Investment,consumption, and hedging under incomplete markets

Entrepreneurs often face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks from their business investments. We extend the standard real options approach to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of business investments, consumption/savings, and portfolio selection. For a lump-sum investment payoff and an agent with a sufficiently strong precautionary savings motive, an increase in volatility can accelerate investment, contrary to the standard real options analysis. When the agent can trade the market portfolio to partially hedge against investment risk, the systematic volatility is compensated via the standard CAPM argument, and the idiosyncratic volatility generates a private equity premium. Finally, when the investment payoff is a series of flows, the agent's idiosyncratic risk exposure alters both the implied option value and the implied project value, causing a reversal of the results in the lump-sum payoff case.     

Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate‐Level Investment

We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate‐level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund.     

Single vs. Multiple Discount Rates: How to Limit “Influence Costs” in the Capital Allocation Process*

Most finance textbooks suggest that companies evaluate investment projects using discount rates that reflect both the debt capacity and the unique risks of the project. In practice, however, companies often use their company‐wide WACC to evaluate such investments because of the difficulty of (and subjectivity involved in) estimating the risk of individual projects, and the potential for managerial bias and influence to distort the estimates. This article proposes a practicable method for calculating the cost of capital that produces different discount rates for investment projects with different risks while minimizing the “influence costs” that arise when managers have discretion in the choice of discount rates. The proposed approach makes use of market information (in the form of the firm‐wide costs of debt and equity), thereby limiting managerial discretion, while typically still providing a good approximation of theoretically correct, project‐specific discount rates. The key to the method's effectiveness is its use of a project's debt capacity to define the capital structure weights, where debt capacity is defined by the amount of debt financing the project will support without lowering the firm's credit rating.     

Board Composition and Relationship‐Specific Investments by Customers and Suppliers

Firms are more likely to include a supplier‐customer on the board if the supplier‐customer invests more in relationship‐specific assets. The results are stronger when the firm has poorer financial reporting quality or is financially distressed, as well as post‐SOX. Suppliers‐customers also increase their relationship‐specific investment following their appointment to the board. Directorships help avoid underinvestment and mitigate contracting frictions by reducing information risks and strengthening informal contracts with the firm.     

Valuing an Early‐Stage Biotechnology Investment as a Rainbow Option

In an article published in this journal in 2003, Richard Shockley and three of his students presented a detailed valuation of an early‐stage biotechnology investment using a binomial lattice option pricing model. The article demonstrates how investments with multiple stages can be treated as “compound sequential options”—that is, as series of options in which investments in one option provide the opportunity to invest in the next in the series. In this article, the author uses the same business case analyzed by Shockley et al. to demonstrate how to value this early‐stage biotechnology investment by separately modeling the two types of risks: technology and product market. An option that has two distinct kinds of risk that develop differently over time is known as a “rainbow option.” The key adjustment to the option pricing model required to value such an option is that, instead of the standard binomial option pricing model with two outcomes at each point in time, the author uses a “quadranomial” option pricing model with four outcomes at each point in time. By distinguishing technology risks from product market risks and allowing them to develop differently over time, the author's analysis leads to a very different valuation and, indeed, a different decision about the initial investment than the one produced by Shockley's model.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Overcoming Opportunism in Public‐Private Project Finance

The possibility of opportunistic behavior, whether by the private investors who operate public‐private projects or by the government agencies who oversee and administer them, can become a powerful deterrent to raising public‐private project financing, especially considering the scale of the investment in infrastructure. Nevertheless, both parties can protect themselves against the counterparty's possible opportunism by giving the investor an “exit” (or put) option and the public agent a “bail‐out” (or call) option on the private investor's shares. In describing the role and design of such puts and calls, this paper presents a mechanism for converting “natural monopolies” into competitive or contestable markets by using over‐the‐counter option contracts that combine the stability of long‐term contracts and the flexibility of short‐term contracts. In the language of economists, the exit/bail‐out option mechanisms presented here are seen as reducing barriers to entry by streamlining incomplete long‐term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to “bounded rationality” and opportunism.     

