基于二阶段动态博弈的基金竞赛行为理论证明

本文旨在运用二阶段动态博弈模型从理论上诠释基金竞赛行为的存在。结果显示输家与赢家之间相对风险大小与年中双方收益率差距的大小相关,调整风险行为决定与管理者之间的业绩差距,当业绩差距相对较高时,输家为追赶赢家会选择风险高的投资策略来获得业绩的相对优势,当业绩差距相对较低时,赢家为防止优势地位的丧失会选择比输家风险更大的投资策略;投资者选择行为的变化导致基金经理的投资策略、风险调整行为发生巨大的变化,并且投资者对基金业绩、排名的反向选择行为导致在正向选择行为下将会出现的输家相对于赢家的增加风险行为消失。     

基金过去的业绩会影响未来的风险选择吗

当基金的业绩表现较差时，基金经理是否会加大基金投资组合的风险呢？本文以Hsiu—lang Chen和George G．Pennacchi的基金经理组合投资模型为基础，分析我国基金业绩对基金投资组合风险的影响。从这一模型来看，基金过去的业绩排名并不一定会影响基金未来的风险选择，过去业绩表现较差的基金也不一定会倾向干增加基金投资组合的风险。另外，本文的实证结果也支持这一结论。随后本文又采用Logit模型来分析影响基金风险选择的因素，结果发现：基金经理从业年限越长、基金申购费和赎回费越低、基金资产净值越大以及基金成立时间越短，基金经理越倾向干在基金业绩表现不好时增加基金的投资组合风险。     

基金业绩排名与基金经理的冒险行为

本文利用2005-2010年间开放式股票型和混合型基金的数据,研究年度基金业绩排名对基金经理冒险行为的影响。与相对业绩排名激励机制会导致基金经理过度冒险的假设相一致,本文发现,年中业绩排名靠后的基金经理(输家)在下半年提高所持有资产组合的风险的程度要大于年中业绩排名靠前的基金经理(赢家)。进一步研究发现,基金经理提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险并不能显著提高下半年基金的业绩。特别是在熊市中,提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险反而显著降低了基金下半年的业绩。     

相对业绩排序对我国开放式基金风险调整行为的影响

本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响.结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家凋高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市.     

相对业绩排序对我国开放式基金风险调整行为的影响

本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响。结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家调高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市。     

证券投资基金经理投资能力的评价

基金评价主要考察的是基金所管理资产的经营情况,一般应包括投资收益、投资风险和基金经理的投资能力三方面内容。投资收益衡量的是资产的保值和增值情况;投资风险衡量的是投资收益的波动情况;而能否在承担最小风险的基础上获得最大的投资收益则是由基金经理的投资能力决定的,基金经理投资能力是基金绩效的决定因素,基金业绩的好坏与基金经理水平高下有直接关系,同时基金经理的投资理念和投资策略还会影响到基金的投资风格。所以说,基金经理投资能力代表了基金的业绩水平,选择基金也就是选择基金经理,当然我们这里所说的基金经理是个宽泛的概念,是指管理基金的整个决策团体。事实上,即使是个体的基金经理对所管理基金的影响也是非常巨大的,优秀的基金经理通常是投资者选择该只基金的重要原因,而基金经理的更换也会导致基金投资者的相应变化。一、证券投资基金经理的投资能力对证券投资基金在一个投资行为周期而言,证券投资基金经理投资能力主要包括以下几方面1.收益-风险搭配能力。也就是所谓的分散化程度。分散化程度既是证券投资基金管理人在进行证券选择和时机选择时要考虑的因素之一,又是两种选择直接造成的结果,它反映了证券投资基金因承担可分散风险而获得的相应收益(损失)。...     

