盈余管理基本理论及其研究述评

本文除分析了盈余管理的一般定义外 ,着重从“经济收益观”和“信息观”两个角度研究了盈余管理的含义 ,并明确提出了盈余管理的五个基本特征。在此基础上 ,本文透过对现代企业存在的“契约磨擦”和“沟通磨擦”分析 ,提出契约磨擦和沟通磨擦是盈余管理存在的两个基本条件。此外 ,本文还讨论了盈余管理实证研究的内容、深远意义和目前存在的问题。     

国内盈余管理的研究综述

一、盈余管理的实证研究成果 西方大量文献对于盈余管理动机的考察集中在以下三个方面:(1)基于会计盈余数据的契约动机;(2)资本市场动机;(3)迎合或规避政府监管的动机.第一种动机一般集中在管理者的薪酬契约和债务契约两方面,即管理者通过盈余管理来增加自己的报酬或降低债务违约的可能性;第二种动机主要表现在上市公司通过盈余管理影响公司股价、迎合分析师或管理者自己的预测;第三种动机主要表现为回避行业监管和反托拉斯监管.     

基于递延所得税费用的盈余管理市场反应研究

以往的学术研究成果表明,上市公司在报酬契约、代理人竞争、债务契约、收费管制和税收管制等许多领域存在着盈余管理行为。但是管理层的这种盈余管理行为必须以投资者不能识别为前提,否则这种盈余管理行为就将是无意义的。本文基于递延所得税费用采用了回归分析法对上市公司盈余管理的市场反映问题进行了实证检验,研究结果表明:投资者并不能识别上市公司的盈余管理行为。     

国内盈余管理的研究综述

一、盈余管理的实证研究成果西方大量文献对于盈余管理动机的考察集中在以下三个方面:(1)基于会计盈余数据的契约动机;(2)资本市场动机;(3)迎合或规避政府监管的动机。第一种动机一般集中在管理者的薪酬契约和债务契约两方面,即管理者通过盈余管理来增加自己的报酬或降低债务违约的可能性;第二种动机主要表现在上市公司通过盈余管理影响公司股价、迎合分析师或管理者自己的预测;第三种动机主要表现为回避行业监管和反托拉斯监管。在上述三大动机之中,我国对第一个方面的研究相当缺乏。这一现象的产生与中国特殊的制度背景不无关系。在我国经…     

关联担保、被担保企业的盈余特征与担保企业的债务契约

本文从担保视角考察了被担保企业的盈余特征对担保企业债务契约的影响,以及双方的关联关系在其中的作用。实证检验发现,被担保企业盈余质量越高,担保企业获取的债务契约越有利,银行能够部分识别被担保企业的盈余信息,盈余信息对银行是有利用价值的。进一步研究发现,当担保双方具有关联关系时,被担保企业的盈余特征与担保企业的债务契约之间的关系会弱化,关联关系事实上部分替代了企业盈余特征所起到的信息作用。     

新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理实证研究

盈余管理是会计界研究的焦点问题,但对盈余管理的研究大多集中于盈余管理的理论、动机、手段等方面,研究方法主要以规范研究为主,盈余管理实证研究较少。基于此,本文在新会计准则实施的背景下,以我国所有上市公司为研究样本,验证和分析了新旧会计准则下我国上市公司盈余管理水平的差异以及新会计准则下我国上市公司的盈余管理途径。     

企业声誉与盈余管理:有效契约观还是寻租观

企业盈余管理行为从根本上反映了会计契约未得到有效执行,本文研究了作为契约执行机制之一的声誉机制对企业盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,对于实施了正向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉能够显著抑制这种盈余管理行为,而对于实施了负向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉却能够显著增加这种盈余管理行为。这表明,拥有良好声誉的企业对外报告了更加稳健的盈余信息,符合声誉机制的有效契约观。进一步研究发现,企业声誉对盈余管理的影响是通过高质量审计师的选聘和有效内部控制的实施来实现的。     

公司治理结构、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文在新《资产减值准则》的研究框架下,结合公司治理理论,对我国上市公司的公司治理特征、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回相互关系进行了实证分析。本文以2001年至2004年所有A股上市公司为样本,实证研究发现:(1)董事会和总经理两职合一、管理层薪酬外部竞争优势弱化、未设置独立审计委员会的公司越倾向于长期资产减值转回进行盈余管理;(2)具有扭亏动机、配股动机的公司越倾向进行长期资产减值转回,具有大清洗动机和利润平滑动机的公司越倾向长期资产减值不转回;(3)未来收益能力和经济环境不影响长期资产减值转回。文章还对政府经济管理部门、上市公司监管部门、上市公司利益相关者及上市公司管理层提出了建议。     

新会计准则下上市公司盈余管理实证研究

盈余管理是会计界研究的焦点问题，但对盈余管理的研究大多集中于盈余管理的理论、动机、手段等方面，研究方法主要以规范研究为主，盈余管理实证研究较少。基于此，本文在新会计准则实施的背景下．以我国所有上市公司为研究样本，验证和分析了新旧会计准则下我国上市公司盈余管理水平的差异以及新会计准则下我国上市公司的盈余管理途径。     

盈余管理的动机和手段探析

盈余管理是企业财务管理的一个重要内容,也是实证会计理论研究的一个重点。西方国家有关盈余管理的研究已经有20年的历史了,我国这方面的研究起步较晚。纵观国内外目前的学术研究,盈余管理主要存在着“经济收益观”和“信息观”两种不同的看法。加拿大会计学家Scott所持的是狭义的“经济收益观”,即盈余管理是会计政策选择具有经济后果的一种具体体现,只要企业经理人有选择不同会计政策的自由,他们必定会选择使其效用最大化或使企业市场价值最大化的会计政策(William R.Scott,FinancialAccountingTheory),它主要是针对会计盈余或利润的控…     

