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1.
首季季报之所以可能导致投资者的信息过载原因有二 :一是许多公司在同一天披露其季报 ;二是公司的年报和季报有可能同时披露。我们的结果说明了信息的集中披露本身并不妨碍投资者对信息的及时利用 ,这些发现对我国资本市场上信息披露监管机构有着直接的政策性含义。  相似文献   

2.
We examine whether financial reporting frequency affects the speed with which accounting information is reflected in security prices. For a sample of 28,824 reporting-frequency observations from 1950 to 1973, we find little evidence of differences in timeliness between firms reporting quarterly and those reporting semiannually, even after controlling for self-selection. However, firms that voluntarily increased reporting frequency from semiannual to quarterly experienced increased timeliness, while firms whose increase was mandated by the SEC did not. We conclude that there is little evidence to support the claim that regulation forcing firms to report more frequently improves earnings timeliness.  相似文献   

3.
This paper uses the quarterly conference call as a disclosure metric to examine whether firms with less informative financial statements are more likely to respond by providing additional voluntary disclosure. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm's information environment, I find a significant inverse relation between measures of the informativeness of a firm's financial statements and the likelihood that the firm will use a quarterly conference call. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis in Verrecchia (1990) that the probability of disclosure of management's private information is negatively related to the precision of prior public information on firm value.  相似文献   

4.
解读企业信息需求——基于机构投资者的信息需求探索   总被引:22,自引:0,他引:22  
潘琰  辛清泉 《会计研究》2004,(12):14-22
这是一项关于新的信息环境和制度背景下 ,企业信息的关键使用者———机构投资者信息需求的最新研究。本研究对中国机构投资者使用公司报告的主要目的、投资决策模式、信息需求的影响因素、信息需求偏好以及他们对公司报告质量的评价等进行了全面调查。研究表明 :目前中国机构投资者的投资理念与其投资决策模式尚未能够有效耦合 ;因特网已成为机构投资者获取更为广泛丰富的公司信息的最主要的渠道 ,但是 ,公司网站披露信息的质量存在缺陷 ;在法定年报中 ,财务信息仍是机构投资者关注的重点 ;机构投资者对简明财务信息有明显偏好 ,对“年报补丁”非常反感 ;目前的财务报告并不存在明显信息冗余 ,相反 ,存在披露不足 ,机构投资者的信息需求与公司报告实务之间仍存在巨大期望差距。本文对调查结果进行了系统分析 ,并提出相应的政策建议。  相似文献   

5.
宫汝凯 《金融研究》2021,492(6):152-169
信息传导的非同步和投资者情绪变化是股票市场的两个典型特征,前者会引发投资者之间出现信息不对称问题,后者主要体现为投资者过度自信,两者共同作用影响股票价格变动。本文将信息不对称和投资者过度自信情绪置于同一个分析框架,建立两阶段动态序贯定价理论模型研究现实市场上信息传导过程中股价变动的内在机制。结果表明:(1)面临新信息的进入,投资者对股票收益预期的调整与均衡价格之间具有正相关关系;(2)面临有利消息时,过度自信投资者比例越大,股票的均衡价格越高,投资收益将越低;面临不利消息时则相反;(3)随着过度自信投资者比例以及过度自信程度升高,市场风险溢价将下降;(4)投资者群体在信息传导过程中出现分化,对股价变动形成异质信念,未获取信息和获取信息但未出现过度自信的投资者认为股价被高估,获取信息且出现过度自信的投资者认为价格被低估,促使更多的交易,引发市场成交量和股价变动;(5)过度自信投资者比例与过度自信程度提高均会对市场效率产生正向影响,而对市场深度具有负向效应。最后,基于理论结果对非对称性和持续性等典型的市场波动性特征进行解释。  相似文献   

6.
Since 1995, managers of thousands of firms have voluntarily disclosed the expected date of their firm's next quarterly earnings announcement to Thomson Financial Services Inc. These disclosures are approximately 500% more accurate than the simple time–series expected report dates used in prior accounting research. These disclosures are also informative. On average, managers who miss their own expected date eventually report earnings that fall about one penny per share below consensus forecasts for each day of delay. Investors respond by sending the price of late–announcing stocks down at the missed expected report date and continue to send them down as the reporting delay lengthens, consistent with our "day late, penny short" result. Despite this, we find that the market response at the time earnings are announced still depends on whether the announcement is early, on time, or late relative to the firm's own expected report date.  相似文献   

