定向增发新股折扣率的影响因素及其与公司短期股价关系的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文分析了影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素,并研究了中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响。本文认为,影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素与外国不同,中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的高低与股东的身份有关,向控股股东及关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率要低于向非关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率。并且,中国上市公司定向增发新股的折扣率越低,投资者获得的超额累积收益率越高。本文运用中国证券市场定向增发新股的数据,对影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素及中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响分别进行了实证研究,实证研究结果证明了本文理论分析的结论。     

定向增发新股、资产注入类型与上市公司绩效的关系——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

股权分置改革之后,通过定向增发新股实现控股股东向上市公司注入资产成为中国证券市场的"热点"问题。本文对2006-2007年间不同类型定向增发资产注入的短期宣告效应和长期持有超额收益率进行比较研究发现,其短期累积超额收益率无显著差异,但投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率与资产注入类型显著相关。当注入的资产与上市公司的业务相关时,投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率显著高于注入的资产与上市公司的业务不相关的长期持有超额收益率,因此,可能存在控股股东向上市公司注入劣质资产进行利益输送的现象。本文用大股东与小股东的代理理论解释了上述现象。     

沪深A股上市定向增发公告的股价效应研究

定向增发新股成为股权分置改革之后中国上市公司股权再融资的主要工具。本文运用事件研究法,通过我国上市公司2009年5月至2011年4月期间最新的A股数据,对宣告定向增发新股的公司股票价格的短期市场表现进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,我国上市公司定向增发存在显著为正的公告效应。在定向增长预案公告日前一周左右的时间内,定向增发公司股票累积平均超额收益率为0.720%,而在公告日前一天至当天的累积平均超额收益为1.766%。     

影响我国上市公司定向增发公告效应的因素分析

自2006年5月9日股权分置改革取得重要的阶段性成果、中国证监会颁布《上市公司证券发行管理办法》以来,上市公司通过定向增发进行再融资已成为当前的热点和主渠道。上市公司定向增发新股是市场实现资源优化配置的重要手段之一,同时涉及公司财富在不同股东之间的重新分配与转移。研究哪些因素影响定向增发的股     

整体上市模式对公司治理影响的比较

不同模式的整体上市在股权结构、关联交易、管理层整合以及战略投资者等方面对公司治理的影响是不同的。整体上市要与解决“一股独大”问题结合考虑,应该对拟通过股权再融资实现整体上市的公司实行行业区别的政策;实行鼓励更多的采用向战略投资者和机构投资者定向增发,以所募集资金收购集团公司资产实现整体上市的政策。要积极支持法人整体上市,对控股股东分次注入资产实现整体上市过程中的利益输送行为加强监管。     

中国上市公司定向增发的短期财富效应研究

定向增发是我国上市公司股权再融资的主流方式.对于上市公司来说,定向增发可以为公司的发展和成长提供资金;对于投资者来说,定向增发为他们提供了良好的投资机会.短期财富效应是指证券市场各因素引起股价发生波动而给股东带来的额外收益.因此,选择39家上市公司定向增发短期财富效应进行研究,其中以2007年10月16日为分界,选取2007年3、4月实施定向增发的21家上市公司及2008年3、4月实施定向增发的18家上市公司为样本,分别分析定向增发在牛市和熊市中的财富效应.在实证研究中,通过超额收益率,建立一元线性回归模型,对样本公司定向增发的市场变化、股东收益进行研究,并得出结论.     

定向增发股份解锁后机构投资者减持行为与盈余管理——来自我国上市公司定向增发新股解锁的经验数据

我国上市公司股权再融资中普遍存在盈余管理问题。我国上市公司在认购的定向增发新股股份解锁前存在正的盈余管理现象,但是上市公司在不同类型投资者实际减持前所进行的盈余管理程度存在着差异:在关联股东实际减持认购的股份前,上市公司进行正向盈余管理的程度更高,并且关联股东的减持比例与上市公司盈余管理存在显著的正相关关系,表明上市公司利用盈余管理向关联股东在实际减持中进行利益输送的程度更高,而非关联股东在实际减持中,非关联股东的减持比例与盈余管理程度无显著关系,上市公司利用盈余管理向非关联股东进行利益输送的效应不明显。     

