Limited attention,share repurchases,and takeover risk

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.     

The Industry Effects Regarding the Probability of Takeovers

This study attempts to determine whether an acquisition announcement signals potential gains to the corresponding industry rivals of the target, and whether these gains can be explained by industry-specific and rival firm-specific factors that reflect the likelihood of a takeover. The research finds that the valuation effects of the target, combined acquirer and target, and industry rivals of the target are positive and significant. The mean valuation effects per corresponding industry are significantly related to industry-specific characteristics that reflect the probability of a takeover. Specifically, industries characterized as having a higher level of free cash flow, a higher level of tangible assets, and a smaller market value experience a more favorable revaluation. A supplemental analysis of the individual rival firms is also conducted, since the variation in the valuation effects between rival firms within each of the industries is distinctly different from the variation of mean industry effect across industries. The analysis of the individual rivals finds that the same rival-specific variables are significant and in the same direction as the analysis of the industry-specific variables. In addition, the valuation effects of individual rivals are also inversely related to their previous performance. Overall, the results suggest that industry-specific and rival firm-specific characteristics that reflect a higher probability of a takeover are important in explaining acquisition gains and motivation.     

Inherited or earned? Performance of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe

In this study, using a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-difference techniques, we investigate the impact of foreign bank ownership on the performance and market power of acquired banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach allows us to control for a selection bias as larger but less profitable banks were more likely to be acquired by foreign investors. We show that during 3 years after takeover, banks become more profitable owing to cost minimization and better risk management. They also gained market share due to passing their lower cost of funds to borrowers in terms of lower lending rates. Previous studies failed to note the improvements in the performance of takeover banks because they did not account for the selection bias.     

银行在公司控制权市场中的作用研究——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以我国上市公司中26例最为接近市场收购行为的要约收购作为样本,实证检验了我国银行贷款强度对公司成为收购目标的可能性和收购成功率的影响。研究发现,银行贷款强度与公司成为收购目标的可能性和收购成功率之间呈显著负相关关系。这一结果的政策含义在于,随着我国资本市场的完善,银行可以通过控制权市场加强对公司的治理。     

The Economics of Law Enforcement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Corporate Takeover Law

This paper examines the impact of takeover law enforcement on corporate acquisitions. We use the European Takeover Directive as a natural experiment, which harmonizes takeover law across countries, while leaving its enforcement to the discretion of individual countries. We exploit this heterogeneity in enforcement quality across countries in a difference-in-differences-in-differences model, while employing an overall inductive research approach, following Karpoff and Whittry's (2018) recommendation. We find that acquirer returns increase in countries with improvements in takeover law, driven by better target selection and lower cost of financing. The increase in acquirer returns is lower in weak enforcement jurisdictions, which we identify by developing a novel Takeover Law Enforcement Index (TLEI). The findings show that takeover law can mitigate agency conflicts, but its true value depends on its enforcement. Our results are strongly robust to alternative model specifications.     

Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

Predicting European Takeover Targets

This article extends the Palepu (1986) acquisition likelihood model by incorporating measures of a technical nature, e.g. momentum, trading volume as well as a measure of market sentiment. We use the proposed model to predict takeover targets in a large sample of European and cross‐border merger and acquisition deals and validate its performance on an in‐ and out‐of‐sample basis. The robustness of the proposed model is investigated across several dimensions. In addition we explore the ability of the model to form the basis of successful takeover timing investment strategies. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that the proposed model predicts European takeover targets with relatively high accuracy and is able to determine portfolios that earn significant returns which are not explained by conventional risk factors.     

What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers: Cost of capital,agency problems,or the means of payment?

How is a takeover bid financed and what is its impact on the expected value creation of the takeover? An analysis of the sources of transaction financing has been largely ignored in the takeover literature. Using a unique dataset, we show that external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are in fact quite distinct. Acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with debt. The takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. The choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing also depends on the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment.     

The Diversification and Cost Effects of Interstate Banking

This study examines recent interstate bank geographic diversification inside the United States. More than 80 holding companies that gradually evolved into interstate banking companies were tested for significant linkages to risk and efficiency indicators. The study finds that while geographic expansion frequently is associated with increases in risk, when banking firms were grouped by threshold levels of geographic diversification more highly diversified interstate banks appear to achieve reductions in risk exposure and operating costs. The study's results suggest the spread of interstate banking may change the industry's risk and cost profile significantly with profound implications for the future of the deposit insurance fund.     

The role of lockups in takeover contests

We examine breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contests. Unless bidding costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree of competition and ensure the efficient allocation of the target to the highest‐valued buyer in a takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the target firm to subsidize entry of a new bidder at the expense of an incumbent bidder. Stock lockups induce too much competition when offered to a second bidder and too little competition when offered to a first bidder. Despite their socially wasteful properties, target management would favor stock lockups, as they induce takeover competition at least cost to the target.