信息透明度、公司治理与中小股东参与

本文利用深交所社会公众股东网络投票的数据,研究了公司信息透明度、中小股东参与公司决策与治理以及其他治理机制之间的关系。经验证据表明当公司信息透明度越差,中小投资者参加投票的积极性越高。上市公司的股权结构会影响中小股东的投票参与率,并且上述关系在信息透明度更差的公司中更显著。进一步分析发现,中小股东参与公司治理能够提高公司未来绩效,并且这种绩效改善在信息透明度更差的公司中更为明显。本文说明中小股东参与公司治理能有效地缓解代理问题,而公司信息透明度会影响其效果的发挥。     

内部公司治理与信息透明度研究综述

本文从内部公司治理机制几个方面对会计信息透明度理论研究的现状进行了评述,指出了现有研究的不足,并对会计信息透明度研究的趋势作了展望。     

非上市国有企业透明度评价体系设计与应用:以中央企业为例

透明度是公司治理的基础。作为全民性质的国有企业更应向社会公开其财务等重要信息,确保应有的透明度,以利于社会公众监督权的行使。本文以国有企业产权属性为逻辑基点,参照上市公司透明度评价标准,构建了以"完整性、及时性、真实性"为基本构件的非上市国有企业透明度评价体系,并以国务院国资委直管的中央企业为例,进行了2012-2014年度样本企业透明度指数的测算和分析。结果表明,近年来我国非上市国有企业透明度水平低且没有实质性改观,行业之间存有差异,企业间的个体差异巨大;近期,应将提高透明度作为完善国有企业治理机制的新突破口,并立法建规,落实责任主体。     

机构共同持股与公司透明度

随着我国资本市场的发展,监管机构和市场投资者对上市公司信息披露的质量提出更高要求,而作为重要的利益相关者,共同机构投资者连结企业之间的经济关联在资本市场中越来越常见,探讨机构共同持股对公司透明度的影响对于完善和发展我国证券市场具有深刻意义。本文以2007－2019年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察机构共同持股对公司透明度的影响。实证结果表明,机构共同持股能够显著提高公司透明度。同时,进一步研究发现,机构共同持股通过减少恶性竞争、降低披露的专有成本和缓解代理问题,降低代理成本这两条路径提高公司透明度。在国有企业、创新型企业中,机构共同持股更能提高公司透明度。本文结论为推进股票发行注册制,进一步完善以信息披露为核心的制度体系提供了理论指导,为资本市场信息环境的改善提供了理论支持。     

内控审计视角下公司治理与企业社会责任研究

在内部控制审计强制执行以及公司治理与企业社会责任融合的背景下,基于综合社会契约理论构建了公司治理与企业社会责任的动态整合框架,即价值创造—利益均衡—责任承担模型,系统分析了在整合框架中公司治理与企业社会责任的双向互动关系以及内部控制审计在整合框架中所发挥的作用,拓展了公司治理与企业社会责任之间相关关系的研究视角,丰富了内部控制审计改革与发展的理论依据。研究发现,内部控制审计对公司治理与企业社会责任的双向互动过程进行调节,在价值创造、利益均衡和责任承担环节中分别发挥着提高透明度、防范风险,促进公平、公正以及监督与约束的作用。内部控制审计的有效执行将有利于规范企业行为,提高公司治理水平,促进企业履行社会责任。     

公司治理视角下提升企业会计透明度的对策研究

增强会计透明度对投资者以及资本市场的正常运行都有着十分重要的作用。公司治理从股权结构、董事会、管理层和监事会等多个角度对企业会计透明度产生影响。当前我国公司治理方面,存在着股权结构不合理,内部人控制严重,小股东监督难以实现,激励机制不健全和审计监督欠缺等众多问题,影响了企业会计透明度。要改善企业的治理结构,增强企业会计透明度,必须建立合理的股权结构,建立独立董事制度,改善企业内部激励机制,完善民间审计机构的聘任制度。     

基于公司治理的激励约束机制研究

良好的公司治理结构是决定企业运作和发展质量的重要条件,是保障公司高效率运作的基石。而在公司治理的内部治理机制方面,现代企业的激励约束机制的构建还很不完善,存在着很多问题。因此,本文从公司治理角度出发,研究了激励约束机制的构建问题,探讨了如何完善企业的公司治理问题,实现企业价值最大化。     

合作制金融组织公司治理研究述评

本文以合作制金融组织与一般性企业在股权结构、经营目标和管理方式上的差异作为切人点,对合作制金融组织公司治理进行了回顾,同时根据我国合作制金融组织的特殊性,对其治理状况做了分析.研究发现尽管合作制企业有着自己独特的特点,但是就目前的研究而言,对合作制金融组织公司治理的研究思路却依然按照一般企业公司治理的机制进行分析,并没有真正做到从其特殊性出发,更没有形成适合其特点的理论框架.     

财务目标的选择——基于公司治理

公司治理模式的发展改变了企业的经营环境,从而导致企业的财务管理目标也要相应变化。一个良好的公司治理机制会导致公司决策的科学性,这与企业的财务管理目标——企业价值最大化的内容相一致,而企业价值最大化的财务管理目标反过来又会完善公司的治理机制。所以,企业应选择企业价值最大化作为财务管理目标。     

内部审计与公司治理

引言 现代企业制度的建立和发展过程中,公司治理作为维持企业正常运作,提高整体竞争能力,增强企业经济效益的最佳手段,受到了企业经营决策者、投资者、立法者以及理论界的极大关注,良好的公司治理机制无疑是企业以及理论界探索的重大课题.     

