auditor quality.     

Anomalies in the Oversight of Australian Auditors

This commentary identifies and comments on anomalies in the oversight of Australian auditors and audit firms. Regulatory and professional oversight and inspection of Australian auditors and audit firms arise from a number of sources, highlighting its multi‐faceted nature. This makes it impossible to identify a single body with ultimate responsibility for auditor oversight. Three recent Australian reviews commissioned by the Financial Reporting Council, together with an evaluation of the roles of the various regulatory and professional bodies, are used in this commentary as a platform from which to identify a number of significant anomalies in oversight processes. Major anomalies highlighted arise from the overlapping nature of the duties and functions of the various bodies and the variation in oversight across different categories of audit service providers. Policymakers should closely examine the issues raised in the paper if auditor oversight is to be undertaken in an effective and efficient manner.     

How individual auditor characteristics impact the likelihood of audit failure: Evidence from China

Audit failure imposes a severe loss on investors and damages market participants' confidence in financial reporting quality. This study investigates the impacts of individual auditor characteristics on the likelihood of audit failure. Chinese regulators mandate listed firms to disclose the engagement auditors' identity. Furthermore, the information regarding individual auditor characteristics in China is also publicly available. Utilizing this unique setting, we examine the relationship between individual auditor characteristics and the likelihood of audit failure in China during the period from 2000 to 2009. We document that individual auditors with more auditing experience are less likely associated with audit failure. We also find a weaker negative relationship between auditor education level and audit failure. Our study has important implications for both auditors and regulators by shedding lights on the determinants of audit failure and by providing guidance to the human resource management in audit firms.     

Cognitive Styles Of Experienced Auditors In The Netherlands

Cognitive styles of decision makers have been studied by a number of researchers over a period of years. Previous research has investigated cognitive styles in relation to information systems design and decision-making variables generally. Studies of cognitive styles in relation to auditor specific decision-making variables have been less common.This paper investigates cognitive styles of practicing auditors in The Netherlands using two well-known psychometric instruments: the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and the MacDonald AT-20 Tolerance for Ambiguity instrument (AT-20). The AT-20 has been used previously to investigate auditor individual differences in cognitive styles in relation to audit decision-making tasks (Pincus 1990). The MBTI has not been previously used to investigate auditor cognitive styles. The study described in this paper involved subjects from three auditing firms in The Netherlands. Subjects were presented with an audit case and asked to come to a decision about materiality. Information in the form of financial statements and other financial information was presented to the subjects via a computer program. The subjects selected the information they wanted to view by choosing an item on a menu. The sequence in which they selected information and the amount of time expended in viewing each page of information were recorded by the computer program. After the subjects finished the case, they were asked to complete the two cognitive style instruments (i.e. MBTI and AT-20).Results indicate that there is a preference for Sensing among subjects as measured by the MBTI. This finding is consistent with previous research using the MBTI which indicates that accountants and auditors generally have a preference for the Sensing type of information acquisition. Some differences between auditing firms were observed in regard to cognitive styles and information search variables.     

Auditors’ scepticism in response to audit committee oversight behaviour

We use two experiments and a survey to examine how audit committee (hereafter, AC) oversight behaviour, particularly AC sceptical attitude and proactive behaviour, affects auditor scepticism, and whether the influence is driven by the risk aspect of auditors’ assessment of AC oversight behaviour. We find that when ACs exercise insufficient scepticism, auditors (junior auditors, managers, and partners) perceive AC oversight as weak, and increase their scepticism. However, AC proactive behaviour does not significantly influence auditor scepticism. Our findings suggest auditors view weak AC oversight as a risk indicator and respond by exercising greater scepticism.     

External auditors' willingness to rely on the work of internal auditors: The influence of work style and barriers to cooperation

The extent to which external auditors rely on the work of internal auditors is an important judgment. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has recommended that external auditors “rely (more) on the work of others” to reduce the greater-than-expected costs associated with compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Reliance decisions, however, are complex decision tasks that require professional judgment and may be influenced by a number of factors, both external (environmental) and internal (cognitive and affective), including the auditors' working style and pervious experiences related to barriers to external/internal auditor cooperation (e.g., previously experienced low versus high internal auditor objectivity and/or competence). We experimentally examine these influences in our research reported herein. Consistent with expectations, external auditors' work styles significantly influenced the extent of planned audit testing, internal auditor reliance judgments, and interpretation of analytical procedures results. Auditors' perceptions about internal auditors' competence and objectivity, developed over years of interaction, also influenced these judgments, and interacted with work styles. Inconsistent with expectations, auditor rank (senior versus manager) did not influence judgments.     

Auditor Selection: What Influences Decisions by Listed Companies?

Major business failures, including Enron and World Com in the United States and Harris Scarfe and HIH in Australia, and related alleged audit failures, have put the choice of auditor on the agenda. The choice of the "right" auditor has economic consequences for an auditee and implications for corporate governance. This paper discusses factors important to explaining auditor choice, including institutional factors (pertaining to the auditee and auditor) and newer emerging criteria as well as networking between directors and auditors. The paper discusses the relevant research and the policy implications for good corporate governance of auditor choice in publicly listed companies.     