7.
The Many Faces of Information Disclosure   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
In this article we ask: what kind of information and how muchof it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosuresare considered. One is information that complements the informationavailable only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementaryinformation). The second is information that is orthogonal tothat which any investor can acquire and thus complements theinformation available to all investors (preprocessed complementaryinformation). And the third is information that substitutesfor the information of the informed investors in that it revealsto all what was previously known only by the informed (substituteinformation). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium,all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information.Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementaryinformation disclosure by firms strengthens investors' privateincentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosureweakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, whilecomplementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effecton financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosureweakens those incentives.  相似文献   

8.
This paper analyzes a setting in which a firm's manager can credibly disclose facts, but not their valuation implications. Consequently, he is uncertain as to how those disclosed facts will be interpreted by investors. Introducing such uncertainty affects the manager's disclosure strategy in two important ways. First, it becomes a function of the market's prior valuation of the firm since that valuation provides a clue as to how future disclosures are likely to be interpreted by investors. Second, the disclosure strategy is no longer characterized, in general, by a single good news/bad news partition of the manager's private information.  相似文献   

9.
In this paper, we propose a theory for deriving the optimal portfolio that assures the log-utility investors of maximizing their expected utility. Restricting investors' information at defined levels, we propose the sample path-wise optimal portfolio (SPOP), which is consistent with the back-test framework used in actualinvestment. It is proven that, at any finite terminal time, this SPOP is asymptotically optimal among all the portfolios which are predictable under investors' incompleteinformation. The optimality is guaranteed by the continuous Bayesian updating formula. Finally, we discuss an algorithm for searching the SPOP, based on asset prices at discrete time intervals.  相似文献   

10.
Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, most US multinational firms no longer disclose geographic earnings in their annual reports. Given the recent growth in foreign operations of US firms and the varying operating environments around the world, information (or lack thereof) related to geographical performance can affect investors’ information set. Using empirical tests that closely follow the [Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 395–419] model, we find results consistent with their predictions. Specifically, using a sample of firms with substantial foreign operations, we find evidence of a decrease in event period private information following adoption of SFAS 131 for firms that no longer disclose geographic earnings. These results suggest that decreased public information (i.e., non-disclosure of geographic earnings) reduces the ability of investors to utilize or generate private information in conjunction with the public announcement of quarterly earnings, which dampens trading. We also find evidence of a decrease in pre-announcement private information following adoption of SFAS 131. This is consistent with an overall improvement in public disclosures that has the effect of reducing differences in the precision of private information across investors in the period prior to the earnings announcement. However, such an effect is observed for both firms which no longer disclose geographic earnings and for firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings.  相似文献   

11.
从会计信息披露的可靠性、相关性、及时性和客观性的角度入手,构建了一个会计信息质量的综合指数,采用多元回归分析的方法对我国机构投资者与上市公司会计信息质量之关系进行了实证研究,并分析了股权分置改革的实施对上述关系的影响.研究结果表明:股权分置改革前后,机构投资者的持股比例、持股的机构投资者数量、前十大流通股东中机构投资者的数量均与会计信息质量正相关;股权分置改革不会影响上述相关关系.  相似文献   

12.
This study examines companies with two classes of shares that entitle their holders to identical cash flow and voting rights but that are available to mutually exclusive sets of investors: A shares to domestic investors and B shares to foreign investors. Price differences between A and B shares are higher in firms with a greater disparity in the disclosures that they make to domestic and foreign investors. This association is more pronounced when the cost (benefit) of information transfer is higher (lower). The results suggest that disclosure disparity creates meaningful differences in investors' average information precision across A and B shares and thus influences the cross-sectional variation in price differences.  相似文献   

13.
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information on volatility. Using intraday data, we estimate the effect of a well‐identified shock on the volatility of stock returns of European banks as a function of the quality of public information available about the banks. We hypothesize that as publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence increase, as private information of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We further show that stock volatility is higher just before important announcements if information is stale.  相似文献   