信息不对称、研发支出与关联股东认购定向增发股份——来自中国证券市场的经验数据

本文以2013年至2015年间公告的上市公司定向增发新股公司为研究对象,研究了上市公司的研发支出与关联股东认购定向增发新股股份的关系。研究发现,定向增发新股公司研发支出的强度越大,关联股东认购本公司定向增发股份的比例越高;定向增发新股公司费用化的研发支出越大,关联股东认购的比例越高;并且当定向增发新股公司信息不对称程度越高时,定向增发新股公司研发支出的强度、费用化的研发支出与关联股东认购本公司定向增发股份的比例之间的正相关关系越显著。这一研究反映了我国会计准则中关于研发费用的处理仍然存在缺陷,并揭示了关联股东利用研发费用的资本化与费用化达到低价认购本公司发行的定向增发新股股份的现象。     

我国上市公司定向增发目的实例分析

定向增发新股的再融资方式,自2006年在我国资本市场采用以来,其增发数量、平均融资规模及其在再融资市场中占的比重均增长迅速,目前已经成为我国上市公司最重要的股权再融资手段。本文将从换购优质资产实现整体上市、募集项目资金、引入战略投资者、公司并购、借壳上市、反向以股抵债、股权激励等七个方面并结合实例来对定向增发的目的进行分析,以使该再融资方式在中国得到进一步的完善和发展。     

定向增发中的控制权变动:运用模式及其市场效应

作为一种重要的股权再融资方式,定向增发不仅可以用于上市公司的资金募集,而且可以用于控制权的重新配置、竞争和转移。在股权高度集中、一股独大现象突出的我国资本市场,当定向增发运用于整体上市、引进战略投资者、买壳上市等控制权变动时意义重大,因为此时的定向增发能直接实现上市公司原大股东控制权的显著变动或变更。利用事件研究法分析发现,我国上市公司定向增发都能带来市场的积极响应,而买壳上市、整体上市的累积超常收益更大。因此,我国上市公司定向增发不仅具有一般资本市场中的信号传递效应,而且还传递了大股东控制及其变动的信息。     

Firm listing status and the investment home bias

Are public firm investment rates more sensitive than private firm rates to new investment opportunities? We offer a new explanation for differences in public and private firm investment sensitivities: investment sensitivities differ because the type of investments favored by firms varies with their listing status. Specifically, we consider the geography of investment opportunities and find that private firms have a much stronger investment home-bias than similar public firms which makes their investment decisions more sensitive to local investment opportunities than public firms. Controlling for local investment opportunities explains four-fifths of the differential sensitivity between public and private firms not explained by more traditional measures of investment opportunities.     

Do Private Firms Invest Differently than Public Firms? Taking Cues from the Natural Gas Industry

We study how listing status affects investment behavior. Theory offers competing hypotheses on how listing‐related frictions affect investment decisions. We use detailed data on 74,670 individual projects in the U.S. natural gas industry to show that private firms respond less than public firms to changes in investment opportunities. Private firms adjust drilling activity for low capital‐intensity investments. However, they do not increase drilling in response to new capital‐intensive growth opportunities. Instead, they sell these projects to public firms. Our evidence suggests that differences in access to external capital are important in explaining the investment behavior of public and private firms.     

Suppliers' listing status and trade credit provision

We show that public suppliers extend more trade credit than their private counterparts. The impact of stock market listing on accounts receivable is more pronounced among firms that are financially more constrained or more reliant on external finance. Moreover, firms significantly increase their trade credit provision following equity issuances in stock exchanges. These results are consistent with the argument that stock market listing status improves firms' access to external sources of financing, especially equity capital, thus enhancing their ability to offer more trade credit to customers.     