Internal auditors’ use of interpersonal likability,arguments, and accounting information in a corporate governance setting

Internal auditors play an important role in influencing managers’ judgments. Yet, the practitioner literature indicates that, because internal audit lacks the client services incentives of external audit, internal auditors often adopt a “policeman approach” that can lead to negative interpersonal relationships with managers. We investigate three variables fundamental to internal auditors’ ability to influence managers: (1) internal auditors’ interpersonal likability, (2) the information used to support their positions, and (3) whether they present that information in a thematically organized argument. We find that managers agree more with an internal auditor who is both likable and uses a thematically organized argument. We find further that this joint effect occurs regardless of whether the internal auditor’s information is relatively supportive or unsupportive of his position. Overall, our theory and findings suggest that an internal auditor can achieve agreement from managers on important corporate governance issues with this fairly straightforward presentation tactic, even when the underlying information is relatively unsupportive and managers otherwise tend not to agree with the internal auditor’s position. Our study contributes to accounting, psychology, and writing and discourse theories with new evidence of the effects of an argument structure (holding the underlying information constant) on users’ judgments, and how those effects depend on the likability of the source of information. Our findings have important implications for internal auditors, managers, external auditors, and others interested in corporate governance.     

Auditors and the post-2002 litigation environment

In the wake of the disclosure of Enron and WorldCom and other dramatic financial reporting frauds, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was passed on July 30, 2002. Thus, 2002 was a watershed year for auditors. Audits performed after the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley began to be reflected in litigation filed in 2003. Analysis of 1169 lawsuits filed between 2001 and 2008 finds that auditor litigation severity decreased in the lawsuits filed after 2002. Analysis of a reduced sample of 1017 lawsuits – where dollar resolution amounts are available – shows that the magnitude of auditor dollar resolution amounts decreased in the lawsuits filed after 2002. Thus, auditor liability risk decreased after 2002.     

Government and managerial influence on auditor switching under partial privatization

We investigate how auditor switching is affected by government influence, misalignment between type of auditor (government vs. private) and type of controlling shareholder (government vs. private), and misalignment between an incumbent auditor and imputed preferences of managers in a market characterized by continued substantial government ownership in listed entities. We exploit a natural policy and regulatory experiment in Iran that allows us to investigate what happens when previously government-owned entities are partially privatized as listed entities where, in many cases, the government retains significant ownership interests. At the same time, there were significant changes in the audit market, resulting in large increases in the number of private sector auditors competing for previously state-administered audits. We find the likelihood of auditor switches is strongly associated with measures of misalignment between type of auditor and type of controlling shareholder and auditor–managerial misalignment, but these associations are constrained by significant government influence. Exposing the constraining effect of significant government influence on auditor switching is an important contribution to our understanding of privatizations, government shareholder influence and auditor choice. These results have implications for policy development in other emerging and transition economies where privatization remains largely partial, and competition among private sector auditors is still emergent.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Intersections of law and accountancy: Unlimited auditor liability in the United Kingdom

In recent years, considerable pressure has grown within the British auditing industry for limitation of liability arising from negligent mis-statements in audit reports. Under British company law, auditors are forbidden from contracting with companies for their liability to be restricted. This legal provision was introduced in the Companies Act 1929 as a byproduct of legislation relating to directors' liability. The paper explores the background to this legal provision, observing that auditor liability cannot be viewed as a self-contained matter of interest only to a limited community. Attitudes to auditor liability have been shaped against a background of changes in the law of negligence, some, but by no means all, arising from cases involving auditors. Moreover, changing concepts of the position of the auditor within corporate governance structures have at different times encouraged and discouraged the assimilation of the legal treatments of auditors and directors. These concepts themselves reflect differing notions of what actually constitutes the “company”: a collectivity of shareholders or a separate entity controlled by directors. These notions emerged against a background of corporate failure and the need to allocate losses among various parties with different degrees of culpability for failure. However, legal developments do not account by themselves for changing attitudes within the auditing industry towards unlimited liability; acceptance of full responsibility for one's statements, adopted as a badge of professional status, has more recently been seen as inhibiting the commercial development of British auditing.     

The Royal Mail Case: A Legal Analysis

This paper examines the legal issues raised in the celebrated Royal Mail Case and the implications of the case for the practice today. It is argued, contrary to the literature, that the case was not about the utilization of secret reserves, but about the non-disclosure of repayments by the Inland Revenue of overprovisions for tax and that defence counsel for the auditor succeeded because of the weak factual case presented by the prosecution. The paper then argues that whilst the factual basis of the prosecution's case was extremely weak, they had missed three fundamental points: the going concern concept, the materiality concept, and the point at which an overprovision for taxation should be recognized. Various minor issues in the case are also analysed, together with the effect they had on the outcome of the case. The implications of the case are then examined and in particular, the duties of auditors where compliance with statutory disclosure provisions conflicts with the requirement to show a true and fair view and whether cases involving technical accounting issues should be heard by specialist judges and assessors.