Analysts' Roundtable on Integrating ESG into Investment Decision‐Making

In this third of the three discussions that took place at the SASB 2016 Symposium, practitioners of a broad range of investment approaches—active as well as passive in both equities and fixed‐income—explain how and why they use ESG information when evaluating companies and making their investment decisions. There was general agreement that successful ESG investing depends on integrating ESG factors with the methods and data of traditional “fundamental” financial statement analysis. And in support of this claim, a number of the panelists noted that some of the world's best “business value investors,” including Warren Buffett, have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment decision‐making. In the analysis of such active fundamental investors, ESG concerns tend to show up as risk factors that can translate into higher costs of capital and lower values. And companies' effectiveness in managing such factors, as ref lected in high ESG scores and rankings, is viewed by many fundamental investors as an indicator of management “quality,” a reliable demonstration of the corporate commitment to investing in the company's future. Moreover, some fixed‐income investors are equally if not more concerned than equity investors about ESG exposures. ESG factors can have pronounced effects on performance by generating “tail risks” that can materialize in both going‐concern and default scenarios. And the rating agencies have long attempted to reflect some of these risks in their analysis, though with mixed success. What is relatively new, however, is the frequency with which fixed income investors are engaging companies on ESG topics. And even large institutional investors with heavily indexed portfolios have become more aggressive in engaging their portfolio companies on ESG issues. Although the traditional ESG filters used by such investors were designed mainly just to screen out tobacco, firearms, and other “sin” shares from equity portfolios, investors' interest in “tilting” their portfolios toward positive sustainability factors, in the form of lowcarbon and gender‐balanced ETFs and other kinds of “smart beta” portfolios, has gained considerable momentum.     

Who Will Pay for Long‐Term Care in the UK? Projections Linking Macro‐ and Micro‐Simulation Models

The long‐term care funding system continues to attract much debate in the UK. We produce projections of state and private long‐term care expenditure and analyse the distributional impact of state‐financed care, through innovative linking of macro‐ and micro‐simulation models. Variant assumptions about life expectancy, dependency and care costs are examined and the impact of universal state‐financed (‘free’) personal care, based on need but not ability to pay, is investigated. We find that future long‐term care expenditure is subject to considerable uncertainty and is particularly sensitive to assumed future trends in real input costs. On a central set of assumptions, free personal care would, by 2051, increase public spending on long‐term care from 1.1 per cent of GDP to 1.3 per cent, or more if it generated an increase in demand. Among the care‐home population aged 85 or over, the immediate beneficiaries of free personal care would be those with relatively high incomes.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

CONVERTIBLE BONDS: MATCHING FINANCIAL AND REAL OPTIONS

For companies whose value consists in large part of “real options”‐ growth opportunities that may (or may not) materialize‐convertible bonds may offer the ideal financing vehicle because of the matching financial options built into the securities. This paper proposes that convertible debt can be a key element in a financing strategy that aims not only to fund current activities, but to give companies access to low‐cost capital if and when their real investment options turn out to be valuable. In this sense, convertibles can be seen as the most cost‐effective solution to a sequential financing problem‐how to fund not only today's activities, but also tomorrow's growth opportunities (some of them not yet even foreseeable). For companies with real options, the ability of convertibles to match capital inflows with corporate outlays adds value by minimizing two sets of costs: those associated with having too much (particularly equity) capital (known as “agency costs of free cash flow”) and those associated with having too little (“new issue” costs). The key to the cost‐effectiveness of convertibles in funding real options is the call provision. Provided the stock price is “in the money” (and the call protection period is over), the call gives managers the option to force conversion of the bonds into equity. If and when the company's investment opportunity materializes, exercise of the call feature gives the firm an infusion of new equity (while eliminating the debt service burden associated with the convertible) that enables it to carry out its new investment plan. Consistent with this argument, the author's recent study of the investment and financing activities of 289 companies around the time of convertible calls reports significant increases in capital expenditures starting in the year of the call and extending three years after. The companies also showed increased financing activity following the call, mainly new long‐term debt issues (many of them also convertibles) in the year of the call.     

Self‐Funding of Health‐Care Plans by Small Firms: Risks and Reforms

Small employers that offer health insurance have usually offered fully insured products through traditional health plans. Recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has created new requirements for fully insured products that will entice more small firms to fund their own health‐care benefits. However, self‐funding poses significant risks to these small firms, their employees, and state exchanges. To mitigate some of these risks within current political realities, we recommend advance disclosures—to small firms of material changes in their stop‐loss policies, and to their employees that premium subsidies are available only on ACA exchanges. We also suggest strengthening Small Business Health Options Program exchanges by broadening the availability of subsidies and building partnerships with brokers. Finally, we recommend an expanded role for brokers and third‐party administrators in helping small firms improve their choice of health‐care insurance.     