14.
Stephen Kuselias 《Abacus》2020,56(3):407-435
Increasingly, jurisdictions around the world have been enacting standards that formally allow organizations to offer equity using the crowdfunding model. Using the Internet, the crowdfunding model raises capital by soliciting from a large number of people (i.e., the crowd). A key feature of crowdfunding that has been embraced by regulators is the use of social information to inform investors as a safeguard for this type of investing. However, research has not yet explored how investors utilize this information. In this study, I investigate whether social information can shift investors away from financial maximization goals. Social identity theory predicts that people can be provoked to act as representatives of their group, setting aside individual interests. I predict, and find, that positive social information focused on an equity crowdfunding organization can activate the social identity of investors who share an identity with that organization, causing them to invest more in a relatively weak organization. In a moderated mediation analysis, I find that positive social information provokes investors who share an identity with an organization to feel a stronger connection to that organization, leading them to increase investment. In addition, I explore whether investors’ perceptions of negative social information are moderated by their social identity. I find that investors who are deeply committed to an identity shared with an organization experiencing negative social information will defensively invest in that organization. The findings of this study will be of interest to investors, regulators, and crowdfunding organizations.  相似文献   

15.
李万福  赵青扬  张怀  谢勇 《金融研究》2020,476(2):188-206
本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。  相似文献   

16.
Our study examines the relation between insider trading and corporate information transparency. We find a negative relation between firms’ information transparency and the economic significance of insider trading, including the amount of insider purchase and sale and the profitability of insider transactions. We also find a negative relation between information transparency and stock price reaction to news of insider trading, which suggests that increases in information transparency preempt insiders’ private information. Our study provides evidence consistent with firms’ transparency-enhancing activities decreasing information asymmetry between insiders and investors by revealing insiders’ private information to investors in a timely manner.  相似文献   

17.
When compared with its prior performance, the year 2001 is not one of the best years for the Neuer Markt. The Neuer Markt's reputation has been marred by the practice of several companies on the exchange that have published misleading information in the form of incomplete annual and quarterly data. In this study, we examine the quality of Neuer Markt quarterly reports by concentrating on the disclosure level of 47 Neuer Markt companies' reports for the third quarter of 1999, 2000, and 2001. To enable making comparisons, we have established four disclosure indexes that measure each report's compliance with the Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations (NM Rules and Regulations) as well as with International Accounting Standards (IAS) and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) interim reporting standards. We then attempt to find typical attributes of Neuer Markt enterprises that provide high or low level of disclosure accounting information in their quarterly reports. The results demonstrate that the level of disclosure has increased over time, partly in response to additional enforcement. In this regard, the quarterly reports standardization project of Deutsche Boerse is an important landmark in satisfying investors' information needs.  相似文献   

18.
会计信息披露需求:来自证券研究机构的分析   总被引:16,自引:0,他引:16  
李翔  冯峥 《会计研究》2006,(3):63-68
证券市场投资者决策需建立在有效信息基础之上,会计信息是证券市场信息披露的重要内容。能否满足投资者信息需求,成为会计信息能否在投资者信息渠道竞争中获胜的关键所在。本文采用调查问卷的方法,以证券研究人员为调查对象,详细分析了投资者对当前披露的会计信息的评价,认为管理会计信息应该并且能够成为信息披露的重要内容。  相似文献   

19.
本文通过比较美国、台湾地区证券非公开发行信息披露制度,分析了我国证券非公开发行信息披露制度的缺陷,提出根据投资者不同来构建我国证券非公开发行信息披露体系,确保信息披露的公平性,充分体现证券非公开发行的特点,实现发行人筹资便利和投资者利益保护之双重价值。  相似文献   

20.
Thispaper examines the optimal disclosure policyin a principal/agent setting in which investors and a managerdirectly receive pre-decision, non-contractible signals. Themanager's signal is more informative than the investors' signal.Under no disclosure, the market price provides contractible informationabout the investors' signal, whereas it does not reveal the investors'signal if the manager fully and truthfully discloses his signal.The Revelation Principle does not apply and we identify conditionsunder which no disclosure dominates full disclosure, and providea ``hurdle' model in which partial disclosure strictly dominatesboth no and full disclosure.  相似文献   

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