Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

Bank Exposure to Interest Rate Risks During Financial Liberalization: Evidence from South Korea

This study documents the changing impact of long and short term interest rate risks on the equity prices of banks in South Korea during the process of financial liberalization. Consistent with the presence of regulatory constraints, Korean bank equity returns are found to be sensitive to both anticipated and unanticipated changes in interest rates in the first period (1976-81) when banks were largely under government control. However, during our last period (1989-99) of liberalization, Korean bank equity returns were found to have a positive association only with unanticipated short-term interest rates. Consistent with the ability to manage other interest rate risks successfully, in this last liberalization period, Korean bank equity returns had no association with long-term or with anticipated short-term interest rates. In view of the continued interest in banking and financial market liberalization among many Asian, African, and formerly socialist countries including China, these results should be of much banking and policy interest. JEL Classifications: G21, G28, E44, L89     

Delayed Expected Loss Recognition and the Risk Profile of Banks

This paper investigates the extent to which delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR) is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to three distinct dimensions of risk: (1) stock market liquidity risk, (2) downside tail risk of individual banks, and (3) codependence of downside tail risk among banks. We hypothesize that DELR increases vulnerability to downside risk by creating expected loss overhangs that threaten future capital adequacy and by degrading bank transparency, which increases financing frictions and opportunities for risk‐shifting. We find that DELR is associated with higher correlations between bank‐level illiquidity and both aggregate banking sector illiquidity and market returns (i.e., higher liquidity risks) during recessions, suggesting that high DELR banks as a group may simultaneously face elevated financing frictions and enhanced opportunities for risk‐shifting behavior in crisis periods. With respect to downside risk, we find that during recessions DELR is associated with significantly higher risk of individual banks suffering severe drops in their equity values, where this association is magnified for banks with low capital levels. Consistent with increased systemic risk, we find that DELR is associated with significantly higher codependence between downside risk of individual banks and downside risk of the banking sector. We theorize that downside risk vulnerability at the individual bank level can translate into systemic risk by virtue of DELR creating a common source of risk vulnerability across high DELR banks simultaneously, which leads to risk codependence among banks and systemic effects from banks acting as part of a herd.     

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract:   This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

Bank portfolio exposure to emerging markets and its effects on bank market value

This study estimates a model of banking company equity returns taking into consideration book value and market value measures of their exposure to emerging markets debt. In this estimation, general systematic market factors, such as the rate of return on the S&P500 stock index and yields on a constant maturity 5-year Treasury note, are held constant such that the exposure variables are accounting for effects due to banks’ exposure to emerging market debt. The results, although not uniform among banking companies, support the hypothesis that the extent of exposure to emerging market debt are factored into the valuation of banking company equity contemporaneously. The inclusion of a market value indicator adds to the explanation of equity returns of some banks. It is also clear that knowing the extent of the exposure on a book value basis is important information alone that may allow investors to take account of or evaluate the effects of changes in banking company equity valuation from LDC debt exposures. We also perform an event study for three major debt crises to determine whether the market recognizes the effects of these events on bank valuation. The event study results show that there is little information from identifying the time period of the crises on banking company equity returns. Explanations for this are that the information of these possible crises has been embedded in bank changes in exposure and that the market valuation of the emerging market debt is already accounted for by our model.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Interest rate risk of German financial institutions: the impact of level,slope, and curvature of the term structure

We investigate here the sensitivity of the equity values of a large sample of German financial institutions to movements in the term structure of interest rates. While similar approaches rely on a single interest rate factor only, we quantify the exposure to changes in level, slope, and curvature, which are the driving factors of term structure changes. Our main findings are: (i) banks and insurances are exposed to level and curvature changes but only marginally to slope movements; (ii) the interest rate risk exposure depends on the banking sector investigated; (iii) level and curvature changes are priced in the cross-section of stock returns.

Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns

The largest commercial bank stocks, ranked by total size of the balance sheet, have significantly lower risk‐adjusted returns than small‐ and medium‐sized bank stocks, even though large banks are significantly more levered. We uncover a size factor in the component of bank returns that is orthogonal to the standard risk factors, including small minus big, which has the right covariance with bank returns to explain the average risk‐adjusted returns. This factor measures size‐dependent exposure to bank‐specific tail risk. These findings are consistent with government guarantees that protect shareholders of large banks, but not small banks, in disaster states.     

Does cyber tech spending matter for bank stability?

CyberTech has drawn academic attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) as banks were forced to embrace CyberTech more aggressively to cope with market competition after the crisis. Banks can improve their operational efficiency and quality of service by relying on CyberTech, but they become more vulnerable to cybersecurity. Thus, increasing investment in CyberTech becomes a strategic necessity for banks to combat cybersecurity hazards. The study investigates how disruptive digital transformation affects bank stability. In particular, it examines whether the law of diminishing marginal returns from overspending on CyberTech affects bank stability. Based on a global sample from 43 countries, we find that an increase in CyberTech spending above the threshold level adversely affects the stability of banks. The main reason behind the adverse effect of CyberTech spending on the stability of banks is that banks take more than the proportional risk for every dollar they spend on disruptive CyberTech after they cross a threshold level of spending. While results persist across sub-samples, our results indicate two important channels of technological regimes – a diminishing returns regime and an increasing returns regime. The diminishing returns regime improves bank stability through more aggressive spending on technology, and the increasing returns regime makes banks more unstable due to excess spending on disruptive CyberTech. The study has implications for cybersecurity and sustainable CyberTech spending for banks.     

