Pricing fixed rate mortgages: Some empirical evidence

We develop a simple model based on the hypothesis that yields in the secondary mortgage market provide a basis for pricing new loans in the primary mortgage market. The model is then expanded to include potential interest rate variations due to lender characteristics and whether the loans meet securitization requirements. The empirical results, using a two-year sample of single-family mortgage rates, conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, we find that the interest rates on FRMs in the primary market move in a one-to-one relationship with secondary market yields. We also find significantly lower interest rates on these mortgages that can be sold in the secondary market versus those that cannot, thus indicating the value of the ability to securitize mortgages.     

Adverse selection in mortgage securitization

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.     

A comparative study of the probability of default for global financial firms

This article presents a modification of Merton’s (1976) ruin option pricing model to estimate the implied probability of default from stock and option market prices. To test the model, we analyze all global financial firms with traded options in the US and focus on the subprime mortgage crisis period. We compare the performance of the implied probability of default from our model to the expected default frequencies based on the Moody’s KMV model and agency credit ratings by constructing cumulative accuracy profiles (CAP) and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). We find that the probability of default estimates from our model are equal or superior to other credit risk measures studied based on CAP and ROC. In particular, during the subprime crisis our model surpassed credit ratings and matched or exceeded KMV in anticipating the magnitude of the crisis. We have also found some initial evidence that adding off-balance-sheet derivatives exposure improves the performance of the KMV model.     

Ratings Competition in the CMBS Market

We consider the relationship between competition among credit rating agencies and the ratings of commercial mortgage‐backed securities (CMBS) using data from 2002 to 2007. We characterize competition using Fitch's aggregate share of CMBS ratings and a measure of Fitch's deal‐specific market share constructed as the probability of Fitch being hired for a specific transaction. Controlling for deal characteristics, we find that subordination levels were lower when Fitch's aggregate and deal‐specific market shares were higher, which suggests that ratings competition yielded less stringent ratings when Fitch was a more significant competitor, although this effect dissipates when Fitch's market shares were high.     

MARKET TIMING IN REGRESSIONS AND REALITY

We compare price‐to‐earnings ratios and dividend yields, which are indirect measures of sentiment, with the bullish sentiment index, which is a direct measure. We find that the sentiment index does better as a market‐timing tool than do P/E ratios and dividend yields, but none is very reliable. We do not argue that market timing is impossible. Rather, we observe that stock prices reflect both sentiment and value, both of which are difficult to measure and neither of which is perfectly known in foresight. Successful market timing requires insights into future sentiment and value, insights beyond those that are reflected in widely available measures.     

Looking Beyond Credit Ratings: Factors Investors Consider In Pricing European Asset‐Backed Securities

In this paper, we empirically investigate what credit factors investors rely upon when pricing the spread at issue for European asset‐backed securities. More specifically, we investigate how credit factors affect new issuance spreads after taking into account credit rating. We do so by investigating primary market spreads for tranches of non‐mortgage‐related asset‐backed securities issued from 1999 to the year prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, 2007. We find that although credit ratings play a major role in determining spreads, investors appear to not rely exclusively on these ratings. Our findings strongly suggest that investors do not ignore other credit factors beyond the assigned credit rating.     

The Integration of Mortgage and Capital Markets in Emerging Economies—Evidence from South Africa

Integration of the capital and mortgage markets is an important step in moving emerging countries toward full economic development. With data from South Africa, this research examines the incremental contribution of deregulation and the secondary mortgage market to the integration between the mortgage and capital markets. With deregulation occurring in the early 1980s, the results indicate that the two markets were fully integrated prior to 2001 when a secondary mortgage market was introduced in South Africa. However, we also find that the introduction of the secondary mortgage market has significantly reduced constraints on the supply of mortgage credit.     

