Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Poison Pill Securities: Shareholder Wealth and Insider Trading

Existing empirical studies on poison pill securities have examined their overall effect on shareholder wealth. This paper segregates the wealth-increasing poison pills from the value-reducing ones by examining the pattern of insider trading activity prior to the pill adoption announcement. Our results show that pill adoptions that are preceded by net insider purchases are associated with significant stock price increases. This finding is consistent with the proposition that corporate insiders buy their own securities because they do not view the adoption of poison pills as an antitakeover strategy, but rather one that enables the board of directors to extract a greater share of the economic gains from the bidder. Our findings also indicate that firms with net insider sales prior to pill adoption announcement experience generally negative but insignificant changes in value. Finally, firms with no insider trading or with an equal number of insider purchases and sales register marginally significant negative returns.     

Insider trading patterns

We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is fleeting. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, we find robust new evidence that both insiders' sales and purchases predict abnormal stock returns. In addition, we provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantages and increase their trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours, they are more likely to engage in longer series of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades are associated with larger abnormal returns. Finally, we show how accounting for these trading patterns sharpens screens for corporate insiders who trade on infor- mation.     

Information transfers and learning in financial markets: Evidence from short selling around insider sales

We document significant increases in short positions on days when company insiders sell their firms’ shares. Short selling increases before insider sales are publicly reported and often before insiders finish selling. Furthermore, the magnitude of short selling activity is consistent with short sellers’ knowledge of the insider’s rank (e.g., CEO, CFO, or a lower-ranked manager) and with knowledge of the unobservable size of the insider’s trading position. We show that short sellers’ superior timing is consistent with (i) monitoring of order flow and (ii) obtaining price-relevant information from brokerages that execute insider sales. Some of our results extend to insider purchases.     

Insider trading in loss firms

This study investigates whether insiders in loss firms trade their company stock differentially around new loss and loss reversal earnings announcements. Research suggests that the likelihood of litigation influences managers' stock trading decisions prior to material events. I hypothesize and find that insiders reduce their net stock sales in a monotonic manner before a new loss announcement presumably to avoid improper trading allegations before bad news. This decrease is more pronounced if the new loss is the start of a multiple loss sequence. In contrast, there is no significant change in net trading patterns in the quarters prior to a loss reversal announcement irrespective of whether the loss reversal is the start of a single profit or multiple profit sequence indicating that insiders seem less concerned about legal implications when trading before good news. The results suggest that insiders in loss firms perceive asymmetric litigation risks to trading stock in the quarters before bad news relative to good news and act accordingly.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE MERITS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

To provide further evidence on the merits of securities class actions, we examine insider transactions immediately before and during the class period, using a larger and newer data set. We show that insiders reduce their stock sales by an abnormal amount immediately before the class period. Alternative measures of insider transactions and analysis of data before the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provide consistent results. These new findings indicate that class actions, on average, have merit. Our data also reestablish a previous empirical result that there is no abnormal selling during the class period.     

Why does shareholder protection matter for abnormal returns after reported insider purchases and sales?

We use a unique data set of more than 240,000 reported insider transactions across 15 European countries and the USA to analyze the link between country-level shareholder protection and abnormal returns following insider trades. We show that abnormal returns after insider transactions are positively correlated with country-level shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders, which supports the information-content hypothesis. Market reaction to insider purchases increases with shareholder protection because shareholder protection enhances the transparency and trustworthiness of insiders’ actions, and limits possibilities for direct profit diversion, so that more information is eventually reflected in stock prices. For insider sales, shareholder protection decreases their negative information content. We conjecture that this is due to the effect of greater transparency and trustworthiness strengthening the diversification and liquidity reasons for selling in better shareholder protection countries. We find limited support for the rent-extraction hypothesis that conjectures that shareholder protection is associated with insider trading dollar profits.     

Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading

This study explores insider trading patterns under different earnings surprises. After controlling for stock market liquidity and earnings announcements returns, we show that insiders sell more aggressively depending on the heterogeneity of analysts whose EPS forecasts are met or beaten to camouflage their trades. Specifically, insiders sell more shares of their company sooner after the publication of earnings when top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten. Consistent with the informed trading literature, insiders strategically select these moments because the stock price impact is low and the legal scrutiny of their trades is minimal. To support this result, we employ an exogenous drop in firms' analyst coverage due to the closure or merger of brokerage houses. Furthermore, in line with the camouflage incentives, by selling after top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten, stock prices adjust slowly to insider trades. Finally, we show that the incentives of insiders to hide their trades are concentrated in opportunistic insiders and members of the top management team, who are more likely to bear the costs of selling shares after positive news.     

Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice

When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.     

Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization

As barriers to international investment fall and technology improves, the cost advantages for a firm's securities to trade publicly in the country in which that firm is located and for that country to have a market for publicly traded securities distinct from the capital markets of other countries will progressively disappear. Securities laws remain an important determinant of whether and where securities are issued, how they are valued, who owns them, and where they trade. I show that there is a demand from entrepreneurs for mechanisms that allow them to commit to credible disclosure because disclosure helps reduce agency costs. Under some circumstances, mandatory disclosure through securities laws can help satisfy that demand, but only provided investors or the state can act on the information disclosed and the laws cannot be weakened ex post too much through lobbying by corporate insiders. With financial globalization, national disclosure laws can have wide-ranging effects on a country's welfare, on firms and on investor portfolios, including the extent to which share holdings reveal a home bias. In equilibrium, if firms can choose the securities laws they are subject to when they go public, some firms will choose stronger securities laws than those of the country in which they are located and some firms will do the opposite.     