基金业绩如何影响风格漂移和经理离职?——理论与经验分析

本文通过一个两期模型,刻画了基金业绩如何通过影响市场信念,进而影响基金风格漂移和基金公司的解雇行为。若上期基金业绩很好,基金经理就会在乐观的自我能力预期下,完全按照自己的判断选择基金投资风格;若上期业绩一般,基金经理会因为调整成本而不太愿意切换投资风格;而若上期业绩很差导致自我能力预期悲观,基金经理就宁愿模仿上期绩优基金的投资风格。综合起来,基金风格漂移将随上期基金业绩呈现出显著的U型关系。进一步,因为业绩很差的基金经理会采取模仿策略,因此在市场风格发生切换时更有可能发生基金经理解雇事件。此外,本文基于中国开放式基金的季度数据,检验了风格漂移与滞后一期基金业绩之间的关系,经验证据稳健地支持了理论分析的各种结论。     

我国基金家族风险调整行为的实证研究

本文选取我国2008年12月31日之前成立的偏股型基金，研究了2006年1月1日至2009年12月31日期间，基金家族内部基金经理根据每年前期家族内部业绩排名而对后期风险进行调整的行为,发现在基金家族内部前7个月排名靠后的基金，后期会显著增大投资组合风险，说明我国基金家族内部存在基金竞赛，即前期排名靠后的基金经理后期倾向于选择高风险高收益的投资组合。进一步研究发现,这种风险选择行为与基金家族的大小呈正相关关系，即大家族内部基金竞赛行为更显著。     

火竞赛观点探讨基金经理人的风险调整行为

竞赛假说将共同基金的市场环境比喻为一项持续、激烈的年度竞赛.本文探讨定期绩效评估系统对于基金经理人所持投资组合风险调整的影响,以检验其是否具有自利性风险调整的行为倾向.研究结果发现:国内基金市场的竞争日趋激烈,基金公司数目日益增加,业绩相对较差的基金经理人有加大风险调整比率的倾向.此外,新基金对投资风险的调整程度,会比老基金来得大.     

基于基金经理更换的激励约束效应研究

本文以2005年至2009年为样本期,考察了基金业绩和内部治理机制在基金经理更换中的作用,以及更换后业绩和投资行为的变化。研究发现:业绩能够较好解释基金经理降职,但对升职解释不足。基金经理升职后,继任经理会改变投资风格,从而使得业绩能够保持;而降职之后,继任经理的投资风格和资产配置都发生了显著的变化,从而使得基金业绩在不增加投资组合风险的前提下得以改善。股权较为分散、股东间有效制衡的基金公司旗下的基金经理更容易被更换,但董事会制度与基金经理更换不尽相关。同时中资基金经理更换机制不如合资基金有效。所以,基金经理更换是一种较为有效但尚不完善的激励机制。     

基金业绩归因与投资者行为

本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。     

Dynamic preferences for popular investment strategies in pension funds

In this paper, we characterize dynamic investment strategies that are consistent with the expected utility setting and more generally with the forward utility setting. Two popular dynamic strategies in the pension funds industry are used to illustrate our results: a constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) strategy and a life-cycle strategy. For the CPPI strategy, we are able to infer preferences of the pension fund’s manager from her investment strategy, and to exhibit the specific expected utility maximization that makes this strategy optimal at any given time horizon. In the Black–Scholes market with deterministic parameters, we are able to show that traditional life-cycle funds are not optimal to any expected utility maximizers. We also prove that a CPPI strategy is optimal for a fund manager with HARA utility function, while an investor with a SAHARA utility function will choose a time-decreasing allocation to risky assets in the same spirit as the life-cycle funds strategy. Finally, we suggest how to modify these strategies if the financial market follows a more general diffusion process than in the Black–Scholes market.     

Does Sentiment Explain Closed-end Fund Discounts? Evidence from Bond Funds

This paper documents that discounts and premia on closed-end bond funds exhibit the same sensitivity to broad market returns as stock fund discounts. Despite this, stock funds sell on average at discounts from net asset value while bond funds sell at small premia. This pattern calls into question the conclusion that the average level of the discount rate can be rationalized by appealing to the systematic nature of discount risk. These results indicate that appeals to investor sentiment, which have been hypothesized as a source of fund discounts, do not fully resolve the puzzle of closed-end fund discounts.     