Fails‐to‐Deliver before and after the Implementation of Rule 203 and Rule 204

We study the determinants of fails‐to‐deliver in the period before and after the implementation of Rule 203 (elimination of option market maker exception from the locate and close‐out requirement) and Rule 204 (t+3 close‐out rule) in September 2008. We find a positive relation between short selling and fails‐to‐deliver that weakens after the implementation of these rules. Fails‐to‐deliver are higher for stocks with low institutional ownership, low book‐to‐market, small market capitalization, high turnover, and put option availability. The relation between short selling and these measures of borrowing costs is also weaker after the implementation of these rules.     

CMBS Subordination,Ratings Inflation,and Regulatory‐Capital Arbitrage

Using detailed origination and performance data on a comprehensive sample of commercial mortgage‐backed security (CMBS) deals, along with their underlying loans and a set of similarly rated residential mortgage‐backed securities (RMBS), we apply reduced‐form and structural modeling strategies to test for regulatory‐capital arbitrage and ratings inflation in the CMBS market. We find that the spread between CMBS and corporate‐bond yields fell significantly for ratings AA and AAA after a loosening of capital requirements for highly rated CMBS in 2002, whereas no comparable drop occurred for lower rated bonds (which experienced no similar regulatory change). We also find that CMBS rated below AA upgraded to AA or AAA significantly faster than comparable RMBS (for which there was no change in risk‐based capital requirements). We use a structural model to investigate these results in more detail and find that little else changed in the CMBS market over this period except for the rating agencies' persistent reductions in subordination levels between 1997 and late 2007. Indeed, had the 2005 vintage CMBS used the subordination levels from 2000, there would have been no losses to the senior bonds in most CMBS structures.     

ESTIMATING EXPECTED EXCESS RETURNS USING HISTORICAL AND OPTION‐IMPLIED VOLATILITY

We test the relation between expected and realized excess returns for the S&P 500 index from January 1994 through December 2003 using the proportional reward‐to‐risk measure to estimate expected returns. When risk is measured by historical volatility, we find no relation between expected and realized excess returns. In contrast, when risk is measured by option‐implied volatility, we find a positive and significant relation between expected and realized excess returns in the 1994–1998 subperiod. In the 1999–2003 subperiod, the option‐implied volatility risk measure yields a positive, but statistically insignificant, risk‐return relation. We attribute this performance difference to the fact that, in the 1994–1998 subperiod, return volatility was lower and the average return was much higher than in the 1999–2003 subperiod, thereby increasing the signal‐to‐noise ratio in the latter subperiod.     

Is there price discovery in equity options?

We use tick-by-tick quote data for 39 liquid US stocks and options on them, and we focus on events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation is inconsistent with the actual stock price. Option market quotes adjust to eliminate the disagreement, while the stock market quotes behave normally, as if there were no disagreement. The disagreement events are typically precipitated by stock price movements and display signed option volume in the direction that tends to eliminate the disagreements. These results show that option price quotes do not contain economically significant information about future stock prices beyond what is already reflected in current stock prices, i.e., no economically significant price discovery occurs in the option market. We also find no option market price discovery using a much larger sample of disagreement events based on a weaker definition of a disagreement, which verifies that the findings for the primary sample are not due to unusual or unrepresentative market behavior during the put-call parity violations.     

GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and Secondary Market Activities

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize mortgages and issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In addition, the GSEs are active participants in the secondary mortgage market on behalf of their own investment portfolios. Because these portfolios have grown quite large, portfolio purchases (in addition to MBS issuance) are often thought to be an important force in the mortgage market. Using monthly data from 1993 to 2005 we estimate a VAR model of the relationship between GSE secondary market activities and mortgage interest rate spreads. We find that GSE portfolio purchases have no significant effects on either primary or secondary mortgage rate spreads. Further, we examine GSE activities and mortgage rate spreads in the wake of the 1998 debt crisis, and find that GSE portfolio purchases did little to affect mortgage rates. This empirical finding is robust to alternative identification assumptions and to alternative model and variable specifications.      

The Impact of the 2007 Liquidity Shock on Bank Jumbo Mortgage Lending

This paper explores the consequences of the collapse of the private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities market in 2007 on banks’ originations of jumbo mortgages. We show that jumbo lending declined by more at banks that were more dependent on this market and were less well capitalized. In contrast, banks that had little dependence on this market and were well capitalized increased jumbo originations. These findings highlight how dependence on the secondary market may cause amplification of financial shocks, and the potential value of capital requirements that are higher during periods of economic growth in mitigating the amplification effects.     