Access to private equity and real firm activity: Evidence from PIPEs

We study how access to private equity financing affects real firm activities using a broad panel of publicly traded U.S. firms that raise external equity through private placements (PIPEs) between 1995 and 2008. The public firms relying on PIPEs are generally small, high-tech firms that cannot finance investment internally and likely face severe external financing constraints; PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance for these firms. We show that firms use PIPE inflows to maintain extremely high R&D investment ratios and to build substantial cash reserves. We also use GMM techniques that control for firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of the decision to raise private equity and find that PIPE funding has a substantial impact on corporate investment in cash reserves and R&D, and a smaller but significant impact on investment in non-cash working capital, but little impact on fixed investment or acquisitions. Our estimates indicate that R&D investment initially increases by $0.20–$0.25 for each dollar of private equity flowing into the firm, and that PIPE funds initially invested in cash ultimately go to R&D. These findings offer direct evidence that access to private equity finance has an important effect on the key input that drives innovation at the firm- and economy-wide levels.     

Post-acquisition performance of private acquirers

We provide the first evidence on the performance of private operating firms as acquirers. Private bidders experience greater post-acquisition operating performance improvements compared to public bidders. This effect is not due to differences in target types, merger accounting, financing constraints, private equity ownership or subsequent listing of some private bidders, and is robust to instrumentation. Further analysis of governance arrangements at least partially attributes the private bidder effect to lower agency costs in private firms. Not only do private firms pay lower prices for target firm assets, they also operate them more efficiently by containing overhead costs and capital expenditures.     

我国发展私募股权基金的思考

发展私募股权基金可促进金融结构优化、推动企业素质提高.但我国发展私募股权基金还存在许多障碍,我们应从完善有利于私募股权基金发展的法律法规体系、促进创新型企业的发展、完善私募股权基金的退出通道、拓宽私募股权基金资本来源渠道等方面促进我国私募股权基金的发展.     

The Performance of Private Equity‐Backed IPOs

My paper examines the aftermarket performance of private equity‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs) and compares it to the performances of equivalent samples of venture capital‐backed and other nonsponsored issues on the London Stock Exchange during the period 1992‐2005. The evidence suggests marked differences across the three groups in terms of market size, industry classification, first‐day returns, and key operating characteristics at the time of flotation. In fact, private equity‐backed IPOs are larger firms in terms of sales and assets, more profitable, and relatively modest first‐day returns. In the three years following the public listing, they display better operating and market performance when compared to other IPOs and the market as a whole.     

Why do firms issue private equity repeatedly? On the motives and information content of multiple PIPE offerings

This study examines why private equity issues tend to be a repeated source of financing for public firms. We test the recent operational needs theory of public equity issuance within the context of repeated private equity issues. We find that repeated PIPE issuers burn through cash quickly and do not reach the standards of information transparency or profitability needed for a successful public equity offering. This has implications for investor composition and the market response to a PIPE. Initial PIPE offerings are characterized by substantial diversity in investor type. In successive transactions firms increasingly rely upon hedge funds, who extract greater price discounts and more often require cash flow rights as opposed to control rights. As firms select a path of repeated PIPEs to raise funds, successive issues become uninformative to the market. We conclude that, for small public firms, the same motive underlies public equity offerings and repeated private equity offerings—an acute need for cash.     

Public Equity and Audit Pricing in the United States

To what degree are audit fees for U.S. firms with publicly traded equity higher than fees for otherwise similar firms with private equity? The answer is potentially important for evaluating regulatory regime design efficiency and for understanding audit demand and production economics. For U.S. firms with publicly traded debt, we hold constant the regulatory regime, including mandated issuer reporting and auditor responsibilities. We vary equity ownership and thus public securities market contextual factors, including any related public firm audit fees from increased audit effort to reduce audit litigation risk and/or pure litigation risk premium (litigation channel effects). In cross‐section, we find that audit fees for public equity firms are 20–22% higher than fees for otherwise similar private equity firms. Time‐series comparisons for firms that change ownership status yield larger percentage fee increases (decreases) for those going public (private). Results are consistent with litigation channel effects giving rise to substantial incremental audit fees for U.S. firms with public equity ownership.     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.