Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Asymmetric response to earnings news across different sentiment states: The role of cognitive dissonance

Using the Chinese stock market data, we test the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance influences the stock market response to earnings news. Supporting this notion, we find that investors disregard earnings news that contradicts their sentiment due to cognitive dissonance, thereby causing a muted announcement date price reaction to such news. Further analysis shows that higher retail concentration and greater valuation uncertainty of the underlying firm exacerbate this cognitive dissonance and hence amplify its impact, but less credible financial report does not. Finally, we find that cognitive dissonance is temporary for bad news under optimism, but is quite persistent for good news under pessimism. Overall, our findings offer a behavioral bias explanation to understand why investors underuse accounting information.     

Does online interaction between firms and investors reduce stock price crash risk?

This paper examines how online interaction between firm management and investors impacts stock price crash risk. Based on the previous literature, we postulate that online interaction constrains crash risk via two channels, i.e., deterring bad news hoarding activities of managers and decreasing differences of opinion among investors. Relying on the launch of Hudongyi (the first official investor relations management platform in the world) for identification, we demonstrate that online firm-investor interaction significantly reduces future stock price crash risk and that these two channels can both explain this effect. Overall, our findings highlight the important role of online interaction in risk management.     

Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls

In this paper, we exploit the open nature of conference calls to explore whether managers withhold information from the investing public. Our evidence suggests that managers regularly leave participants on the conference call in the dark by not answering their questions. We find that the best predictors of such an event are firm size, a CEO's stock price–based incentives, company age, firm performance, litigation risk, and whether analysts are actively involved during the call's Q&A section. Finally, we document strong support for the assumption maintained in the literature that investors interpret silence negatively. That is, investors seem to interpret no news as bad news.     

The impact of litigation risk on the strategic timing of management earnings forecasts

This paper examines whether managers strategically time their earnings forecasts (MEFs) as litigation risk increases. We find as litigation risk increases, the propensity to release a delayed forecast until after the market is closed (AMC) or a Friday decreases but not proportionally more for bad news than for good news. How costly this behaviour is to investors is questionable as share price returns do not reveal any under‐reaction to strategically timed bad news MEF released AMC. We also find evidence consistent with managers timing their MEFs during a natural no‐trading period to better disseminate information.     

Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements

We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company’s stock price.     

Voluntary Disclosures and Analyst Feedback

We study the resource allocation role of voluntary disclosures when feedback from financial markets is potentially useful to managers in undertaking value maximizing actions. Managers weigh the short‐term price implications of disclosure against the long‐term efficiency gains due to feedback while financial analysts strategically produce information. The model can explain why managers disclose bad information (e.g., grim outlook), that reduces the stock price, and why prices respond more strongly to bad news relative to good news. We find that not all firms enjoy the same quality of feedback, and that feedback, by itself, does not induce more disclosure but less.     

Trading volume in options and common stock around quarterly earnings announcements

This study examines trading in call and put options around quarterly earnings announcements and investigates whether the existence of these options affects the common stock trading volume response to these announcements. We find that the options trading volume reaction to earnings announcements is larger than the corresponding reaction in common stock. Consistent with the idea that options provide an alternative vehicle for trading on information, the existence of these options lowers the level of trading in common stock. Options also appear to offer investors an alternative method of taking short positions, as shown by the symmetric stock market trading volume reaction to good versus bad news for firms with listed options. In contrast, firms without listed options exhibit a larger trading volume response to good news than to bad news of similar magnitude.