我国QDII基金经理的选股择时能力研究

本文选取2009年前成立的8只QDII基金为研究样本,以2009年和2010年的周度数据为基础,采用TM和CL模型对QDII基金经理的选股能力和择时能力进行实证分析。实证结果表明,我国QDII基金经理的选股择时能力不具有持续性。2009年有较强的选股能力和择时能力,2010年有一定的选股能力,但是缺乏择时能力。进一步分析,QDII基金经理的选股择时能力的显著性都不强。     

Target-Bequest Investment and Insurance Fund

We propose a new type of investment fund, a Target-Bequest Fund (TBF), for which the manager of the fund invests to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal, specified by the investor. We assume the fund pays dividends at a rate proportional to the value of the fund, with the proportion also specified by the investor. In addition to considering this basic fund, we propose two extensions. The first extension is to impose a no-borrowing constraint. Indeed, unless the investment fund is a hedge fund, it will likely not allow the manager to invest more in the risky asset than is available in the fund, so this constraint is a realistic one. The second extension is to allow the fund manager to buy life insurance to help reach the bequest goal. We consider both extensions in the special case for which the proportional dividend rate is less than or equal to the riskless rate of return. Our focus is to obtain explicit solutions in a simplified market and insurance setting to give actuaries implementing this fund design some rules-of-thumb for investing in a financial market and buying life insurance in more realistic settings. We fully expect these rules-of-thumb to be generally valid in those more realistic settings.     

Optimal Control of DC Pension Plan Management under Two Incentive Schemes

Since the late 1990s, a performance fee arrangement has been approved as a managerial incentive in direction contribution (DC) pension plan management to motivate managers. However, the fact that managers may take undue risk for the larger performance fees and thus reduce members’ utility has been a subject of debate. As such, this study investigates the optimal risk-taking policies of DC pension fund managers under both the single management fee scheme and a mixed scheme with a lower management fee, as well as an additional performance fee. The analytical solutions are derived by using the duality method and concavification techniques in a singular optimization problem. The results show the complex risk-taking structures of fund managers and recognize the win-win situation of implementing performance-based incentives in DC pension plan management. Under the setting of geometric Brownian motion asset price dynamics and constant relative risk aversion utility, the optimal risk investment proportion shows a peak-valley pattern under the mixed scheme. Further, the manager gambles for gain when fund wealth is low and time to maturity is short. As opposed to the existing literature, this study found that the risk-taking policy is more conservative when fund wealth is relatively large. Furthermore, the utilities of the manager and members could both be improved by appropriately choosing the performance fee rate.     

Does Motivation Matter When Assessing Trade Performance? An Analysis of Mutual Funds

We relate the performance of mutual fund trades to their motivation.A fund manager who buys stocks when there are heavy investoroutflows is likely to be motivated by the belief that the stocksare significantly undervalued. In contrast, when there are heavyinflows, the manager is likely to be motivated to work off excessliquidity by buying stocks. Our analysis reveals that managersmaking purely valuation-motivated purchases substantially beatthe market but are unable to do so when compelled to investexcess cash from investor inflows. A similar, but weaker, patternis found for stocks that are sold. (JEL G11, G29)     

Mutual Fund Managers’ Prior Work Experience and Their Investment Skill

This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund managers’ past professional backgrounds and their portfolio performance using Chinese mutual fund data from 2003 to 2016. We focus on managers with prior work experience either as industry analysts or as macroanalysts. We hypothesize that managers who worked as industry analysts exhibit superior stock picking skills, while managers with a background as macroanalysts time the market better. These hypotheses are supported by the data after controlling for observable fund and manager characteristics. Bootstrap analyses suggest that a significant difference in performance between these two types of managers cannot be attributed purely to luck.     

“强者”一定“恒强”吗？——来自中国股票型公募基金动量效应研究的新发现

以2014-2018年中国股票型公募基金市场为样本，改进基金动量组合构造方法，并提出中国公募基金市场“新动量效应”。研究发现：传统动量效应稳健性较差并存在较高“动量崩溃”风险，而剔除历史上表现“最好”的基金，则可以显著提高动量组合收益稳健性;同时，“新动量因子”具有更加稳健的股票横截面定价能力；最后，从“投资者关注”和“处置效应”两个角度，对“新动量因子”存在机制作出了理论解释。     

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry

We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.