Price Discovery in Near‐ and Away‐from‐the‐Money Option Markets

This paper examines the relative price discovery roles of near‐ and away‐from‐the‐money option markets. The evidence shows that, when considering multiple options with different strike prices jointly, option markets have an average information share of 17.6%. However, no individual option market dominates in the price discovery process, higher and lower trading activity options (i.e., near‐ and away‐from‐the‐money options, respectively) each contribute approximately equally to this process. The main implications of these results are that (1) collectively, option markets process a substantial amount of new stock price‐related information, and (2) looking across strike prices, option markets appear to be informationally nonredundant.     

Stock Options and the Corporate Demand for Insurance

This article shows that a corporate manager compensated in stock options makes corporate decisions to maximize stock option value. Overinvestment is a consequence if risk increases with investment. Facing the choice of hedging corporate risk with forward contracts on a stock market index fund and insuring pure risks the manager will choose the latter. Hedging with forwards reduces weight in both tails of corporate payoff distribution and thus reduces option value. Insuring pure risks reduces the weight in the left tail where the options are out‐of‐the‐money and increases the weight in the right tail where the options are in‐the‐money; the effect is an increase in the option value. Insurance reduces the overinvestment problem but no level of insurance coverage can reduce investment to that which maximizes the shareholder value.     

VALUATION OF EVENT‐CONTINGENT OPTIONS

I study a new class of investment options, event‐contingent options. These are options to invest and divest in projects that are dependent on other projects of the same firm or that are conditioned by projects of other firms in its value chain. I construct payoff functions and derive closed‐form solutions for the value of options to invest contingent on investment (OICI), options to invest contingent on divestment (OICD), options to divest contingent on divestment (ODCD), and options to divest contingent on investment (ODCI). I also derive analytical comparative statics for these option valuation equations and examine their implications on the firm's wealth. I offer examples of event‐contingent options in a global context.     

Real options maximizing survival probability under incomplete markets

By integrating the survival problem into the theory of real option valuation under incomplete markets, we analyze an entrepreneurial firm's optimal survival probability and the joint decisions of business investments and portfolio choices when the business investment opportunity has undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks. Based on the theory of stochastic control, we derive the semi-closed-form solutions for the firm's optimal survival probability, its investment thresholds and the implied option value. The results show that the goal of maximizing the survival probability greatly changes the entrepreneur's business investment strategies, the pattern of asset allocation and the correlation between the option value and the project risks. The comparative statics analysis shows that public authorities should subsidize entrepreneurs and maintain stabile financial markets in order to encourage entrepreneurship.     

Competition and risk‐taking in investment banking

How does competition affect the investment banking business and the risks individual institutions are exposed to? Using a large sample of investment banks operating in seven developed economies over 1997–2014, we apply a panel VAR model to examine the relationships between competition and risk without assuming any a priori restrictions. Our main finding is that investment banks’ higher risk exposure, measured as a long‐term capital‐at‐risk and return volatility, was facilitated by greater competitive pressures for both boutique investment banks and full‐service investment banks. Overall, we find some evidence that more competition leads to more fragility before and during the recent financial crisis.     

On‐the‐Job Learning and News‐Driven Business Cycles

This paper proposes a new channel of on‐the‐job learning to explain the positive comovement between consumption and employment following good news about future productivity. The new recruits can generate an additional stream of output production in all future periods, and the firm's labor demand is thus characterized by the forward‐looking property. Therefore, the firm is motivated to hire more new recruits in advance in response to good news about future productivity. Once the increase in labor demand is greater than the decrease in labor supply caused by the income effect, the coincident rise in consumption and employment can be driven by the news shock. When such a channel is paired with investment adjustment costs and the endogenous capacity utilization rate, this paper provides a plausible explanation for simultaneous booms in current consumption, investment, output, and employment to match the empirical evidence under the news shock.     

Fails‐to‐Deliver before and after the Implementation of Rule 203 and Rule 204

We study the determinants of fails‐to‐deliver in the period before and after the implementation of Rule 203 (elimination of option market maker exception from the locate and close‐out requirement) and Rule 204 (t+3 close‐out rule) in September 2008. We find a positive relation between short selling and fails‐to‐deliver that weakens after the implementation of these rules. Fails‐to‐deliver are higher for stocks with low institutional ownership, low book‐to‐market, small market capitalization, high turnover, and put option availability. The relation between short selling and these measures of borrowing costs is also weaker after the implementation of these rules.