Wer trägt das Terrorrisiko?

This article deals with insuring terrorism risks and it focuses on the situation in Germany after the events of September 11^th 2001. After a brief introduction to the general problems of insuring against terrorism the authors explore how terrorism affects different lines of insurance business in Germany and examine Extremus, the German specialist insurer with government backing for insuring property risks against terrorism. A thorough analysis of different aspects of risk transfer follows. This analysis also addresses different pricing strategies for insuring against terrorism. In this section the authors focus on the question to what extend one can really speak of a risk transfer through insurance in respect to terrorism. Scenarios are developed of how large losses would affect the insurance industry as well as the customers. In regard to those scenarios it becomes visible that the risk transfer from the policyholder to the insurer is not complete.In their conclusion the authors examine some scenarios of increased and decreased terrorist activity and the effects that each of these scenarios will have on the solution of insuring against terrorism through Extremus.     

Risk and Regulation in Derivatives (or Why Derivatives Are a Blessing,Not a Curse)

In this article, first published in 1994, the authors aimed to defuse the widespread hysteria about derivatives fueled by media accounts (like Fortune magazine's cover story in the same year) by offering a systematic analysis of the risks to companies, investors, and the entire financial system associated with the operation of the relatively new derivatives markets. Such analysis ended up providing assurances like the following:

• As long as most companies are using derivatives mainly to limit their financial exposures and not to enlarge them in efforts to pad their operating profits, reported losses on derivatives should not be a matter for concern. “Complaining about losses on a swap used to hedge a firm's exposure,” as the authors note, “is like objecting to the costs of a fire insurance policy if the building doesn't burn down.”
• To the extent that companies are using derivatives to hedge—and what evidence we have suggests that most are—the default risk of derivatives has been greatly exaggerated. An interest rate swap used by a B‐rated company to hedge a large exposure to interest rates will generally have significantly less default risk than a AAA‐rated corporate bond issue.
• Thanks to the corporate use of derivatives, much of the impact of economic shocks such as spikes in interest rates or oil prices is being transferred away from the hedging companies to investors and other companies better able to absorb them. And in this fashion, defaults in the economy as a whole, and hence systemic risk, are effectively being reduced, not increased, through the operation of the derivatives markets.

Moreover, the authors warn in closing that the likely effect of then proposed derivatives regulation would be to restrict access to and increase the costs to companies of using derivatives markets. As one example, the excessive capital requirements associated with derivatives facing bank dealers—based on gross rather than net measures of exposure—and which regulators have since proposed extending to nonbank dealers—were expected to have the unintended effect of encouraging dealers to sell precisely the kinds of riskier, leveraged derivatives that Bankers Trust sold Procter & Gamble, and that functioned as Exhibit A in the Fortune article.     

An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility

In summarizing the findings of their recent study, the authors report findings that suggest that not all socially responsible corporate policies are likely to have the same effect on a company's ownership and value. Using environmental policy as their proxy for CSR activities, the authors classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (1) actions that reduce the likelihood of harmful outcomes by reducing the corporate exposure to environmental risk; and (2) actions that enhance companies' perceived ‘greenness’ through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Although both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially beneficial, corporate expenditures that reduce a firm's environmental risk exposure are more likely to benefit shareholders by limiting the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, and fines—and possibly thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. By contrast, corporate expenditures that enhance the firm's perceived greenness by going beyond legal requirements and risk management rationales could actually reduce shareholder value. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that institutional investors tend to own smaller than average percentages of both companies the authors identify as ‘toxic’ and make limited efforts to manage their environmental risk, and companies they label ‘green’ with low environmental risk exposure but relatively high CSR spending on the environment. At the same time, such investors hold larger‐than‐average positions in ‘neutral’ companies with relatively low, or effectively managed, environmental risk exposures and limited investment in ‘greenness’ programs. The authors also find that both toxic and green companies have lower (Tobin's Q) valuations than neutral companies, and that otherwise toxic companies that effectively manage their environmental risk exposures have higher valuations.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Session Ii: Capitalism and Social Insurance