Corporate Governance and Information Efficiency in Security Markets

This paper investigates a neglected topic in corporate governance research; namely, do governance characteristics affect the market reaction to news? The topic is important given the emphasis by governance regulations and codes of best practice on the need for greater transparency of corporate activities. For the first time in the corporate governance literature, we show that corporate governance characteristics (particularly the presence of founding family directors and gender diverse boards) affect the market reaction to company specific news. The results of the paper point to the analysis of the impact of governance characteristics on the market reaction to news being a new and complementary research agenda within corporate governance.     

What Determines Corporate Transparency?

We investigate corporate transparency, defined as the availability of firm‐specific information to those outside publicly traded firms. We conceptualize corporate transparency within a country as output from a multifaceted system whose components collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information. We factor analyze a range of measures capturing countries' firm‐specific information environments, isolating two distinct factors. The first factor, interpreted as financial transparency, captures the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures, and their interpretation and dissemination by analysts and the media. The second factor, interpreted as governance transparency, captures the intensity of governance disclosures used by outside investors to hold officers and directors accountable. We investigate whether these factors vary with countries' legal/judicial regimes and political economies. Our main multivariate result is that the governance transparency factor is primarily related to a country's legal/judicial regime, whereas the financial transparency factor is primarily related to political economy.     

The Value Relevance of Transparency and Corporate Governance in Malaysia Before and After the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper investigates whether the value relevance of financial reporting transparency and corporate governance in Malaysia increased after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Our sample comprised 94 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in both 1996 and 2001. The disclosure indexes were significantly value relevant for 2001 but not for 1996. Our corporate governance measure was also significantly value relevant for 2001 but not for 1996. Accordingly, it would appear that after the Asian financial crisis, investors have become more sensitized to transparency and corporate governance issues.     

Quality of Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity in Brazil

Common sense suggests that the adoption of better corporate governance practices, which enable greater transparency, more protection against capital expropriation, and greater rights for investors, should have the effect of reducing the risk perceived by shareholders and so lead to lower required returns. This article investigates the existence of an inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of equity capital for Brazilian companies. The authors begin by constructing a broad index of corporate governance quality that combines four key aspects of corporate governance: (1) transparency and disclosure; (2) structure of the board of directors; (3) ownership and control structure; and (4) shareholder rights. To estimate the cost of equity, the CAPM was applied by using ex ante market premiums calculated with a simple discounted‐dividend method. On the basis of a sample of 67 Brazilian companies traded at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) during the period 1998–2008, the study concludes that there is a significant inverse relationship between the cost of equity and a number of proxies for effective governance, particularly those representing transparency and disclosure. Closer inspection of the reductions in cost of capital associated with improvements in the specific governance quality index components suggests that companies would benefit the most from prompt submission of information to regulators and full disclosure of executive pay.     

基于主成份分析的上市公司治理水平体系构建

全球金融危机的爆发与蔓延突显出公司治理对风险防范的重要性,政府监管层、上市公司以及投资者自身都产生了对公司治理进行评价的客观要求。本文将公司治理体系分为股权结构、董事会治理、经理层治理、信息披露及透明度、伦理维度五个层面,运用主成份分析方法来寻求上述五个层面各代理变量的线性组合,构建了上市公司治理水平体系。     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.     

Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role?

We investigate whether market competition affects the relationship between corporate transparency and firm value in the United States using a sample of 12,665 firm-year observations, representing 1,644 individual firms for the period 1996–2018. The results show that stronger transparency enhances firm value, and market competition has a significantly positive effect on that relationship. More importantly, we use hierarchical linear models further to explore the cross-level interaction impact of market competition, and we find evidence suggesting that the industry-level competition has a significant cross-level moderating effect. Additionally, consistent with the substitute perspective, we also find that the disciplinary power of competition on the relationship between transparency and value is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, our evidence supports the “bright side” of the competition view and highlights the active external governance role that competition plays in the value promotion effect of corporate transparency at both the individual and the industry levels.     

The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance

This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance in turn affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a shareholder‐friendly or management‐friendly reputation is determined in equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directors' desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across firms. Directors' reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. We derive implications for multiple directorships, board size, transparency, and board independence.     

Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: Evidence from Europe

With respect to the increasing significance of transparency and corporate governance, the study at hand investigates the impact of a broad set of principal corporate governance mechanisms on the market valuation of publicly traded real estate companies from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany, while addressing major econometric shortcomings of previous corporate governance studies, including omitted variable bias, endogeneity and reverse causality. The results of the analysis have important practical implications for strategic decision-making of both top-executives of publicly traded real estate companies as well as investors.     

Corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases

We study the association between corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases (ARPRs). Press releases constitute a timely vehicle to communicate firm performance to third parties but they can be manipulated to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements. We predict that governance mechanisms actively monitor managerial disclosures, improving firm transparency and thus reducing impression management in ARPRs. The results confirm that strong governance limits impression management, consistent with governance monitoring effectively reducing self-serving disclosures by management. Our evidence suggests that management disclosure practices respond, at least partly, to informative motivations. We also show that strong governance firms are more likely to release an ARPR.