The market price of risk of the variance term structure

In this paper I examine the market price of risk of the variance term structure. To this end, the S&P 500 option implied variance term structure is used as a proxy for aggregate variance risk. Principal component analysis shows that time variation in the variance term structure over the 1996–2012 period can be explained mainly by two factors which capture changes in the level and slope. The market price of risk of each factor is estimated in the cross-section of stock returns. The slope of the variance term structure is the most significant factor in the cross-section of stocks returns and carries a negative risk premium. The slope factor has also some predictive ability over long horizon equity returns.     

EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS

We investigate the reaction of bank equity returns to changes in the relevant Federal Reserve (Fed) policy tool, which is the federal funds rate during periods of interest rate targeting and the discount rate during periods of reserves targeting. Three policy periods from 1974 to 1996 are investigated. We find that bank equity returns are inversely related to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool and that the degree of sensitivity of bank equity returns is conditioned on the direction of the change in the Fed policy tool. Also, we find that values of larger commercial banks and low‐capital‐ratio commercial banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14.     

Return Dependence and the Limits of Product Diversification in Financial Firms

Copula‐GARCH models indicate dependence between bank returns and those to insurance underwriting, securities brokerage, and mortgage finance increased during the recent crisis. In contrast, dependence between banks and the broader market was little changed. The crisis‐related jump in return dependence within the financial services sector was greatest for banks that had previously appeared the most independent. Larger banks were also especially prone to increased dependence. These findings raise doubts about the ability of financial conglomerates to diversify effectively and highlight the need for policy progress in methods for resolving such institutions should they become illiquid or insolvent.     

Liquidity Provision,Bank Capital,and the Macroeconomy

New bank equity must come from somewhere. In general equilibrium, raising bank capital requirements means either that banks produce less short‐term debt (as debt holders must become shareholders), or short‐term debt is not reduced and the banking system acquires nonbank equity (as the shareholders in nonbanks become shareholders in banks). The welfare effects involve a trade‐off because bank debt is special as it is used for transactions purposes, but more bank capital can reduce the chance of bank failure (producing welfare losses).     

Working for the enemy? The impact of investment banker job changes on deal flow

This paper examines the impact of job changes by prominent investment bankers on the M&A and equity market shares of investment banks. Using a hand-collected sample of job changes between 1998 and 2006, we find that after controlling for deal and bank-level characteristics, hiring a banker from an investment bank with a more prominent industry presence has a positive impact on both equity and M&A market share for the gaining bank and a negative impact on the losing bank's M&A market share. After the banker switches firms, we find a significant amount of business following the banker from the losing bank to the gaining bank, particularly when the relationship is strong between the client firm and the banker. Abnormal returns around the announcement of a banker changing employers are positive and significant for the gaining bank, suggesting that the market views banker additions as value increasing. Overall, our results suggest human capital is a critical component of investment banking deal flow.     

Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

International Propagation of the Credit Crisis: Lessons for Bank Regulation*

The authors use a large sample of non‐U.S. banks to examine the origins and spread of the 2007–2009 crisis. Using both stock market and structural variables, they test whether the effects of the crisis on individual banks are better explained by crisis models or by the VaR‐type analysis of the Basel system. The latter emphasizes risk weightings for individual assets while ignoring linkages that could leave banks exposed to systemic shocks. Consistent with crisis models, the authors find that a small set of pre‐crisis measures of a bank's international linkages, leverage, and the fragility of its liability structure does a good job of discriminating between banks that suffered a large impact and those that did not. (Indeed, these measures explain almost 50% of the differences among banks' stock returns during the crisis period, and almost 40% of the changes in the variability of those returns.) The authors also provide evidence of both a direct linkage among banks' stock returns and an indirect linkage that could reflect either linkages in the real economy or common demands by investors for liquidity. The authors run a “horse race” that demonstrates that simple measures of book leverage were better predictors of bank performance than the Basel capital ratios. They find that banks with lower Basel risk weightings prior to the crisis proved, on average, to be more exposed to the crisis. The authors' explanation is that banks with lower Basel risk measures tended to operate with higher leverage and more aggressive funding strategies, which in turn exposed them to greater crisis risk (even as they conformed to the letter of the Basel system in terms of asset risk measures). Finally, the authors find no evidence that substandard governance was a separate contributing factor to crisis exposure. Banks with substantial international business that were exposed to systemic shocks had high governance scores.     

新会计准则下银行资产分类会计选择的理论建模

2007年1月1日起实施的新会计准则对商业银行最重要的影响在于资产分类方面的新规定。新准则规定基于管理者持有该证券的动机和是否具有持有到期的能力对金融资产分类。资产分类的不同决定着市场价值变化对盈利水平和银行权益的影响。本文考虑新会计准则对银行资产分类的可能影响,设计了一个债券类产品和贷款,根据投资者效用和动机研究银行的资产分类决策,对银行考虑新会计准则对其影响时的资产分类决策建模。模型的解表明,风险中性的银行权衡流动性需求、权益稳定、资产收益几个方面决定其金融资产的分类,而银行收益和股东价值仍主要取决于银行的投资战略和对市场的预期,对资产分类规定的变化不会影响银行的实际收益,但短期银行会考虑其流动性需求和监管资本的稳定性,来决定银行的分类决策。