In what Jeff Gordon describes as “the great risk shift,” large U.S. companies have responded during the last 50 years to the forces of globalization and increased pressure from investors by transferring the risks associated with product and worker obsolescence from their shareholders to their employees. Layoffs have generally meant very large, if not complete, losses of “firm‐specific investments” by displaced employees. And the problem is especially troubling in the U.S., where the employees of large companies lose not only their jobs and income streams, but also often their connection to their social network, to the entire system of social welfare and insurance that tends to be provided by large companies and the workplace. While applauding corporate retraining programs, Gordon suggests that individual company efforts are likely to be overwhelmed by the demand for such services. The solution accordingly lies in the form of government‐provided social insurance—in programs that, whether orchestrated and funded at the state or federal level, provide the most cost‐effective government “match” designed to ensure the preservation of human potential and lifetime earnings power of employees.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

The effect of information disclosure on demand for high‐load insurance

Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high‐load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive‐compatible insurance demand experiment, in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most commonly suggested disclosures affect insurance demand, disclosing either (1) the true probability of loss, (2) the contract's expected loss, or (3) the insurer's profit on the transaction. Similar to consumers in naturally occurring insurance markets, subjects in the laboratory demonstrate significant demand for high‐load insurance against modest stakes. However, we find no effect of any of the three disclosure treatments on subjects' insurance choices. We discuss the implications of our results for possible public policy initiatives in insurance markets.     

Corporate Risks and Property Insurance: Evidence From the People's Republic of China

Using panel data (1997–1999) for 235 publicly listed companies in the People's Republic of China, this study empirically tests the linkage between corporate risks and the decision to purchase property insurance and its financial extent. To achieve these objectives, we first estimate a probit insurance participation decision model and then a fixed‐effects insurance volume decision model with Heckman's sample selection correction. Our results indicate that the managerial decision to purchase property insurance is positively related to company size and insolvency risks. By contrast, the amount of property insurance purchased is positively related to systematic risks but negatively related to insolvency and unsystematic risks and company size. We find that the amount of property insurance used by Chinese companies can also be affected by other factors (e.g., the cash flow constraints). In addition, the decision to purchase property insurance and the financial extent to which it is used varies among Chinese companies according to their geographical location. However, state ownership does not appear to be an important determinant of the purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly listed companies.     

Pricing and Capital Allocation for Multiline Insurance Firms

We study multiline insurance companies with limited liability. Insurance premiums are determined by no‐arbitrage principles. The results are developed under the realistic assumption that the losses created by insurer default are allocated among policyholders following an ex post, pro rata, sharing rule. In general, the ratio of default costs to expected claims, and thus the ratio of premiums to expected claims, vary across insurance lines. Moreover, capital and related costs are allocated across lines in proportion to each line's share of a digital default option on the insurer. Our results expand and generalize those derived elsewhere in the literature.     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Liquidity,the Value of the Firm,and Corporate Finance

The theory of corporate finance has been based on the idea that a company's market value is determined mainly by just two variables: the company's expected after‐tax operating cash flows or earnings, and the risk associated with producing them. The authors argue that there is another important factor affecting a company's value: the liquidity of its own securities, debt as well as equity. The paper supports this argument by reviewing the large and growing body of evidence showing that differences—and changes—in liquidity can have major effects on the pricing of corporate stocks and bonds or, equivalently, on investors' required returns for holding them. The authors also suggest that the liquidity of a company's securities can be managed by corporate policies and actions. For those companies whose value is likely to be increased by having more liquid securities—which is by no means true of all companies (mature firms that don't need outside capital may well benefit from having more concentrated ownership and hence less liquidity)—management should consider actions such as reducing leverage and substituting dividends for stock repurchases as well as measures designed to increase the effectiveness of their disclosure and investor relations program and the size of their investor base.     

The use of Hurst and effective return in investing

This study measures the deposit insurance premium under stochastic interest rates for Taiwan's banks by applying the two-step maximum likelihood estimation method. The estimation results suggest that the current premiums—charging 5, 5.5, and 6 basis points per dollar of insured deposits—are too low, but largely reflect the rank orders of the risks of the insured banks. Moreover, the regression results indicate that asset volatility dominates bank size in determining the insurance premium. When the volatility risk is decomposed into two parts, credit risk significantly dominates interest-rate risk. An examination of bank characteristics indicates that privately owned old banks are more likely to have lower levels of credit risk, asset volatility, and deposit insurance premiums than state-owned banks and newly chartered banks.     