Loss given default of high loan-to-value residential mortgages

This paper studies loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high loan-to-value residential mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that loss given default can largely be explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, and the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. We find that the current loan-to-value ratio is the single most important determinant. More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions. These findings have important policy implications for several key issues in Basel II implementation.     

Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper examines two forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs, and (2) the adoption of revised risk-based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). We argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence reduce their charter values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two companies. This last consequence warrants greater supervisory awareness and legal authorities.     

DO INSIDERS PRACTICE WHAT THEY PREACH? INFORMED OPTION EXERCISES AROUND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

We examine executive stock option exercises around a sample of merger and acquisition announcements between 1996 and 2006, focusing on a subset we identify as potentially informed. For stock‐financed acquisitions, we find a surge in informed exercises by acquirer insiders in the year leading up to the acquisition announcement, but target insiders display no similar increase. We find the market reaction upon the announcement for acquirers is negatively related to extreme early exercises and find some evidence of long‐run underperformance. Overall, our evidence indicates that insiders knowingly bid for firms when they personally believe their own firm is overvalued.     

Competition, interlisting and market structure in options trading

This paper applies a game theory approach to examine the effects of a market structure change in options trading from a monopoly to a Cournot-type oligopoly that occurred in two successive periods on the Montreal exchange. We analyze the intra-day behaviour of option bid-ask spreads and find that cross-listing has a differential impact on spreads, affecting quoted but not effective spreads under oligopoly. We also find that the impact of the change in structure on effective spreads comes mostly from an increase in limit orders and is consistent with a switch from Cournot to Bertrand-type strategic behaviour for such orders. We conclude that market structure effects within an options exchange are enough to realize most of the benefits of inter-market competition even in the context of market thinness.     

On the determinants of yield spreads between mortgage pass-through and Treasury securities

Yield spreads between mortgage pass-through and U.S. Treasury securities may reflect differences in taxation, phenomena affecting relative supply and demand, and compensation for default, call, and marketability risks on mortgage instruments. Our research empirically models differences in yields between pass-throughs and comparable-maturity Treasuries. We find that interest-rate volatility and the term structure of rates, factors often cited in the mortgage pricing literature as affecting the mortgage call premium, are the primary determinants of movements in these spreads. Moreover, these effects have grown in importance in recent years as exercise of the prepayment option has increased. We also find evidence that liquidity and credit concerns affect the pricing of pass-through securities.     

Asymmetric Volatility and Trading Activity in Index Futures Options

We examine the impact of option trading activity on implied volatility changes to returns in the index futures option market. Controlling for option moneyness, delta‐to‐option‐premium ratio, and liquidity, we find that net buying pressure, profit‐maximization behavior, and liquidity are interrelated and affect asymmetric responses of implied volatilities to returns. Implied volatilities of options with more liquidity, a higher exercise price, and a higher delta‐to‐option‐premium ratio have the most profound asymmetric response.     

VOLATILITY FORECASTS,TRADING VOLUME,AND THE ARCH VERSUS OPTION‐IMPLIED VOLATILITY TRADE‐OFF

We investigate empirically the role of trading volume (1) in predicting the relative informativeness of volatility forecasts produced by autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models versus the volatility forecasts derived from option prices, and (2) in improving volatility forecasts produced by ARCH and option models and combinations of models. Daily and monthly data are explored. We find that if trading volume was low during period t?1 relative to the recent past, ARCH is at least as important as options for forecasting future stock market volatility. Conversely, if volume was high during period t?1 relative to the recent past, option‐implied volatility is much more important than ARCH for forecasting future volatility. Considering relative trading volume as a proxy for changes in the set of information available to investors, our findings reveal an important switching role for trading volume between a volatility forecast that reflects relatively stale information (the historical ARCH estimate) and the option‐implied forward‐looking estimate.