The Dog That Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes

This paper documents that at the individual stock level, insiders' sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders' purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. A key feature of our theory is that rational uninformed investors may react more strongly to the absence of insider sales than to their presence (the “dog that did not bark” effect). We test our hypothesis against competing stories, such as insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution.     

The Effect of Information Quality on Optimal Portfolio Choice

Three types of agents acting on different information sets are considered: fully informed agents, insiders, and outsiders. Differences in information quality are shown to affect the properties of their optimal portfolios. For an outsider, the share of wealth invested in the stock is decreasing in the variance of the stock. However, for an insider, the effect of an increasing stock variance on the optimal portfolio weight is ambiguous. In a calibration to U.S. data, the confidence intervals of the insider's demand for the stock converge, whereas the outsider's confidence intervals become wider.     

Trading by bank insiders before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

This paper sheds new light on the role bank executives played in the financial crisis. It examines whether they foresaw the poor performance of their own bank by analyzing their insider trading patterns. Insider trading during 2006 predicts stock returns during the crisis: a portfolio strategy based on insider trading information earns a risk-adjusted return of over 40% during the crisis. Further, banks with a high exposure to the housing market and banks with a low exposure exhibit different insider trading patterns starting in mid-2006, when US housing prices first decline: insiders of high-exposure banks are 20% more likely to sell stock than insiders of low-exposure banks. This pattern is more pronounced for CEOs than other insiders. However, insider trading patterns of high- and low-exposure banks do not differ before 2006. Replacing high-exposure banks by too-big-too-fail banks yields similar results. This evidence indicates that insiders of high-exposure and too-big-too-fail banks revised their assessment of their banks’ investments following the reversal in the housing market.     

Learning from peers' stock prices and corporate investment

Peers' valuation matters for firms' investment: a one standard deviation increase in peers' valuation is associated with a 5.9% increase in corporate investment. This association is stronger when a firm's stock price informativeness is lower or when its managers appear less informed. Also, the sensitivity of a firm's investment to its stock price is lower when its peers' stock price informativeness is higher or when demands for its products and its peers' products are more correlated. Furthermore, the sensitivity of firms' investment to their peers' valuation drops significantly after going public. These findings are uniquely predicted by a model in which managers learn information from their peers' valuation.     

Insiders' hedging in a jump diffusion model

In this paper, we formulate the optimal hedging problem when the underlying stock price has jumps, especially for insiders who have more information than the general public. The jumps in the underlying price process depend on another diffusion process, which models a sequence of firm-specific information. This diffusion process is observed only by insiders. Nevertheless, the market is incomplete to insiders as well as to the general public. We use the local risk minimization method to find an optimal hedging strategy for insiders. We also numerically compare the value of the insider's hedging portfolio with the value of an honest trader's hedging portfolio for a simulated sample path of a stock price.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

The Validity of the Economic Value Added Approach: an Empirical Application

This study investigates the relative explanatory power of the Economic Value Added (EVA) model with respect to stock returns and firms' market value, compared to established accounting variables (e.g. net income, operating income), in the context of a small European developing market, namely the Athens Stock Exchange, in its first market‐wide application of the EVA measure. Relative information content tests reveal that net and operating income appear to be more value relevant than EVA. Additionally, incremental information tests suggest that EVA unique components add only marginally to the information content of accounting profit. Moreover, EVA does not appear to have a stronger correlation with firms' Market Value Added than the other variables, suggesting that – for our Greek dataset – EVA, even though useful as a performance evaluation tool, need not necessarily be more correlated with shareholder's value than established accounting variables.     

卖空机制能够约束内部人减持吗？——基于融资融券制度的经验证据

本文以我国放松卖空管制为视角,探究其对内部人减持的影响。研究表明,卖空机制能够抑制企业内部人减持行为。机制分析发现,卖空对内部人减持的抑制作用是通过缓解股权高溢价实现的。进一步研究表明,卖空能够抑制大股东、董事以及管理层减持,但对监事减持无影响;卖空能够降低内部人减持的获利程度,并且在内部人减持动机更大时,对内部人减持的抑制作用更强;卖空通过约束内部人减持提升了股票定价效率,还有助于降低内部人增持行为。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和内部人减持领域的文献,并对政府部门完善制度设计具有启示意义。     

The real effects of bank distress: Evidence from bank bailouts in Germany

How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times of distress and crisis, featuring the different transmission of bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a bank-induced increase of firms' probabilities of default. Moreover, bailouts tend to reduce trade credit availability and ultimately firms' sales. We further find that the direction and magnitude of the effects depends on firm quality and the relationship orientation of banks.     

The Effects of Cash,Debt, and Insiders on Open Market Share Repurchases

The findings of the authors' recent study suggest, on balance, that stock repurchases function much like tax‐efficient special dividends, increasing when free cash flow is large and when debt levels are low, but not replacing regularly scheduled dividends. Repurchasing companies experience median event returns of about 2% around the repurchase announcements, with a related mean effect of roughly 3%. Companies with greater free cash flow and less debt are more likely than otherwise comparable companies to repurchase their shares. Furthermore, repurchasing companies that exhibit substandard preannouncement stock price returns and seek to buy back higher percentages of shares tend to elicit more positive stock price reactions. At the same time, the study provides some evidence that corporate managers attempt to use their inside information to profit from buybacks. For example, managing insiders in repurchasing firms decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity two weeks before repurchase announcements to a greater extent than non‐managing insiders. But perhaps the most remarkable finding from this part of the study is how little insiders as a group seem to profit from their short‐term trading behavior—a finding that suggests that the market appears to anticipate much of this behavior.