Defeasing Legacy Costs*

The authors propose a new way to defease the legacy costs of America's defined benefit pension system that will help ensure its viability. The proposal would allow companies to exchange their legacy pension debt for another liability with more attractive terms—to the benefit of the sponsor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and the plan participants. The transparency gained by separating the past from future liabilities will give better insight into sponsors' balance sheets. And it could take the PBGC out of the impossible position of insuring against events over which the insured have considerable control.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

The effect of corporate social responsibility on the branding of financial services

In today's global world, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasing public demand for greater transparency from multinational companies. CSR is a new and growing financial risk factor. If it is mismanaged, a firm's corporate reputation can be badly damaged and a direct negative impact on its business and bottom-line may result. Instead of simply campaigning directly against industrial groups and lobbying governments and international organisations to issue new legislation, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are increasingly putting pressure on the financial services groups and insurance companies. This new global tactic may affect a bank's relationship with its clients and shareholders.There are market benefits and competitive advantages for those companies whose business policies integrate CSR. The growth in socially responsible investments and in CSR awareness among City people persuades some bankers that the most successful firms of the future will be those who proactively balance short-term financial goals with long-term sustainable franchise building. To respond to this challenge, corporations will have to convince citizens they can trust both their brands and the people behind them. In this context, one must recognise that finance brands have been clumsily managed. Nowadays, several big consumer brands are used as societal role models, but they are also the targets of anti-globalisation and anti-logo activists. In order to avoid such an outcome — not to mention corporate mortification — the key social marketing strategy must be to communicate proactively the business activity's raison d'être to opinion leaders and the general public. In general, industry does not yet care enough and many companies are reacting only when put under pressure by public opinion. It is time, however, to market the social raison d'être of a business and indeed to contest its current exclusion from ‘civil society’. Consumer and service sectors lead the field. In view of the downturn of the global economy, more than ever before, CSR branding is of paramount importance to the financial sector if bankers do not want to become the easy scapegoats. It is necessary to make it clear that financial services companies are global citizens too.     

Insurance-adjusted valuation,decision making,and capital return

Although the insurance industry has a significant economic role, few theoretical studies link insurance with the overlapping generations economy. This study suggests a new overlapping generations model that includes insurance in the agents' economic decisions under the uncertainty of financial losses. In this insurance model, we derive risk-averse workers' optimal insurance purchases and consumption based on the insurance-adjusted valuations, which are the present value of the income streams minus insurance premiums paid in the future. The theoretical equilibrium model predicts capital returns, wealth, labor supply, etc. Our findings show that higher workforce and technological progress increase private insurance demand and reduce the capital-output ratio, and higher losses as a fraction of output increase social insurance demand and reduce the capital-output ratio via numerical comparative statics.     

Liquidity,the Value of the Firm,and Corporate Finance*

The theory of corporate finance has been based on the idea that a company's market value is determined mainly by just two variables: the company's expected aftertax operating cash flows or earnings, and the risk associated with producing them. The authors argue that there is another important factor affecting a company's value: the liquidity of its own securities, debt as well as equity. The paper supports this argument by reviewing the large and growing body of evidence showing that differences—and, perhaps even more important, sudden changes—in liquidity can have major effects on the pricing of corporate stocks and bonds or, equivalently, on investors' required returns for holding them. The authors also suggest that the liquidity of a company's securities can be managed by corporate policies and actions. For those companies whose value is likely to be increased by having more liquid securities—which is by no means true of all companies (for example, mature firms with little need for outside equity are likely to benefit from having more concentrated ownership and hence less liquidity)—management should consider actions such as reducing leverage and substituting dividends for stock repurchases as well as measures designed to increase the effectiveness of their disclosure and investor relations program and the size of their retail investor base.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

International Insurance Society Roundtable on Risk Management After the Crisis

In this roundtable, an adviser to several central banks and founding member of the Group of 30 discusses regulatory reform and corporate risk management strategies with senior executives from three of the world's largest insurance companies. Much of the discussion attempts to explain why insurance and reinsurance companies have proven less vulnerable to the crisis than commercial and investment banks. Part of the explanation has to do with their financial conservatism, which is attributed to a habitual tendency to decision‐making that gives heavy weight to long‐term probabilities and risks. But along with this “actuarial” cast of mind is a growing willingness to accept and make use of risk‐based capital requirements—a decision‐making framework that is, in some respects, in conflict with the accounting and regulatory capital conventions that still prevail in the industry. In particular, “Solvency II”—the risk‐based capital guidelines that are set for adoption in 2012 by insurers in the European Union—is held up as a possible model for global use.     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.