CEO权力、董事会稳定性与盈余管理

基于CEO和董事会相对权力的视角,研究了CEO权力和董事会稳定性对盈余质量的影响。研究发现,CEO权力越大,上市公司盈余管理程度越高;而稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。区分企业产权性质后发现,上述研究结论主要体现在民营企业中。进一步研究发现,CEO任期较短时,CEO相对董事会的权力较小,稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。但随着CEO任期的增长,CEO相对于董事会的权力越强,董事会并不能有效监督CEO操纵盈余管理行为。     

Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective

Earnings management has been cast into negative light due to the recent corporate scandals and, therefore, is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Enron and Worldcom represent two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. However, some argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public. We offer agency theory as a tool to distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management. The empirical evidence suggests that firms where earnings management occurs to a larger (less) extent suffer less (more) agency costs. Moreover, a positive relation is documented between firm value and the extent of earnings management. Taken together, the results reveal that earnings management is, on average, not detrimental.     

股权质押、盈余管理与审计师风险应对

基于2007—2018年我国A股1109家上市公司的数据,研究大股东股权质押、真实盈余管理与审计师风险应对之间的关系,探究真实盈余管理程度是否增强了大股东股权质押与审计师风险应对的正向关系。研究发现:大股东股权质押正向影响了审计费用和审计意见;真实盈余管理程度加剧了大股东股权质押后的负面效果,进而加强了大股东股权质押与审计费用间的正向关系,但对审计意见的影响不显著;进一步的研究发现:上期的审计费用反向助长了当期的股权质押率;存在大股东股权质押的上市公司,审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率会随审计费用的提高而加大。该结论扩展了审计师风险应对的研究范围及影响大股东股权质押的其他因素,对提高审计师风险应对及完善大股东股权质押政策具有一定的参考价值。     

Discussion of “Why are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation”

The Dechow et al. paper (2003, this issue) on the distribution of earnings raises an important question: why are earnings kinky? They conduct a number of tests of the earnings management explanation and do not find supportive evidence. They also provide evidence that a number of factors influence the magnitude of the discontinuity in earnings, suggesting that it is a poor proxy for the extent of earnings management. This discussion addresses the contribution of their study, the power of their tests and the implications for future research.     

The impact of abnormal real earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks on future operating performance

Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), this study investigates the association between firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings, last year's earnings) and subsequent operating performance. We examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms' future performance for the period 2009 to 2015 for UK firms. Our analysis shows that the manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significantly positive consequence for firms' subsequent operating performance and signals firms' good future performance. We also find that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.     

The dynamic of financial crises and its non-monotonic effects on earnings quality

Despite the wealth of research examining earnings quality and earnings management, we still have much to learn about the effects of macroeconomic factors on accounting discretion’s decisions; the recent financial crises may be one of such factors. Nevertheless, the extant literature is inconclusive about the direction of the relationship between earnings quality and economic downturn. In this study, we focus on the extent to which organizational survival may be an objective of earnings management. In this manner, we add to research considering earnings target as an objective of earnings manipulation. Furthermore, our results suggest that these objectives likely change as crisis becomes worse. Consequently, we argue that the relationship between financial crises and earnings management is non-monotonic. Earnings management decreases when the intensity of the crisis is low, while it increases when the crisis is acute.     

Audit pricing, quality of earnings and board independence: The case of the Athens stock exchange

Prior research has pointed to the importance of the determinants of audit pricing. This paper examines empirically the effect of both audit independence and earnings management on the audit pricing by companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. This test is performed in an institutional setting with excessive earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms. The results based on a sample of 97 Greek companies for a five-year period (2000-2004), show that there is a positive association between audit independence and auditing pricing. Our results also indicate a positive association between audit pricing and earnings management for the small size companies. Taken together our results suggest that strong governance is related to increased needs for quality assurance services and that the relation between earnings management and audit pricing might indicate potential red flags. Finally, limitations, suggestions for further research and policy implications for regulatory agencies are offered.     

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility – and subsequent costs – of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.     

Acquirers’ earnings management ahead of stock-for-stock bids in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets

The accounting literature has found evidence that acquirers in stock-for-stock M&A have typically managed earnings upwards ahead of a bid. Other literatures have concluded that, when stock prices are high and rising, M&A is higher, more M&A is financed with stock, market sentiment and stockholders’ perceptions of information appear to change, and in these circumstances new (arbitrage) motivations for M&A emerge. This paper revisits earnings management ahead of M&A in the light of these findings, comparing experience in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets. It finds that such earnings management is more pronounced in hot markets; that only in such markets are positive discretionary accruals commonly associated with positive abnormal returns on the announcement of earnings; and that in such markets – against the expectations from signalling theory – these positive returns are not reversed on announcement of a stock-for-stock bid. The results suggest that the economic benefits achieved by engaging in earnings management during hot markets are indeed significant: in hot markets, we estimate that on average share acquirers engage in working capital accrual management equivalent to over a third of the average acquirer’s return on total assets in that year; and that this earnings management is associated with increases in market value which are statistically and economically significant, enabling the bidder to secure control of the target with fewer shares.     

管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究

本文以我国上市公司作为研究样本,依据行为金融理论,从管理者过度自信角度研究了企业盈余管理行为。研究发现,管理者过度自信既会导致公司正向盈余管理行为的发生,也会导致负向盈余管理行为的发生。进一步研究发现,女性比例越高的管理团队越有可能进行盈余管理,管理团队的年龄越小越有可能进行正向盈余管理,管理团队学历越低越有可能进行负向盈余管理行为。本文对研究公司选择会计政策行为,治理公司盈余管理行为乃至完善公司治理结构均具有一定的启示。